



HISTORY OF EUROPE

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum ; quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ulæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello : odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus : et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—LIVY, lib. xxi.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM

THE COMMENCEMENT OF

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

TO THE

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN MDCCCXV


BY

ARCHIBALD ALISON, L.L.D.

F.R.S.E.

New Edition, with Portraits

VOL. VII.



WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MDCCCXLIX

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.

CONTENTS OF VOL. VII.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

§	Page
1. Importance of the subject,	1
2. Astonishing financial efforts of England during the war,	2
3. Historical details.—Public income before the Commonwealth. Large increase consequent on the Great Rebellion,	3
4. Permanent addition to them on the accession of William III.,	4
5. Reasons which led to the introduction of the national debt,	5
Corresponding increase of the expenditure of France on the accession of Louis Philippe,	note, 6
6. Progressive growth of the public debt during the succeeding century,	7
Table illustrating its increase,	note, 8
7. Alarming financial aspect of the country on Mr Pitt's accession to power in 1784,	9
8. Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing evils,	ib.
9. His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in parliament,	11
10. And his simultaneous adoption of measures for national defence,	12
11. Establishment of the sinking-fund, and Mr Pitt's speech on introducing it,	13
12. Mr Fox gives this plan his cordial support,	15
13. It is passed by the legislature, and made applicable to all future loans,	16
14. Modification introduced upon the system in 1802,	18
15. Immense results of the sinking-fund,	19
Table showing the progressive growth of the sinking-fund,	note, 20
16. Obloquy to which it became exposed,	20
17. General diffusion of this delusion,	21
18. Which is the more dangerous, as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error,	22
19. Comparison of the arguments for and against the sinking-fund,	23
Pitt clearly saw the objection since urged against the system,	note, 24
20. Value of the system in time of peace,	24
21. Distinctive merit of Mr Pitt's system for the sinking-fund,	26
22. Proof of these principles afforded by the result during the last twenty years,	27
23. It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt,	ib.
Durable and far-seeing system which he had established,	note, 28
24. Had it been adhered to, the whole debt would have been discharged in 1845,	29
Tables showing the progressive growth of a sinking-fund of fifteen or ten millions, from 1816 to 1836,	note, ib.

	Page
§	80
25. Causes which have led to the decay of this system, . . .	30
26. It was the desire for present popularity in the government, . . .	31
Table showing the amount of direct and indirect taxes repealed from 1816 to 1834,	note, 32
27. Great error in not repealing at once all the direct taxes on the peace, . . .	33
28. Imprudent remission of indirect taxes since 1816, . . .	34
29. Little good has been derived from this repeal of indirect taxes, . . .	35
30. Immense burdens under which the nation prospered during the war, . . .	36
31. Argument on this subject,	37
32. Great immediate as well as ultimate advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking-fund,	38
33. Beneficial result which would have arisen from keeping up the price of the funds,	ib.
34. Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects, . . .	39
35. Lord Castlereagh's error regarding the income-tax,	40
36. The nation was mainly responsible for this change of system,	41
37. Advantages of the funding system,	42
38. Its dangers,	43
39. Mr Pitt's views on this subject,	44
40. Modification which they received after the first Continental peace in 1797, . . .	45
41. Mr Pitt's speech on the change then introduced,	ib.
42. He proposes to augment the supplies raised within the year,	47
43. Trebling of the assessed taxes,	48
44. In Mr Pitt's view, these heavy burdens were to be temporary only,	ib.
45. Great change of system thus introduced,	49
46. First introduction of the income-tax,	50
47. Mr Pitt's speech introducing this impost, and his plan,	51
48. Objections urged against it,	52
49. It is adopted by parliament,	53
50. Change subsequently induced on the system,	54
51. Advantages of the new system,	55
52. Mr Pitt's permanent taxes were all in the indirect form: their advantages, . . .	56
53. Arguments for indirect taxation,	57
54. Reply to the objections against it,	58
55. Reasons of the superior lightness of indirect taxation,	59
56. Cases in which indirect taxes, by being excessive, become direct burdens on production,	60
57. Important difference between indirect taxes on rural and manufactured produce,	61
58. General character of Mr Pitt's financial measures. Their grandeur and foresight,	62
59. Their errors. Undue extent of the funding system,	63
60. Niggardly use of the military forces of England,	64
61. This was his great defect,	65
62. Injudicious system of borrowing in the three per cents,	66
63. Its effects in preventing the reduction of interest on peace,	67
64. The temporary diminution of interest was no adequate compensation for these evils,	68
65. In Mr Pitt's view, the sinking-fund was to remedy all these evils,	70
Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department, during the war,	note, 71

§	Page
66. Vast effects of the suspension of cash payments in 1797, . . .	72
67. Causes which produced the suspension of cash payments in 1797. Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state, <i>ib.</i>	
68. It was the mainspring of the financial strength of the nation during the war, . . .	74
Table showing the paper and coin issued, with the exports, imports, and revenue of every year during the war, . . . <i>note,</i>	75
69. Great temporary advantages of the funding system, . . .	75
70. The undue ascendancy of popular power led to the undoing of Mr Pitt's durable system for reduction of the debt, . . .	77
71. And it must ultimately ruin the British empire, . . .	78
72. The contraction of the currency by the bill of 1819 was the cause of this, . . .	79
73. Which was itself owing to the ascendancy of the moneyed interest produced by the war, . . .	80
74. These causes will impel the British race to the New World, . . .	81

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESSBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER 1806.

1. Immense results of the campaign of Austerlitz, . . .	83
2. The premiership offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined, . . .	84
3. Public opinion on the necessity of a coalition of parties, . . .	85
4. Mr Fox is sent for, . . .	86
5. State of parties in the country, and their principles, . . .	87
6. Composition of the cabinet, . . .	88
7. First measures of the new ministry. The budget, . . .	89
8. Return of Napoleon to Paris. Financial crisis there, . . .	91
9. Its ostensible causes, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
10. Vast speculations of M. Ouvrard, . . .	93
11. The immediate cause of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war, . . .	94
12. Measures of Napoleon in consequence, . . .	96
13. Real cause of the catastrophe, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
14. Means by which the crisis had hitherto been avoided, . . .	97
15. The root of the evil was the extravagant expenditure of government, . . .	98
16. Financial changes in consequence introduced in France, . . .	99
17. And imposition of the French armies as a burden on foreign states, . . .	100
18. French budget for 1805, and exposition by the minister of the interior, . . .	101
19. Exposition of the triumphs of France: silence as to Trafalgar, . . .	102
20. Erection of the column in the Place Vendôme, . . .	103
21. Advance of the French against Naples, . . .	104
22. Successful invasion of Calabria, . . .	105
23. Joseph Buonaparte created King of the two Sicilies, . . .	106
24. Naples is threatened by Sir Sidney Smith. General Stuart lands in the Bay of St Euphemia, . . .	107
25. Reynier resolves to attack him, . . .	108
26. Battle of Maida, . . .	109

§	Page
27. Great moral effect of this victory,	110
28. Its immediate results are less considerable,	111
29. Surrender of Gaeta,	112
30. Retreat of the English. Suppression of the insurrection,	113
31. Domestic reforms of Joseph in Naples,	114
32. Miserable state of Holland since its conquest by France,	115
33. Napoleon's measures to place his brother Louis on the throne of that country,	116
34. Creation of military fiefs in the kingdom of Italy,	<i>ib.</i>
35. Napoleon's secret views in these measures,	117
36. Audience given to the Turkish ambassador,	118
37. Naval operations: sailing and division of the Brest fleet,	119
38. Defeat of the first squadron at St Domingo,	120
39. Disasters of Willaumez's squadron,	<i>ib.</i>
40. Capture of Linois, and other naval operations,	122
41. Reflections on these last naval disasters of France,	123
42. Greatness of the French navy under Louis XVI.,	124
43. Napoleon's change of system in regard to the naval war,	<i>ib.</i>
44. Reflections on the growth of the English maritime power,	125
45. Character of the French navy,	126
46. Probable future influence of the British navy on the world,	127
47. Reduction of the Cape of Good Hope,	128
48. Sir Home Popham resolves to attack Buenos Ayres,	129
49. Which falls,	130
50. Embarrassment of government on this success,	<i>ib.</i>
51. Buenos Ayres is retaken by the South Americans,	131
52. Differences with America in regard to neutral rights,	132
53. Grounds of conduct of England, as explained by Sir W. Scott,	134
54. Violent measures of Congress,	135
55. The commissioners on both sides adjust the differences,	<i>ib.</i>
56. Continental affairs. Coldness between France and Prussia,	136
57. Increasing jealousies between the two cabinets. Prussia seizes on Hanover,	138
58. Measures of retaliation by Great Britain,	<i>ib.</i>
59. Mr Fox's speech on the subject,	140
60. Napoleon's opinion of Prussia in this transaction,	141
61. His further measures of aggression on Germany,	<i>ib.</i>
62. Universal indignation in the north of Germany,	142
Gentz's pamphlet on the subject,	<i>note</i> , 143
63. Formation of the Confederacy of the Rhine,	143
64. Powers admitted to the confederacy,	145
65. The Emperor renounces the crown of Germany,	146
Addresses of Napoleon and the Emperor Francis to the German States,	<i>note</i> , 148
66. Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin,	148
67. Fresh umbrage of Prussia at the treaty of France with Russia. Warlike preparations of Prussia,	150
68. Renewed causes of discord between France and Russia,	151
69. Differences about Cattaro, which is occupied by the Russians,	152
70. The French in return seize Ragusa: actions in its neighbourhood,	153
71. D'Oubril concludes a treaty at Paris between France and Russia,	154

§	Page
72. Which is disavowed by the cabinet of St Petersburg,	155
73. Opening of the negotiations between France and England,	156
74. England insists on Russia being a party to the negotiation,	157
75. Basis of <i>uti possidetis</i> fixed,	158
76. Which France departs from,	159
77. Continuation of the negotiations, and gradual estrangement of the parties,	160
78. Progress of the negotiation,	161
79. The demands of France become more extravagant, and the negotiation is broken off,	162
80. Real views of the parties in this negotiation,	163
81. State of affairs at Berlin: Prussia's ultimatum, and preparations for war on both sides,	164
82. Murder of Palm. Great sensation which it occasioned,	166
Proceedings of the military commission by which he was condemned, <i>note, ib.</i>	
83. Influence which it had on the rupture of the negotiation,	168
84. Mr Fox's eyes are at last opened to the real nature of the war,	<i>ib.</i>
Last instructions of Mr Fox to Lord Lauderdale,	<i>note, ib.</i>
85. Death of Mr Fox. His character,	170
86. His vices and failings,	171
87. His extraordinary talents in debate,	172
88. His fame is on the decline as a just thinker,	173
89. Reasons of this,	174
90. His errors as a political philosopher,	175

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA. FALL OF PRUSSIA.

1. Natural disadvantages of Prussia,	177
2. Political situation and inhabitants of Prussia,	178
3. Population and extent of Prussia,	179
4. Towns and manufacturing industry of Prussia,	180
5. Rapid agricultural progress of Prussia,	181
6. Slow progress of Prussia at first, and rapid subsequent growth,	182
7. Statistical details,	<i>ib.</i>
8. State of religion in Prussia,	183
9. Revenue and expenditure of Prussia,	184
10. Military establishment,	185
11. The Landwehr and Landsturm,	186
12. Great diffusion of education in Prussia,	187
13. Manners and court of Berlin,	188
14. Its state policy and diplomacy,	189
15. Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England,	190
16. And of Austria,	<i>ib.</i>
17. But the cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neutral,	192
18. Spain long obsequious to France under the Prince of the Peace,	193
19. At length indicates hostile dispositions against France,	194
20. The lesser German powers incline to France,	195
21. Preparations of Prussia. Forces on both sides,	<i>ib.</i>
22. Her grievous want of foresight and defensive measures,	196

§	Page
23. Imprudent conduct of the Prussian generals,	198
24. Proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers,	199
25. Manifesto of Prussia,	200
26. The true character of the war as asserted in it,	201
27. Reflections on these proclamations,	202
28. Napoleon's insult to the Queen of Prussia,	<i>ib.</i>
29. Preparatory movements of the Prussians,	203
30. Counter-movement of Napoleon. His system of providing for his troops,	204
31. The Duke of Brunswick renounces the offensive. Description of the theatre of war,	206
32. Commencement of hostilities, and defeat of detached bodies of Prussians,	207
33. Success of the French left against Prince Louis,	208
34. Death of that Prince,	209
35. Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French,	210
36. Movements on both sides preparatory to a general action,	211
37. Result of these manœuvres,	212
38. Concentration of the Prussian forces near Weimar,	<i>ib.</i>
39. The Prussian army is again divided. The King marches to Auerstadt,	213
40. Napoleon's dispositions for the battle,	214
41. And vigorous efforts to surmount the Landgrafenberg,	215
42. Situation of the armies on both sides, on the morning of the 14th,	216
43. Battle of Jena,	217
44. Defensive measures of the Prussians,	218
45. Commencement of the battle,	219
46. The Prussians are defeated,	220
47. Arrival of Ruchel, who is overwhelmed,	222
48. Preparatory movements which led to the battle of the King's army,	223
49. Battle of Auerstadt,	224
50. Additional forces come up on both sides,	<i>ib.</i>
51. Desperate conflict which ensued at the summit,	226
52. Arrival of other divisions on the field. Progress of the battle,	<i>ib.</i>
53. Desperate struggle around the Sonnenberg on the Prussian right,	227
54. The Prussian reserve advances, and is overthrown,	228
55. Disastrous retreat of the Prussians during the night from both fields of battle,	229
56. Meeting of the two discomfited armies in their flight,	230
57. Loss on both sides in these actions,	231
58. Unparalleled disasters of the retreat,	232
59. Capture of Erfurth with fourteen thousand men,	233
60. The King of Prussia gives the command to Hohenlohe, and retires to Magdeburg,	234
61. Measures of Napoleon to follow up the victory,	235
62. Soult defeats Kalkreuth,	236
63. Prince Eugene of Würtemberg is defeated by Bernadotte at Halle,	237
64. Desperate action which ensued on his retreat,	<i>ib.</i>
65. Saxony is overrun by the French,	238
66. Investment of Magdeburg, which is abandoned by Hohenlohe,	239
67. Who is pursued and assailed,	241
68. Is utterly defeated at Prentzlow,	242
69. And compelled to surrender. Profound grief of the Prussian troops,	<i>ib.</i>

§	Page
70. March and escape of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar,	243
71. Disgraceful surrender of Stettin and Cüstrin,	244
72. Reflections on these events. Depots at Erfurth and Wittenberg formed by Napoleon,	245
73. Blücher's corps is pursued to Lübeck,	246
74. Where he is shut up,	248
75. And is there defeated after a desperate conflict,	249
76. Desperate assault of the town,	ib.
77. He retires to Ratkau, and is there made prisoner,	251
78. Fall of Magdeburg,	ib.
79. Fall of Hameln and Nienburg on the Weser,	253
80. Napoleon detaches Saxony from the coalition,	ib.
81. Refuses to treat with Prussia,	255
82. Napoleon visits Potsdam and the tomb of Frederick,	256
83. Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenburg occupied by the French,	258
84. Affair of Prince Hatzfeld,	259
85. His pardon by Napoleon,	260
86. Napoleon's proclamation and addresses to his soldiers,	261
87. Unpardonable severity of Napoleon to the Duke of Brunswick,	262
88. And to the Queen of Prussia and the Elector of Hesse Cassel,	263
89. Enormous contributions levied on Prussia and the north of Germany,	265
90. Cruelties exercised towards the conquered districts,	266
91. Military organisation of the country from the Rhine to the Vistula,	267
92. Negotiations with Prussia, and the first demands of Napoleon acceded to,	268
93. Convention signed by the plenipotentiaries,	269
94. Which the King of Prussia refuses to ratify,	270
95. Famous Berlin decree against English commerce,	271
96. Affairs of Poland. Napoleon's language to the Polish deputies,	ib.
97. Advance of Jerome into Silesia, of the French army to the Vistula, and of Mortier to Hanburg,	273
98. Levy of a new conscription in France,	ib.
99. Treaty between France and Saxony,	274
100. Immense results of the campaign,	275
101. Talents and rashness displayed by Napoleon during the campaign,	276
102. Reflections on the sudden fall of Prussia,	277
103. General despondency which it occasions in Europe,	278
104. Blücher's opinion of the probable resurrection of Germany,	279
105. Salutary ultimate result of this suffering to Prussia,	281

CHAPTER XLIV.

CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU. DECEMBER 1806—MARCH 1807.

1. Advance of the French and Russians to the Vistula,	282
2. Military preparations of Russia,	283
3. Composition and character of her armies,	284
4. Imprudent division of their force by the invasion of Moldavia,	286
5. Embarrassment of Napoleon on the Polish question,	287
6. Arguments in favour of the restoration of Poland,	288
7. Security for the permanence of her alliance with France,	289

§	Page
8. Arguments on the other side against interfering on behalf of the Poles,	289
9. Certainty of the restoration of Poland inducing the inveterate hostility of the Northern powers,	291
10. Napoleon adopts a middle course, and rouses only Prussian Poland,	292
11. Forged proclamations issued in Kosciusko's name, and great excitement in Poland,	293
12. Napoleon's ambiguous bulletin on the subject,	294
13. Napoleon proposes to Austria to exchange Galicia for Silesia, which is refused,	295
14. Napoleon's strong declaration in favour of Turkey,	296
15. His proclamation to his soldiers on the anniversary of Austerlitz,	297
16. Its great effect. Formation of the Temple of Glory at Paris,	299
17. Napoleon's plans for its construction,	300
Napoleon's secret design in this edifice,	<i>note</i> , 302
18. Vast efforts of Napoleon to recruit his army, and secure his flanks and rear,	302
19. Enormous contributions levied on all the conquered states,	303
20. Positions and force of the French on the Vistula,	304
21. And of the Russians,	306
22. Positions of the troops, and their evacuation of Warsaw; and Alexander's proclamation to his soldiers,	<i>ib.</i>
23. Application for assistance in men and money to England. Its impolitic refusal,	308
24. The Russians resume the offensive,	<i>ib.</i>
25. Napoleon advances to Warsaw. General enthusiasm there,	309
26. And resumes the offensive against the Russians,	310
27. Forcing of the passage of the Ukra by the French,	311
28. Kamenskoi loses his presence of mind, and orders the sacrifice of the artillery,	313
29. Object of Napoleon in these movements,	314
30. Description of the field at Pultusk, and of the positions of the two hostile armies,	<i>ib.</i>
31. Battle of Pultusk,	315
32. Which turns out to the disadvantage of the French,	317
33. Combat of Golymin,	<i>ib.</i>
34. Its doubtful issue,	319
35. Napoleon stops his advance, and puts his army into winter-quarters,	320
36. The Russians also go into winter-quarters,	321
37. Results of this winter campaign, and impression which it produces in Europe,	<i>ib.</i>
38. Positions of the French army in winter-quarters,	323
39. Napoleon's measures to provide food and secure his cantonments,	324
40. Reduction of the fortresses in Silesia,	325
41. Siege and fall of Breslau,	<i>ib.</i>
42. Capture of Brieg and Schweidnitz, and total conquest of Silesia,	326
43. Operations on the left towards Pomerania and Dantzic,	327
44. Operations of Marmont in Illyria,	328
45. Napoleon's efforts to stimulate the Turks to vigorous resistance,	<i>ib.</i>
46. Delightful residence of the French at Warsaw,	330
47. Enthusiastic reception of the French by the Polish women,	332
48. Kamenskoi goes mad, and Benningsen assumes the command. He advances against Bernadotte,	<i>ib.</i>
49. Rapid advance of Benningsen towards Königsberg,	333

§	Page
50. He surprises Ney's corps,	334
51. Bernadotte, attacked near Mohrungen, escapes with difficulty, . . .	335
52. Gaudentz is relieved, and the French left wing driven back by the Russians,	336
53. Dangerous situation of Napoleon,	337
54. Vigour of Napoleon in assembling his army,	338
55. Napoleon marches to the rear of Benningsen,	339
56. Who discovers his design and falls back,	340
57. The French pursue the Russians, who resolve to give battle, . . .	341
58. Combat of Landsberg,	342
59. Combat of Leibstadt and retreat of Lestocq,	343
60. Relative forces on both sides,	344
61. Bloody combats round Eylau the day before the battle,	345
62. Anxious situation of both armies in their night-bivouac,	347
63. Description of the field of battle, and the positions of either army, .	ib.
64. Distribution of the French forces,	349
65. Battle of Eylau. Defeat of Augereau,	350
66. Imminent danger of Napoleon,	351
67. Grand charge by the cavalry and Imperial Guard on the Russian centre, .	352
68. Great success of Davoust on the French right,	354
69. Bagavout is defeated on the Russian left,	ib.
70. Benningsen throws back his left to arrest the evil,	355
71. Lestocq at length appears on the Russian right, and restores the battle, .	356
72. Schloditten is carried by Ney, and retaken by Benningsen,	357
73. Benningsen, contrary to the wishes of his officers, resolves to retreat, .	358
74. Results of the battle, and losses on both sides,	359
75. Aspect of the field of battle on the following day,	360
76. Inactivity and losses of the French after the battle,	361
77. Napoleon calls in all his reinforcements, and proposes peace, . . .	362
78. Which is refused by Prussia,	363
79. Napoleon retreats, and goes into cantonments on the Passarge, . . .	364
80. The Russians advance, and also go into cantonments. Both parties claim the victory at Eylau,	365
81. Operations of Essen against Savary. Combat of Ostrolenka,	366
82. Immense sensation excited by the battle of Eylau in Europe,	367
83. Unwise refusal of military succour by England,	369
84. Universal consternation at Paris on the news being received of Eylau, .	370
85. Napoleon demands a third conscription since the beginning of the war, .	ib.
86. Immense activity of Napoleon to repair his losses,	372
87. Extreme danger of Napoleon's situation at this juncture,	373
88. Ruinous effect of the surrender of the Prussian fortresses,	374
89. Observations on the movements of both parties,	375

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR FOX'S ADMINISTRATION.

FEBRUARY 1806—MARCH 1807.

1. Important civil changes which originated during the war,	377
2. Effects of the accession of the Whigs to power,	378

§	Page
3. Their plan for a new system for the recruiting of the army,	379
4. Great change in the composition of the army. Arguments in support of it by Mr Windham,	380
5. Impracticability of forced conscription,	381
6. Inefficiency of voluntary enlistment,	382
7. Means by which he proposes to render it more efficient,	383
8. Advantages of short periods of enlistment, as securing a better class of soldiers,	384
9. Proposed limitation of that period,	385
10. Reply of the former ministers on the subject,	386
11. The limited enlistment already partially in operation,	387
12. The circumstances of Great Britain peculiar, and without precedent in those of any foreign state,	388
13. Arguments against the reduction of the volunteer force,	389
14. And in favour of raising the additional force required by ballot,	390
15. The bill passes,	391
16. Reflections on the measure,	<i>ib.</i>
17. Error of the ministerial plan so far as regards the volunteers,	393
18. Temporary service now in a great degree abandoned,	394
19. Abolition of the slave trade,	395
20. Arguments against the change by the West India interest,	<i>ib.</i>
21. Alleged evil effects of abolition of the trade,	396
22. The slave trade asserted not to be the cause of the degraded state of Africa,	397
23. Arguments of Mr Wilberforce and others for the abolition,	398
24. Their answer to the assertion of the necessity of the trade to maintain the supply of negroes,	399
25. Alleged gradual improvement of the race should the trade be abolished,	400
26. Its demoralising effect on Africa,	401
27. Abolition tends to promote the gradual abrogation of slavery itself,	402
28. The abolition is carried,	403
29. Deplorable effects of the change hitherto on the negro race,	404
30. But they are not chargeable on its authors, but subsequent changes,	405
Enormous present extent and horrors of the slave trade,	<i>note, ib.</i>
Immense increase of produce in the slave colonies of late years. Comparatively stationary condition of the British islands,	<i>note, 406</i>
Enormous fiscal injustice to which they have been exposed,	<i>note, ib.</i>
31. Ruinous effects of emancipation of negroes,	408
Rapid decline of West India produce since emancipation,	<i>note, ib.</i>
32. Which are to be ascribed to the emancipation of the negroes, not to the abolition of the slave trade,	409
33. Lord Henry Petty's plan of finance,	411
34. Argument in favour of it. Advantages of the sinking-fund,	412
35. Proposed measures for the redemption of the successive loans,	413
36. And for providing the charges on them,	414
37. Advantages of the proposed system,	<i>ib.</i>
38. Argument against it by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Perceval,	416
39. Counter-plan proposed by them,	<i>ib.</i>
40. The ministerial scheme as threatening to break up the sinking-fund,	418
41. Budget for 1807,	419
42. Reflections on this subject,	<i>ib.</i>
43. Prejudicial effect in the end of these discussions,	421

§	Page
44. Lord Henry Petty's plan was the preferable of the two,	421
45. General character of the Whig measures of domestic administration at this period,	422
46. Foreign transactions. Fresh expedition to South America, and capture of Monte Video,	423
47. A second expedition against Buenos Ayres is resolved on,	425
48. Preparations for its defence,	426
49. Failure of the attack,	427
50. Court-martial on General Whitelocke, who is cashiered,	428
51. Reflections on this event,	<i>ib.</i>
52. Capture of Curaçoa, and establishment of the republic of Hayti,	429
53. State of affairs in Turkey,	430
54. Cause of rupture between Turkey and Russia,	431
55. Dismissal of the Waiwodes of Wallachia and Moldavia by Sultaun Selim,	<i>ib.</i>
56. Violent remonstrances of Russia and England, which produce a repeal of the measure,	433
57. Meanwhile the Russian armies invade the principalities,	434
58. And war is declared,	435
59. Rapid progress of the Russians in the principalities,	436
60. The Russians require the aid of a naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to,	<i>ib.</i>
61. Description of the Dardanelles,	437
62. Ultimatum of Great Britain, and declaration of war by Turkey,	438
63. Sir John Duckworth resolves to pass the Dardanelles,	439
64. The Straits are forced after much resistance,	440
65. The Divan resolves on submission, as Constantinople was defenceless,	441
66. Intrepid conduct of Sebastiani,	<i>ib.</i>
67. The Turks negotiate to gain time, and complete their preparations,	442
68. Vast energy displayed by the Mussulmans in their defence,	443
69. The English renounce the enterprise,	444
70. The British fleet repossess the Straits,	445
71. Blockade of the Dardanelles,	446
72. Naval actions off Tenedos,	447
73. Descent by the British on the coasts of Egypt. Macleod defeated at El Hammed,	448
74. Evacuation of Alexandria,	<i>ib.</i>
75. Great discontent at these repeated defeats throughout Great Britain,	449
76. Measures for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick,	<i>ib.</i>
77. Arguments in favour of it by Lord Howick,	450
78. Arguments against it by Mr Perceval,	451
79. The alleged tendency of the measure,	452
80. Repugnance of the King to the bill, which is withdrawn,	453
81. The King requires a written pledge that no further concessions should be made to the Catholics. Change of ministry,	454
Composition of the new cabinet,	<i>note, 456</i>
82. Arguments in parliament against the King's conduct,	456
83. And in support of it by Mr Perceval and Mr Canning,	457
84. The sovereign had been left in the dark as to the extent of the measure,	458
85. Defence of his conduct in requiring the pledge from ministers,	459
86. Dissolution of parliament, and great majority for the new ministers,	460

§	Page
87. Biography of Lord Eldon,	461
88. His rise at the bar to the office of chancellor,	462
89. His character as a lawyer and statesman,	463
90. Character of the Whig ministry, and effects of their fall,	464
91. Reflections on their foreign measures,	465
92. And their glaring neglect of the Russian war,	467
Repeated and ineffectual applications which Alexander had made for aid from England during the Polish war,	<i>note</i> , 468
93. The Dardanelles expedition is an exception to the general inexpediency of their foreign policy,	468
94. These defeats were ultimately beneficial,	470

CHAPTER XLVI.

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND, AND PEACE OF TILSIT.

1. Negotiations and treaties between the Allies for the vigorous prosecution of the war,	471
2. Austria strives to mediate between the contending powers. Treaty between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein,	472
3. To which England and Sweden accede,	473
4. But too late to prevent the irritation of Russia,	<i>ib.</i>
5. Negotiations of Napoleon during the same period. Auxiliary forces obtained under Romana from Spain,	475
6. Operations in Pomerania, and views of Napoleon regarding Sweden,	477
7. Armistice between the Swedes and French,	478
8. Sweden again reverts to the alliance,	480
9. Formation of an army of reserve on the Elbe,	<i>ib.</i>
10. Negotiations with Turkey and Persia by Napoleon,	481
11. Preparations for aiding them by land,	482
12. Jealousy excited in the Divan by the summoning of Parga,	483
13. Measures to organise the military strength of Poland,	484
14. Winter-quarters of the French army,	485
15. Winter-quarters of the Russians. Combat of Guttstadt,	487
16. Great designs of Napoleon at this time for the interior of his empire,	489
17. And for political improvements,	491
Napoleon fixes on a design for the Madeleine at Paris,	<i>note</i> , 492
18. Finances of France during this year,	492
Receipts and expenditure of the year,	<i>note</i> , 494
19. Statutes of the Grand Sanhedrim of the Jews at Paris,	494
20. Reflections on this event,	496
21. Napoleon's efforts to feed his troops. Sieges in Silesia during the interval of hostilities,	<i>ib.</i>
22. Fall of Schweidnitz,	498
23. Of Neisse,	<i>ib.</i>
24. And of Glatz,	499
25. Siege of Dantzic. Description of that fortress,	500
26. State of its fortifications,	501
27. First operations of the besieging force,	502
28. Capture of the Isle of Nehrung,	<i>ib.</i>

§	Page
29. Progress of the siege,	503
30. Attempt of the Allies to raise the siege,	505
31. Which proves unsuccessful,	506
32. Growing difficulties of the besieged, and fall of the place,	507
33. Reinforcements which arrived to the Russian army. Its strength and positions,	509
34. Strength and position of the French army,	510
35. Defensive measures of the Russians,	512
36. Designs of the Russians on Ney's corps,	513
37. Feigned attacks on the bridges of the Passarge, and real attack on Marshal Ney,	514
38. Its success at first, and final failure,	515
39. Napoleon concentrates his army, and the Russians fall back,	516
40. The Russians, pursued by the French, fall back to Heilsberg,	518
41. Different plans of operation which presented themselves to Napoleon,	519
42. Advance upon Heilsberg,	520
43. Description of the position and intrenched camp of Heilsberg,	521
44. Battle of Heilsberg,	522
45. Fresh attack by Lannes, which also proves unsuccessful,	524
Violent explosion of Lannes, Murat, and Napoleon in consequence, <i>note</i> ,	524
46. Frightful appearance of the slain after the battle,	525
47. Napoleon turns their flank, and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg,	526
48. Movements of the two armies before the battle of Friedland,	527
49. Description of the field of Friedland,	528
50. Benningsen resolves to attack Lannes' corps. Situation of that corps,	529
51. He crosses the Alle, and attacks the French marshal,	531
52. Disposition and arrangement of the Russian army,	<i>ib.</i>
53. No decisive success is gained on either side before the arrival of the other French corps,	532
54. Preparatory dispositions and forces of Napoleon,	533
55. Order of battle taken up by the French,	535
56. Battle of Friedland. Splendid attack by Ney's corps,	536
57. Gallant charge of the Russian Guard,	537
58. Progress of the action on the centre and right of the Russians,	538
59. Benningsen's measures to secure a retreat,	540
60. Immense results of the battle,	541
61. The Russians retreat without molestation to Allenburg and Wehlau,	542
62. Capture of Königsberg,	544
63. Measures of Napoleon, and retreat of the Russians to the Niemen,	545
64. The Emperor Alexander proposes an armistice,	547
65. Reasons which made Napoleon rejoice at this step,	548
66. Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation,	549
67. Conclusion of an armistice,	550
Napoleon's proclamation thereon to his troops, <i>note</i> ,	551
68. Interview on the raft at Tilsit,	551
69. First words of Napoleon and Alexander,	552
70. Commencement of the negotiations at Tilsit,	553
71. Napoleon's interview with the Queen of Prussia,	554
72. Napoleon's character of the Queen of Prussia,	556
73. Convivialities between the Russian and French officers,	<i>ib.</i>

§	Page
74. Napoleon's admiration of the Russian Imperial Guard,	558
75. Treaty of Tilsit. Its leading provisions. Creation of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and kingdom of Westphalia,	<i>ib.</i>
76. Treaty with Prussia,	559
77. Immense losses of Prussia by this treaty,	560
78. Secret treaty for the partition of Turkey,	562
79. Secret articles regarding England and all neutral fleets,	564
80. Secret agreement between the Emperors regarding Spain and Italy,	565
a Decisive evidence of these projects of spoliation which exists both on the testimony of the French and Russian Emperors,	<i>note, 566</i>
81. Measures of Napoleon to secure his anticipated Turkish acquisitions,	567
82. Convention regarding the payment of the French contribution on Prussia,	569
83. Noble proclamation by the King of Prussia to his lost provinces,	570
84. Enormous losses sustained by the French during the campaign,	571
85. Memorable retribution for the partition of Poland on the partitioning powers,	573
86. And of Russia,	<i>ib.</i>
87. Terrible retribution that was approaching to France,	574
88. Evil consequences of the treaty of Tilsit in the end to Napoleon,	575
89. Useless allies which Napoleon made to himself by this treaty,	576
90. Disgraceful perfidy of Napoleon towards the Turks,	577
91. Whom he surrenders to the spoliation of Russia,	578
92. No defence can be made for it in consequence of the revolution at Con- stantinople,	<i>ib.</i>
93. Mutual projects of the Emperors for the spoliation of the other European powers,	579
94. Napoleon's leading object in the treaty was the humbling of Great Britain,	581
95. England could not complain of its conditions,	582
96. It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the war was prolonged,	583

CHAPTER XLVII.

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

1. Comparison of the Roman empire and British India,	584
2. Wonderful circumstances attending the British dominion in India,	585
3. Its extent, population, revenue, and military strength,	<i>ib.</i>
4. Dreadful dangers it has surmounted,	587
5. Physical description of the Indian peninsula,	588
6. Its vegetable and animal productions,	590
7. Extraordinary diplomatic ability with which India has been governed,	592
8. Immense advantages of the British government to the Indian people,	593
9. Great diminution of crime under the British rule,	594
10. Great change effected in the aspect of the country in the central and western provinces,	595
11. Rapid progress of wealth, population, and comfort, over all India,	596
12. Increased taste for British manufactures over India,	597
13. Vast police force established throughout Bengal, and its admirable effects,	598
14. Principles of Indian taxation,	599
15. Management of land. The Zemindar system,	600

§	Page
16. Its practical operation,	601
17. The Ryotwar system,	602
18. The Village system,	603
19. Admirable effect of the Village system in all ages,	604
20. Effects of this large land revenue on the general system of taxation,	606
21. Complete system of toleration established in India,	607
22. Vast varieties of religious belief found in India,	608
23. Effect of this religious division in facilitating the government of the country,	<i>ib.</i>
24. Vast variety of national character in India,	610
25. And various military qualities of the inhabitants,	611
26. Difference of character owing to physical causes,	612
27. Origin and composition of the sepoy force,	<i>ib.</i>
28. Causes of the facility with which it has been raised,	613
29. Elevated rank and situation of the sepoy troops,	614
30. General character of the Indian army,	615
31. Touching anecdotes of the fidelity of sepoy troops,	617
32. Their fidelity to the English under every trial,	618
33. And admirable courage,	619
34. Which is owing to the fidelity of the English government to its engagements,	620
35. Contrast of the Company's rule to the devastating Mahommedan sway which preceded it,	621
36. Unbounded devastations of their former wars,	622
37. Wonderful nature of this empire, won by so small a force, and amidst so many difficulties at home,	624
38. Wars in which the empire was involved, during the growth of the Indian power,	625
39. What were the causes of this success? Conquest was forced upon the British by necessity, not adopted from inclination,	626
40. Difference between Rome, and France, and England, in this particular,	627
41. Conquest was forced on the British in the East by necessity,	628

* CHAPTER XLIII.

RISE OF INDIA UNDER CLIVE AND HASTINGS.—1750-1798.

1. Sketch of the principal Indian powers when the British empire arose,	630
2. The Mahratta confederacy,	631
3. Origin and early history of the East India Company. Capture of Calcutta by Surajee Dowlah,	632
4. Calcutta retaken. Rise and great exploits of Clive,	633
5. Dethronement of Surajee Dowlah by Clive,	634
6. Acquisition of territory by the Company, and defeat of the Mogul Emperor,	636
7. Cession of all Bengal and Bahar to the English,	<i>ib.</i>
8. Origin and progress of the Madras Presidency,	637
9. Sieges of Madras and Pondicherry by the French and English,	638
10. Early history of Clive,	639
11. His first introduction into active life,	640
12. His character as a hero and a statesman,	641

§	Page
13. Rise and character of Hyder Ali,	643
14. Hostilities with Hyder are resolved on by the local authorities, but dis- proved by the Company,	644
15. First campaigns against him, and early disasters,	645
16. Transactions in the Carnatic, down to the renewal of the war with Hyder in 1780,	647
17. Mr Burke's description of Hyder's irruption,	648
18. Great successes of Hyder in the Carnatic,	649
19. The firm conduct of Warren Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote re-establishes affairs,	650
20. Early history of Hastings,	651
21. His progress as a statesman,	652
22. His character and errors,	653
23. Further disasters stemmed by the energy of Hastings. Death of Hyder, <i>ib.</i>	
24. War with Tippoo, and invasion of Mysore from Bombay. Its early success, .	656
25. Final disasters of the expedition,	657
26. British invasion of Mysore, which leads to a peace,	658
27. Change introduced by Tippoo in the Indian armies,	659
28. Its ruinous effects on the independence of the native powers,	660
29. Mr Hastings' long-protracted prosecution,	661
30. Proceedings in parliament on the subject,	662
31. Proceedings and charges against Mr Hastings before the Commons,	664
32. His trial before the House of Lords,	665
33. And his acquittal,	<i>ib.</i>
34. Ultimate change of public opinion on this subject,	667
35. Reflections on the cruel injustice of this prosecution,	668
36. Mr Fox's India Bill. Its premature fate,	669
37. Objections to which the bill was liable,	671
38. Mr Pitt's India Bill, which becomes law,	672
39. Reflections on this constitution for India,	
40. Arrangements with the British government for the increase of the British force in India,	673
41. Fresh war with Tippoo Saib,	674
42. Lord Cornwallis's first campaign against Tippoo,	675
43. Vast preparations for the siege of Seringapatam,	677
44. Preparations for a decisive battle under the walls of Seringapatam,	678
45. Commencement of the action,	<i>ib.</i>
46. Danger of Cornwallis, and his ultimate success,	679
47. Concluding operations of the war,	680
48. Treaty with Tippoo,	681
49. Experienced necessity of further conquests in India,	682
50. Pacific administration and principles of Sir John Shore,	<i>ib.</i>
51. Its disastrous effects,	683
52. Intriguing of Tippoo to form a confederacy against the English,	684
53. Tippoo's overt acts of hostility,	685
APPENDIX,	687

HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

It would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the mainspring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay ; in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other states, when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, in her citadel amidst the waves, the return of a right spirit in the neighbouring nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain. Even the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the contest they had so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of government the means of permanently continuing it. Vain would have been the reaction produced by suffering against the French Revolution, vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if

CHAP.
XLI.

1805.

1.
Importance
of the sub-
ject.

CHAP.
XLI.

1805.

Britain had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis. If she had been unable to aliment the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust, the sword of Wellington would have been drawn in vain ; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts if the wealth of England had not at last arrayed them in dense and disciplined battalions on the banks of the Rhine.

2.
Astonishing
financial
efforts of
England
during the
war.

How, then, did it happen, that this 'inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world ; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years ; to uphold a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe ; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land forces of Napoleon, and equipped all the armies of the north, on the Elbe and the Rhine, for the liberation of Germany ? The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe. But the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organised and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seemed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found ; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth it amounted only to £400,000

a-year; and in that of James I. to £450,000, and, even including all the subsidies received from parliament during his reign, only to £480,000 a-year—sums certainly not equivalent to more than £800,000 or £1,000,000 of our money.¹ That enjoyed by Charles I. amounted on an average to £895,000 annually—a sum perhaps equal to £1,500,000 in these times.² It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people of England—affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when they are relieved from all control by the other powers in the state. The sums raised in England during the Commonwealth—that is, from 3d November 1640, to 5th November 1659—amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of £83,000,000,—being at the rate of nearly £5,000,000 a-year;* or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had

CHAP.
XLI.

1805.

3.

Historical details. Public income before the Commonwealth. Large increase consequent on the Great Rebellion.

¹ Hume, v. 412; vi. 112.

² Ibid. vii. 341.

* "It is seldom," says Hume, "that the people gain anything by revolutions in government; because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old: but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money and the tyranny of the Star Chamber had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the Crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of the administration."³

The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of £83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth,—a striking proof of the despotic character of the executive during that period:—

Land-tax,	£32,000,000
Excise,	8,000,000
Tonnage and poundage,	7,600,000
Sale of Church lands,	10,035,000
Sequestration of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years,	3,528,000
Sequestration of private estates in England,	4,564,000
Fee-farm rents for five years,	2,963,000
Composition with delinquents in Ireland,	1,000,000
Sales of estates in Ireland,	3,567,000
Other lesser,	10,074,000
Total,	£83,331,000

CHAP.
XLI.

1642-1638.

1 Pebrer,
139, 142

preceded it. The permanent revenue of Cromwell from the three kingdoms was raised to £1,868,000 : or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I.* The total public income at the death of Charles II. was £1,800,000, under James II. £2,000,000 ; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was not then materially different from what it is at the present moment.^{1†}

4.
Permanent
addition to
them on the
accession of
William
III.

These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of the house of Orange to the throne. The intimate connexion of the princes of that family with Continental politics, and the long wars in which in consequence the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. The Prince of Orange brought from the republic of Holland, where it had been already practised and was thoroughly understood, the important secret of governing popular assemblies, and extracting heavy taxes from popular communities. Like the Roman emperors, he did not discard the senate, but he contrived to render it the instrument of his will. He did not, like the Stuarts, engage the throne in a contest with parliament : on the contrary, he did everything by its votes, and concealed the exactions of the crown under the shadow of the authority of the house of Commons. His

* Of this sum, there was drawn from England,	£1,517,274
from Scotland,	143,652
from Ireland,	207,590

Total,	£1,868,516
--------	------------

—PEBRER, 140.

† The quarter of wheat, from 1636 to 1701, was on an average 51s. 11½d.
from 1700 to 1765, 40s. 6d.
from 1764 to 1794, 44s. 7d.

In 1835 the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 39s. 8d., and the average of the five years preceding 1836 was only 48s. The price was much higher during the next five years, but that was the result of uncommonly rainy seasons coming in succession during that whole period.—SMITH'S *Wealth of Nations*, i. 358 ; and *Corn Average*, 1835.

whole efforts were directed to gain the majority of the constituencies in the country by corruption, and of votes in parliament by patronage. A vast government expenditure, incurred in a cause at first highly popular, and the profuse contracting of loans on the security of the revenue of future years, afforded the means of doing both. This system proved entirely successful, and it is to its success that the subsequent greatness of the empire is mainly to be ascribed. But for it, the means of raising taxes adequate to the protection, and necessary for the defence, of the empire, would never have been discovered; and England, like Poland, would have fallen a prey to the ambition of the adjoining nations, the resources of which had been drawn forth by the force of despotic power, while no means of developing its own had been discovered. Great as have been the obligations which England owes in many different views to the Revolution, it is beyond all question the greatest that it brought in a sovereign instructed in the art of overcoming the ignorant impatience of taxation which is the invariable characteristic of free communities, and thus gave it a government capable of turning to the best account the activity and energy of its inhabitants, at the same time that it had the means given it of maintaining their independence.

So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled: being raised from £2,000,000 a-year to £3,895,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity. Various motives combined to induce the government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on

5.
Reasons
which led
to the intro-
duction of
the national
debt.

CHAP.
XLI.

1688-1700.

the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-burnings and divisions soon succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of government over a nation thus divided : foreign wars were rightly deemed requisite to maintain the ascendant of the Protestant principles to which the king owed his accession to the throne ; and the Continental connexions of the house of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles by which the very existence of the commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same cause which led to nearly the duplication of the public burdens of France by Louis Philippe,* after the revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and originated the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessment of future years. It was justly thought, that the present influence of government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself ; and that, by the distribution of the debt

Correspond-
ing increase
of the expen-
diture of
France on
the accession
of Louis
Philippe.

* The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions, as France and England were at the accessions of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar :—

1824,	.	.	951,000,000, or about £38,000,000	
1825,	.	.	946,000,000	... 37,800,000
1826,	.	.	942,000,000	... 37,600,000
1827,	.	.	986,000,000	.. 39,400,000
1828,	.	.	939,000,000	... 37,500,000
1829,	.	.	975,000,000	... 39,000,000
1830, Revol. in July,			981,000,000	... 39,200,000
1831, Louis Philippe,			1,511,000,000	... 60,400,000
1832,	1,100,000,000	... 44,000,000
1833,	1,120,000,000	... 44,800,000

—See *Stat. de France*, published by government.

among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power of attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank-notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed. But, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages: and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1784.

¹ Pebrer, 59,
60. Alison's
Marlbo-
rough, 246,
249.

It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain were increased after this period. Suffice it to say, that both were largely augmented during the glorious war of the Succession; that the long and pacific administration which followed, effected no sensible reduction in their amount; that the checkered contest of 1739, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' war, contributed equally to their increase; and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1783, in the opinion both of Mr Hume and Adam Smith, they must inevitably prove fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was £12,000,000, and the debt £240,000,000, the interest of which absorbed so large

6.
Progressive
growth of
the public
debt during
the succeed-
ing century.

CHAP.
XLI.

1784.

1 Febrer,
245.

a proportion as £9,319,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during its disastrous continuance having been no less than one hundred millions.^{1*}

It was at this period that Mr Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr Fox and the coalition ministry. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of

* The following table exhibits, in a clear and condensed form, the increase of the public revenue, and progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present times.

Table illus-
trating its
increase.

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue.
National Debt at the Revolution,	£664,263	£39,865	£2,001,855
Increase during the reign of William,	15,730,439	1,271,087	
Debt at the accession of Queen Anne,	16,394,702	1,310,952	3,895,205
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne,	37,750,661	2,040,416	
Debt at the accession of George I.,	54,145,363	3,351,368	5,691,803
Decrease during the reign of George I.,	2,053,128	133,807	
Debt at the accession of George II.,	52,092,235	3,217,561	6,762,463
Decrease during the peace, .	5,137,612	253,526	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1739,	46,954,623	2,954,035	6,874,000
Increase during the war, .	31,338,689	1,096,979	
Debt at the end of the war, 1748,	78,293,312	4,061,014	6,923,000
Decrease during the peace, .	3,721,472	664,277	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1756,	74,571,840	3,396,737	7,127,161
Increase during the war, .	72,111,004	2,444,104	
Debt at the end of the war in 1763,	146,682,844	5,840,841	8,523,440
Decrease during the peace, .	10,739,793	364,000	
Debt at the opening of the Ame- rican war, 1776, .	135,943,051	5,476,841	10,265,405
Increase during the war, .	102,541,819	3,843,034	
Debt at the peace of 1783, .	238,484,870	9,319,925	11,962,000
Decrease during the peace, .	4,751,261	143,569	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1793,	233,733,609	9,176,356	16,658,814
Increase during the war, .	295,105,668	10,252,152	
Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February 1801, .	528,839,277	19,428,503	34,113,146
Increase during the second war, .	335,983,164	12,796,796	
Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st Feb- ruary 1816, .	864,822,441	32,225,304	72,210,512
Decrease since the peace, .	82,155,207	3,883,841	
Debt on the 5th January 1832,	£782,667,234	£28,341,463	£50,990,000

—MOREAU and PEBRE's *Tables*, 70, 89, 153, 245; and PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

CHAP.
XLI.

1784.

7.
Alarming
financial
aspect of the
country on
Mr Pitt's
accession to
power in
1784.

extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inextricable, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking-fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the preceding years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed now more than two-thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening at no distant period to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. Little foresight was required to show, that, in the course of events, wars and changes must arise, which would render it indispensable for the government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities. But how could any administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralysing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr Pitt; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his understanding with the utmost vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of

8.
Principle on
which he
proposed to
remedy the
existing
evils.

CHAP.
XLI.

1784.

money at compound interest; and Dr Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great.* Mr Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might, without difficulty, be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed in producing great effects, because they were directed to the *annual* discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation; they advanced, therefore, by addition, not multiplication—in an arithmetical, not a geometrical ratio. Mr Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy: he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and, inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam-engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

Mr Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject of the finances,—one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the constitution, sank into insig-

* A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would, in the year 1775, have amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

nificance. From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted upon it, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on the subject on 29th March 1786, "the people of England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions upon which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this House, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it—to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which on many accounts we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties of my situation, but by the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate all my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity that which we ourselves have felt the want of,—an efficient sinking-fund for the national debt.¹ To

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

9.

His strong
expressions
on the im-
portance of
the subject
in parlia-
ment.¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1295,
1313, 1109.

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

accomplish this is the first wish of my heart; and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt."

10.
And his simultaneous adoption of measures for national defence.

It is worthy of especial notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking-fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired; and, on the contrary, he at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," he said, "by the plausible and popular name of economy—he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy—to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking-fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the sinking-fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies without which the nation must be endangered."¹ Every measure of this great man was directed to great and *lasting* national objects. He was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

¹ Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1109.

In pursuance of these designs, Mr Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of £900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of £100,000—should be granted to his Majesty, to be vested

in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sums thus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the further purchase of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan would be secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the people, but from the *dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested in the public trustees*. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the *side of the creditor to that of the debtor*—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would, to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction.* “If this million,” said

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

11.
Establishment of the sinking-fund, and Mr Pitt's speech on introducing it.

* The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of five per cent, is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that £200,000,000 is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for £1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of £200,000 to be annually applied to the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners, for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progressive growth in ten years will stand as follows:—

First year's surplus,	.	.	.	£200,000
Second,	.	.	.	210,000
Third,	.	.	.	220,500
Fourth,	.	.	.	231,250
Fifth,	.	.	.	242,562
Sixth,	.	.	.	253,078
Seventh,	.	.	.	265,654
Eighth,	.	.	.	278,286
Ninth,	.	.	.	292,114
Tenth,	.	.	.	306,661
				£2,500,105

The wonderful rate at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

Mr Pitt, "to be so applied, is to be laid out, with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation ; and this will diminish the debt of this country so much, as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the bane of this country ; for if the original sinking-fund had been properly preserved, it can easily be proved, that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome ; but this, as yet, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his conveniency, gotten hold of this sum, which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock ; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long, very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved ; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House, and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law—of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt ; *it must for ever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war.* To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan."¹*

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1309,
1322.

* The speech delivered by Mr Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one of the most luminous of his whole parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded, "That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the

Nor was Mr Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments; but he pointed out with too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amidst the necessities or weaknesses of future administrations. "No man," said he, "in existence, was, or ever had been, a greater friend to the principle of a sinking-fund than I have been, from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking-fund, for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals, to whom the faith of parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions at stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when parliament, stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking-fund, or enabling government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

12.

Mr Fox
gives this
plan his cor-
dial support.

calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was prepared. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up; but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far-extended speech, as Mr Fox called it, without one omission or error.—See WILLIAM PITT—No. V.; *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxxvi. 852; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by Dr Croly, one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

CHAP.
XLI.

1786.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1818.

of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents?"¹ Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in the composition of his scheme, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and on the 26th May, the King gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

13.
It is passed
by the legis-
lature, and
afterwards
made appli-
cable to all
future loans.

The sinking-fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate period; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which followed soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy of Mr Pitt is to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never on any pretence whatever to be departed from, that, when any additional loan was contracted, provi-

March 30,
1792.

sion should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr Pitt, "not to confine our views to the sinking-fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time so severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter, we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should of course be issued out of the consolidated fund,* to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, *an additional sum sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking-fund, after reaching its largest amount, will discharge what will then remain of the present debt.* To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, £100,000 should be raised in addition to the existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose that £200,000 a-year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking-fund." Mr Fox stated, "That he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt, and that as strongly when on the Ministerial as when on the Opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr Pitt, but he wished it as warmly."¹ In conformity with the united opinion of these great men,

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxix. 1050,
1058.

* The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which were amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated during war among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

CHAP.
XLI.

1792-1802.

1 32 Geo.
III. c. 69.14.
Modifica-
tion of the
system in-
troduced in
1802.

April 14.

it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "That whenever in future any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one per cent on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be placed to the account of the commissioners."¹ Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty be expected in little more than forty years.

Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking-fund was managed, till 1802; and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking-fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not indeed by Mr Pitt, but by Mr Addington, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now £488,000,000; its interest, including the charges of the sinking-fund, £23,000,000. It is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking-fund should be removed; and that both that original fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to: it being enacted, "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking-fund of £1,000,000, with the £200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund to be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years.²

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 890,
892.

Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking-fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking-fund which he established, down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that the sinking-fund of a million which Mr Pitt established in 1786, had increased, by accumulation at compound interest, and the great additions drawn from the one per cent on the vast loans from 1792 to 1812, to the enormous sum of *fifteen millions and a half yearly* in 1813, while the debt which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than £238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years; whereas Mr Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years; the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of five per cent. The subsequent £200,000 a-year granted, undoubtedly accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the prodigious accumulation which the one per cent on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the table on next page, showing the sums paid off by the sinking-fund in every year from 1786 to 1813—the loans contracted during that period—the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking-fund rose, with the immense sums

15.
Immense
results of
the sinking-
fund.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

borrowed at different periods during the war; and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were £585,000,000, it will not appear surprising, that even the small sum of one per cent on each, regularly issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked-for accumulation.*

16.
Obloquy
to which it
became
exposed.

It is this subsequent addition of one per cent on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking-fund, which has been the cause at once of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr Pitt's financial statements, and, delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking-fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply

Table showing
the progressive
growth of
the sinking-
fund.

* Table showing the sums paid to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in every year from 1792 to 1816; the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those commissioners in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time.—MOREAU'S *Tables*; PEBRE'S *Tables*, 153, 154, 246; *Parl. Papers*, 1822, &c. 145; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1; COLQUHOUN, 292, 294; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

Years.	Sinking-Fund.	Stock Redeemed by Sinking-Fund.	Loans Contracted.	Proportion of Loan paid to Sinking-Fund.	Expenditure, including Interest of Debt, Funded and Unfunded, and Sinking-Fund.	Total Charge of Debt, including Sinking-Fund.	Revenue.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1792	1,458,504	1,507,100			16,179,347	9,437,862	16,382,435
1793	1,534,970	1,982,650	4,500,000		17,434,767	9,890,904	17,674,395
1794	1,630,615	2,174,405	12,907,451	1,630,615	22,734,366	10,715,941	17,440,800
1795	1,672,000	2,804,945	42,090,646	1,872,200	29,305,477	11,081,139	17,374,890
1796	2,141,596	3,683,455	42,736,196	2,141,595	39,751,091	12,345,957	18,243,876
1797	2,639,724	4,399,070	14,620,000	2,639,724	40,791,533	13,683,139	18,668,925
1798	3,369,218	6,716,153	18,000,000	3,361,752	50,793,857	16,405,402	20,518,780
1799	4,294,325	7,853,109	12,500,000	3,984,252	51,241,798	20,108,885	23,097,945
1800	4,549,871	7,321,338	18,500,000	4,288,208	59,206,081	21,572,877	29,094,008
1801	4,767,992	7,315,062	34,410,000	4,620,479	61,617,988	21,661,029	28,085,829
1802	5,310,511	8,091,454	23,000,000	5,117,723	73,072,468	23,808,885	28,221,183
1803	5,922,979	7,733,421	10,000,000	5,685,542	62,373,480	25,436,804	34,401,733
1804	6,287,940	10,527,243	10,000,000	6,018,179	54,912,890	25,666,212	49,335,978
1805	6,851,200	11,305,692	21,526,699	6,521,394	67,619,475	26,689,646	49,662,471
1806	7,615,167	12,234,064	18,000,000	7,181,482	76,036,796	28,963,702	53,698,124
1807	8,323,329	12,807,070	12,500,000	7,829,588	75,154,548	30,336,859	58,902,291
1808	9,479,165	14,171,407	12,000,000	8,908,673	78,369,689	32,062,537	61,524,113
1809	10,188,607	13,965,824	19,532,000	9,555,853	76,566,013	32,781,592	63,042,746
1810	10,904,451	14,352,771	16,311,000	10,170,104	76,865,548	33,966,223	66,029,349
1811	11,060,601	15,659,194	24,000,000	10,813,016	83,735,223	35,248,933	64,427,371
1812	12,502,860	18,147,245	27,871,325	11,543,881	88,737,324	36,388,790	63,332,432
1813	13,483,160	21,108,442	53,763,100	12,439,631	105,943,727	38,443,147	63,211,492
1814	15,379,262	24,120,867	18,500,000	14,181,006	106,832,260	41,755,235	70,926,215
1815	14,120,963	19,149,684	45,133,589	12,748,231	92,280,180	42,992,430	72,131,214
1816	13,452,696	20,280,098	3,000,000	11,902,051	65,169,771	43,902,999	62,264,546

of loans, or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and, mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely *during war*, for its *permanent* character, which was to appear chiefly on the return of peace, loudly proclaimed that the whole was founded on an entire delusion: that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans; that at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed, had been actually borrowed since the commencement of the war; that it was impossible that a nation, any more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations; and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income.¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1802.

¹ Hamilton
on the sink-
ing-fund,
and others.

These doctrines soon spread among a considerable part of the thinking portion of the nation; but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into other channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoleon; and democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal. Attacks on the sinking-fund were eagerly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr Pitt's system, the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth. The meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days. The heedlessness of future consequences, which ever distinguishes the masses of mankind, came to infect general opinion: the aversion to taxation, so general among the many, made them lend a ready ear to any proposed reduction of taxation, without the slightest regard to its influence on the future fortunes of the empire; and a system on which the greatest and best of

17.
General dif-
fusion of
this delu-
sion.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

men in the last age had been united—in commendation of which Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke—was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

18.
Which is
the more
dangerous,
as it involves
much ab-
stract truth
mixed with
error.

Had these doctrines been confined to the declamations of the hustings, or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent, and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed, beyond what their authors intended, as an engine for the purposes of faction or ambition. But unhappily the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion. The prevailing ideas spread to the legislature; and the statesmen who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens, without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking-fund till it was totally extinguished. During the great convulsion of 1832, the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The same mournful notice has since repeatedly been sent forth from the same office, accompanied, in some cases, with the still more alarming intelligence, that during a profound peace a considerable addition had been made annually to the total amount of the national debt. The principle acted upon since 1823, when it was first announced in parliament, has been to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the jealousy of expenditure incident to a democratic system, can never be expected to be considerable, Mr Pitt's sinking-fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed.*

* The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the sinking-

In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form an important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history. But it is only by attending to the abandonment of Mr Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned which, so far as human wisdom could, had guarded against the evils which must, to all appearance, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British empire. It is perfectly true, as Mr Hamilton and

fund from the time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken upon by Mr Vansittart in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1838:—

CHAP.
XII.

1802.

19.

Comparison
of the argu-
ments for
and against
the sinking-
fund.

Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.	Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.
	£	£	£		£	£	£
1786	662,000	500,000	239,693,900	1813	24,246,039	16,064,057	661,409,958
1787	1,503,000	1,000,000	239,200,719	1814	27,552,230	14,830,957	740,623,555
1788	1,506,000	1,000,000	237,697,665	1815	22,539,653	14,241,397	752,857,236
1789	1,558,000	1,155,000	236,191,315	1816	24,001,983	13,945,117	816,311,940
1790	1,587,500	1,230,000	234,632,465	1817	23,117,541	14,514,457	796,200,192
1791	1,567,100	1,371,000	233,044,965	1818	19,460,982	15,339,483	776,742,403
1792	1,962,650	1,458,504	231,537,865	1819	19,648,469	16,305,590	791,867,314
1793	2,174,405	1,634,972	229,614,446	1820	31,191,702	17,499,773	794,980,480
1794	2,804,945	1,872,957	224,034,718	1821	24,518,885	17,219,957	801,565,310
1795	3,083,455	2,143,697	247,877,237	1822	23,605,931	18,889,319	795,312,767
1796	4,390,670	2,639,956	301,861,306	1823	17,966,680	7,482,325	796,530,144
1797	6,790,023	3,393,214	355,323,774	1824	4,828,530	10,652,059	791,701,612
1798	8,102,875	4,093,164	381,525,836	1825	10,583,732	6,093,475	781,123,222
1799	9,550,004	4,528,568	414,936,334	1826	3,313,834	5,621,231	778,128,265
1800	10,713,108	4,908,379	423,367,547	1827	2,886,528	5,704,706	783,801,739
1801	10,491,325	5,528,315	447,147,164	1828	7,281,414	4,067,965	777,476,890
1802	9,436,389	6,114,033	497,043,489	1829	6,035,414	4,509,485	772,322,540
1803	13,181,687	6,494,694	522,231,786	1830	6,425,465	4,545,465	771,251,932
1804	12,860,629	7,436,929	528,260,642	1831	3,304,729	1,663,093	757,486,907
1805	13,759,007	9,402,058	545,803,318	1832	9,079	5,696	754,100,549
1806	15,341,799	10,625,419	573,529,932	1833	1,321,749	1,023,704	751,658,853
1807	16,064,962	10,165,579	593,694,287	1834	2,461,927	1,776,378	743,675,299
1808	16,181,639	10,584,672	601,733,073	1835	1,846,791	1,270,030	738,549,860
1809	16,656,643	11,359,579	604,287,474	1836	2,169,700	1,590,727	761,422,570
1810	17,884,234	12,095,691	614,789,091	1837	1,968,219	1,300,609	763,730,552
1811	20,733,354	13,075,977	624,301,936	1838	nil.	nil.	762,771,224
1812	21,322,168	14,078,577	635,583,448				

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. and ii. 6, 8; FÉBRER'S *Tables*, 247; MOREAU'S *Tables*; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 260; and for 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, pp. 3, 4, each year.

N.B.—This table exhibits the progress of the sinking-fund and stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table, applicable to Great Britain alone.

Since 1838 to 1843, no money has been applied to the reduction of the national debt; on the contrary, fresh debt, to the amount of £10,000,000, has been contracted, being at the average of £1,650,000 a-year. About as much has been paid off since 1843, but wholly by the operation of the war income-tax.—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vii. 4, and viii. 4.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

the opponents of the sinking-fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial operations—by borrowing with one hand, while you pay off with another ; and unquestionably Mr Pitt never imagined that if the nation was paying off ten millions a-year, and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking-fund ; because, as long as larger sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no *present* benefit to the state ; nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But, all that notwithstanding, Mr Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt was founded not only on consummate wisdom, but on a thorough knowledge of human nature. To be convinced of this we have only to look to the causes which have led to the abandonment of the sinking-fund since the war, and the state in which that abandonment has left the finances of the empire.

20.
Value of the
system in
time of
peace.

Mr Pitt never looked to the sinking-fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year : he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt *in time of peace*.* It was then that its real effect was to be seen : it was then that the debt contracted during war was to be really

Pitt clearly
saw the ob-
jections since
urged against
the system.

* Mr Pitt's speech on the budget in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking-fund during war ; but always looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased, in consequence of the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking-fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy,—we shall have to go far before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the war. Yet there are means by which I am confident

discharged. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance; indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation felt by mankind in general, and the especial desire always experienced, when the excitement of war ceases, that its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to get the popular representatives, at the conclusion of a contest, to lay on *new* taxes, and provide for a sinking-fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so that it might be at once brought forward in entire and efficient operation, upon the conclusion of hostilities, without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

From what has now been stated, it will readily be discerned in what the grand merit of Mr Pitt's financial system consisted. It was the imposition, by law, of sufficient *indirect* taxes to meet not only the interest of

it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise, and not less practicable, to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year: and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking-fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. *I cannot indeed take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation; but if the means I have pointed out are adopted, and resolutely adhered to, it will leave us at least stationary.*"—*Parl. Hist.* xxxiii. 1053, 1054.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

21.

Distinctive
merit of Mr
Pitt's system for the
sinking-
fund.

every new loan, but a hundredth part more to provide a sinking-fund for the extinction of its capital, which was its grand distinction. It brought the nation successfully through the crisis of the war, and would have proved the ultimate salvation of the empire, if it had been adhered to with the steadiness which he so earnestly impressed upon the nation, and if no subsequent monetary change had rendered impossible the continuance of the indirect taxes necessary to uphold the system. There was neither juggle nor deception in this. It was a very plain and practical operation,—viz: the providing a surplus of taxation to eat in at compound interest on the capital of the debt. This principle of providing such a surplus is the well-known and indispensable preliminary to every system for the reduction of burdens, whether in public or private. It was in the building upon that foundation the superstructure of a regular invariable system, and bestowing on it the wonderful powers of compound interest, that Mr Pitt's great merit consisted. It was the subsequent repeal of the indirect taxes laid on to provide this surplus fund during peace, when there was no necessity whatever for such a measure, and no motive for it but the thirst for temporary applause in successive administrations, or the difficulty of upholding the indirect taxes, owing to a ruinous and unlooked-for contraction of the currency, which was the real evil that ruined this noble fabric, and has rendered the debt a hopeless burden on the nation. And if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by recollecting the example of France prior to the Revolution, when the system went on for half a century before that crisis, of borrowing large sums annually, and making no provision whatever for payment even of their annual interest, in consequence of which the finances got involved in such a state of hopeless embarrassment as, by rendering the convocation of the States-general unavoidable in a moment of extraordinary excitement, overturned the monarchy.¹

¹ See *Ante*,
chap. iii.
§§ 118-125.

The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking-fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt—amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In the sixteen years from 1816 to 1832, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of five per cent granted to the holders of the five per cents, which were reduced to four: that is, it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions.* It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr Pitt's unbending self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking-fund was to be applied to the current services of the year,

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

22.

Proof of these principles afforded by the result during the last twenty years.

23.

It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt.

* Funded debt on January 5, 1816,	£816,311,940
Unfunded ditto,	48,510,501

Total, £864,822,441

Total debt on 5th January 1833,—viz :

Funded, £754,100,549

Unfunded, 27,752,650

781,853,199

Paid off in sixteen years, £82,969,242

—*Annual Finance Statement*, 1833; and PEBBLER, 246; and PORTER'S *Parliamentary Tables*, ii. 6.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has, to all practical purposes, swallowed it entirely up. The sinking-fund, when thus broken upon, has proved the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the conclusion of hostilities, with a view to effect a diminution of the public debt; and how completely dependent, therefore, the sinking-fund was for its very existence upon Mr Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view, *without any application to the legislature*, by the mere cessation of borrowing, on the return of peace.*

Durable and far-seeing system which he had established.

* In Mr Pitt's Financial Resolutions, in the year 1790, which embrace a vast variety of important financial details, there is the clearest indication of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was,—“That supposing the price of 3 per cent stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, £90 in time of peace, and £75 in time of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about £85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about forty years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793 will be redeemed in about forty-seven years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable,) taxes would be set free in each year of peace to the amount of £133,000, and of war to that of £168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would, in the course of the same period, gradually rise from £5,000,000 to £10,400,000; and that, on the suppositions before stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of £10,500,000, and about 1846, further taxes to the amount of £4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the

Not a shadow of a doubt can now remain that Mr Pitt's and Mr Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1845. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the commissioners the whole sinking-fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836 would, at five per cent, have been above five hundred millions, and the sinking-fund would now (1835) have been paying off above forty millions a-year.* Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking-fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent, which, on an average, is probably not far

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

24.

Had it been adhered to, the whole debt would have been discharged in 1845.

reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793; making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of £19,000,000 yearly." Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and experience has now proved that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repealed, these anticipations would have been more than realised, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.¹

¹ Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1155.

* Table L, showing what the sinking-fund, accumulating at five per cent, if maintained at £15,000,000 a-year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836:—

Tables showing the progressive growth of a sinking-fund of fifteen and one often millions, from 1816 to 1836.

1816	. . .	£15,000,000	Brought forward,	£212,660,625
1817	. . .	15,750,000	1827	. . . 25,530,240
1818	. . .	16,537,500	1828	. . . 26,839,360
1819	. . .	17,363,870	1829	. . . 28,181,423
1820	. . .	18,231,973	1830	. . . 29,580,464
1821	. . .	19,143,566	1831	. . . 31,079,590
1822	. . .	20,100,774	1832	. . . 33,158,577
1823	. . .	21,005,038	1833	. . . 34,816,000
1824	. . .	22,055,234	1834	. . . 35,524,625
1825	. . .	23,157,048	1835	. . . 37,238,312
1826	. . .	24,315,572	1836	. . . 39,099,214
Carry forward,		£212,660,625	Total in 20 years,	£533,708,430

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

from the truth, the fund applicable to the reduction of the debt would now have been above twenty millions annually, and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of funded property would not probably have been consistent, either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury.

25.
Causes
which have
led to the
decay of this
system.

Everything, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but on an accurate knowledge of human nature, a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind, that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the wars of the French Revolution might have been discharged in little more than the time which was occupied in its contraction.

Table II., showing what the sinking-fund, if maintained from the taxes at £10,000,000 sterling, and if accumulating at four per cent only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836:—

1816	.	.	.	£10,000,000	Brought forward,	£138,243,700			
1817	.	.	.	10,400,000	1827	.	.	.	16,032,580
1818	.	.	.	10,816,000	1828	.	.	.	16,673,880
1819	.	.	.	11,264,000	1829	.	.	.	17,340,832
1820	.	.	.	11,715,560	1830	.	.	.	18,034,464
1821	.	.	.	12,671,544	1831	.	.	.	18,754,840
1822	.	.	.	13,178,404	1832	.	.	.	19,505,032
1823	.	.	.	13,705,540	1833	.	.	.	20,285,232
1824	.	.	.	14,253,760	1834	.	.	.	21,096,640
1825	.	.	.	14,822,948	1835	.	.	.	21,930,504
1826	.	.	.	15,415,944	1836	.	.	.	22,107,724

Carry forward, £138,243,700 Total in 20 years, £331,005,428

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the £533,708,430 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or £587,000,000. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at an average of 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the £342,000,000 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or £385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment, (1835.)

What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to under the severest trials with unshaken fidelity? The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen: in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the fatal contraction of the currency in 1819, which rendered the continuance of the indirect taxes which formed the basis of the sinking-fund difficult, and in the end impossible; in the advent of times when government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain.

When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "for," said he, "if you had spoken wisely, these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest disasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual amongst them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage. The learned fiercely assailed the sinking-fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile impos-

26.
It was the
desire for
present po-
pularity in
the govern-
ment.

CHAP.
XLI.

1802.

ture, incapable of standing the examination of reason or experience. The Opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; tax after tax was repealed amidst the applause of the whole nation;* the general concurrence in the work of destruction for a time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amidst mutual compliments from the Opposition to the Ministerial benches, the broad foundations of British greatness were loosened; the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue, to the amount of forty millions a-year, surrendered without any equivalent; and the nation, when it awakened from its trance, found itself saddled for ever with eight-and-twenty millions as the

* Taxes repealed since the peace of 1814 to 1834,—

Table showing the amount of direct and indirect taxes repealed from 1814 to 1834.	NET PRODUCE.		GROSS PRODUCE.
1814. War duties on goods, &c.	£932,000		£248,861
1815. Ditto,	222,000		222,749
1816. Property tax and war malt,	17,547,000		17,886,666
1817. Sweet wines,	37,000		37,813
1818. Vinegar, &c.	9,500		9,524
1819. Plate glass, &c.	269,000		273,573
1820. Beer in Scotland,	4,000		4,000
1821. Wool,	471,000		490,113
1822. Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000		2,164,037
1823. Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000		4,236,389
1824. Thrown silk and salt,	1,801,000		1,805,467
1825. Wine, salt, &c.	3,676,000		3,771,019
1826. Runn and British spirits,	1,967,000		1,973,915
1827. Stamps,	84,000		84,038
1828. Rice, &c.	51,000		52,227
1829. Silk, &c.	126,000		126,406
1830. Beer, hides, and sugar,	4,070,000		4,264,425
1831. Printed cotton and coals,	1,538,000		3,189,312
1832. Candles, almonds, raisins, &c.	747,000		754,996
1833. Soap, tiles, &c.	1,000,000		1,100,000
1834. House duty,	1,200,000		1,400,000
	£42,125,500		£44,845,529
Laid on in the same time,	5,813,000		
Net taxation reduced,	£36,312,500		

Of which £18,690,000 was direct, and £17,490,000 indirect.—See *Parl. Paper*, 14th June 1833, and *Budget 1834, Parl. Deb.*

interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and with a democratic constitution which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

CHAP.
XLI.

1806-1832.

The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxation upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when the excitement and expenditure of war were over. The income tax could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid anything to government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitement and understood necessities of war can render them bearable. His system was, therefore, to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of government — those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security, on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple object was gained. The nation, during the continuance of war, was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties, while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in those indirect duties which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of, from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state,

27.

Great error
in not re-
pealing at
once all the
direct taxes
on the peace.

CHAP.
XLI.
1816-1832.

in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amidst the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts, which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

28.
Imprudent
remission of
indirect
taxes since
1816.

Following out these principles, the income tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt-tax, and in general all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated: but on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking-fund, and none of them repealed till, from the growth of a surplus, after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population, and the constant efforts of general industry, would progressively have enabled government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the salt tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since the peace amount to £42,000,000, while £5,000,000, only have been imposed during the same period; and consequently, after the repeal of the income tax, assessed taxes, and these oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking-fund, even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a-year, would have remained. Thus Mr Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities

of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.*

If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking-fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable; and therefore that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But unfortunately this was by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has, on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as its future prospects, from the change. In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect, that during the war the nation not only existed, but thrived under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than *half* of what they have since become. During the four last years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five millions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty; although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from

CHAP.
XLI.
1816-1832.

29.
Little good
has been de-
rived from
this repeal
of indirect
taxes.

* Total taxes repealed since the peace,	£42,115,000
Might have been repealed, viz.—	
Property tax and war malt,	£17,547,000
War duties on goods,	2,154,000
Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000
Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000
Candles,	600,000
Soap tax,	800,000
House tax,	1,200,000
	27,625,000
Leaving to support the sinking-fund,	14,490,000
	42,115,000

Besides £5,813,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period.

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

80.

Immense
burdens un-
der which
the nation
prospered
during the
war.

twenty-five to thirty; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five; and in the last year the former had swelled to the enormous amount of one hundred and five millions, and the latter to sixty.*

Without doubt, the prosperity of the later years of the war was in a great degree fictitious: most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear, that if this had gone on for some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as in private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation; it is like reducing a patient suddenly from an inflammatory diet to the fare of an anchorite. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but unquestionably the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

	Raised by taxes.	Official value. Exports.	Official value. Imports.
		Great Britain and Ireland.	Great Britain and Ireland.
* 1813, .	£63,211,000	£38,226,283	£25,163,411
1814, .	70,926,000	Records destroyed by fire.	
1815, .	72,210,000	52,573,034	33,755,264
1816, .	62,264,000	56,624,600	32,987,396
1830, .	55,824,802	69,691,302	46,245,241
1831, .	54,810,190	71,429,004	49,713,889
1832, .	50,990,315	76,071,572	44,586,241
1836, .	48,591,180	97,621,549	57,230,968
1837, .	47,030,000	85,781,669	54,737,301
1838, .	47,978,753	105,170,549	61,268,320

—*FEBRER'S Tables*, 159, 341; *PORTER'S Tables*, i. 48, and ii. 49; *Finance Accounts*, 27th March 1839; *PORTER'S Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step further, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking-fund? That was the ruinous measure. The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a-year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would to all appearance have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long run diminishing, the national burdens, would at the same time have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the disastrous effects of which, for twenty years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to labour. No one branch of the government expenditure would have gone further to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking-fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a-year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty, thirty, and forty millions annually, applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum in loans, during the war, occasioned.

The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that, since 1820, they would have been constantly kept at from ninety to one hundred. The

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

31.

Argument
on this sub-
ject.

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

32.

Great immediate as well as ultimate advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking-fund.

effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the government expenditure in other departments, must have been immense. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in amount, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking-fund would have operated like a great forcing-pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work could only have been drawn from the nation, as the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry. But experience has abundantly proved that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income, to such a productive investment, is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if, from an undue regard to popular clamour, it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner, not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilising of his fields and the draining of his morasses.

33.

Beneficial result which would have arisen from keeping up the price of the funds.

Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and increasing purchases of the commissioners, would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out, in order to realise the

great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt, would have altogether counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going further than either reason or experience will justify. But this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively an endurable burden—that the nation would, to all appearance, have been much more prosperous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two-thirds of the national debt. This prosperity, doubtless, would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital; but, whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only for its discharge—and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking-fund and Mr Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that if the demands of government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, its demands on government must instantly undergo a similar diminution; that if the exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a-year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it was not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers; whereas,

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

34.
Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects.

CHAP.
XII.
1816-1832.

in truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real. Though a diminution of those burdens was effected, it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when such demand could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes and consequent abandonment of the sinking-fund necessarily occasioned, and which the maintenance of its machinery, till it had fulfilled its destined purpose, would to a very great degree have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious expedience for its recommendation, but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

35.
Lord Castlereagh's error regarding the income tax.

Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain that heavy impost, as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities; and its weight was so excessive, that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer

to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit government to a contest with the nation on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above thirty millions a-year, when they were not complained of, and when the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr Pitt's principles.

The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result. It is not unlikely that, from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and history cannot acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous, popular weakness; and if they could not prevail on the House of Commons to adhere to Mr Pitt's financial system, they should at least have laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment. And as the repeal of indirect taxes during peace was the fatal error, so the return to an income-tax during the burdens of the Chinese, and the disasters of the Affghanistaun wars, in 1842, was a wise and manly measure, as much in accordance with the spirit of Mr Pitt's financial policy as the previous calamitous reductions of indirect taxes had been against it.

It was impossible to explain Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

86.
The nation
was mainly
responsible
for this
change of
system.

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

37.
Advantages
of the fund-
ing system.

apology for the anachronism ; and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

It is evident that, in some cases, the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, the interest of which is alone laid as a burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and if possible would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contests, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so it is always advisable, to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income ; so that, at the conclusion of hostilities, no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When, in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure ; nor is it reasonable, in such cases, to lay upon those who, for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalisation of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit ; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amidst all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation ; or to resist the conclusion

deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application, at the close of the war, that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed.*

CHAP.
XLI.
1816-1832.

But this system, like everything good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity and conducted with prudence—unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing is to nations, not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leaving the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause which has overwhelmed almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages. The existence of the means of relieving present difficulties by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by government, that, by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a

38.

Its dangers.

* Loans contracted by the British government in the latter years of the war :—

1812,	£24,000,000	1814,	£58,763,000
1813,	27,871,000	1815,	18,500,000

Of these great loans upwards of £12,000,000 was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to the subsidising of foreign powers, in consequence of which the whole armies of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 80,000 men, was maintained on the southern frontier of France.—MOREAU'S *Tables*; FEBRER, 246.

CHAP.
XLI.

1816-1832.

39.
Mr Pitt's
views on this
subject.

very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

Mr Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and of the ultimate dangers of the funding system. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue which present appearances seemed to afford. During its earlier years, when the Continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war supplies of the year were raised by that means; provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and of the sinking-fund for the extinction of these loans, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged.* It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of a hundred and sixteen million pounds was contracted before the Continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not, whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the contest it might

		LOANS CONTRACTED.
* 1793,		£4,500,000
1794,	12,907,451
1795,	42,090,646
1796,	42,736,196
1797,	14,620,000

speedily be brought to a successful issue? That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the Allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, let slip the means of triumph when within their grasp.

The financial measures of the British minister, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent : the real error consisted in the misapplication or undue husbanding of the land forces of the country, for which it is not so easy to find an apology. But after the peace of Campo Formio, in 1797, this system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle. Her Continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle ; and the utmost that she could now expect was, to continue a defensive warfare till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798 :—

“Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret

40.
Modification
which they
received
after the first
Continental
peace in
1797.

41.
Mr Pitt's
speech on
the change
then intro-
duced.

CHAP.
XLI.

1798.

the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth, and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the embarrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success, is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy, will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour, and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that, after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, on such a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever, is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause, and to the supply of our own exigencies; by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

“To guard against the undue accumulation of the pub-

lic debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed anything which has been raised at any former period at one time; but I trust that, whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle, by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations; and that, while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view—if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert—great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance. The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the manners, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the proportion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into execution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardship in every individual instance;¹ but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting

CHAP.
XLI.

1798.

42.

He proposes
to augment
the supplies
raised with-
in the year.¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii.1042,
1045.

CHAP.
XLI.

1793.

the large deficiency which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year."

43.
Trebling of
the assessed
taxes.

In pursuance of these admirable principles, Mr Pitt proposed to treble the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages; and that the house and window taxes, which in a great measure are borne by the middle ranks, should only be doubled; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the committee of the House of Commons; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never exceeded four millions and a half—a deficiency which demonstrated that the limits of indirect taxation on these objects had been passed, and rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year. The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr Pitt's plan, to be continued only for a limited time, and kept up only as a war burden.¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii.1076.

44.
In Mr Pitt's
view, these
heavy bur-
dens were
to be tem-
porary only.

"I propose," said he, "that the increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking-fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exoneration of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope that, by stopping short of this effort, you

will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and, by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability; the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware it will be said that it would have been fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated; but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sum by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it; but if, on the other hand, you fund its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest, which, in forty years, will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language, fit for men legislating for a country that, from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow circumscribed sphere of shortsighted selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity, a sum of between forty and fifty millions sterling?' And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve everything dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity."¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1799.

Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii. 1054,
1055.

45.
Great
change of
system thus
introduced.

CHAP.
XLI.

1799.

the whole principal sums themselves. An admirable plan and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance—that of making the supplies raised within the year equal, or nearly equal, to the expenditure. It was soon, however, departed from amidst the necessities or profusion of future years; and from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it adds to the public, it was necessarily attended both with greatly more present suffering, and far less counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

46.
First introduction of
the income-
tax.

The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr Pitt's administration. But, in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a niggardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort, it appeared possible to obtain, during the absence of Napoleon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr Pitt proposed the income-tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and, if considered as a *war* impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive, and, for such circumstances, the most expedient, that could be adopted. The grounds on which this addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr Pitt:—

Feb. 1799.

“The principles of finance which the house adopted last year, were, first, to reduce the total amount to be at

present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount; and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion: but I trust that all who value the national safety will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts." In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under £60 a-year should pay anything: that, from that up to £200 a-year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for £200 a-year and upwards, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to make disclosure to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was, if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three-fourths of the rack-rent of their lands. The total taxable income of Great Britain he estimated at £102,000,000 a-year, and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to £9,500,000,¹ for which the income-tax was to be mort-

CHAP.
XII.

1799.

47.
Mr Pitt's
speech intro-
ducing this
impost, and
his plan.¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 5, 6,
18, 22.

CHAP.
XLI.

1799.

48.
Objections
urged
against it.

gaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged.

In opposition to this bill, it was argued by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downwards, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land-tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window-tax was a burden on a luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but on income: that is, of imposing a burden which, by no possibility, can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third, or even a half: that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution? The great danger of this tax, therefore, is, that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middle orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middle class, and do it soon: it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great source of general prosperity; and then we should have only two classes in the community—and a miserable community it would be—of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means, is doubtless just: but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary—it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income may spend what portion of it he chooses,

without injury to his heirs: but income resulting from personal industry, or from profession, stands in a very different situation; for it is necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed: and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who, in all probability, will be the more extravagant: and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the far-spread injustice be inflicted which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration."¹

CHAP.
XLI.

1799.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 134,
147.

The income-tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799; the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, £18,500,000, besides £3,000,000 of exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary, if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr Pitt that no less than £120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account—a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and providing them in great part by the funding system. The system of Mr Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy; and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required

49.

It is adopted
by parliament.

CHAP.
XLI.

1799-1800.

beyond one or two years; and, in consequence, it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income-tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it came to violate the principle that these direct taxes, being a burdensome impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1798 to 1801, the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct war taxes was no less than fifty-six millions.

50.

Change subsequently introduced on the system.

The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking-fund required for their redemption; and, in 1802, when Mr Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this £56,000,000, as well as £40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war. For the whole of this immense sum of £96,000,000 he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but for the sinking-fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt that this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle—which is, that the whole sums required for the interest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and that direct burdens should be reserved only for the extraordinary efforts made during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure.¹

¹ Parl. Deb. viii. 573, 576.

The changes which have now been mentioned embraced

all the leading principles of Mr Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of chancellor of the exchequer:—"In the year 1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, "the proportion of the sinking-fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being £5,835,000, and the latter £480,572,000. But in the year ending 1st February 1806, the sinking-fund amounted to £7,566,000, and the unredeemed debt was then £517,280,000; making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this, it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking-fund, or to detain the house with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the house to cling to it as their sheet-anchor for the future, they were called to support it, from having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact that, during the first ten years of the war, the increase of the debt was £253,000,000—being at the rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a-year: whereas, during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downwards, the total sum borrowed has been £36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a-year only."¹

CHAP.
XLI.

1799-1806.

51.
Advantages
of the new
system.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 70.
Parl. Deb.
vi. 567, 570.

With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged

CHAP.
XLI.

1805-1810.

52.

Mr Pitt's
permanent
taxes were
all in the
indirect
form. Their
advantages.

to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans annually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and the amounts requisite for the immediate redemption of the principals of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr Hume :—" The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed; and being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the others. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting a *universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenues of the empire*. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans."¹ It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr Pitt's financial measures, that he not only provided, in permanent imposts, for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking-

¹ Hume's
Essays, i.
365, 366.

fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially restricted to those years only during which the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

CHAP.
XLI.

1805-1810.

In addition to these forcible reasons for always, except in cases of obvious necessity, and when national resources are exhausted, preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish Pashas or the Indian Rajahs, have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason, though not apparent at first sight, when stated appears entirely satisfactory. It consists in a difference to the resources of the state similar to that experienced in agriculture upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below, after it has fertilised numerous plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, *before it is withdrawn*, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the government may be the same in both cases: but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the

53.
Arguments
for indirect
taxation.

CHAP.
XLI.

1806-1810.

tax-collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax, and, by their united efforts and increased economy in production, discharge it without difficulty; a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone, and if he attempts to throw it upon another, he is immediately met by a diminished sale for his produce. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form; that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future subsistence.

54.
Reply to the
objections
against
them.

Nor is there any foundation for the obvious reply to this argument, based on the observation, that if the productions of industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralysed as if the impost were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind have everywhere rejected its authority. No complaint was made during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain; but so burdensome was the income-tax, producing only fourteen millions a-year, felt to be, that all the efforts of government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals opened by the Reform Bill, upon the legislature, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a half extracted directly by the assessed taxes,

which were made the subject of such loud complaint, that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are felt as most oppressive by them at the moment.

Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse soever it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not in reality fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery for production of the article taxed, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguishes the burden. The proof of this is decisive: the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war: many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during that period, were sold at half the price at its termination which they brought at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the *permanent* expenses of the nation by the indirect taxes; of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention during peace of direct, and the lavish relinquishment of indirect taxes.

It results from these principles, that when an indirect

CHAP.
XLI.

1806-1810.

56.

Cases in
which indi-
rect taxes,
by being ex-
cessive, be-
come direct
burdens on
production.

tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material, or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or to lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption; it becomes a direct burden on production, and, if unduly heavy, may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in Great Britain in regard to the heavy import duties on sugar. The burden formerly of thirty shillings, then of twenty-seven shillings, and afterwards of twenty-four shillings the hundredweight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead (from £6 to £6, 10s. the cwt. :) but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to twelve or fifteen pounds the hogshead (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt.,) including duty, it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent on the rude material—the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a-quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production. The cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery; and the stoppage of the slave trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties, and defray the interest of their mortgages, by raising more extensive

crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices, and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive: the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per hundredweight was, in Great Britain, twenty-three shillings and eightpence, excluding duty; while in America it was thirty-six shillings per hundredweight in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than to America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to a hundred per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which had fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1806-1810.

¹ Commons' Rep. on West Indies, 1832, p. 7.

In all fiscal measures on this subject, there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than anything else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, *the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same*; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilised states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, that of producing agricultural produce is always much greater. Great Britain can undersell the world in manu-

57.
Important difference between indirect taxes on rural and manufactured produce.

CHAP.
XLI.

1806-1810.

58.
General
character of
Mr Pitt's
financial
measures.
Their grandeur and
foresight.

factures, but her farmers would be ruined without a corn-law—a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.

Such were the general features of Mr Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately followed; stigmatised by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amidst the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the governments by which he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable, consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing, the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages; inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understandings, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements, it required for its successful development, patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell, because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. It was abandoned, because the Revolution of 1832 placed a single class of society, that of the moneyed men and traders, in the chief possession of political power. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the Revolutionary war, we feel that we are

conversing with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman, in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and constructed for eternal duration, to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs who dwell amidst their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

CHAP.
XLI.
1790-1806.

While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, it is indispensable that we should not draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray. I. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Mr Pitt, is having carried too far, and continued too long, the funding system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterwards so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broken through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugene, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was past—after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Pichegru—after Spain and Prussia had retired from the struggle, and when the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napo-

59.
Their errors.
Undue extent of the
funding system.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

leon, the career of conquest in Italy, it became evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one-half. These loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time, on account of the loans of these years, would have been above £120,000,000 ! So prodigious is the difference, as regards the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the energetic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more acceptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

60.
Niggardly
use of the
military
forces of
England.

II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding, were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale, and in a way, calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the immense burdens thus imposed on posterity ; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the histories of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised ; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly

accepted a temporary respite from the victorious arms of Clairfait : after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura against the terrible energy of Suwarroff, and the scientific ability of the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at these periods at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might not the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare ; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been brought down by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers, then reposing inactive in the British islands, on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies !

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote. While the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most niggardly exertion of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish present dissipation of its funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportionate efforts in the field had at the same time been made, and if it was evident that nothing had been omitted which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war. But our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only two hundred and eight thousand men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a sea-girt and inaccessible citadel, never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand, and that only in the two first years of the war. Mr Pitt's plans for military operations

61.
This was his
great defect.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

were all based on the action of Continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking off pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence, in a great measure, the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

62.
Injudicious
system of
borrowing
in the three
per cents.

III. But the greatest of all Mr Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which he carried the ruinous system of borrowing in the three per cents—in other words, inscribing the public creditor for £100 in the books of the bank of England, in consideration of only £60 advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true; though even that advantage, as will immediately appear, was very trifling. But what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable; the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions have been contracted in the three per cents; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to pay in all two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking-fund at 80, on an average—which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr Pitt's estimate in 1799—the surplus to be

paid above what was received, would still be one hundred and fifty millions.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

63.

Its effect in
preventing
the reduc-
tion of in-
terest on
peace.

Nor have the evils of this improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on somewhat more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the 5 per cents—that is, if a bond for £100 had been given for each £100 only paid into the treasury. But as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with great part of the funds so contracted, of reducing the interest in time of peace? It is impossible to lower the interest of the three per cents till interest generally falls below three per cent; because if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, four per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the five per cents, it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the five per cents, and which, on £157,000,000 only of the debt, the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time £1,700,000 a-year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to three and a half; the two together, after taking into view the dissentients, having saved the nation, *for ever*, £2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the £600,000,000 in the three per cents (£360,000,000 sterling) at £18,000,000 a-year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent, would have been £3,600,000, and by the second of one-

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

half per cent, £1,800,000 more; in all £5,400,000 for ever. The sum already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years in future the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions.

64.
The temporary diminution of interest was no adequate compensation for these evils.

The temporary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses, with which the system was ultimately attended. It appears, from the curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the 3 per cents and the 5 per cents was seldom above a half per cent, generally not more than a quarter.* What

* Take, for example, the following loans contracted in the 3 and 5 per cents, at different periods during the war:—

	Amounts actually paid into Treasury.	Interest.	Rate per cent.
	£	£	
1794. Loan in 5 per cents, .	1,907,451	96,326	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	10,806,000	502,791	4½ per cent.
1795. Loan in 5 per cents, .	1,490,646	80,494	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	17,777,163	841,374	4½ per cent.
1796. Loan in 5 per cents, .	2,034,889	101,744	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	8,500,000	493,145	5½ per cent.
1797. Loan in 5 per cents, .	17,815,918	1,006,242	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	13,000,000	825,500	5½ per cent.
1801. Loan in 5 per cents, .	2,227,012	111,380	5½ per cent.
1806. Loan in 3 per cents, .	27,519,544	1,344,487	5½ per cent.
1807. Loan in 5 per cents, .	1,293,200	64,660	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	10,800,000	512,400	4½ per cent, but £140 stock created for each £60 paid.
1809. Loan in 5 per cents, .	7,932,100	408,878	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, .	11,600,000	538,433	4½ per cent.
1811. Loan in 5 per cents, .	4,909,350	258,315	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, .	11,925,243	569,500	4½ per cent.
1814. Loan in 5 per cents, .	5,549,400	277,470	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents, .	12,345,076	574,362	4½ per cent.
1815. Loan in 5 per cents, .	10,313,000	603,310	5½ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, .	27,000,000	1,517,400	5½ per cent.

—See PEBRER'S *Tables*, 246, from MOREAU.

It clearly appears, from this remarkable table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the 3 and the 5 per cents, from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears; for the public creditors were frequently, in the three per cents, inscribed for much more than £100 in consideration of £60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than £140 of stock for each £60 paid.

is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled government to have effected on the return of peace? Even supposing the difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent, what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest *for ever* to four or three-and-a-half per cent? This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument. And if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an additional loan every year while the inability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than, by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, to have disabled posterity for ever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts.* So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that, by a solemn resolution in 1824, parliament pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the 5 per cents: a resolution worthy of the British legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget, but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praise-

* The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents, but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject in a company consisting of the most eminent and intelligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended, that if Mr Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a *little loan* to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that the money could not have been obtained on other terms; and the "little" loan became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr Anderson of Moredun, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes and Co. of Edinburgh, he will recur, perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790-1806.

65.
In Mr Pitt's
view, the
sinking-
fund was to
remedy all
these evils.

worthy determinations, amidst the warlike profusion or democratic pressure of subsequent times.

It is true, as Mr Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking-fund, and had provided means which, if steadily adhered to, would *unquestionably have produced that result* even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the 3 per cents could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated, was the purchase of stock by the sinking-fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they by no means exculpate Mr Pitt as regards these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 85 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking-fund which he himself had established; and the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to

uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effects of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements.*

To Mr Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are even

* It is a common opinion that the great expenses of Mr Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during the whole war only amounted to £52,528,470; of which no less than £33,000,000 were advanced during the three last years. At Mr Pitt's death the sum was only £6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war, were as follows:—(MOREAU,) (PORTER.)

Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department, during the war.

Years.	Subsidies to Foreign Powers.	Army.		Civil List.	Ordnance.	Navy, Total.	Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded.	Total Expenditure.
		Ordinary.	Extraordinary.					
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1793	2,198,200	4,167,312	1,021,536	843,603	2,464,307	10,715,941	22,754,366	
1794	4,000	9,209,236	1,027,761	1,500,767	4,219,156	11,081,159	29,305,477	
1795	810,500	14,562,737	1,025,842	1,968,008	8,135,140	12,345,987	39,751,091	
1796	99,500	13,738,350	1,125,053	2,590,000	7,780,868	13,683,129	40,761,533	
1797	—	16,208,690	1,081,046	2,121,552	11,984,031	16,405,402	50,739,857	
1798	120,012	7,986,297	3,165,854	1,111,376	1,715,355	12,591,728	51,241,798	
1799	325,000	9,898,716	4,241,433	1,208,067	2,221,516	13,036,490	59,296,081	
1800	2,613,178	9,971,889	3,906,000	1,247,420	1,918,967	14,809,488	61,617,988	
1801	200,114	8,838,208	5,347,174	1,290,136	2,165,909	17,303,370	73,072,468	
1802	—	6,951,193	2,635,063	1,338,768	1,500,733	11,704,400	62,373,480	
1803	—	8,134,315	3,165,092	1,425,545	1,827,150	7,979,878	54,912,890	
1804	—	12,189,891	3,560,804	1,417,517	3,550,142	11,759,352	67,619,475	
1805	—	10,758,343	6,261,387	1,914,104	4,782,289	14,466,998	76,056,796	
1806	—	9,282,192	5,829,000	1,676,323	5,511,064	16,084,028	75,154,548	
1807	—	9,956,684	5,431,867	1,680,061	4,190,748	16,775,762	78,369,689	
1808	1,400,000	11,353,390	5,847,760	1,724,147	5,108,960	17,467,891	76,566,913	
1809	2,050,000	12,591,041	5,872,054	1,696,994	4,374,184	19,236,037	76,865,548	
1810	2,660,103	11,357,623	7,178,677	1,651,297	4,652,333	20,054,412	88,735,223	
1811	2,977,747	13,753,163	10,116,196	1,582,097	4,557,509	19,540,679	88,757,324	
1812	5,315,828	15,382,050	9,605,313	1,748,349	4,252,416	20,500,339	105,943,727	
1813	11,294,416	18,500,985	10,968,535	1,708,526	3,404,582	21,996,624	106,882,260	
1814	10,024,624	16,532,945	17,662,610	1,675,152	4,480,729	21,961,567	92,280,180	
1815	11,035,248	23,172,137	1,682,021	2,963,892	16,373,870	43,902,989	65,169,771	
Totals	53,128,470	384,787,438	32,936,125	71,082,262	328,236,415	619,830,178	1,539,176,633	

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of fifteen hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirtieth, the latter hardly a forty-eighth of the total expenditure. The vastness of the sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted; for it gave England the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; coinciding thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the niggardly use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficiency, which was the real reproach of Mr Pitt's administration.

CHAP.
XLI.

1797.

66.

Vast effects
of the sus-
pension of
cash pay-
ments in
1797.

yet far from being exhausted. The SUSPENSION OF CASH PAYMENTS in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century. When taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the productiveness of the Spanish mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, it led the way to a series of changes in prices, and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico, and which has already subverted the former balance of power in the interior of Great Britain. To it the future historian will perhaps point as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate decline of the British empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its elucidation, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency, from the rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is at the same time made the subject of discussion.

67.

Causes
which pro-
duced the
suspension
of cash pay-
ments in
1797. Its
powerful
operation
in increas-
ing the
present re-
sources of
the state.

At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed to Mr Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor, like the subsequent changes of a similar kind in this country, of moneyed selfishness and theoretical opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national

bankruptcy, stared him in the face, if the momentous step was any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at subsequent periods, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all the resources of the kingdom. No doubt, however, can remain that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war, and is to be regarded as the principal cause of its successful termination. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when, from over-issue, it becomes depreciated, or, from distrust of government, discredited, or when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place, that the perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amidst this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependants. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every new demand upon them, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the expansion of the currency, as productive of present strength, as the opposite system of contracting it, after the contest was over, was conducive to future weakness. No financial embarrassments of any moment were experienced while the war lasted, subse-

CHAP.
XLI.

1797.

quent to 1797. In vain Napoleon waited for the failure of the funding system, and the giving way of England's financial resources. Year after year the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained; and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the Continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle.

68.
It was the
mainspring
of the finan-
cial strength
of the nation
during the
war.

No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an *annual creation* of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that the great cause is to be found of the never-failing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, the quickened and extended circulation of which spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports, and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if it had not been sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency. It is evident, also, that the funding system, with all its dangers and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassments with which it was to be attended,

but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management.*

The contracting and immediately spending of loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a-year, in addition to the revenue of equal amount, raised by taxation, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was indeed withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry; but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence in that respect was still more

CHAP.
XLI.
1797.

69.
Great temporary advantages of the funding system.

* Table showing the amount of bank-notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the commercial paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the gold and silver annually coined at the Bank, with the exports, imports, and revenue for the same period.

Years.	L.5 Notes in circulation.	Under L.5.	Commercial Paper rendered at Bank.	Bullion Coined.	Total of Notes.	Official Value of Imports into Great Britain.	Official Value of Exports from Great Britain.	Revenue.	British Vessels' Tonnage.
1792	11,307,380	—	—	1,171,863	11,307,380	19,693,358	24,904,860	17,864,464	1,540,145
1793	11,388,910	—	—	2,747,430	11,388,910	19,693,357	20,390,179	17,707,983	—
1794	10,744,020	—	—	2,553,895	10,744,020	22,294,893	26,748,082	17,899,294	—
1795	14,017,610	—	2,646,500	493,416	14,017,610	23,736,889	27,123,338	18,456,298	—
1796	10,729,520	—	3,505,000	464,680	10,729,520	22,187,319	20,613,313	18,543,628	—
1797	9,674,790	867,585	3,350,000	3,600,297	10,543,363	21,013,956	28,917,010	19,833,646	—
1798	11,647,610	1,448,320	4,490,600	3,967,595	13,095,830	25,122,203	27,317,087	30,499,995	—
1799	11,494,150	1,466,650	5,403,900	449,963	12,959,800	24,068,700	29,556,637	35,311,018	—
1800	15,373,990	1,471,540	6,401,600	189,937	16,854,880	28,357,781	33,381,617	34,769,457	1,905,438
1801	15,573,520	9,334,720	7,906,100	450,942	16,013,860	20,455,268	24,293,564	35,616,351	1,725,349
1802	15,574,880	9,213,090	7,233,300	497,019	15,166,880	28,908,373	37,873,324	37,111,620	2,147,629
1803	18,360,970	2,968,960	10,747,600	596,445	15,319,930	26,104,541	28,075,239	38,208,937	2,167,863
1804	15,546,660	4,331,370	9,083,400	718,397	17,077,830	26,454,281	31,071,108	45,515,153	2,268,570
1805	13,011,010	4,890,160	11,365,500	54,668	17,871,170	37,344,720	30,540,491	50,635,190	2,383,442
1806	13,271,220	4,453,600	12,380,100	405,106	17,730,120	26,504,473	32,884,101	54,071,908	2,268,714
1807	12,840,740	4,138,890	12,384,000	None.	16,380,680	32,826,845	30,885,084	59,408,731	2,231,621
1808	14,098,680	4,695,170	19,950,100	371,714	18,788,860	25,660,983	29,956,639	62,147,601	3,324,519
1809	14,241,360	4,301,500	15,475,700	296,946	15,542,860	30,170,292	45,867,216	63,879,802	2,308,468
1810	16,159,180	5,860,420	20,070,600	316,936	21,019,600	37,613,284	42,656,843	67,232,597	2,426,044
1811	16,246,130	7,114,080	14,355,400	312,263	23,860,220	25,340,704	27,237,232	65,309,100	2,474,774
1812	15,901,290	7,457,080	14,391,600	None.	23,408,390	24,923,922	37,982,977	66,729,125	2,478,739
1813	15,407,320	7,713,610	12,330,200	519,722	23,120,930	Records destroyed by fire.	—	68,302,560	—
1814	16,455,540	8,345,540	13,285,800	None.	24,801,080	32,622,771	51,358,398	70,240,313	2,616,965
1815	15,226,260	7,517,000	12,380,000	None.	27,022,620	31,822,053	67,420,443	72,803,142	2,631,811
1816	16,081,220	9,001,400	11,416,400	None.	27,622,620	26,374,921	48,216,156	62,640,711	2,648,593

Table showing the paper and coin issued with the exports, imports, and revenue of every year during the war.

—*Parl. Deb.* vii. xiv. xv.; *App. Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563; COLQUHOUN, 99.—MOREAU'S *Tables*, and PEPPER, 279.—MARSHALL'S *Digest*, pp. 97, 147, 286.

Thus, in the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled; the revenue tripled, the exports more than doubled, and the imports increased a half. The increase of commercial paper, from 1792 to 1810, was *sevenfold*—indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

CHAP.
XLI.

1797-1816.

powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals. It was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter ; but still that circumstance, how prejudicial soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression : exports and imports doubled, the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were to a certain extent delusive ; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emergencies ; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow this feverish and unnatural period of excitement, is indeed certain. But still the effect at the moment was the same ; and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created, were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state in future times it might have been, to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict ; and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept for ever from the book of existence.

Had Mr Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with

this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking-fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience: and there can be no question that, if it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1845; that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of a rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking-fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes on which it depended, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation, a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals; the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed alone to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent governments. Without exculpating the members of the administrations who did not manfully resist, and, if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may safely be affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for

CHAP.
XLI.

1797-1816.

70.

The undue ascendancy of popular power led to the undoing of Mr Pitt's durable system for reduction of the debt.

CHAP.
XLI.

1797-1816.

its redemption, they have to blame, not Mr Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind democratic spirit which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge.

71.
And it must
ultimately
ruin the
British
empire.

¹ Tocque-
ville, ii.
237.

"All nations," says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American democracy, "which have made a great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable of durable achievements."¹ The abandonment of a system fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking-fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the constitution had become overloaded in reality, before it was so in form, on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an "ignorant impatience of taxation" was to bring about that disregard of everything but present objects, which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. During nearly thirty years of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline, the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired under the increasing influence of the unthinking multitude; and at length, upon the subversion of that aristocratic predominance by the great change of 1832, it was finally to all practical purposes destroyed. Irrecoverable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state; for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected.

In truth, the abandonment of the sinking-fund, in consequence of the weak and vacillating conduct of the successive administrations in yielding to partial clamours, raised by interested parties for a reduction of taxation affecting themselves, was so enormous an error, and is fraught with such evidently disastrous effects to the future independence and existence of the country, that it would be wholly unaccountable, in an age of intelligence and political activity, were it not explained by the dreadful effects of the sudden and prodigious contraction of the currency which took place in consequence of the act compelling the Bank of England to resume cash payments in 1819. Whoever will cast his eye over the instructive table given in the Appendix to the last volume of this work, will at once perceive that this fatal measure, which, at the very time that the annual supply of the precious metals for the globe had been reduced a half by the effects of the South American revolutions, curtailed the paper circulation of the British islands by *another half*, had the effect of lowering prices for the next thirty years by fully fifty per cent.* The remuneration of industry in every department being so greatly reduced, while money engagements of all sorts, public and private, underwent no diminution, the payment of most of the indirect taxes became impossible. It was an easy matter for the masters engaged in the principal branches of manufacture in the kingdom to prove to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, under the forcible reduction of prices which the contraction of the currency had produced, they could not carry on their operations without a great reduction or entire liberation from taxation. Such relief had become to them, in many cases, the price of existence. Hundreds of thousands would be thrown out of employment if it was not given. This explains, and can alone explain, the otherwise inexplicable infatuation of so many different administrations in

CHAP.
XLI.

1797-1816.

72.

The contraction of the currency by the bill of 1819 was the cause of this.

* See Appendix, Chap. xcv.

CHAP.
XLI.

1797-1816.

abandoning to so great an extent the indirect taxes, the sheet-anchor of the British finances. Disastrous as it was, that abandonment was an effect, not a cause. It was the direct and unavoidable effect of a violent and uncalled-for contraction of the currency to the extent of a half, at the very time when the failure in the wonted supplies of the precious metals for the use of the globe, and the prodigious increase of population and transactions in the British islands, most loudly called for its increase.

73.
Which was
itself owing
to the ascen-
dency of the
moneyed in-
terest pro-
duced by the
war.

But this only removes the difficulty a step further back. How did it happen that government could ever have been induced to give their consent to a measure fraught with such ruinous consequences as this contraction of the currency has proved to be? It affected the exchequer at least as much as the general industry of the country; it at once stopped the liquidation of the public debt, starved down the military and naval establishments of the empire to a scale inconsistent with its lasting defence, and has kept the treasury ever since in almost ceaseless embarrassments. The solution of this enigma is to be found in the weight acquired in the country by a body previously little regarded, but which has now become paramount to all others, in consequence of the success of the war,—the *moneyed interest*. So vast had been the accumulation of capital during the contest, so immense the numbers, and powerful the influence, of the trading and commercial classes who had risen to affluence while it continued, that they had now come to overshadow all the other classes of the state put together. The classes had become all-powerful whose interest was to buy cheap and sell dear. The consumers were enabled to set the producers at defiance. The Reform Act, produced by the wide-spread and universal suffering occasioned by this important change, gave the moneyed interest a permanent sway in the state; for it bestowed two-thirds of the seats in the House of Commons on the

members for burghs, and two-thirds of the votes in every burgh on the trading or moneyed classes, or the persons whom they could influence. Thence the entire deviation of British legislation since that time from all the principles which formerly regulated it. Thence the abandonment of the sinking-fund to cheapen government, of the corn-laws to cheapen labour, of colonial protection to cheapen sugar and wood, of the navigation laws to cheapen freights. England, like imperial Rome, had fallen under the rule of a body of moneyed patricians, whose interests were adverse to that of all the industrious classes in the state, but whose influence outweighed them all put together. They desired to cheapen everything except money, and that they sought to make as dear as possible. Ultimate ruin will be brought upon the British as it was on the Roman empire, from the same cause, and in the same way. And thus the entire success of the measures of protection and a sufficient currency, which formed the leading features of Mr Pitt's domestic policy, was the immediate cause of their abandonment by the next generation, because they reared up a wealthy moneyed class whose interests were at variance with those of industry, but whose influence was beyond its control.

But if the sun of British greatness is from these causes setting in the Old, it is from the same cause rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the democratic spirit, both in the British isles and on the shores of the Atlantic—the energy it develops, the desires it creates, the burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the west; and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilisation into the primeval recesses of the forest. Two hundred thousand of the Anglo-Saxons or Celtic race are now annually impelled, by necessity, ambition, or restlessness,

CHAP.
XLI.

1806.

74.

These causes
will impel
the British
race to the
New World.

CHAP.

XLI.

1797-1816.

from the British islands to the shores of the New World.* In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown; but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality. But in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as in those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing operation of those principles at once of corruption and regeneration which are combined in humanity; and which, universal in communities as in single men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

* In the year 1848, 258,000 emigrants sailed from the British islands, of whom 244,000 were destined for the United States or Canada, and in 1849 the number was still greater.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESSBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE
CONTINENTAL WAR. JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

THE peace of Pressburg seemed to have finally subjected the Continent to the empire of France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes was dissolved. The military strength of Austria had received, to all appearance, an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his overthrow. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they, too, had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was mute; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the Continental

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

1.

Immense
results of the
campaign of
Austerlitz.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

armies, and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible object; while the death of the great statesman who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolution, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of government might be anticipated on the part of his successors.

2.
The premiership offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined.

The hopes entertained by Napoleon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power, to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon to all appearance likely to be realised. The death of Mr Pitt dissolved the administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none — friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unreserved confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sank into the grave, the ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The King, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the midst of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India bill introduced by the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the government in the hands of the same party, and immediately after Mr Pitt's death commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new administration on the same basis. But that experienced and cautious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his shortlived power was the dubious one of accepting the wardenship of the Cinque Ports,¹ which had been held by Mr Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift

¹ Ann. Reg. 1806, 18, 21.
Parl. Deb. iv. 67, 75.
Pellew's Sidmouth, ii. 414.

of the crown. This office was pressed upon him by the King, and had undoubtedly been well deserved by his faithful services, for which he had hitherto declined any remuneration ; but, being the sole act of a shortlived power, it was much commented on, and gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussions in both houses of parliament under the succeeding administration.

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the ministry after Mr Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties, and a union of all the principal statesmen of the time, to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary ; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that, having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its forces might not be more effectually disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a great degree. The Opposition journals had increased in number and vehemence of declamation ; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of government, in that point where Mr Pitt's administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, are exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years ; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs ; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when those absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true

3.
Public opinion on the necessity of a coalition of parties.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

friends to their country, on whichever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish, accordingly, was felt for the formation of a government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction — a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England. It never can do so, except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and as calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy for the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 17, 25.

4.
Mr Fox is
sent for.

Yielding, at length, though unwillingly, and with sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the King, on the 26th January, sent a message to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham House, to confer with his Majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr Fox as the person he should consult on the subject. The King, though personally averse to that statesman, instantly saw the necessity of making his private feelings give way to the public good. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the King: and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men. No time was lost in sending for Mr Addington, recently before created Lord Sidmouth, who agreed to form part of the administration. The anxious wish expressed both by the sovereign and the nation that the government should be formed on the broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties,² which, although it gave great apparent stability

² Ann. Reg.
1806, 21.
Pellew's
Sidmouth,
ii. 414.

at the outset, was little calculated in the end to insure the permanence of the administration.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

5.

State of parties in the country, and their principles.

Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr Pitt's cabinet, then divided the legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to democratic principles, were represented by Mr Fox and Mr Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of highly popular institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the test acts, the abolition of slavery, peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had seceded with Mr Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families, and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold on the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stancher brethren. In hostility to France, and fierce opposition to revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the popular side, although they might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more democratic portion of the government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of these great parties, though highly respectable from the weight of private character, the adherents of Mr Addington's administration, who had remained in Opposition ever since they were displaced from power, were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr Addington) was the leader of this portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalesce, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists; and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.

6.
Composition
of the
cabinet.

The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new cabinet; but the preponderance of Mr Fox's adherents was so great as to render the ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most considerable, under government. Mr Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the crown, contented himself with the important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was to be expected, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made First Lord of the Treasury; Mr Erskine, Lord Chancellor; Lord Howick, (formerly Mr Grey,) First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr Windham, Secretary at War; Earl Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home Department.* The cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting

* The Cabinet was composed of the following members :—

Lord Erskine—Lord Chancellor.

Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council.

Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.

Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.

Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.

Earl Moira—Master General of the Ordnance.

Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

Mr Fox—Foreign Affairs.

Mr Windham—Secretary at War.

Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Lord Ellenborough—Chief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet.

—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 26.

a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius, for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But, amidst the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily rejected the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs. By a still greater number, the admission of the Lord Chief-Justice into the cabinet was justly regarded as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties, which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 26, 28.

Notwithstanding the essential and total change which the ministry had undergone, and the accession of a party to power who had so long denounced the measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the policy of government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterised the war as unjust and impolitic, preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors—a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of his great predecessor, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, it was proposed to carry the war taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions

7.
First measures of the new ministry. The budget.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

and a half—an increase which was effected by raising the income-tax from six and a half to ten per cent, and by an addition of 3s. a hundredweight to the duty on sugar. The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still £18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and for a sinking-fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing £500,000 a-year, and an additional duty laid on pig-iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount in all of £1,136,000.* The great addition to the income-tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden, and a total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue;¹ and there can be no doubt that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 566, 574.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 71.

* BUDGET OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1806.

Expenditure, Extraordinary.

Navy,	£15,281,000
Army,	18,500,000
Ordnance,	4,718,000
Miscellaneous,	2,170,000
Arrears of subsidies,	1,000,000
Vote of credit,	2,000,000
	<hr/>
	£43,669,000

Income, Extraordinary.

Malt and personal estate duties,	£2,750,000
Grants from captured ships,	1,000,000
Lotteries,	380,000
Surplus of consolidated fund,	3,500,000
War-taxes, 19,500,000	} 18,000,000
Deduct as outstanding at end of year, 1,500,000	
Loan,	18,000,000
	<hr/>
	£43,630,000

exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand, and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being £23,000,000, and the total sum raised by taxes and other sources of revenue, £55,796,000, while the total expenditure was £72,750,000, and income, including the loan of £18,000,000, no less than £73,796,000.—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 566, 569; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesmanlike part.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

The return of Napoleon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, had become necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to involve the government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from political, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the Emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Matters had arrived at such a pass, that the public service could no longer be carried on, and nothing but the Emperor's unparalleled victories and speedy return could have averted a national bankruptcy. He had often, during the preceding years, declared his resolution not to issue treasury bills; but he forgot to follow the only rule by which that resource could be averted, that of keeping his expenditure within his income. As it was, he instantly applied his mind, with its wonted vigour, to the consideration of the tremendous crisis which had arisen. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the council of finance was assembled: it sat nine hours; and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed minister of finances, and M. de Marbois, the former minister, dismissed.¹

8.
Return of
Napoleon
to Paris.
Financial
crisis there.

¹ Bign. v.
96. Bour.
vii. 111.
Thiers, vi.
25, 187, 188.

This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, and which, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, might have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the empire,

9.
Its ostensi-
ble causes.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

and urged on by the constant demand for accommodation on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, rendered necessary by the expenditure of government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progressively enlarging its discounts. Before the Emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoleon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amidst all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the minister of finances on the subject, and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in extensive transactions, or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the royal privilege of coining money.* The immense discounts which occasioned the peril were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who, being obliged to make good their payments to government by a certain day, and embarrassed by the remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were unavoidably driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and the peremptory demands of the treasury, and their credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration.¹ The Bank of France was the quarter to which they in general applied for accommoda-

¹ Bign. v. 85, 88. Bour vii. 92, 96. Thiers, vi. 188, 189, 191.

* His words are, in a letter to the minister of finances²—"The evil originates in the bank having transgressed the law. What has the law done? It has given the privilege of coining money in the form of paper to a particular company; but what did it intend by so doing? Assuredly, that the circulation thus created should be based on solid credit. The bank appears to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which is to discount to individuals, not in proportion to their real capital, but to the number of shares of its capital stock which they possess. That, however, is no real test of solvency. How many persons may be possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them a single farthing? The paper of the bank is thus issued in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on real credit, but on a delusive supposition of wealth. In one word, in discounting after this

² From Boulogne, Sept. 24, 1805.

tion ; but the pressure thus occasioned upon that establishment was so severe that, even after the successes at Ulm, they had announced to the Emperor that they could not continue their advances, and that the drain of specie was such that they themselves stood in the most imminent danger.

To relieve the pressure on the bank, attempts had been made to obtain a supply of the precious metals from every quarter whence they could be drawn. For this purpose, recourse was had to certain great mercantile companies, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to that establishment, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these was that of which Ouvrard was the leading partner ; and its engagements with the Bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the Spanish fleet ; and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service ; and before the middle of 1805, nearly seventy millions of francs (£2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the government occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market ; but so implicated was the

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

10.
Vast speculations of M.
Ouvrard.

manner, the bank *is coining false money*. So clearly do I see the dangers of such a course, that, if necessary, I would stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in it. I am distressed beyond measure at the necessities of my situation, which, by compelling me to live in camps, and engaging me in distant expeditions, withdraw my attention from what would otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first wish of my heart—a good and solid organisation of all that concerns the interest of banks, manufactures, and commerce.” What admirable wisdom in these remarks, written at the camp of Boulogne, in the midst of the boundless arrangements which the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced, must have required, and of which his correspondence furnishes such ample proof !—See BIGNON, v. 85, 86.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

treasury in these transactions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course, and thus increase the depreciation, which had already become sufficiently alarming. M. Desprez, a great capitalist, engaged also in the collection of specie, and who had long supported the bank, became embarrassed, and himself solicited aid from that establishment. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sank so much in value that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100. A universal disquietude prevailed, and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.¹

¹ Bign. v. 85, 93. Bour. vii. 92, 100. Thiers, vi. 197, 201.

11.
The immediate cause of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war.

Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states, both on the part of government and individuals. Napoleon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) from the Bank of France, without the slightest regard to its necessary effect upon the credit of that establishment. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the minister of finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanlerbergh, and Seguire, who advanced 102,000,000 francs (£4,080,000) to the public treasury, and received in return long-dated bills for 150,000,000 francs. To meet this advance Ouvrard hastened to Madrid, to obtain a supply of piastres from the Spanish government; and such was the ascendancy which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an *exclusive* right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company:

nearly the whole treasures of the world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining from America, before a year expired, 272,000,000 francs (£11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of the Continent, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Desprez—who had demanded a loan of 100,000,000 francs (£4,000,000) from the Bank, which they could not give him—and several other of the greatest capitalists,—including M. Recamier, the splendour of whose living, as well as the beauty of his wife, had long riveted public attention—failed. This immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the bank and the treasury. Paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanlerbergh, one of the greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing solely by an advance to a great amount from the public funds. The consequences would have been fatal to the empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany, for the government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service. But the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Pressburg operated like a charm in dispelling the panic: with the cessation of Continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased; and the crisis was in fact over, when the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public confidence. The danger, however, had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it: and, by merely protracting the contest in Moravia for a few weeks, the Allies would infallibly have brought the French government to a national bankruptcy.¹

¹ Bign. v.
89, 94. Bour.
vii. 100, 111.
Sav. ii. 157,
162. Thiers,
vi. 197, 201.

Napoleon was highly indignant at these embarrassments, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

12.

Measures of
Napoleon in
conse-
quence.

victory of Austerlitz.* Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders; the imprudent facility of M. de Marbois, the minister of finances, became the general object of reprobation, and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration.† The Emperor minutely scrutinised the embarrassments of the bank and the treasury: it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the government amounted to 141,000,000 francs, (£5,600,000,) of which Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh owed nearly two-thirds, and prosecutions were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, including M. Desprez, who were thrown into prison without distinction. Measures of the last severity were threatened against Ouvrard and his partners, who were offered their choice between standing the chances of a criminal prosecution, and the immediate cession of all they possessed. They preferred the latter, and in consequence that gigantic company was reduced to bankruptcy: but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned: but a few years after, the government was under the necessity of resuming it: and Napoleon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by appointing him president of the Chamber of Accounts.¹

¹ Bour. vii.
111. Bign.
v. 96, 97.
Thiers, vi.
377.

13.
Real cause
of the catas-
trophe.

In fact, though it suited the interests of the Emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the minister of finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper, and the crisis was, in fact, occasioned by the vicious system to

* "Beaten," says Savary, "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii. 161.

† The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Stael, "He," said she, "is nothing but a willow painted to look like bronze."—BOUR. vii. 111.

which the extravagant expenditure of the imperial government had driven the finance ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoleon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the distressed condition of the finances. The actual receipts of the treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions of francs below the annual expenses. In addition to this, the payments of the finance minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year; while the period of his receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Hence arose an indispensable necessity for recourse to money-lenders, who advanced cash to the treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realised. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure, as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the Chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit, which was daily increasing; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted by the treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it.¹

¹ Bign. v 87,
88, 103.
Thiers, viii.
86, 97.

Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances: and this system succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804. But the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the Austrian war, rendered these resources totally insufficient; and it became necessary to apply to greater capitalists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, who were already the contractors for the supplies to almost all the forces, both

14.
Means by
which the
crisis had
hitherto
been avoid-
ed.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

by land and sea ; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on exchequer bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of government, and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone government derived the funds requisite for its immense engagements. The monetary embarrassments of 1805, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure : but they arose not on the part of individuals, but of government ; the crisis was not commercial but political.¹

¹ Bign. v.
87, 88.

15.
The root of
the evil was
the extrava-
gant expen-
diture of
govern-
ment.

Thence the singular and instructive fact, that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoleon so loudly complained, were made not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service. The root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the Emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of government. He often boasted that he never had, and never would, issue government paper. This was quite true ; but it was equally true, what he passed over, that his expenditure of a hundred millions of francs annually, beyond his income, drove all the government contractors to that perilous expedient. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest : it indicated the arrival of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the Convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes ; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become

indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but to maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution. Napoleon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. Marbois had long before represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoleon was so sensible of this, that he had expressed his resolution, in military fashion, to have M. Ouvrard arrested, and made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Bign. v.
87, 88.
Thiers, viii.
97, 99.

The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he, "between the bank and the treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign a decree for the emancipation of the treasury." The difficulty was, that the treasury had to pay every twelve months a hundred and twenty millions of francs (£4,800,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (£2,400,000) were funded in the five per cents; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit banks, under the name of "caisses de service," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to

16.
Financial
changes in
consequence
introduced
in France.

* "Bourrienne," said he, in 1800, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested."—"General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?"—"Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? At the public expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the government.—BOUR. vii. 94, 95.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Bign. v.
89, 189,
and 195.

deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly.¹

17.
And imposi-
tion of the
French
armies as a
burden on
foreign
states.
Nov. 18.

But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by government greatly beyond its income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz provided the means of solving the difficulty. From the moment the Grand Army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany.* On the 18th November, an edict of the Emperor directed the transmission of all funds to the army of the north to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the army of Italy. Thus the three principal armies of the empire ceased to be any longer a charge upon its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoleon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were in consequence, as the Duke de Gaeta,² their principal compiler, himself confesses, no true statement of the imperial expenses.³ They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic

² Gaeta, l.
272, 434.

³ Bign. v.
99, 100.

* From the castle of Louisberg in Würtemberg, Napoleon wrote, so early as 4th October 1805, to the minister of finances at Paris—"The army maintains the most exact discipline: the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: *I have no need of money from you.*" These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—BIGNON, v. 100.

finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; and, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the conquered states, totally fallacious.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

The budget of France for 1805, presented to the Chambers in February 1806, accordingly exhibited a most deceptive picture of the national finances; but even as it was, it showed an expenditure of 666,000,000 francs (£26,600,000,) and an income of only 589,000,000 francs (£23,600,000,) the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states.* But although Napoleon knew as well as any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a

18.
French budget for 1805, and exposition by the minister of the interior.

* The receipts and expenditure exhibited were as follows :—

RECEIPTS.	
Direct taxes,	311,649,196 francs.
Registration and stamps,	172,763,591
Customs,	52,725,918
Lottery,	13,860,000
Post-office,	10,000,000
Excise,	25,000,000
Salt,	3,000,000
<hr/>	
Total from France,	588,998,705 francs, or £23,600,000
„ from Italy,	30,000,000 or 1,200,000
„ from Germany and Holland,	100,000,000 or 4,000,000
<hr/>	
Total,	718,998,705 francs, or £28,800,000
EXPENDITURE.	
Army,	271,500,000
Navy,	140,000,000
Church,	35,000,000
Interest of debt,	69,140,000
Civil list,	27,000,000
Minister of Finance,	43,349,800
„ of Justice,	21,200,000
„ of Interior,	29,500,000
„ of Treasury,	8,000,000
„ of Police,	700,000
Miscellaneous,	20,765,339
<hr/>	
666,155,139 francs, or £26,600,000	

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

splendid exposition of the state of the empire. The report drawn up by Champagny, minister of the interior, contained a picture of the imperial dominions, which, from the magnitude of the victories it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Saone as essentially improved; Alessandria as surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Appenines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Corniche, and the Mont Genève, opening to loaded chariots a path amidst heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Saone, and the Rhone; harbours and wet-docks in a state of rapid construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; the works of Antwerp and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England.¹

¹ Bign. v.
104, 108.

19.
Exposition
of the tri-
umphs of
France: si-
lence as to
Trafalgar.

The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence. "The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the Republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The house of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions; Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded: the Italian peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great empire; the Emperor has guaranteed, as

chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects for exultation, Napoleon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers:—"The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion by an hour. I shall always be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality—a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak, and temporise, till the proper time arrived, with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoleon's policy.¹

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

¹ Bign. v.
104, 110.
Hard. ix.
91.

The return of Napoleon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the Emperor and the Grand Army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of the Emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect; five hundred Imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to the summit of the structure, one hundred and twenty feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoleon, afterwards carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis Philippe, it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his gray riding-coat, the dress which has become

20.
Erection of
the Column
in the Place
Vendôme.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

canonised in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. The standards taken from the enemy during the campaign—one hundred and twenty in number—were brought with great pomp through the streets of Paris on the 1st of January, and divided between the senate, the tribunate, the city of Paris, and the cathedral of Notre Dame. “These standards,” said the Archbishop of Paris, when they were placed beneath the sacred roof, “will attest to our latest posterity the efforts made by Europe against us; the glorious deeds of our soldiers; the protection vouchsafed by heaven to France; the prodigious success of our invincible Emperor, and the homage which he has rendered to God for his victories.” The senate decreed that his birth-day should be one of the national fêtes. Magnificent rejoicings were projected by the Emperor to signalise the return of the Grand Army to the capital; but they were adjourned, first on the account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign.¹

¹ Bign. v.
112, 113.
Thiers, vi.
372, 374.

21.
Advance of
the French
against
Naples.

The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Massena was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month fifty thousand men, under the command of Joseph Buonaparte, had crossed the Pontifical States and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible; the feeble Russian and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily; the court, thunderstruck by the menacing proclamation of 27th December, speedily followed their example; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hast-

ened to appease the conqueror by submission ; a futile attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops. In vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage ; she was seconded by none. Capua opened its gates ; Gaeta was invested ; the Campagna filled with the invaders ; she, vanquished but not subdued, compelled to yield to necessity, followed her timid consort to Sicily ; and, on the 15th February, Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Buonaparte, enter its walls.¹

CHAP.

XLII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xv.
95, 99. Bign.
v. 114, 116.
Hard. ix.
56, 58.

But although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the sea-girt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The Prince of Hesse-Philipsthal had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own heroic resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied, that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity ; and the long resistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its Continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion, the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their government and its allies, submitted to the enemy ; and General Reynier, with a considerable corps, in the outset experienced little resistance in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Massena with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation ; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the

22.
Successful
invasion of
Calabria.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Bot. iv.
Hard. ix. 88,
90. Dum.
xv. 107,
116.

23.
Joseph
Buonaparte
created King
of the Two
Sicilies.
March 30.

April 4.

² Bign. v.
131. Hard.
ix. 93, 94.
Colletta, ii.
14, 15.

peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to despair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position. But they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campo-Tenese their tumultuary levies, though fifteen thousand strong, were entirely dispersed. The victorious Reynier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoleon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily.¹

When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in person to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district. He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Savigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoleon created him king of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time the states of Venice were definitively annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand-duke of Berg, with a considerable territory: and the Emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army.² Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the

military hero of the Revolution gave abundant indications of his design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, utterly to overturn its principles.*

Events, however, soon occurred which showed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects on his elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment. Nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sidney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment amidst the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions, attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffection which prevailed in Calabria, the English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the capital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than five thousand men, which landed in the Gulf of St Euphemia: and the commander, Sir John Stuart,

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

24.
Naples is threatened by Sir Sidney Smith. General Stuart lands in the Bay of St Euphemia.

July 1.

* "The interest of our crown," said Napoleon, "and the tranquillity of the continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and *forming part of the great empire*—we therefore declare our well-beloved brother Joseph King of the two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier was created Prince of Neufchâtel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the Pontifical States; Bernadotte became Prince of Pontecorvo; Cambacères and Lebrun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories: a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues to be distributed among the French soldiers.—HARD. ix. 94, 95; BIGN. v. 131.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

issued a proclamation calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none, however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received; and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Reynier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at MAIDA, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution, Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces, accordingly, in quest of the enemy. On the 5th July the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning: the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive, that it would be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers.¹

¹ Bot. iv.
210, 211.
Colletta, ii.
19. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
142. Dum.
xv. 142, 145.

25.
Reynier
resolves to
attack him.

When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Reynier, consisting of five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet toward the sea; while the British, bivouacking in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential influences of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Reynier was inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the

errors of General Menou. He was encouraged, besides, by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to seven thousand five hundred men, and, resolving to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, he marched at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Bot. iv.
211. Dum.
xv. 144.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 142.

Surprised, but nothing dismayed, at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current falls into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled with light troops, who kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached. Notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory, after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge; the 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward; and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity; their battalions broke and fled, but were instantly overtaken amidst deafening shouts, and assailed with such fury, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a thousand, including General Compère, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Reynier

26.
Battle of
Maida.
July 6.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Sir J. Stuart's Despatch, Ann. Reg. 1806, 591, 593.
Bot. iv. 211, 212. Colletta, ii. 20.
Dum. xv. 146, 148.

made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the other flank. A rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons, rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left. This movement might have yet retrieved the day, had not the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, been assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 20th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew his shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers.^{1*}

27.
Great moral effect of this victory.

The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation amidst the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites, and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results, or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, seldom was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling: but what mattered all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had succumbed in the conflict. At last the rival states had come into collision, on terms approaching to equality, and free from the paralysing influence of lukewarm or dubious allies. The result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoleon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or

* The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded. The Duchess of Abrantes states the entire loss of the French at 5000 men.—D'ABRANTES, ix. 136; and Sir J. STUART's *Despatch, Ann. Reg.* 1806, 594.

ascribed to their true cause,—general inexperience in the military art; confidence, the surest presage of victory, when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service; and, reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy,* and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy: the people no longer hesitated to speak of Cressy and Azincour. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war. Napoleon was well aware of its importance: he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal.¹ “Sive tanta, sive minor, victoria fuit, ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello, gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibale, vincentibus tunc difficilius fuit, quam postea vincere.”²†

¹ D'Abr. ix.
136.

² Liv. xxiii.
16.

But, though productive in the end of the most important consequences from the moral feelings which it inspired, the victory of Maida was not attended at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and

28.
Its immediate results are less considerable.

* In particular, Captain Pasley's able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England; a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

† “Be the victory great or small, a great affair was achieved on that day, and I know not but the most important in the war. For not to be conquered by Hannibal, was then more difficult than afterwards to conquer.”—Livy, xxiii. 16.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xv.
148, 155.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 595.
Bot. iv. 213.
Jom. ii. 238.
Bign. v. 126.

29.
Surrender
of Gaeta.

July 18.

* Bign. v.
127, 128.
Dum. xv.
155, 170.
Bot. iv. 214.

ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily, were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wild-fire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after, the town of Crotona, containing a thousand men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. The detachments of the French were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilised warfare. So general were the losses, that Reynier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the intrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of eight thousand men, at length to make head against the enemy.¹

These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Massena, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on board an English vessel to Sicily: his successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit; proposals of capitulation were made; and Massena, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions.^{2*} The

* The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable

garrison, still seven thousand strong, marched out with the honours of war; and on the 18th July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Massena eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible. Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain too often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Massena, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents stood their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria, but were at length turned by the Monte Aug. 5. Galdo, and defeated with great slaughter. A guerilla warfare ensued, attended with savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the slain. But after several months of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English;¹

30.
Retreat of
the English.
Suppression
of the insur-
rection.

1 Dum. xv.
171, 179.
Jom. ii. 239,
246. Bot. iv.
214, 217.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 143,
148.

siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened on the 10th July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent.—Gaeta, named after the nurse of Æneas,* underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marshal Daun. Thirty years afterwards it was besieged and taken when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—See DUMAS, xv. 155, 170.

* “Tu quoque litoribus nostris, Æneia nutrix,
Æternam moriens famam, Caieta, dedisti.”

VIRGIL, lib. vii.

CHAP.
XLII.1806.
Nov. 10.31.
Domestic
reforms of
Joseph in
Naples.

and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost by sickness and the sword little short of fifteen thousand men.

No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the regulation of the finances, the general police of the country, stood equally in need of improvement. Hence the remarkable fact, so common on the Continent, so rare in England, that the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education; while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses following in its train, were to be found among the rabble of the cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in a constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe, when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Buonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found ample room for, and soon effected, the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restricted; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the public debt, part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national institute, and various other useful institu-

tions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals, were undertaken or projected; and a general spirit of activity was diffused by the energy of the government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits induced in other countries by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution.¹

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

¹ Colletta,
ii. 1, 15.
Bign. v.
133, 139.

The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the Two Sicilies by the brother of Napoleon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Pressburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious Emperor; while the republic of Venice, incorporated by the decree of 30th March with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the grand pensionary in 1805, had almost established among them a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were to all appearance indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a half-way house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepot of the commercial riches of Holland in the eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean; and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotic rule of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others was equalled only by their base adulation to the foreign rulers of the commonwealth.² The people, despairing of relief, and worn out by the exactions of obscure tyrants, in the

32.
Miserable
state of Hol-
land since
its conquest
by France.

² Hard. ix.
99, 100.
Bign. v.
141.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things.

33.
Napoleon's
measures to
place his
brother
Louis on
the throne
of that
country.
May 26.

Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoleon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view, a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that in the existing state of Europe a hereditary government could alone guarantee the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious liberties of the state," declared Louis king of Holland. A few days after, the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the Emperor. But the elusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which Napoleon made to his brother on the occasion:—"Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of constable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge *towards me*, and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states."¹

¹ Hard. ix.
99, 100.
Bign. v.
141, 142.

34.
Creation of
military fiefs
in the king-
dom of Italy.

At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy afforded the Emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne. Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoleon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers; while a fifteenth of the revenue which these states yielded to the treasury at Milan was set apart to form appanages suitable to

those dignities. A revenue of one million two hundred thousand francs (£48,000) was on this occasion set apart from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund out of which he was to recompense his soldiers, and which was soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoleon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Bign. v.
139, 140.

The system upon which Napoleon now openly entered, of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of dependent dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere ebullition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances which had elevated him to the throne, and continued to surround him when there. He clearly perceived that it was revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both dreaded, from dear-bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship, his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him. This being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance to which he could trust was that which united him to his own family, and identified with his own the interests of inferior royalties, dependent on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own relations? could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoleon; and that, *situated as he was*, they were founded

35.
Napoleon's
secret views
in these
measures.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite in the highest degree the jealousy and hostility of the other Continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is indeed equally certain. But these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They show only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played; and add another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal truth, that those who owe their elevation to revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by, than to those who resist its fury.^{1*}

¹ Bign. v.
132, 143.
Las Cas.
vii. 127.

36.
Audience
given to the
Turkish
ambassador.

On the same day on which a king was given by the French Emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the Grand Signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoleon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his subsequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Everything," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from me: united to my throne, he need fear nothing from his enemies."² Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoleon signed on the Niemen

² Bign. v.
145.

* "The truth is," said Napoleon, "that I was never master of my own movements—I was never altogether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—Las Cas. vii. 124, 125.

a treaty with Russia for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe.

But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoleon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations, and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies. The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievement of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which under Villeneuve had issued from Cadiz : but the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoleon had so fondly calculated, still existed ; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their services. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations in smaller armaments, against their remote colonies or merchant vessels. Half the Brest squadron, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, was victualled for six months ; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons. The first, under Admiral Leissegues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, was destined to carry out succours to St Domingo ; while the second, under Willaumez, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward-bound merchant fleets. But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which nearly annihilated the enemy's remaining naval force, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war.¹

Admiral Leissegues arrived without any accident at St Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores ; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

37.

Naval operations.
Sailing and division of the Brest fleet.

Dec. 13,
1806.

¹ Dum. xv.
84, 86. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
229.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

38.

Defeat of the
first squad-
ron at St
Domingo.

during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the *Imperial*, a splendid vessel of a hundred and thirty guns, which bore the Admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action : a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed ; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb *Imperial*, being driven ashore and burned. The frigates stood out to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement, and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all their ships stood to their guns : on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760 ; while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed, and 294 wounded. The *Imperial*, before it ran ashore, had seen 500 of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels.¹

¹ Dum. xv.
86, 89. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
229. Bign.
v. 156.

39.
Disasters of
Willau-
mez's squa-
dron.

Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a disaster, the cruize of Admiral Willaumez, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence, when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in with the homeward-bound Jamaica

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane, with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th July, Sir John Borlase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the 4th June: Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance with a second fleet in the same latitude; while a third, under Admiral Louis, put to sea in the end of August, to intercept the return of the French. As it was now evident that the attention of the English government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St Domingo; and under the influence of these feelings the Veteran, of seventy-four guns, commanded by Jerome Buonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders stood away in the night of the 30th July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Willaumez saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet. The Foudroyant, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havannah, pursued by the English frigate Anson under the very guns of the Moro Castle; the Impetueux was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burned, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the Cassard alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Buonaparte, in the Veteran, made a rich prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by

June 4.

July 8.

July 15.

August 28.

July 30.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

1 Ann. Reg.

1806, 230,

231. Bign.

v. 157, 138.

Dum. xv.

90, 94.

40.

Capture of
Linois, and
other naval
operations.
Sept. 18,
1805.

some English vessels when he reached the bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where she was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety.¹

The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmolested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given,* made an attack on the Centurion, fifty guns, and two English merchantmen, in the bay of Vizigapatam. But though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove the other on shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois reluctantly bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell in the night into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and after a short action was taken, with the Marengo of eighty, and the Belle Poule of forty guns. Next day, five large frigates, with troops on board bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were captured. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the Rochefort squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made eight hundred prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British government, Lallemand's was called by the

March 13,
1806.

March 14.

* *Ante*, Chap. xxxvii. § 27.

English sailors the Invisible Squadron. He had the fortune to meet and capture the Calcutta of fifty guns, which, while convoying some merchantmen, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships, and surrendered after a gallant resistance; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French, who in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.
Dec. 15,
1805.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 220.
Bign. v.
153, 154.

These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish navies were TOTALLY DESTROYED, and the English fleet, by general consent, had attained to UNIVERSAL DOMINION. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary ascendancy acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire. Napoleon afterwards acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the important harbours of Denmark, were put at his disposal: but he never again ventured on naval enterprises; and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the Brest fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque Roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, convoying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours. All apprehensions of invasion disappeared; and England, relieved alike from danger of domestic warfare and of colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and launch forth her legions in that career of glory which has immortalised the name of Wellington.

41.
Reflections
on these last
naval dis-
asters of
France.

It was not thus at the commencement of the struggle, nor had it been thus in the preceding war. The mild

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

42.
Greatness of
the French
navy under
Louis XVI.

and pacific Louis XVI. had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of power. The French and Spanish fleets had ridden triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been revictualled in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the Convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can never produce a naval power. The insanity of Brissot and the society of Les Amis des Noirs cut off the right arm of the maritime strength of France by the destruction of St Domingo; the confiscations of the Convention utterly ruined her commercial wealth; the blockade of her harbours deprived her of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only her own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralysed, that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily insulted him in his harbours.

43.
Napoleon's
change of
system in
regard to
the naval
war.

This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoleon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivaling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe.

Abandoning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, everywhere set on foot, for the formation of a navy were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the Continental powers, which could everywhere be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for if any considerable state were left out, the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to the separate interests of England, but it is the commencement of that important change in the system of Continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoleon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illustrious men, who, during a series of ages, reared up the astonishing maritime power of England. It was not, like the empires of Napoleon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime; nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III. the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France; thirty thousand of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the

44.
Reflections
on the
growth of
the English
maritime
power.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

victory of Sluys equalled in magnitude and importance, though, from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs, it has not attained equal celebrity with, those of Cressy and Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake, the fire of Essex, the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric. It grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow. The power of Louis XIV., the genius of Napoleon, were alike shattered against its strength; the victories of La Hogue and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the revolutionary war. Dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the northern ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen severity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amidst the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amidst the solitude of the waves, the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced.

45.
Character of
the French
navy.

But amidst all our admiration of the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities not

less worthy of admiration. Theirs was the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory, but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation, in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoleon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs. But had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that, as self-confidence is its soul, so despondence is its ruin; that the vehement bursts of anger with which he visited the leaders under whom disasters at sea had been incurred, was the chief cause of this nervous dread of responsibility; and that, in reality, the admirals who encountered not only danger but disgrace in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land forces to certain victory at Austerlitz or Jena.

As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal dominion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion, that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert, that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created, is already conspicuous. The Roman legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

46.
Probable
future influence of the
British navy
on the
world.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

the still more glorious inheritance of Transatlantic and Australian greatness. A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than it did the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilisation follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will come before us, arising to greatness in the east of Europe. The Cross is inscribed on its banners: *Wo to the Crescent!* is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoleon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, irresistible, the one by sea and the other by land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

These defeats of the French naval squadrons were not the only maritime operations of this year. Before Mr Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, consisting of five thousand men, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, the naval armament being under the direction of Sir Home Popham. On the 4th January 1806, the whole reached Table Bay; but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking in that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th they came up with the Dutch forces, five thousand strong, chiefly cavalry, in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders stood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet, than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle; while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; General Jansens, who had retired with three thou-

47.
Reduction
of the Cape
of Good
Hope.
Jan. 8.

sand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for his safe return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the British dominions.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 233,
234. Dum.
xv. 69, 73.

This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth: but the facility with which it was achieved, inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda in South America, and had even been appointed, in December 1804, to the Diadem of sixty-four guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the continent of South America favourable to the trade of this country."² This intention, however, had been afterwards abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces; and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope; and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay, taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops.³ With these, and two companies which he had the address

48.
Sir Home
Popham
resolves
to attack
Buenos
Ayres.

² Lord Melville's evidence in Sir H. Popham's trial.
March 9,
1807.

³ Ann. Reg.
1806, 234,
235. Dum.
xv. 73, 75.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

49.

Which falls.
28th June.

to procure from St Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio de la Plata.

The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th June, and the troops were immediately disembarked. General Beresford, who commanded the land forces, at once proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy, by threatening Monte Video, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders; and a capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property—a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat on the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1006, 235,
236. Dum.
xv. 74, 75.

50.
Embarrass-
ment of
government
on this
success.

Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked-for success reached the British islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpedience and unhappy tendency of the enterprise; for on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing; which unhappily arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people, perhaps, of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though fortunately not very lasting, fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports. Boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered; and those fabled regions which formed the Eldorado of Sir Walter Raleigh, appeared about to pour

their inexhaustible treasures into the British islands. Under the influence of these highly excited feelings, every principle of reason, every suggestion of sense, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience, was swept away: speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained; and government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.¹

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 237,
238.

But long before the cabinet of St James's were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the boundless consignments which were in preparation could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unwonted occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders. An insurrection was secretly organised in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward. The militia of the surrounding districts were assembled; Colonel Linières, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Monte Video at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection within the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible; a desperate conflict ensued in the town; and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal conflict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender

51.
Buenos
Ayres is
retaken by
the South
Americans.
Aug. 4.

Aug. 12.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

were afterwards violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till reinforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended, in the end, with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American governments, set sail from New York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after undergoing many hardships, and landing on the Spanish main, was obliged to re-embark and make the best of his way back to Trinidad.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 240,
241.

52.
Differences
with America
in regard
to neutral
rights.

Differences at this period arose, which threatened to involve the British government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service: the next, the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

necessary consequence from the right of search which the American government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had recognised, and which constituted the basis of the whole maritime laws of Europe. It was impossible to expect that when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to the service of these neutrals, and whom they recognised, they should not reclaim them for their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether.^{1*} The second arose from the decisions of the English admiralty courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country, contrary to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo.²

¹ The Essex,
May 1805,
per Sir
W. Scott.
Robinson's
Rep. ii. 184.

² Case of
Polly, July
5, 1800.
Rob. ii. 368.

The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that to bring the neutral within the

* On the part of the Americans it was contended, "that the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that, while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British-born subjects; and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to abstract right, or the practice of other states; the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their case, than it could be in any other. The American government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships; but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, "That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which he owed to the government of his nativity; and that, provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them; that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its merchant

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

53.

Grounds of
the conduct
of England
as explained
by Sir W.
Scott.

exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done. On the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unloading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognise such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state; but it was equally natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity, and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognising as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then,¹ after extensive capital had, on the faith of that recogni-

¹ Robinson's
Reports, iii.
241, 249.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 246,
248.

vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if in the course of that search her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time reclaim its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary from the right of search; it is in truth the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment; if the Americans can show that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released; but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer, as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which has never yet been done."—See *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 244, 245.

nition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize.

To these serious and lasting subjects of discord, was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship *Leander*, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so vehement a commotion, that Mr Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the Union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, and after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect on the 15th November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights, and everything announced the commencement of a Transatlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

54.

Violent
measures
of Congress.

April 18.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 247,
249.

55.

The commis-
sioners on
both sides
adjust the
differences.

But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the excited populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr Munroe and Mr Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of Great Britain. The instructions of their respective governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their important duties in a corresponding spirit. Under such auspices the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever,

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such difficulties, that the American commissioners, in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to be satisfied, in the mean time, with a pledge by the British government, that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and would afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by America, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity. But on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade between the colonies and parent states of the enemy, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent on European, and two per cent on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the northern coalition.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 248,
250. Art. 11
and 12,
Treaty.

56.
Continental
affairs. Cold-
ness between
France and
Prussia.

While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoleon was rapidly advancing in his career of terrestrial empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned

which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th December, whereby he substituted for the intended war-like defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral, if not allied, England. Great was the embarrassment of the cabinet of Berlin when the intelligence of this unexpected arrangement arrived. On the one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be rounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls. On the other, some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoleon prevailed over the king's better principles, and it was determined not to ratify the treaty unconditionally, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications. As a colour to the transaction, and also, perhaps, as a salve to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margravates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the mean time be obtained;" while it was represented to the English minister at Berlin that arrangements had been concluded with France for insuring the tranquillity of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Prussian troops, and to the administration of the king, until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitely annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the mean time the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army was disbanded, and a proclamation to the same effect issued by the king on taking possession of that territory.¹

Jan. 26.

¹ Hardenberg's Letter, Jan. 26, 1806, to Mr Jackson. Ann. Reg. 1806, 158. Hard. ix. 52, 58. Bign. v. 223, 226.

But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

57.

Increasing
jealousies
between the
two cabi-
nets. Prussia
seizes on
Hanover.

Feb. 4.

Feb. 15.

March 28.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 159.
Bign. v. 232,
234. Hard.
ix. 107.
Thiers, vi.
407, 408.

of Napoleon to admit any modifications, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoleon the question was decided; all sincere alliance was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian government, the Emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect; Prussia had not resolution enough to resist; and on the 15th February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ratified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. Count Schulenberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation, closing its harbours against English vessels. Finally, on the 1st April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoleon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France.¹

58.
Measures of
retaliation
by Great
Britain.

This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater potentates, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoleon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to manifest their resentment. But Prussia was egregiously mistaken when she applied

it to Great Britain. So early as the 3d February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more than take possession of it for a temporary purpose. At the same time the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr Fox, when the intentions of the cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation appear announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to show that perfidious government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours were declared in a state of blockade; an embargo was laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours; while a message from the King to both houses of parliament announced his resolution "to assert the dignity of his crown, and his anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power with whom his majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts." An order in council was soon after issued, authorising the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was soon almost swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed, four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Feb. 3.

March 17.

April 23.

May 14.
¹ Hard. ix.
 207, 210.
 Bign. v. 233.
 Ann. Reg.
 1806, 159,
 161. Parl.
 Deb. vi. 882,
 886.

In the speech which he made shortly after in the House of Commons, Mr Fox drew in vivid colours, and depicted with all the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

59.

Mr Fox's
speech on
the subject.

disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. "The Emperor of Russia," said he, "after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French Emperor. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer; but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoleon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country—and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of everything that is contemptible in servility, with everything that is odious in rapacity.¹ Other nations

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 890, 892.
892. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
161.

have yielded to the ascendant of military power—Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master.”

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

In consenting to this infamous transaction, the cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French Emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed by that dreaded conqueror. “From the moment,” says Bignon, “that the treaty of 15th February was signed, Napoleon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France: he would not permit the delay of a single day.”¹ Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoleon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian cabinet before they were finally consummated.²

60.
Napoleon's
opinion of
Prussia in
this trans-
action.

¹ Bign. 232.

² Hard. ix.
107.

The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared in a series of measures which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic empire, and ultimately brought the former power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French empire. On 15th March, Murat, without any previous concert with the cabinet of Berlin, was invested with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of 15th February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Baireuth in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune, the brother-in-law of Napoleon, in the very heart of the Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now

61.
His further
measures of
aggression
on Ger-
many.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

awakened jealousy of the Prussian government ; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Warden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of four million francs (£160,000) from the city of Frankfort ; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburg to a still larger amount ; while, in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English, was seized without distinction, and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (£240,000) was the price at which the imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound Continental peace, to tender to the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian government now began to fall ; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies.¹

¹ Bign. v.
247, 270.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 164.
Hard. ix.
136, 224,
225. Bour.
vii. 137, 158.

62.
Universal
indignation
in the north
of Germany.

No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation, which animated all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they they had made so many sacrifices ; but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The Queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporising policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation ; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as

enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall. One universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks. It was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat; the elder spoke of the glories of Frederick and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence, issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved; * and that universal fervour ensued which is the invariable forerunner, for good or for evil, of great events. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters.¹

While these generous feelings were gaining strength in the north of Germany, unbounded discontent arose in the south, from the exactions of the French army, which retired from Austria after the peace of Pressburg. According to Napoleon's usual policy, the whole of these immense bodies of men were fed, clothed, and lodged, at the expense of the territories in which they were quartered, or through which they passed; and a large part of their pay was also laid on the unhappy Germans, under pretence of retaining it, as a gratuity for the men, in the imperial exchequer, when they returned home. Unbounded was the exasper-

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 165.
Hard. ix.
117, 119.
Thiers, vi.
416, 420.

63.
Formation
of the Con-
federacy of
the Rhine.

* One of the most remarkable of these was a pamphlet published by the celebrated Gentz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard everything as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But how is our salvation to be effected? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, resuscitating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes; they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource—that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations, and peace to the world. You, then, who amidst the universal shipwreck have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts; who have

Gentz's pam-
phlet on the
subject.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

ration which this iniquitous system excited in the countries in which it was enforced. But strong as were the feelings of patriotism and indignation which the conquests and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate feelings of many of their people, Napoleon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the Emperor at Mayence; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states of Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which these had elevated their sovereigns. France, on this occasion, played off with fatal effect the policy so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution—that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoleon felt daily

hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down, but not destroyed: in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is for Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved. It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more: *we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe.*" GENTZ, *Europe en 1806*; and HARD. ix. 122, 123. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time!—a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to direct their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance, under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on their resources.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Hard. ix.
153, 155.
Bign. v. 300,
305. Luc-
ches. i. 124,
131.

Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty were not long of being brought to a termination. The plenipotentiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July; and on the 12th of that month, the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were—the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand-duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau-Weilburg, Nassau-Usingen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm, Salm-Kirburg, Isenburg-Birchstein, Aremberg, Lichtenstein-Darmberg, and the Count de la Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand-duke of Würzburg, acceded to the confederacy a short time afterwards. By the act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be *severed for ever from the Germanic empire*, rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, and placed under the protection of the Emperor of the French. Any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole.² Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate of

64.
Powers ad-
mitted to
the confe-
deracy.

Sept. 30.

² Arts. 1, 7,
12, and 35.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Arts. 24,
25.² See Treaty,
Ann. Reg.
1806, 818.
Martens'
Traité, viii.
480, 506.65.
The Em-
peror re-
nounces the
crown of
Germany.

Ratisbon, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories enclosed within their dominions.¹ Lastly, a separate article provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection; which were, for France, two hundred thousand, and for the German states, fifty-eight thousand men. But subsequent experience soon proved that Napoleon exacted and received military aid to double that number from them.^{2*}

This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoleon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic empire had been pierced to the heart, and some of her fairest provinces had been reft from the empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great. Sixteen millions of men were by a single stroke transferred from the empire to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the Emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Charlemagne had been crowned emperor in 800; Napoleon dissolved the empire in 1806. Immense was the sensation which this violent aggression produced in Europe. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened

* The contingents were settled as follows:—

France,	200,000
Bavaria,	30,000
Württemberg,	12,000
Baden,	3,000
Berg,	5,000
Darmstadt,	4,000
Nassau, Hohenzollern, and others,	4,000

258,000

by what immediately followed. On the 1st August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced princes. The former deemed it unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the empire, the inconsistency between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amidst the weakness of their former chief, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess power adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterwards to expiate with tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Soult still held the battlements of Braunau; on one pretext or another the evacuation of the German states, which by the treaty of Pressburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed; the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn; the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored; while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the Imperial cabinet dissembled their feelings; and, justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, renounced the throne of the Cæsars, and declared himself the first of a new series of Emperors of Austria.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Aug. 1.

Aug. 6 and 9.

¹ Jom. ii.

240, 243.

Bign. v. 317,

319. Hard.

ix. 157.

Martens,

viii. 501.

Thiers, vi.

505.

* Napoleon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon, announcing the Confederation of the Rhine:—"The German constitution is no longer but a shadow; the Diet has ceased to have any will of its own. His majesty the Emperor and king can, therefore, no longer recognise its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation

CHAP.
XLII.1806.
66.Great sensation which
these events
produce at
Berlin.

Though in appearance levelled at the Emperor Francis as chief of the empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded. All classes, from the cabinet of the King to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet; they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. The increasing aggressions of Napoleon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. The senseless declamations of Murat, in particular, contributed not a little to open the eyes of all persons in the north of Germany to the dangers which awaited them. His companions said at table, "Yours is a pretty principality, indeed, for the brother-in-law of so great an emperor. Doubtless you will soon be King of Westphalia, and get a noble kingdom carved out of that despicable Prussia, which has betrayed all the world." Bernadotte, who was established at Anspach, indulged in still more extravagant chimeras; and Augereau's officers at Würzburg drank toasts openly, to success in the approaching war with Prussia. Nor were these vain and senseless words only. Murat advanced claims seriously to the principality of Embden, and the three abbacies which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as

of the Rhine. In his pacific views, he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his promises." The confederate princes declared,—"The results of the three last wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the princes of the West and South have deemed it expedient to renounce all connexion with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory and those of his empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity." With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the empire:—"Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the Imperial throne imposed upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no

Addresses of
Napoleon
and the Em-
peror Francis
to the Ger-
man States.

well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the House of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, tributary to the vassal of Napoleon; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with the court of Berlin, Prussia was given to understand by the French Emperor, that if she was desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to her in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation.* But that power was informed shortly after, that the Hanse Towns, which Napoleon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy; that Saxony could not be allowed to form a part of it against its will; while the Elector of Hesse was invited to join the Confederacy of the Rhine, and on his refusing to comply, was struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Sept. 27.

Oct. 3.

¹ Hard. ix.
167, 176.
Bign. v. 369,
390. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
167. Thiers,
vi. 507, 551.

But all these grievances, serious as they were, sank into insignificance compared to that which arose, when it was discovered by M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of

value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the Princes Electors of the empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the Imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the electors, princes, and states, members of the supreme tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chief." See HARD. ix. 159, 162.

* "L'Empereur Napoleon verra sans peine, et même avec plaisir, que la Prusse range sous son influence, au moyen d'une confédération semblable à celle du Rhin, tous les états du nord d'Allemagne. On promettait de n'apporter aucun obstacle à une confédération de ce guerte. *Napoléon à l'ambassadeur Français à Berlin*, Septembre 29, 1806."—THIERS, vi. 507.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

67.

Fresh um-
brage of
Prussia at
the treaty
of France
with Russia.
Warlike
preparations
of Prussia.

Aug. 9.

Hanover to its lawful sovereign; that while continually urging the cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoleon had engaged to Russia, in the treaty signed with d'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions; and that while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederick-William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand-duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the King of Prussia put his armies on the war-footing, despatched M. Krusemark to St Petersburg, and M. Jacobi to London, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers; opened the navigation of the Elbe; concluded his differences with Sweden; assembled his generals, and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible: the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne. Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able, single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amidst thunders of applause, at the theatres; and the Queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch, by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps.¹

¹ Hard. ix.
176, 181.
Bign. v. 409,
415. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
167.

While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of southern Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England. The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz, had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France. Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities, and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Pressburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations towards his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still further removed the possibility of a rupture; while the withdrawing of Austria from the Continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. "Napoleon," said Prince Czartorinski to Alexander, "is at present victorious, but he may not be always so. Austria is beat down, but she detests her conqueror. Prussia is divided between the war and peace pursuit, but she will end by ranging herself on the side of German independence. Await your time: protract affairs till one or other of these powers is ready to act. Meanwhile remain united to England, and ready to resume your arms on the first favourable opportunity. You will in the end compel Napoleon to give you what is your due."—"When we contend," replied Alexander, "with that man, we are children contending with a giant. Without Prussia we can do nothing. She is the only power that has not been conquered by France." There appeared, therefore, no chance of an immediate collision between the powers. But not-

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

68.

Renewed
causes of
discord
between
France and
Russia.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Thiers, vi.
425, 426.

69.

Differences
about Cat-
taro, which
is occupied
by the Rus-
sians.

withstanding these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again brought them into collision ; and the quarter where the difference arose, indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.¹

Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in its naval transactions. By the treaty of Pressburg, it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorised to take possession had not arrived ; and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who were almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pursuance of these instigations, the people, who are styled Montenegrins, and ardently desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict investment, in which they were soon supported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived from Corfu. After a short blockade, he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately transferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force. But the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious, that the Austrian subaltern officers in the fortress protested against its conditions, and the governor was afterwards brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Transylvanian fortress for life.²

March 4.

² Ann. Reg.
1806, 140,
150. Bign.
v. 258, 262.
Hard. ix.
195, 196.

Nothing that has since transpired authorises the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her, for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoleon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than Napoleon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Braunau, on the Austrian frontier, and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German states. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrins from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him, he was at liberty to look for an indemnity wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with which he had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians both by land and sea; but before anything of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the cabinet of St Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. In consequence, however, of that ambassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune arrival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

70.

The French
in return
seize Ra-
gusa. Ac-
tions in its
neighbour-
hood.

May 27.

July 9.

July 6.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 150,
151. Bign.
v. 258, 265.
Hard. ix.
219, 221.

fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrins. But these troops, having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued.¹

71.
D'Oubril
concludes a
treaty at
Paris be-
tween
France and
Russia.

M. d'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he appears, when he arrived at Paris, to have acted in a way not agreeable to the cabinet of St Petersburg or his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with these powers was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands of the Emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and the Czar from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoleon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord, to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV. should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-Royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of king—the harbours of those islands being shut against the

July 20.

British flag during the continuance of the present war ; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his queen ; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties—a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concurred in within a year afterwards at Tilsit. Thus did Napoleon and d'Oubril concur in despoiling the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands to his son ; gift away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the court of Palermo or the cabinet of London ; dispose of the Balearic Islands, without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain ; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden, at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover.¹

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Martens, viii. 309, 472. Hard. ix. 119, 120. Bign. v. 325, 329.

M. d'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions ; for no sooner was it concluded, than he set off in person to render an account of it at St Petersburg, observing, at the same time—"I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my imperial master." In effect, before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A change of ministry had ensued : Prince Adam Czaratorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the

72.
Which is disavowed by the cabinet of Petersburg.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Aug. 25.

Imperial government, as "entirely in opposition to the instructions which d'Oubril had received," though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been communicated to the cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian government was saved the dishonour which must for ever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one ministry, with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the Imperial cabinet, between the time of issuing the instructions and signing the treaty, not any deviation from those instructions on the part of its ambassador. And all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states.¹*

¹ Bign. v.
330, 344.
Hard. ix.
221, 222.

73.
Opening of
negotiations
between
France and
England.

The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the cabinet of St Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and England, which had been long in dependence at Paris; and the turn which they were now taking left little hope that hostilities, in every quarter, could be brought to a termination. This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private

* The powers conferred on M. d'Oubril bore:—"We authorise, by these presents, M. d'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorised on the part of the French government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to adhibit to it our imperial ratification in the terms that shall be specified." On the other hand, the act of disavowal bore—"The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. d'Oubril has been

audience with Mr Fox, in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoleon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English minister, after having at first dismissed him from his presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply from that minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated that passage, in the exposition of the state of the empire by the Minister of the Interior, wherein Napoleon declared that he would always be ready to renew conferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments ; and thus commenced a negotiation under the most favourable of all auspices—mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it.¹

The basis proposed by Mr Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle, that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their respective allies."—"Our interests," said Talleyrand, "are easily reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kingdoms of the earth put together. We are a great

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Feb. 10.

March 26.
¹ Bign. v.
266, 269.
Hard. ix.
184, 187.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 92, 94.

74.
England
insists on
Russia be-
ing a party
to the ne-
gotiation.
April 1.

submitted to a council specially summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions transmitted to him at Vienna before his departure from that town ; and they found that M. d'Oubril, in signing that treaty, has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however—that of mere banishment to his estates—did not look as if there had been any very serious deviation from instructions.—See MARTENS' *Sup.* iv. 308, 312 ; and HARD. ix. 222.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

Despatch,
April 20.¹ Parl. Deb.
viii. 103,
108. Bign.
v. 267, 274.^{75.}
Basis of *uti*
possidetis
fixed.

June 13.

² Lord Yar-
mouth's
Commun.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 110.

Continental power ; but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If, in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation ; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia ? We answer, Yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty, independent of that power ? No." Finding the English minister immovable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation ; and it was agreed that the accession of the Continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.¹

The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and honour of England and France themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoleon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoleon was brought to agree to—although he had only a few months before ceded it to Prussia—and the retention of Sicily by England or its allies ;* the recognition of the Emperor of France by England, and the guaranteeing of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France.² These

* "I inquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said. 'Vous l'avez,' he replied—'*nous ne vous la demandons pas ; si vous ne la possediez pas, elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.*' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make further questions. We ask nothing of you (*nous ne vous demandons rien,*) amounting to an admission of *uti possidetis*, as applicable to

terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti possidetis*, and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr Fox on the subject.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

At the time when the proposals were made by the French government, no accommodation had been effected with Russia ; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Oubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace in behalf of Russia, and Napoleon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British government. When pressed, therefore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti possidetis*, and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied, that though the sentiments of the Emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that *some changes had taken place*, the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the Emperor had received reports from his brother, and the general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily*, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island ; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown, the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and of the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the cabinet of St James's to enter into the negotiation ; that if a confidential com-

76.
Which
France de-
parts from.
June 13.

June 16.

his Majesty's conquests." Talleyrand concluded with these words:—"Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changés : l'aigreur qui caractérisait le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus. Et ce que nous désirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne."—LORD YARMOUTH'S *Communication*, No. 12 ; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

June 26.

July 1.

July 9.

¹ Lord Yarmouth's and Mr Fox's Despatches, June 19.

July 1, 5, and 12.

Parl. Deb. viii. 110, 115.

munication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the Emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the Emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication." Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was alone on the faith of this basis, more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct it; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine quâ non*, without which it was useless to continue the conferences. Talleyrand upon this offered the *Hanse Towns* as an equivalent to the King of Naples for the loss of that island: and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian majesty: looking out thus, according to the usual system of Napoleon, in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions.¹

77.
Continuation of the negotiations, and gradual estrangement of the parties.

This clear departure on the side of France from the basis of the negotiation originally laid down by its own minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be despoiled in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents, augured but ill for its ultimate success; and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily

should be retained by the King of England, and enjoined on Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this was not acceded to. The changes in Germany consequent on the Confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be modified, if peace with Great Britain was concluded. Mr Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ragusa, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the proposed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoleon would by no means consent. Advices were received at Paris that an army of thirty thousand men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in that capital belonging to corps in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments, and the approaching signature of a separate treaty between France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles, taken from Spain, was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British plenipotentiary.¹

The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the cabinet of St Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacification. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover: full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clark. Specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

July 9.

July 19.

July 20.

¹ Mr Fox's
and Lord
Yarmouth's
Desp. July
9, 18, 19,
and 20.

Parl. Deb.
viii. 113,
125. Mar-
tens, viii.
472.

78.

Progress of
the negotia-
tion.
July 21.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

July 30.

¹ Lord Yar-
mouth's and
Mr Fox's
Despatches,
July 28,
August 3,
1806. Parl.
Deb. viii.
125, 138.

no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoleon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia, as a compensation for Hanover, or by his Sicilian majesty: and held out the menace that, by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views in regard to the Spanish peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as similar ones had been in Holland and Naples. But, regardless of these threats, Mr Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti possidetis*, as the only one which could be admitted; and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British government.¹

79.
The nego-
tiation is
broken off.

Under the auspices of this able nobleman, the negotiation was protracted two months longer without leading to any satisfactory result. The English minister continued incessantly to demand a return to the principle of *uti possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation; and the French cabinet as uniformly eluded or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain. Lord Lauderdale in consequence repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril. This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, further than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia; but it considerably lowered those of Napoleon, and Talleyrand announced that France "would make great con-

Sept. 3.

Sept. 18.

cessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterwards explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain; the confirmation of its possession of Malta; the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire; and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity *from Spain*, in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoleon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia.¹

CHAP.
XLII.1806.
Sept. 26.October 6.
1 Parl. Deb.
viii. 173,
203. Bign.
v. 343, 359.
Lord Lau-
derdale's
Desp. 26th
Sept.

Thus this negotiation, begun under such favourable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro. Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the south and north of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but in reality the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view, in contending for these distant possessions, were more considerable than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the crown of Naples that Napoleon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother; it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire. It was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the colossal empires of France and Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties;² and the negotiation

80.
Real views
of the parties
in this
negotiation.² Bign. v.
363, 365.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France—the empire of the seas, and the dominion of continental Europe.

81.
State of af-
fairs at Ber-
lin. Prus-
sia's ultima-
tum, and
preparations
for war on
both sides.

The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify d'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when shortly after it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible; a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the Queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin.¹ The enthusiasm was universal; but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to frenzy. In proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital.*

¹ Bign. v.
403.

Aug. 26.

Lucchesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his government full of acrimonious complaints of the cabinet of the Tuileries, which either by accident or design fell into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoleon. He instantly demanded the recall of the obnoxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission was mainly to protract matters, that the cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and if possible gain time

Sept. 3.

Sept. 7.

* He repeated with emphasis the lines of the poet Gleims, in allusion to the warlike bards of Berlin:—

“Sie singen laut im hohen chor
Vom Tod, fürs Vaterland uns vor:
Doch kommt ein einziger Husar,
So lauft die ganze Barden Schar.”

for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoleon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His forces were so great that they might well inspire confidence in the issue of the contest. He had four hundred and fifty thousand men on foot, of whom a hundred and fifty thousand were in the interior, and a hundred and seventy thousand with the Grand Army in the centre of Germany, besides fifty thousand in Lombardy. Thirty thousand horse, and ten thousand artillerymen, formed part of the force with which he would first commence operations. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly defiling from Braunau, the Inn, and the Necker, towards the banks of the Elbe, and one hundred thousand men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at their head on the night of the 26th September, conveyed the Guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were—1st, That the French troops should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the Emperor, and continuing it without interruption. 2d, That the districts on the Wesel should be detached from the French empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter-league in the north of Germany. No stronger proof of the infatuation which had seized the cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of Napoleon and the Grand Army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England, proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rosbach than the eve of the battle of Jena.¹

Sept. 26.

Oct. 1.

¹ Jom. ii.
274. Bign.
v. 443.
Hard. ix.
266. Thiers,
vi. 508.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

82.

Murder of
Palm. Great
sensation
which it oc-
casioned.

Aug. 12.

Aug. 25.

The public mind was at this period violently excited in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder committed by orders of Napoleon on a citizen of one of the free cities of the empire, who had sold a work hostile to his interests. Palm, a tradesman in Nuremberg, had been instrumental with many other booksellers in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gentz, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others were fortunate enough to make their escape; but Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers assembled by the Emperor's orders at Braunau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence.* This atrocious proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany. Men compared the

Proceedings
of the mili-
tary commis-
sion by which
he was con-
demned.

* The judgment of the military commission convicting Palm, and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble:—"Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservation; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the progress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of nations and the *respect due to crowned heads*; injurious to the people committed to their government; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination—declares unanimously, That the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty of high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the frenzy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination, or any private crime. If they had,

loud declamations of the republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with this savage violation of it by their military chief; and concluded, that the only freedom which they really had at heart was license for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendancy, that of military violence. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the senate of Frankfort, after recounting the enormous contributions which they had paid to the French armies in 1796, 1799, 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Augereau replied to this proclamation by a stern requisition to have the authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the magistrates of the state: but after they had been arrested, Napoleon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop further proceedings.¹ Aug. 19. Aug. 27.

¹ Hard. ix.
246, 250.
Bign. v. 337,
339.

The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevenge, either upon Napoleon or the French people. It fell deeply and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general

they were published, not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its Emperor, but in the free city of Nuremburg, in the heart of the German empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoleon, but to Germans, aliens to his authority, and enemies of his government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Pressburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that *Russia*, a separate power at war with France, had in the usual course of hostility conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Applying Napoleon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Swiss, to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British empire to throw off the rule of their sovereign and parliament, and to establish annual parliaments and universal suffrage?—See BIGNON, v. 337, 338.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

83.

Influence
which it had
on the rup-
ture of the
negotiation
with Eng-
land.

freedom by the spread of republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoleon for the negotiations which ultimately led to their abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the exile to St Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly, in every part of Europe, that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France: that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolor flag. Napoleon has frequently said, that if Mr Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all the subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted; but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to tear from one of the brightest ornaments of his country the honour of having at last been awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and of having possessed the magnanimity, in opposition to his former long-continued delusion, instantly to act upon the conviction.

84.

Mr Fox's
eyes are at
last opened
to the real
nature of
the war.

In his last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow out the path thus clearly chalked out.* In several of the speeches which

Last instruc-
tions of Mr
Fox to Lord
Lauderdale.

* "In the instructions," says Mr Fox in his last important official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his Lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded; in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct: the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential

he had delivered, after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration.* Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic duty: the two lights of the age came finally to concur in the same policy. If Mr Pitt struggled for fifteen years, amidst difficulty and disaster, to carry on the war, it was Mr Fox who bequeathed the flood of glory in which it terminated to his successors; and who, after having spent the best part of his life in recommending less honourable and enlightened measures of

parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to use them till the French government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his Majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand upon this made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany; and stated, 'that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place.' That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, the German confederation treaties were both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoleon's assertion, that, if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. Its last stages, down to his death on 17th September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—See Mr Fox's *Despatches, August 3d and 14th, 1806; Parl. Deb.* viii. 138, 164.

* In the debate on Mr Windham's military system, on April 3, 1806, Mr Fox said, with admirable candour:—"Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that *I have been weaned from the opinions which I formerly held* with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying on the war, we must be reduced to that state which I for one cannot contemplate without apprehension,—*'toto divisos orbe Britannos,'*—and be left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or indeed under any system which we may act upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 715, 716.

CHAP.
XLII.

concession to his country, in his last moments "nailed her colours to the mast."*

1806.

85.

Death of
Mr Fox.
His charac-
ter.

Sept. 13.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 258.

The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining; and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill, his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th September he sank into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery.¹ Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings, and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his character communicated confidence; the ardour of his

* This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox, on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties. Ten years before, the champions of the constitution and of revolution, Mr Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, had in like manner come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm," said Mackintosh in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings, is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter: you are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitution of my country." Burke answered from the bed of death:—"You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shows how much your own sagacity, operating on

eloquence roused enthusiasm ; the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship.”—“ I admired,” says Gibbon, “ the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood.” Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr Fox’s character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between them ceased :—
 “ To be sure, he is a man made to be loved !”¹*

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

¹ Mackintosh’s Mem.
i. 324.

A man of pleasure in every sense of the word ; dissipated and irregular in private life ; having ruined his private fortune at the gaming-table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in parliament, yet he never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments, and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration, not only of his partisans, but of his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic everywhere turned as to those of the gifted spirit intrusted with their cause. To his sup-

86.
His vices
and failings.

your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the show of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end.” What words between such men !—See MACKINTOSH’S *Memoirs*, i. 87, 88.

* The convivial talents of Fox were great, as may well be believed from his so long being the idol of the brilliant circle of wits and beauties who in his early days did homage to the rising sun of the Prince of Wales. With men his conversation often partook of the licentious character of the fashionable and unscrupulous society in which he lived ; but in the company of elegant women no man was more scrupulously well-bred, or often more felicitous in the delicate expression of flattery. On one occasion, when he was at a supper at the house of the young and beautiful Duchess of Devonshire, a sort of game went round, in which each gentleman presented the lady next him with fruit of some kind, accompanied by an impromptu line or verse : “ Come, Mr Fox,” said the Duchess, “ you have given me nothing as yet : what are you thinking of ?” He immediately took a bunch of grapes, and presented it to the Duchess with the words, “ Je plains jusqu’à l’ivresse.”

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

port the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he triumphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gratuitous exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

87.
His extraordinary
talents in
debate.

Mr Fox was the greatest debater that the English parliament ever produced: he has been styled by a most competent judge, "the most Demosthenian orator who has appeared since the days of Demosthenes."* Without the admirable arrangement and lucid order which enabled Mr Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate. But his habits were too desultory—his indolence too great—his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge.† Respectable as a historian, the fragment on the annals of the English Revolution which he composed is justly

* Sir James Mackintosh.

† No man more frequently referred to Adam Smith; yet he had never read the "Wealth of Nations."

admired for the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments ; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the parliamentary orator.* It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen ; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from studying the vehement declamation—the powerful and fervent reasoning—by which his great speeches there are distinguished.

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

But, notwithstanding all this, the fame of Mr Fox is on the decline, not from a diminished sense of his genius, but an altered view, among the thinking few at least, of his principles. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected in legislation the freedom of the press, and opposed the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind. But in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of democracy—in so far as he supported the wild projects of the French revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same

88.
His fame
is on the
decline as
a just
thinker.

* This is the more remarkable, as he had so elevated a conception of the proper character of history that he classed the chief works of thought thus :—
1. Poetry. 2. History. 3. Oratory. This was no slight homage to the historical muse, when coming from the first orator of his own, or perhaps any age.
—See Fox's *History*, Introd. p. vii.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

destructive doctrines, and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition—he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

89.
Reasons of
this.

The doctrines, that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands—that the extension of political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil—that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction—and that the growth of democratic ascendancy is the commencement of social regeneration,—are sometimes amiable, from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular, from the agreeable flattery they convey to the multitude. They are liable to only one objection—that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and a fatal forgetfulness of the character of the vast majority of men who in every rank are swayed by selfishness or stimulated by passion. They invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a democratic regime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, is kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated. It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional

monarchy; no hope remains of its outliving the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when these antagonist forces are brought for any length of time to draw in the same direction.*

The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr Pitt opposed to revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps for ever, under the triumph in which Mr Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by this great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration. On the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave. It can only award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, but not that of a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim

CHAP.
XLII.
1806.

90.
His errors
as a political philosopher.

* "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes."—"In turbis atque seditionibus," says the Roman annalist, "pessimo cuique plurima vis; pax et quies bonis artibus aluntur."—"Enfin je vois," said the French demagogue when going to the scaffold, "que dans les révolutions l'autorité toujours reste aux plus scélérats."—"A democratic republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few; with this difference, that the few who are thus elevated to power are the most worthless and profligate of the community." "Democracy," says the author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and to control; and consequently the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large." What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—THUCYDIDES, l. iii. c. 39; SALLUST, *de Bello Cat.*; RIOUFFE, 67; *Parl. Hist.* xxx. 902; MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 92.

CHAP.
XLII.

1806.

the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart,—it will indulge the pleasing hope, that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many, of his earlier delusions; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors, by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA—FALL OF PRUSSIA.

No monarchy in Europe is less indebted than the Prussian, for its political power and importance, to the advantages of nature. Its territory, flat, sandy, and in great part comparatively sterile, can only be brought to a high state of cultivation by long-continued efforts, and the unsparing application of human industry. Its sea-coast has few advantageous harbours; its rivers, though numerous, and in general navigable, descend for the greater part of their course through the territories of separate or rival states. Without the natural fertility of the Sarmatian plains, or the mineral wealth of the Bohemian mountains; destitute alike of the flocks of Hungary and the herds of Switzerland; enjoying neither the forests of Norway nor the vines of France—it depends entirely on grain crops and pastures, and for them the bounty of nature has afforded no peculiar advantages. Vast tracts of gloomy heath, or blowing sand, hardly less unproductive, form a large part of its surface; in other places, cheerless, desolate plains, thickly strewn with rushes or stunted firs, convey a monotonous, mournful impression to the mind of the traveller. Yet have the industry and perseverance of man conquered all these disadvantages: the arid sands have been covered with waving crops, the rushy fields with rich pastures;¹ and in no country in Europe is agriculture now advancing with more vigor-

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

1.
Natural disadvantages
of Prussia.¹ Tchoborski, i. 115, 117. Personal observation.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

2.
Political
situation
and inhabi-
tants of
Prussia.

ous strides, or population increasing with such steady rapidity.*

If Prussia owes little to her natural advantages, she is indebted still less to the political facilities of her situation, or the homogeneity in character of her inhabitants. Her territory, which has gradually been enlarged by the talents or good fortune of her rulers, is widely scattered from the Rhine to the Vistula, with other states in some places intervening, and in general in such long shreds as equally to expose her to attack and to deprive her of the advantages of a compact formation of defence. Her population is composed of different races, speaking in some places different languages, and but recently actuated in any by a common bond of national attachment. The old electorate of Brandenburg originally formed part of the vast monarchy of Poland, and broke off from that unwieldy commonwealth during the weakness of its unbridled democracy; Silesia, conquered by the Great Frederick in the middle of the eighteenth century, is a province of Bohemia, and is chiefly inhabited by Slavonian tribes; while Prussian Poland was the fruit of the iniquitous spoliation of that unhappy state in 1772 and 1794, and its inhabitants retain all the mournful recollections and national traditions by which the Sarmatian race is characterised in every part of the world. Yet does the Prussian monarchy now form a united and prosperous whole: its rise during the last century has been rapid beyond example; it singly defeated, under

* Prussia contains at present—

	ARPENTS.
Arable lands,	47,295,716
Vineyards,	1,024,176
Meadows,	14,326,429
Pastures,	16,972,714
Forests,	23,800,000
Wastes, lakes, &c.	8,986,347

112,405,382

or nearly 111,000 square English geographical miles. Twenty-one thousand four hundred and ninety arpents make a square German geographical mile.—See TCHOBORSKI, i. 115; and FORSTER and WEBER, *Statistiques de la Prusse*, 17, 21.

the Great Frederick, a coalition of the three most powerful monarchies in Europe; and it yields to no country in the world in patriotic spirit, and the glorious efforts which it has since made to maintain its independence.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

Augmented as it has been by the acquisitions made at the treaty of Paris in 1814, the Prussian monarchy now contains upwards of fifteen millions of inhabitants, who are diffused over a territory embracing one hundred and eleven thousand four hundred and eighty-eight square English miles—a surface little less than that of Great Britain and Ireland, which contain one hundred and twenty-two thousand. At the commencement of the war of 1806, however, both were much less considerable; the former only amounting to nine million five hundred thousand souls, the latter to seventy-two thousand square miles of territory. If this considerable population was placed on a compact and defensible territory, it would form a great and powerful monarchy, having nearly the resources, in population and territory, of the British empire in Europe at the commencement of the Revolutionary war; but both population and territory are so scattered over a long and narrow extent of level surface, that they seem at first sight to be a source rather of weakness than strength. They extend from the banks of the Niemen to those of the Sarre, over a space three hundred leagues, or nine hundred miles, in length; while the greatest breadth does not exceed a hundred and thirty leagues, and their average is not above forty. These straggling territories are in many places interrupted by the possessions of foreign princes, enclosed within those of Prussia, which, on the other hand, has no inconsiderable portion of its dependencies imbedded in the dominions of other states. Thus the Prussian dominions present an irregular strip stretching along the whole north of Germany, having its back to the Baltic Sea and German Ocean, the harbours of which

3.
Population
and extent
of Prussia.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
294, 295.⁴
Towns and
manufactur-
ing industry
of Prussia.

are liable to be blockaded by the superior fleets of Britain ; while its long front is exposed to the incursions of Austria, and its two extremities lie open, with no natural frontier capable of defence, and but few artificial strongholds, to the incursions of the great monarchies of France and Russia—the former possessing above twice, the latter nearly four times, its military resources.¹

The urban population of Prussia bears a remarkably large proportion to the rural, for the former amounts to a fourth of the whole inhabitants. The number of towns and burghs is ten hundred and twelve, of which thirty-seven contain above ten thousand inhabitants.* This great number and size of towns indicates either extraordinary riches in the adjacent territory, as in Lombardy and Flanders, or considerable manufacturing advantages, such as those which have raised the cities to such a stupendous magnitude in the north of England and the west of Scotland. Such, accordingly, is the case ; and the manufacturing industry of Prussia, in spite of the prohibitory system adopted generally by the Continental states, is very considerable. Inferior of course, by more than a half, in proportion to the square league of terri-

	Population in 1834.		Population in 1834.
* Viz.—Berlin, . . .	258,000	Trèves, . . .	16,000
Breslau, . . .	88,000	Stralsund, . . .	16,000
Cologne, . . .	71,000	Halberstadt, . . .	15,000
Königsberg, . . .	70,000	Brandenburg, . . .	15,000
Torgau, . . .	70,000	Neisse, . . .	13,000
Dantzic, . . .	65,000	Glogau, . . .	12,500
Magdeburg, . . .	42,000	Bonn, . . .	12,500
Aix-la-Chapelle, . . .	37,000	Quedlinburg, . . .	12,500
Stettin, . . .	36,000	Görlitz, . . .	12,000
Elberfeld, . . .	29,000	Brieg, . . .	12,000
Dusseldorf, . . .	28,000	Liegnitz, . . .	11,500
Coblentz, . . .	26,000	Grüneberg, . . .	11,900
Posen, . . .	25,000	Schweidnitz, . . .	11,000
Halle, . . .	25,000	Minden, . . .	11,000
Potsdam, . . .	24,000	Mühlhausen, . . .	10,500
Erfurt, . . .	22,000	Prentzlow, . . .	10,000
Memel, . . .	10,000	Aschersleben, . . .	10,000
Frankfort-on-Oder, . . .	18,000	Naumburg, . . .	10,000
Krefeld, . . .	17,000		

tory to that of Britain, it is considerably superior to that of France.* The iron-works and manufactories of zinc and copper, as well as the salt-works, in its dominions, are very extensive; and the cotton manufactures, though recently established, are making, under the shelter of the heavy protective duties established against those of England, rapid progress. The total amount of its exports in 1828 was 24,102,000 thalers, or nearly £4,000,000, and four thousand merchant vessels bore the flag of Frederick-William.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
291, 292.

The main strength of Prussia, however, lies in its agriculture; and it is in the patriotic spirit and undaunted courage of the class engaged in it, that the monarchy in every age has found the surest bulwark against foreign aggression. So rapid has been the increase of sheep of late years in Prussia, that their number, which in 1816 amounted only to 8,261,400, had risen in 1825 to 14,156,000—that is, nearly doubled; and the most decisive proof of the general increase of rural produce is to be found in the fact, that though population in Prussia is now advancing more rapidly than in any country of Europe, so as to double, if the present progress should continue, in twenty-six years, yet no importation of foreign grain is required.^{2†} Subsistence, under the influence of increased production, so far from becoming scarce, is constantly declining in price, and the augmented comforts and wants of a prosperous people are amply provided

^{5.}
Rapid agri-
cultural pro-
gress of
Prussia.

² Malte
Brun, v. 289,
305. Dupin,
Force Com-
merciale de
France, i.
36.

* Horse-power of machines in proportion to the square league of territory:—

In Great Britain,	415 horses.
In Prussia,	183 —
In France,	178 —

In proportion to her extent of surface, Prussia has fewer steam-engines than France, but more hydraulic machines; and, on the whole, a greater amount of mechanical power.—See EGEN, *Untersuchungen über den Effekt*, &c.—Berlin, 1831; and MALTE BRUN, v. 291.

† In 1828, the total population of the Prussian provinces, exclusive of the Canton of Neuchâtel, was 12,672,000 inhabitants. In 1832, it was 13,843,000; and it is now (1843) upwards of 15,000,000. The proportion per square league in the first period, was 892; in the second, 998—a prodigious difference to have taken place in so short a period as four years.—MALTE BRUN, v. 276.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

6.

Slow progress of Prussia at first, and her rapid subsequent growth.

for by the labours of the agricultural portion of the community.

It was by slow degrees, however, and by the successive efforts of more than one generation of great men, that Prussia was raised to its present prosperous condition. The monarchy, in reality, dates from the accession of Frederick the Great; but during the short period which has since elapsed, it has made unexampled progress. The treasure, indeed, amassed by that great warrior and able prince, had been wholly dissipated during the succeeding reign; but, both under his sway and that of his successor Frederick-William, the monarchy had made important advances in territory, wealth, and population. By withdrawing from the alliance against France in 1794, the cabinet of Berlin succeeded in appropriating to itself a large portion of the spoils of Poland; while the open preference to French interests which they evinced for the ten years which followed the treaty of Bâle, was rewarded by a considerable share of the indemnities—in other words, of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire; and a most important increase of influence, by the place assigned to Prussia as the protector of the neutral leagues situated beyond a fixed line in the north of Germany. During this long period of peace, the industry and population of the country rapidly advanced; a large portion of the commerce of Germany had fallen into its hands, and the whirl and expenditure of war, so desolating to other states, was felt only as increasing the demand for agricultural produce, or augmenting the profits of neutral navigation.¹

¹ Hard. v. and vi. 379, 247, 249. Bign. ii. 291, 292.

7.
Statistical details.

At the death of the Great Frederick in 1786, the population of the monarchy was 7,000,000 of souls, and its revenue 31,000,000 thalers, or about £4,600,000 sterling. By the shares obtained of Poland on occasion of its successive dismemberments, and the acquisition of Anspach, Baireuth, and other districts, its population was raised to 9,000,000; and although the treasure of 70,000,000

thalers (£10,500,000) left by the Great Frederick had disappeared, and given place to a debt of 28,000,000 of thalers, or £4,200,000, yet this was compensated by the increase of the revenue, which had risen to 36,000,000 thalers, or £5,400,000. Various establishments had been set on foot at Berlin, eminently calculated to promote the interests both of commerce and agriculture. In particular, a bank and society of commerce were established in that capital, and institutions formed in the provinces to lend money to the landed proprietors on reasonable terms. By the aid of these establishments, and the effect of long-continued peace and prosperity, the finances of the state were in the most flourishing condition in 1804; all the branches of the public service were provided for by the current revenue, and some progress was even made in the reduction of the debt. The large share of the German indemnities, obtained through French and Russian influence by this aspiring power, made a considerable addition to the public resources: the acquisition of 526,000 souls raised the population to 9,500,000 souls, and the increase of 2,375,000 thalers yearly revenue swelled the income of the public treasury to 38,375,000 thalers, or £5,750,000 sterling—a sum equivalent, from the difference in the value of money, to at least ten millions sterling in Great Britain. This revenue, as in Austria, was the net receipt of the exchequer, and independent, not merely of the expenses of collection, but of various local charges in the different provinces. The regular army was nearly 200,000 strong, brave, and highly disciplined, but not to be compared to the French, either in the experience and skill of the officers, or in the moral energy which had been developed by the events of the Revolution.¹

¹ Bign. ii.
293, 297.

Unlimited toleration prevails in Prussia. The Protestant is the religion of the sovereign and of the state, but persons professing all creeds are equally eligible to all offices under government, and, practically speaking, no difference is made between them. On the whole, two-

8.
State of religion in Prussia.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

thirds of the inhabitants are Protestants, one-third Catholics; but the proportions between these two great divisions of Christians vary considerably in the different provinces.* Each religion has its separate ministers and bishops. Berlin is every five years the seat of a general synod; that capital has a Protestant bishop, and Königsberg another; but the Catholics have two archbishops and six bishops in the Prussian dominions. Like the Austrian government, however, the Prussians are careful not to admit the slightest interference in matters not purely spiritual by the court of Rome, and Catholic ministers of vacant livings are appointed by a variety of lay patrons, as in Great Britain, without any serious collision with the Holy See.¹

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
282.

9.
Revenue
and expen-
diture of
Prussia.

The revenue of Prussia, like that of all other countries in Europe, is derived partly from direct, partly from indirect taxation.† The total revenue is 79,810,000 florins, or nearly £8,000,000 sterling—a sum at least equal to

* The Prussian population was divided, according to its religion, in 1829, in the following manner :—

Provinces.	Protestants.	Catholics.	Mormon- ites.	Jews.	Totals, includ- ing Military.
Prussia,	1,448,113	529,921	13,919	19,408	2,008,361
Posen,	309,495	687,401	...	67,590	1,064,506
Pomerania,	864,588	7,543	...	4,709	876,842
Brandenburg,	1,505,471	20,535	245	10,341	1,539,592
Silesia,	1,284,448	1,091,132	...	20,970	2,396,551
Saxony,	1,316,700	89,081	...	3,607	1,409,388
Westphalia,	504,611	711,883	171	11,981	1,228,548
Rhenish Pro- vinces.	499,840	1,678,719	1,315	22,421	2,202,322
	7,753,264	4,816,215	15,658	160,978	12,726,110

—MALTE BRUN, v. 304.

† The particulars are—

Direct taxes,	.	.	26,802,837 florins, or £2,680,253
Indirect,	.	.	40,740,000 ... 4,074,000
Domains and forests,	.	.	7,171,428 ... 717,142
Mines,	.	.	1,310,000 ... 131,000
Lottery,	.	.	1,327,443 ... 131,000
Miscellaneous,	.	.	438,572 ... 43,857

Total, 79,810,000 florins, or £7,981,000

—TCHOBORSKI'S *Finances de l'Autriche et de la Prusse*, i. 4, 5.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

£14,000,000 sterling in Great Britain, if the difference in the value of money is taken into consideration. The expenditure is somewhat less, amounting only to 75,238,571 florins, or £7,523,857 sterling, leaving a balance of above 5,000,000 florins, or £500,000 yearly to go to the discharge of the principal of the public debt.* The public debt of Prussia in 1833 amounted to 723,450,000 francs, or £29,000,000 sterling. In 1823 the debt was 908,950,000 francs, or £36,350,000; so that in ten years they have reduced the debt by £7,000,000, at which rate it will be entirely extinguished in 1872. It would appear, therefore, that the finances of Prussia are in a more prosperous state than those of Austria, France, or Great Britain, in all of which, although their national resources are incomparably greater, the expenditure generally exceeds the income by a very considerable sum, and all thoughts of a sinking-fund, or of a permanent system for the reduction of the debt, have been practically abandoned. This fact speaks volumes as to the patriotic spirit of the Prussian people, and the economy and far-seeing policy of its government, especially when the large military establishment they are obliged to keep up to secure their independence is taken into consideration.¹

¹ Tchoborski, *Finances de l'Autriche et de la Prusse*, i. 1, 10. Malte Brun, v. 285, 310.

The military establishment of Prussia is greater, in proportion to its population, than that of any other country in Europe. It consists, in time of peace, of one hundred and twenty-two thousand men: but so admirable are the arrangements for the augmentation of this force in time of war, and such the ardent and patriotic spirit of

^{10.}
Military
establish-
ment.

* The particulars are—

Interest of public debt, including			
sinking-fund,	.	.	12,244,286 florins, or £1,225,428
Civil list and court,	.	.	20,905,743 ... 2,090,574
Army and ordnance,	.	.	33,180,000 ... 3,318,000
Miscellaneous,	.	.	5,300,000 ... 530,000
Reserve fund,	.	.	3,318,572 ... 331,557

75,238,571

£7,523,857

—TCHOBORSKI'S *Finances de l'Autriche et de la Prusse*, i. 9.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the people, that the state could then without difficulty call forth an army of five hundred thousand combatants. The regular army is composed of three classes. 1st, Of voluntary recruits, who are received from seventeen to forty years of age. 2d, Of young men who are balloted for: a burden to which all the inhabitants of the kingdom, without exception, are subject. 3d, Of veteran soldiers who prolong the period of their service voluntarily beyond the period required by law. Every Prussian, without exception, from the royal family downwards, between the ages of twenty and fifty, is liable to be drawn for the military service in some department or other; but he is only bound to serve in the regular army five years; and of these he is only three years actually with his colours, the other two being allowed to be spent at home. Thus the military duty is so short that it is never considered as a burden, but rather as an agreeable mode of spending the first three years of manhood; and there are very few who either can or wish to avoid it. The *cadres* of the regiments, or permanent staff, and a certain proportion of the privates, are fixed, and hold to arms voluntarily as a profession for life; and this gives to the troops, notwithstanding the frequent change of the privates, the consistence and steadiness of old soldiers, while, at the same time, it spreads through a large part of the people a practical acquaintance with military duties. It is to this system, introduced by the Great Frederick, but matured and brought to perfection by those able statesmen, Stein and Scharnhorst, after the treaty of Tilsit, that the stability and continual progress of the Prussian monarchy is, beyond all doubt, to be ascribed.¹

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
286, 287.

11.
The Land-
wehr and
Landsturm.

Besides the regular army, the military establishment of Prussia embraces also the *landwehr* and *landsturm*, which, in time of need, can quadruple its effective strength. The former is divided into two *bans*: the first comprehending all the young men from twenty to thirty-two who have not gone through the five years' service in

the regular army; the second formed of persons, whether they have served or not, from thirty-two to fifty years of age. After that period all obligation of military service entirely ceases. During peace, the landwehr, which consists of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are never called into active service, or removed from home; but they are not on that account the less carefully and regularly instructed during a certain number of days in the year in their military duties. In case of war or invasion, the first ban are called out, and united to the regular forces, to whom they are soon scarcely inferior in discipline and prowess: the second ban form the garrisons of strong places, and perform the service of the interior. In addition to this immense force, which numbers fully two hundred thousand combatants, there is organised in Prussia a second reserve, called the landsturm, which embraces every man, without exception, not already enrolled in one of the other services, between the ages of seventeen and fifty years. Such a force in many countries would be little more than a tumultuary rabble, more likely to be burdensome than available in real service; but in Prussia, where almost all the citizens have at one period or another served in the ranks, it forms a much more efficient body, and actually performed good service on many occasions during the glorious struggle of 1813.¹

Education is more generally diffused in Prussia than in any other country of equal extent in Europe. Over the whole of its dominions, one in seven of the whole population is at school; while in France the proportion is one in twenty-three; in England one in fifteen; and in Scotland one in eleven. There can be no doubt that this is the greatest proportion of persons undergoing instruction which obtains in the world. Instruction is there compulsory: the laws compel the sending of children to school by their parents, and, when necessary, that duty is enforced by the magistrates. In general, however, it is unnecessary, so great is the desire of parents and relations

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
285, 286.

12.
Great diffu-
sion of edu-
cation in
Prussia.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

to give their children the blessings of education. Schools are established in every parish, and the costs of instruction are very trifling, so as to be within the reach of the humblest of the people; and to the destitute it is given gratuitously. The tree of knowledge, however, has in Prussia, as elsewhere, brought forth its accustomed fruits of good and evil. In Prussia there are, according to the most recent returns, no less than *twelve times* as many crimes committed, in proportion to the population, as in France, where education is not diffused to a third of the extent it is in Prussia—a fact which demonstrates, equally with the experience of every other country, the sedulous care which it is indispensable to take before that great instrument of *power* is put into the hands of the people.¹*

¹ Malte
Brun, v.
277, 278.

13.
Manners
and court
of Berlin.

The Prussian capital had long been one of the most agreeable and least expensive in Europe. No rigid etiquette, no impassable line of demarcation, separated the court from the people: the royal family lived on terms of friendly equality, not only with the nobility, but with the leading inhabitants of Berlin. An easy demeanour, a total absence of aristocratic pride, and of extravagance or parade, distinguished all the parties given at court, at which the king and queen mingled on terms of perfect equality with their subjects. Many ladies of rank, both at Paris and London, spent larger sums annually on their dress than the Queen of Prussia; none equalled her in dignity and grace of manner, and the elevated sentiments with which she was inspired. Admiration of her beauty, and attachment to her person, formed one of the strongest feelings of the Prussian monarchy; and nothing contributed more to produce that profound

* In France and Prussia there were in 1826:—

	PRUSSIA.	FRANCE.
Crimes against the person, .	1 in 34,122	1 in 32,411
“ against property, .	1 in 597	1 in 9,392
“ on the whole, .	1 in 587	1 in 7,285

—MALTE BRUN, v. 278; and BALBI et GUERRY, *Sur l'Education en France*, iii. 786.

irritation at France, which, in the latter years of the war, pervaded all classes of its inhabitants, than the harshness and injustice with which Napoleon, to whom chivalrous feelings were unknown, treated, in the days of her misfortune, that captivating and high-spirited princess.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Bign. ii.
297, 299.

A spirit of economy, order, and wisdom, pervaded all the internal arrangements of the state. The cabinet, led at that period by Haugwitz, but in which the great abilities of Hardenberg and Stein soon obtained an ascendancy, was one of the ablest in Europe. Its diplomatists, inferior to none in information, penetration, and address, had long given to Prussia a degree of influence at foreign courts beyond what could have been expected from the resources and weight of the monarchy. The established principles of the Prussian cabinet, under the direction of Haugwitz, ever since the peace of Bâle in 1795, had been to keep aloof from the dangers of war, and take advantage, as far as possible, of the distresses of their neighbours to augment the territory and resources of the monarchy. From a mistaken idea of present interest, not less than the influence of former rivalry with Austria, they inclined to the alliance with France, and derived great temporary benefits from the union, both in the accessions of territory which they received out of the ecclesiastical estates of the empire, and the increase of importance which they acquired as the head of the defensive league of the north of Germany. Little did they imagine, however, in what a terrible catastrophe that policy was to terminate, or anticipate, as the reward of their long friendship, a severity of treatment to which Austria and England were strangers, even after years of inveterate and perilous hostility. The interview at Memel in 1802, and the open support given by Russia to the Prussian claims in the matter of the indemnities, had already laid the foundation of an intimate personal friendship between Frederick-William and the Emperor Alexander.² But it was at first an alliance of policy

14.
Its state
policy and
diplomacy.

² Bign. ii.
300, 301;
Hard. vi.
401-7, 411.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

rather than affection, and acquired the warmth of impassioned attachment at the tomb of the Great Frederick and on the field of Leipsic.

15.

Efforts of
Prussia to
obtain the
aid of
Russia and
England.

Sept. 25.

Aug. 17.

Notwithstanding the inconsiderate haste with which Prussia had taken up arms, the cabinet of Berlin made some attempts to induce the other powers of Europe to share with them the dangers of the conflict. With England it was no difficult matter to effect a reconciliation. At the first authentic accounts of the change in the policy of Frederick-William, an order in council was issued, raising the blockade of the Prussian harbours. M. Jacobi, the Prussian minister in London, returned to that capital immediately after he had left it; and the British ministry had the generosity to resume its amicable relations with the cabinet of Berlin before an explanation had been given on the subject of Hanover. With Sweden an accommodation was also without difficulty effected, on the footing of the troops of that power taking possession of Lauenberg, which they did in the name of the King of Great Britain. It was not so easy a matter to convince the cabinet of St Petersburg of this unlooked-for change in the Prussian councils; and, taught by the long vacillation of its policy, they were for some time unwilling to yield to the general joy which was diffused through the Russian capital, on the intelligence that war was resolved on. But no sooner was Alexander informed, by confidential letters brought by General Krusemark from the King of Prussia, that he had embarked seriously in the contest, than he instantly wrote promising an immediate succour of seventy thousand men, and announcing his intention of himself marching at the head of a chosen army to aid in the support of his ally.¹

Sept. 18.
¹ Hard. ix.
272, 275.
Bign. v. 413,
415. Dum.
xv. 285, 287.

16.

And of
Austria.

Important as the announcement of the intentions of Russia was, the accession of Austria would have been of still more value to the common cause, from its closer proximity to the scene of action, and the strong positions which the Bohemian mountains afforded on the flank of

the probable theatre of war. The Prussian ambassador accordingly was indefatigable in his endeavours to rouse the cabinet of Vienna to a sense of the vital importance of joining heart and hand in the approaching conflict for the liberties of Europe. He represented to Count Stadion, then prime minister at Vienna, "that the losses inflicted on Austria by the treaty of Pressburg were so immense, that the emperor, of necessity, must at some future period look out for the means of repairing them. The province of the Tyrol is of such irreparable importance to Austria, that no doubt can be entertained that she will take advantage of the first opportunity to resume it from Bavaria, by rousing the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that important province to their ancient masters. Napoleon has justly conceived the most serious apprehensions for the faithful observance of that treaty which he himself has been the first to violate. Does he not, in defiance of his engagements, still hold the fortress of Braunau and the line of the Inn, six months after he was bound by a solemn treaty to have evacuated Germany with all his forces? The recent establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and dissolution of the Germanic empire, too clearly demonstrate with what ulterior views the French government is actuated in regard to the countries beyond the Rhine. Honour, necessity, the existence of his people, have forced the King of Prussia to take up arms alone; but a powerful Russian army, and the well-known generosity of England, diminish the perilous chances of the conflict. Now, therefore, is the time for Austria and Prussia to lay aside their jealousies springing from the conquest of Silesia, and unite their forces against the common enemy, who is about to make the Confederation of the Rhine an outwork from whence to enslave all the other states of Germanic origin."¹

¹ Hard. ix.
277, 281.

Forcible as these considerations were, and strongly as the cabinet of Vienna felt their justice, there were yet many circumstances which forbade them to yield on this

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

17.
But the
cabinet
of Vienna
resolves to
remain
neutral.

Oct. 6.

occasion to their inclinations. The conduct of Prussia for ten years had been so dubious and vacillating; her hostility to Austria, especially on the division of the indemnities, so evident; her partiality for the French alliance so conspicuous: her changes of policy during the last year so extraordinary, that no reliance could be placed on her maintaining a decided line of conduct for any length of time together, and, least of all, on her continuing steadfast in that sudden and perilous hostility in which she had now engaged, and the vehemence of which was the worst possible guarantee for its endurance. Who could insure that she would not desert this alliance as she had done the first coalition against France, or abandon her policy as suddenly as she had done her recent hostility against England, and leave to Austria, irrevocably embarked, the whole weight and dangers of the contest? The Archduke Charles, on being consulted as to the state of the army, reported that the infantry, which had not yet been rejoined by the prisoners taken during the campaign, was hardly a half of its full complement; the cavalry but recently remounted, and for the most part unskilled in military exercises; the artillery numerous, but the majority of the gunners without any experience. The treasury was empty; some of the most valuable provinces of the monarchy had been torn away, and those which remained were exhausted by enormous war contributions, wrung from them by the enemy. Influenced by these considerations, the cabinet of Vienna resolved to preserve a strict neutrality, and issued a proclamation to that effect. However much the historian may lament that determination, from a knowledge of the boundless calamities which an opposite course might have saved to both monarchies, it is impossible to deny that, situated as Austria was at that time, it was the most prudent resolution which its government could have adopted;¹ and that, if Prussia was left single-handed to maintain the cause of European independence,

¹ Hard. ix.
279, 281.
Bign. v. 418,
419. Luc-
chesini, ii.
106, 112.

it was no more than she was bound to expect from the selfish and temporising policy which she had so long followed.*

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

Hopes were not wanting to the cabinet of Berlin of efficacious aid in another quarter where it was least expected, and of a kind to paralyse a considerable part of the French forces. Spain, bereft of her navy by the battle of Trafalgar, blockaded in her harbours, destitute of commerce, cut off from all intercourse with her colonies, had felt all the burdens of war without any of its glories. The public indignation was hourly accumulating against the Prince of the Peace, whose ignoble birth, exorbitant power, and immense wealth, rendered him as much an object of jealousy to the Castilian noblesse, as the uniform disasters which had attended his administration made him detested by the people. Still, however, that ruling favourite persevered, against the almost unanimous wishes of the kingdom, in the French alliance, till his pride was offended at the haughty conduct of Napoleon, who excluded the Spanish ambassador from any share in the negotiations for a general peace at Paris, and it was revealed to him, that in those conferences the French Emperor had seriously proposed to take the Balearic islands from the Spanish crown, and confer them as an indemnity for Sicily, together with a revenue drawn from Spain, on the King of Naples.¹ At the same time the assembling of a powerful army at Bayonne, ostensibly

18.
Spain long
obsequious
to France
under the
Prince of
Peace.

¹ Lucches.
ii. 99, 100.
Hard. ix.
285, 286.

* The instructions of Mr Adair, the British ambassador at Vienna at that period, were, not to stimulate the Austrian government to hurry into a war, of which the consequences, if unsuccessful, might be fatal to that country, but to offer its government, if they deemed the opportunity favourable for engaging in hostilities, or if the necessities of their situation compelled them to such a course, the whole pecuniary aid which Great Britain was capable of affording. Of the wisdom of this course of proceeding, no one who considers the precarious situation of Austria at that crisis can entertain a doubt; and it affords another proof of the clear insight which Mr Fox at that period had obtained as to the insatiable ambition of Napoleon, and of the magnanimity with which that upright statesman instantly acted upon his conviction. "A man," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "unjustly styled by Napoleon and his adherents, the last prop of the pacific dispositions of the cabinet of St James's."—*Vide* LUCCHESINI, ii. 96, 97, *note*; and BIGNON, v. 417.

Instructions
to Mr Adair
on the sub-
ject.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

19.

At length
indicates
hostile dis-
positions
against
France.

directed against Portugal, sufficiently indicated a design to overawe both states of the Peninsula.

The light now suddenly flashed upon the Spanish rulers. They perceived, as Prussia had done during the same negotiation, that the French Emperor made use of the powers with whom he was in alliance as mere dependencies, excluding them from any participation in treaties in which they were deeply interested, and disposing of their provinces to others without condescending even to ask their consent to the transfer. No sooner, therefore, did they receive intelligence of the rupture of the conferences between Great Britain and France at Paris, and the resolution of Prussia to take up arms, than they resolved to detach themselves from the French alliance, and join their forces to those engaged in the cause of European independence. Despatches from the Prussian envoy at Paris to the Prince of the Peace on this subject were secretly intercepted and deciphered by the French government, which from that moment resolved on the overthrow of the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon at the first convenient opportunity. At the same time, the Prince of the Peace, deeming concealment of his designs no longer necessary, issued two proclamations, in the middle of October, in which he enjoined the immediate filling up of the ranks of the army, and the organisation of the national militia, under their constitutional leaders, in all the provinces of the monarchy. Thus was the ambition and reckless disregard of national rights by Napoleon again reviving, on a surer basis, because that of experience and common danger, the great original European coalition against France; and on the eve of the battle of Jena were the first sparkles of that terrible conflagration visible, which afterwards burned with such fury in Russia, Germany, and the Spanish peninsula.¹

Oct. 14
and 15.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 221.
Lucches. ii.
100, 101.
Hard. ix.
285, 286.

But although the greater and distant powers, with the exception of Austria, were thus arming in favour of the coalition, the lesser states nearer the scene of action were

overawed by the influence and the authority of France. Napoleon was daily receiving accessions of strength from the states which bordered on the Confederation of the Rhine. The Archduke Ferdinand, though brother to the Emperor of Austria, gave the first example of defection by joining his states of Würzburg to that alliance; the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, whom interest as well as family connexions strongly inclined to the cause of Prussia, was nevertheless so overcome by his apprehensions, as to persist, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the cabinet of Berlin, in a forced neutrality; and summoned to each of the hostile camps, and sorely perplexed between his inclinations and his apprehensions, put his troops on the war footing of twenty thousand men, and contrived to protract his ultimate decision till the battle of Jena rendered submission to France a matter of necessity. Saxony alone, conterminous along its northern frontier with Prussia, and capable from its strength of adopting a more generous resolution, openly joined the cabinet of Berlin; but twenty thousand men were all that it brought to the standards of the Prussian generals.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

20.

The lesser
German
powers in-
cline to
France.

Sept. 25.

¹ Bign. v.
435, 442.
Dum. xv.
287, 288.

The whole weight of the contest, therefore, fell on Prussia; for although great and efficacious aid might be expected to be derived in time from Russia, and succours were hoped for from England, both in men and money, yet these auxiliaries were as yet far distant. The Muscovite battalions were still cantoned on the Niemen; those of England had not yet left the Thames; while Napoleon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops, was rapidly approaching the Thuringian Forest. Nothing daunted, however, by this formidable prospect, Frederick-William gallantly took the field, and directed all the disposable troops of the monarchy towards Saxony and Erfurth. The total military strength of the kingdom was two hundred and forty thousand men, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand were assembled on the

21.

Prepara-
tions of
Prussia.
Forces on
both sides.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

frontier, and twelve thousand were in observation in Westphalia, for the approaching campaign; the remainder being dispersed in garrisoned depots, or not yet put in a state for active operations. Such was the general enthusiasm, and so little did they anticipate the terrible reverses which awaited them, that the Prussian guards marched out of Berlin, singing triumphant airs, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, almost in a state of sedition from the tumultuous joy they experienced on at length being about to measure their strength with the enemy. Napoleon's forces were much more considerable. They amounted in Germany alone to one hundred and ninety thousand men; of whom twenty-eight thousand were the terrible reserve cavalry under Murat, and they were directed by the ablest and most experienced marshals in the French army.¹ *

¹ Lucches.
ii. 117, 118.
Dum. xv.
289. Jom.
ii. 275, 276.
Hard. ix.
299, 300.
Thiers, vii.
42, 43.

22.
Her grievous want of foresight and defensive measures.

The memorable military operations of the year 1813, and the tenacious hold which Napoleon then kept of the fortresses on the Elbe, when assailed by the greatly superior forces of the coalition, have demonstrated that no position in Europe is more susceptible of defence than the course of that river; and that supported by the ramparts of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden, an inferior force may there for a considerable time prolong its defence against an enemy possessing an overwhelming superiority in the field. Had these fortresses been pro-

* Napoleon's army was divided into nine corps, and stationed as follows, on the 3d October, when he arrived at Wurtzburg,—

	MEN.
First corps—Bernadotte—at Lichtenfelds,	20,000
Second do.—Marmont—Ilyria,	
Third do.—Davoust—Bamberg,	27,000
Fourth do.—Soult—between Amberg and Bamberg,	32,000
Fifth do.—Lefebvre, succeeded by Lannes—in front of Schweinfurt,	22,000
Sixth do. Ney—Nuremberg,	20,000
Seventh do.—Augereau—Wurtzburg,	17,000
Cavalry do.—Murat—between Wurtzburg and Kronach,	28,000
Imperial Guard—Bessières and Lefebvre, after Lannes got the 5th corps—Wurtzburg,	20,000

 186,000

The bulk of the army was grouped round Coburg and Bamberg. The whole

perly armed and provisioned, and the Prussians been commanded by a general capable of turning to the best advantage the means of defence which they afforded, it is probable that as protracted a contest might have been maintained as Napoleon supported in 1796 on the Adige, or Kray in 1800 around the bastions of Ulm, and time gained for the arrival of the Russians before a decisive blow was struck in the centre of Germany. But not only had no preparations for such a defensive system been made, but the nation, as well as its rulers, were in such a state of exultation as to despise them. None of these important bulwarks were provisioned; hardly were guns mounted on their ramparts. The interior fortified towns on the Oder and in Silesia were for the most part in the most deplorable state. No depots were formed; no provision was made for recruiting the army in case of disaster. They had not even a rallying point assigned in the event of defeat, though the strong fortresses of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau lay immediately in the rear of the theatre of war, and the Elbe spread its ample stream to arrest the victor. Careless of the future, chanting songs of victory, and enjoying its triumphant march through the villages, the army bent its steps towards Erfurth; strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, stronger still in the anticipation of the overthrow of Napoleon,¹

¹ Hard. ix.
297, 300.
Lucches. ii.
117, 120.

force bearing on the Prussians, exclusive of Marmont in Illyria, was 186,000 men.

The Prussians, when the campaign opened, were divided into three armies: the right wing, under General Ruchel, of 30,000 men, was stationed on the frontiers of the Hessian territories; the centre, 55,000 strong, commanded by the King in person, with his lieutenant-general, the Duke of Brunswick, under his orders, was in front of the Elbe around Magdeburg, with its advanced guard on the Saale; the left wing, composed of 40,000 men, including the Saxons, was commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the King's brother, under him. In all 125,000—a noble force, but as much inferior to that at the command of Napoleon, as was the capacity of their leader compared to his. It was assembled in Saxony: its extreme left rested on the Bohemian mountains, and its advanced posts were pushed as far as Hof and the Kirchberg. A detached corps of 12,000 men, in Westphalia, was under the orders of a general destined to future celebrity—BLUCHER.—See DUMAS, xv. 290, 514; JOM. ii. 275, 276; *Official Report of the Prussian strength to the Duke of Brunswick*, HARD. ix. 484, App. G.; and THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 42.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

23.
Imprudent
conduct of
the Prussian
generals.

and dreaming rather of the banks of the Rhine or the plains of Champagne, than of the shores of the Vistula and the fields of Poland.

But if the infatuation of the army was great, greater still was the delusion of its commanders. The Duke of Brunswick, though an able man of the last century, and enjoying a great reputation, was altogether behind the age, and ignorant of the perilous chances of a war with the veteran legions and numerous columns of Napoleon. The disasters of the late campaigns were by him ascribed entirely to timidity or want of skill in the Austrians ; the true way to combat the French, he constantly maintained, was to assume a vigorous offensive, and paralyse their military enthusiasm by compelling them to defend their own positions. That there was some truth in this opinion, no one acquainted with the character and history of the French army could deny ; but unfortunately, it required, for its successful application, both a general and an army very different from the Prussian at this period. The former did not possess the energy and rapidity, the latter the strength or experience, requisite for so perilous a system. Bold even to rashness in the original conception of the campaign, the Duke of Brunswick was vacillating and irresolute when he came to carry it into execution ; and, while his opponent was counting hours and minutes in the march of his indefatigable legions, he frequently lost whole days in deliberation or councils of war, or changed the destination of the forces when their movements were half completed. The troops, indeed, were numerous and perfectly disciplined : the artillery admirable ; the cavalry magnificent ; the staff skilful and highly educated, but in matters of theory and detail, rather than the practical disposal of large masses in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy. But what the whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer, were alike ignorant of, was the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoleon had introduced into modern war, by the

union of consummate skill at headquarters with enormous masses and a vast application of physical force ; combining thus the talent of Cæsar or Turenne with the fierceness of the sweep of Scythian warfare. Applying then to the present the experience of the past age, the usual error of second-rate men, they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them ; and advanced as against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in presence of Napoleon and a hundred and fifty thousand effective men.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Hard. ix.
301, 303.
Jom. ii. 279.

As usual in such cases, the contending parties prefaced the war of arms by mutual manifestoes calculated to rouse the spirit of their respective forces, or vindicate their hostility in the eyes of Europe. That of Napoleon, which bore intrinsic evidence of his composition, was, as usual, admirably calculated to dazzle and stimulate his followers. "Soldiers! the order for your return to France was already issued: you had already approached it by several marches: triumphal fêtes awaited you; preparations for your reception were already made in the capital: but whilst we were surrendering ourselves to a too confident security, new conspiracies were formed under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war have been heard from Berlin: for two months provocations have daily been offered to us; the same insane spirit which, taking the advantage of our dissensions fourteen years ago, conducted the Prussians into the plains of Champagne, still prevails in their councils. If it is no longer Paris which they propose to raze to its foundation, it is now their standards which they announce their intention of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony which they wish to compel to renounce, by a shameful transaction, its independence, and range itself by their side; it is your laurels which they wish to tear from your brows: they insist upon our evacuating Germany at the mere sight of their army! The fools! Let them learn that it is a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to wither

24.
Proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers.
7th Oct.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the honours of a great people and its allies. Their projects were then confounded : they found in the plains of Champagne defeat, shame, and death : but the lessons of experience are forgotten ; and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy are never extinguished. Soldiers ! there is not one among you who would return to France by any other path but that of honour. We should never re-enter there except under triumphal arches. What then ! shall we have braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts—vanquished Europe, repeatedly coalesced against us—extended our glory from the east to the west—to return at last to our country like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French eagle fled at the mere sight of the Prussian standards ? But they have already arrived at our advanced posts. Let us then march, since moderation has not been able to awaken them from this astonishing trance : let the Prussian army experience the same fate which it did fourteen years ago : let them learn that if it is easy, by means of the friendship of a great people, to acquire power and dominions, its enmity, though capable of being roused only by an abandonment of every principle of wisdom and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean.”¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
4, 6.

25.
Manifesto
of Prussia.

Less fitted to rouse the military passions and warlike enthusiasm of its subjects, than this masterpiece of Napoleon, the Prussian manifesto, drawn by Gentz, was yet a model of dignified reason, and concluded with a sentiment as to the ultimate issue of the contest, which subsequent events have rendered prophetic. “ All our efforts, and those of our allies, to preserve peace have proved unsuccessful ; and if we are not willing to abandon to the despotism of an implacable enemy, and to deliver over to his devouring armies, the whole north of Germany, and perhaps of Europe, a war is inevitable. His majesty has resolved upon it, because the honour and security of the state are in danger : he would have deemed himself happy

could he have attained the same end by pacific means ; but it is with the firmest confidence that he takes the command of the army which is about to combat for its country and national honour, because the cause in which it is engaged is just. His majesty is well aware that for long the army desired war ; and even when circumstances prevented him from yielding to its wishes, these wishes commanded his respect, because they took their origin in those feelings of honour and patriotism which have ever distinguished the Prussian forces. The nation, in a body, has manifested the warm interest which it takes in this conflict ; and that strong expression of enthusiasm has confirmed his majesty in the opinion, that now it is not only unavoidable, but in unison with the wishes of all the people. His majesty is convinced that the desire to preserve unchanged the national honour, and the glory which the Great Frederick has shed over our arms, will suffice to excite the army to combat with its accustomed valour, and to support with constancy all its fatigues.

“ But this war possesses even a more general interest. We have to deal with an enemy who all around us has beaten the most numerous armies, humbled their most powerful states, annihilated their most venerable constitutions ; ravished from several nations their honour, from others their independence. A similar fate awaited the Prussian monarchy : numerous armies menaced your frontiers ; they were daily augmenting ; it had become your turn to fall into the gulf, to bow beneath a stranger yoke ; and already his pride and rapacity coveted the spoils of the north of Germany. Thus we combat for our independence, for our hearths, for all that is dear to us ; and if God gives victory to the just side, to our arms, to the courage which burns in the heart of every Prussian, we shall be the liberators of oppressed millions. Every warrior who shall fall on the field of battle will have sacrificed his life in the cause of humanity ; every one who survives will acquire, besides immortal glory, a just

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

26.

The true
character of
the war as
asserted in
it.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xvi.
8, 10.

title to the gratitude, the triumph, the tears of joy of a liberated country. Who amongst us could endure the thoughts of becoming the prey of a stranger? While we combat for our own safety, to avert for us the deepest humiliation to which a nation can be subjected, *we are the saviours of all our German brethren*; the eyes of all nations are fixed on us as the last bulwark of liberty, security, or social order in Europe.”¹

27.
Reflections
on these
proclama-
tions.

The opposite style of these two eloquent proclamations is very remarkable. Both are addressed to the strongest passions of the human breast; both are masterpieces of manly oratory; but the language which they severally employ is strikingly characteristic of the different situations in which their authors respectively stood. Napoleon speaks to his soldiers only of an insult offered to their arms—of glory and triumphs, and victories to be won; Frederick-William, equally firm, but less sanguine as to the result, disguises not the dangers and chances of the struggle, but reminds them of the duty they owe to themselves, their country, the cause of the human race. The former invokes the eagles of France, and calls on the soldiers to follow their glorious career: the latter appeals to the God of battles, and anticipates from his aid a final triumph to the arms of freedom. The battle of Jena and chains of Tilsit seemed for long to have announced an abandonment of this cause by the care of Providence; but let these words be borne in mind, and compared with the final issue of the contest.

28.
Napoleon's
insult to the
Queen of
Prussia.

Napoleon had no gallantry or chivalrous feeling in his breast. The Prussian minister had, with the ultimatum of the cabinet of Berlin, given a pressing request for an answer to the Prussian headquarters by the 8th October. “Marshal,” said he to Berthier, “they have given us a rendezvous for the 8th; never did a Frenchman refuse such an appeal. We are told that a beautiful queen is to be a spectator of the combat; let us then be courteous,

and march without resting for Saxony." Francis I. might have used the same language; but what followed in the first bulletin of the campaign, dictated by Napoleon himself? "The Emperor was right when he spoke thus: for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an Amazon, wearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters a-day to spread the conflagration in all directions. We seem to behold Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace. After her follows Prince Louis of Prussia, a young prince full of bravery and courage, hurried on by the spirit of party, who flatters himself he shall find a great renown in the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of these illustrious persons, all the court cries to 'To arms!' but *when war shall have reached them with all its horrors, all will seek to exculpate themselves from having been instrumental in bringing its thunder to the peaceful plains of the North.*" Such was the language in which Napoleon spoke of the most beautiful princess in Europe, rousing her subjects to patriotic resistance! How singularly prophetic is the concluding part of the sentence of what he himself experienced, just six years afterwards, in the frozen fields of Russia.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

Animated by those heart-stirring addresses, the forces on both sides rapidly approached each other; and their advanced outposts were in presence on the 8th October. Then began the terrible contest of the north with the south of Europe; never destined to be extinguished till the domes of the Kremlin were reddened with flames, and the towers of Notre Dame were shaken by the discharges of the Russian batteries. The first plan discussed at Berlin was for the whole army to debouche in separate columns by the two great roads, those of Adorf and Saalfeld, and Eisenach and Gotha, and commence the offensive towards the valley of the Maine, on the east and west of the Thuringian Forest, the intermediate passes of which were to be occupied by a central corps;

¹ Nap. Bulletin, ii. 11, 12.29.
Preparatory movements of the Prussians.

Atlas, Plate 39.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

Sept. 27.

but this plan was soon abandoned, as exposing the army to a perilous division of force in presence of so powerful and enterprising an enemy. The design ultimately adopted was to advance with the right under Ruchel in front, which was pushed on to Eisenach; next in echelon followed the centre, commanded by the King in person, which, united with the corps of Hohenlohe, was to advance upon Saalfeld and Jena, while each wing was covered by a detached corps of observation, the right by Blucher on the confines of Hesse, the left by Tauenzien, on the side of Baireuth. The object of this movement was to determine the hesitation of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and effect the junction of his contingent to the Prussian army, and at the same time pierce the centre of the valley of the Maine, which was the base of the enemy's operations, and cut them off from their communications with France. Both objects were important, and the design was well conceived, had the Duke of Brunswick possessed a force adequate to its execution. But it necessarily involved his army in great hazard in presence of a numerous and skilful enemy; and by leaving open to his advance the great roads to Dresden and Leipsic, exposed the Prussians to the very danger of being themselves turned and cut off from their communications and magazines, when endeavouring to inflict that injury on their opponents.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
19. Jom. ii.
279, 280.

30.
Counter
movement
of Napoleon.
His system
of provid-
ing for his
troops.

Napoleon was not a man to let slip the opportunity which this hazardous attempt of the Prussians to pass his position afforded, of not merely defeating, but destroying their army. Confident in the numbers and experience of his troops, which rendered a situation comparatively safe to them, which was to the last degree perilous to their opponents, he instantly resolved to retort upon the enemy the measure they were preparing to play off upon him; and by throwing forward his army with the right in front, turn the Prussian left, and cut them off from their magazines on the Elbe, and the heart of the monarchy.

On the 8th October, the French army was concentrated round Bamberg; at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Napoleon put himself in motion, and his columns marched towards Saxony, on three great roads, by echelon, the right in front. On the right, Soult and Ney with a Bavarian division moved from Baireuth by Hof, on Plauen; in the centre, Murat with the cavalry, as also Bernadotte and Davoust, marched from Bamberg by Kronach, on Saalburg; on the left, Lannes and Augereau, breaking up from Schweinfurt, advanced by Coburg and Graffen-thal upon Saalfeld. The effect of these movements was to bring the centre and right of the French directly upon the Prussian magazines and reserves, while they were stretching forward on the left, to interpose between their antagonists and the Rhine. In commencing these movements, the French Emperor put in practice his usual system for providing for his army. This was to make his troops subsist daily, in general, on the resources of the country which they occupied,—to extend themselves sufficiently to obtain supplies, but not so as to be beyond concentration in case of attack,—and to have in reserve in waggons bread adequate for several days, to meet any sudden emergency. This reserve store, carefully husbanded and duly replenished when drawn upon, served for all cases of concentration before or after battles. To convey it, Napoleon allowed two caissons for a battalion, and one for a squadron. Adding to that the carriages provided for the sick and wounded, he calculated that four or five hundred waggons should suffice for the largest army. The most peremptory orders were issued against any general or officer applying any part of these public conveyances to his private purposes; and in one instance, having discovered that one of his marshals made such use of them in the outset of the campaign, he manifested the utmost displeasure, and declared Berthier responsible for all such evasions of his orders in future.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
280, 281.
Dum. xvi.
19, 26. Bign.
v. 465, 466.
Norv. ii. 456,
457. Thiers,
vii. 38.

The Prussians were in the midst of their perilous

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

31.

The Duke of
Brunswick
renounces
the offen-
sive. De-
scription of
the theatre
of war.

advance to the French left, when intelligence of this rapid accumulation of forces against their own centre and left reached the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters. It was indispensable to renounce forthwith the hazardous enterprise; and orders were instantly despatched to countermand the advance, and direct the concentration of the army in the neighbourhood of Weimar: the principal column, commanded by the King, at Erfurth; Ruchel at Gotha; Hohenlohe at Hochdorf; the reserve, under the Duke of Würtemberg, at Halle. Thus the Prussians, in presence of the greatest general and most powerful army of modern times, were thrown into a change of position, and a complicated series of cross movements, with their flank exposed to the enemy—the situation of all others the most perilous in war, and which, not a year before, had proved fatal to the combined army, when attempting a similar movement in front of Austerlitz. To complete their danger, the concentration, from the orders which they received, took place on the centre and right; whereas it was on the left, towards Hof, that it should have been made, to resist the rapid march of the invaders upon their magazines and resources. The Thuringian Forest, which those movements promised to render the first theatre of approaching hostilities, is a range of broken hills, for the most part covered with wood, which, branching off from the central chain that encircles Bohemia, stretches to the northwards until it subsides into the plains of Westphalia, where it terminates. This range separates the valley of the Rhine from that of the Elbe, the waters from the western slope flowing into the former, those from the eastern into the latter. It thus runs directly athwart the line of communication between France and Prussia, and requires to be traversed in one quarter or another in going from the one country to the other. Three great roads cross this broken woody region, and conduct the traveller from the banks of the Rhine to the sands of Prussia. The first, starting from Mayence, follows the windings of the Maine, as far

as Coburg, where it approaches the summit of the Thuringian ridge, from which the Maine flows in one direction, the Saale in another. Three defiles penetrate the summit level: that of Baireuth to Hof, that of Coburg to Saalfeld, that of Kronach to Schleitz. The second route, which is the one usually followed by travellers going from Mayence to Saxony or Berlin, passes the wooded summits of the Thuringian Forest to the left of their highest elevation. It branches off from the valley of the Maine at Hanau, ascends the lateral valley of the Fulda, and, after surmounting the ridge, descends by Eisenach, Gotha, and Weimar into the Saxon plains and the banks of the Elbe. The third, by striking far to the north, avoids entirely the Thuringian range, and, leaving the Rhine at Wesel, makes straight for the Westphalian plains between the northern extremity of the hills and the sea. Of these routes Napoleon chose the first, which brought him by Würzburg to the sources of the Saale; and it was there that he came in contact with the Prussian army, in the very act of making their perilous movement from left to right.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
280. Dum.
xvi. 26, 31.
Bign. v. 466,
467. Hard.
ix. 303.
Thiers, vii.
59, 60. Personal
observation.

But before the junction of the Prussian forces, even in this false direction, could be effected, the formidable legions of Napoleon were already upon them. As might have been expected, when surprised in this manner in the middle of a lateral movement, they were attacked at the same time in different quarters, and in all by greatly superior columns of the enemy. The French masses, dense and strong, marching on the great chaussées, fell perpendicularly upon the flank of their opponents when endeavouring, by cross and often deplorable roads, to reach the points of rendezvous assigned to them. The consequences might easily have been anticipated. They were defeated in every quarter, and lost, in the very outset of the campaign, the moral influence of an advance. On the 9th, Tauenzlein, who was at the moment in front of Schleitz with six thousand Prussians and three thousand Saxons, was attacked by Bernadotte, at the head of greatly supe-

32.
Commence-
ment of hos-
tilities, and
defeat of
detached
bodies of
Prussians.

Oct. 9.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1809.
Oct. 10.

Oct. 11.
1 Bign. v.
468, 470.
Dum. xvi.
51, 58.

33.
Success of
the French
left against
Prince
Louis.

rrior forces, and after a gallant resistance dislodged from his position with the loss of several hundred men. The day following, Murat marched on Gera, and on the road fell in with and captured a convoy of five hundred carriages and a pontoon train—an extraordinary proof of the advantage the French had already gained, when, on the third day after hostilities had commenced, they had fallen in with and captured a large part of the reserve trains and heavy baggage of the enemy.¹

Nor was the French left, under Lannes and Augereau, less successful. On the 10th, the former of these generals arrived on the heights of Saalfeld, and animated his troops to the highest degree by reading to them the proclamation of Napoleon on the opening of hostilities; and on the same day, in continuing his advance upon Saalfeld, he fell in with Prince Louis, who commanded the rear-guard of the Prussian left, and had been stationed at Rudolstadt and Blankenburg by Prince Hohenlohe to cover the cross-march of his columns, who were then endeavouring to reach the points of rendezvous assigned them by their commander-in-chief. This gallant prince, in common with his immediate superior Prince Hohenlohe, had long expressed the opinion, which they had in vain endeavoured to impress upon the Duke of Brunswick, that Napoleon meditated an attack on the Prussian left, and that a concentration of their troops in that direction should have been made some days before.* Unable to prevent the disastrous resolution to assemble on the right, he now set himself with heroic bravery to mitigate its effects. The forces under his command were only eleven batta-

* In the great council of war, held on the 5th October at Erfurth, when the Duke of Brunswick's project of continuing the march across the Thuringian Forest was discussed, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Louis, and Colonel Massenbach, his chief of the staff, strongly represented that, by continuing the march in that direction, the army would be exposed to certain ruin; that they would soon arrive at a country where the ground was entirely favourable to the operations of the enemy, and adverse to their own method of fighting; and that if the French were inclined, as seemed more than probable, to turn either of the wings of the army, nothing could favour this design so much as the

lions and eighteen squadrons of hussars, with eighteen pieces of cannon ; and with these he had to withstand the shock of Lannes, with twenty-five thousand men. Notwithstanding this fearful preponderance of force, he resolved to hold firm during the remainder of the day, to gain time for the evacuation of the considerable magazines which were collected close in his rear at Saalfeld.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

Oct. 9.
1 Lucches.
ii. 137, 139.
Dum. xvi.
55, 57.

In this gallant but unhappy determination he was confirmed from an opinion that it was only by resuming the old Prussian system of a vigorous offensive, that the spirits of the soldiers, which had been much sunk by the general order to retreat on the preceding day, could be revived. The sensible increase of the enemy all around him on the following day—even the turning of his right flank by Suchet with a powerful body of light troops, which rendered his position no longer tenable, could not induce him to abandon his ground ; and, when the attack commenced, the Prussians were surrounded on all sides. Notwithstanding this, they made a gallant resistance, and enabled the artillery and chariots to leave Saalfeld in safety. Returning from the town to his gallant comrades, who still made good their ground in its front, Prince Louis found them dropping fast under the murderous fire of the French tirailleurs. Soon their retreat was converted into a rout by the ravages of the hostile artillery ; and the prince himself, while combating bravely with the rearguard, and striving to restore order among the fugitives, was surrounded by the enemy's hussars—“Surrender, colonel,” said their chief, “not knowing the rank of his opponent, “or you are a dead man.” Louis answered only by a blow with his sabre, which wounded

34.
Death of
that prince.

Oct. 10.

plunging the Prussian host by columns into the forest. These sage observations made no sort of impression on the Duke of Brunswick ; and all the modification of his plan which these generals could effect, was that the troops should halt for a day on the 8th October, and on the following morning throw out strong reconnoitring parties, and receive bread for eight days before entering the defiles of Thuringia. It may safely be affirmed that that council, by continuing this fatal advance, determined the result of the campaign.—See DUMAS, xvi. 25, 26 ; and *Saalfeld*, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, iii. 299.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

35.

Discourage-
ment of the
Prussians,
who are
completely
turned by
the French.

without disabling his adversary, who replied with a mortal stroke, which laid the heroic prince dead at his feet.

In this disastrous encounter the Prussians lost twelve hundred prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded, and thirty pieces of cannon. But this was the least part of their misfortunes: the heroic Prince Louis was no more. He had fallen, it is true, while bravely combating on the field of honour; but his body had remained the trophy of the victors, and the continued advance of the enemy too surely indicated that defeat had attended the first serious encounter of the Prussian arms.* Their army was now broken in upon in several points; its magazines in part seized; its concentration interrupted; and the dejected columns, without any fixed rallying points, were wandering about in every direction, while the terrible French legions, in dense masses, were falling perpendicularly on their flank. These disasters rapidly communicated their depressing effect to the minds of the soldiers. The death of Prince Louis, above all, equally dear to the officers and private men, diffused a universal gloom. So grievous a calamity in the outset of the campaign was regarded as the worst augury of its future fortunes; and, as is usual with great bodies in a violent state of excitement, the transition was immediate from the preceding exultation to an extraordinary degree of depression.¹

Meanwhile the movements preparatory to a decisive battle continued, though in a very different spirit, on both sides. In deep dejection, and with infinite difficulty, the Prussians at length concentrated their forces in two

¹ Lucches.
ii. 137, 140.
Bign.v. 468,
470. Dum.
xvi. 51, 58.

* No sooner was the rank of the prince known, than Marshal Lannes, with deserved courtesy, showed his corpse all the honours due to so illustrious a character. It was interred with military honours in the cemetery of the princes of Coburg, at Saalfeld; and Berthier wrote on the 12th to the chief of the Prussian staff, announcing that the Emperor had ordered it to be restored, if it was desired that his remains should rest in the tomb of his ancestors—an offer which the disasters immediately ensuing rendered it impossible for the royal family at that time to accept.—BIGNON, v. 469.

great masses under the King in the neighbourhood of Weimar, and under Hohenlohe near Jena. It was in the highest exultation, on the other hand, and in the full anticipation of victory, that the French made a sweep which brought them completely round the Prussian army. The early triumphs with which the campaign had opened had given Napoleon hopes of rapid and decisive success. He no longer feared, as he admitted he had done at first, that he would be obliged to have recourse to the mattock.* The confusion of the enemy's columns had dissipated the prestige of the Great Frederick. Encouraged by these events, he now hesitated not to follow out the brilliant career which had opened to his arms. A complete conversion, turning on the pivot of the left, took place in the direction of his columns, who wheeled round so as to face the Northern Ocean. Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat marched upon Naumburg, where, on the next day, they made themselves masters of considerable magazines; Soult was advancing on Jena, where Lannes was already established; while Ney and Augereau were at Roda and Kahla, in its immediate neighbourhood. Such was the confusion of the Prussian movements, and the bad understanding which already prevailed between them and the Saxons, that, when the French took up the ground which the Allies had just quitted in the environs of Jena, they found the fields and roads covered with arms, cuirasses, and chariots, like the scene of a defeat. The Saxons had pillaged the Prussians, and the Prussians the Saxons. Baggage and ammunition waggons had been abandoned by their drivers, and lay scattered in confusion, while some guns had even been spiked to prevent their being of service to the enemy.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

36.

Movements
on both sides
preparatory
to a general
action.

Oct. 12.

Oct. 13.

¹ Dum. xvi.
53, 64. Jom.
ii. 282, 283.
Lucches. ii.
140, 141.

* In setting out for the Prussian campaign, Napoleon expected to experience a more formidable resistance than he had yet met with in Europe. The exploits of the Seven Years' War had filled him with the highest idea of the troops trained in the school of its illustrious hero, and he said to his assembled officers at Mayence, "We shall have earth to move in this war."—See JOMINI, ii. 282.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

37.
Result of
these man-
œuvres.

Oct. 12.

¹ Dum. xvi.
72, 76. Jom.
ii, 284. Luc-
ches. ii, 141.

38.
Concentra-
tion of the
Prussian
forces near
Weimar.

The result of these different marches was in the highest degree favourable to the French arms. By the advance on Naumburg they had cut the enemy off from the line of retreat to Leipsic, and thrown their left back in such a manner that the French on the banks of the Saale had their back to the Elbe, and faced the Rhine; while the Prussians had their back to the Rhine, and could only hope to regain their country by cutting their way through the enemy. Finding affairs in a situation so much more favourable than he could possibly have anticipated, Napoleon, to gain additional time to complete the encircling of his antagonists, despatched, on the 12th, an officer of his household with proposals of peace to Frederick-William, taking care meanwhile not to suspend for one instant the march of his columns; but the letter did not reach that monarch till the battle was over. In the evening of the 12th the army of Hohenlohe, which, with all the additions it had received from Ruchel, did not exceed forty thousand men, was grouped in dense masses on a ridge of heights to the north on the road from Jena to Weimar, between the Ilm and the Saale. Its advanced posts were on the Landgrafenberg, a steep hill between its position and the town of Jena, from the summit of which the whole lines of the Prussians could be descried, and over which the only road to the attack of their position in front lay.¹

The army of the King of Prussia, on the other hand, under the immediate command of the Duke of Brunswick, sixty-five thousand strong, was concentrated at the distance of somewhat more than a league in the rear of Hohenlohe, near Weimar. Thus the whole Prussian army, consisting of above a hundred thousand men, of which eighteen thousand were superb cavalry, with three hundred pieces of cannon, was at length assembled in a field of battle, where their far-famed tactics had a fair theatre for development; and notwithstanding the early disasters of the campaign, an opportunity was afforded

them of reinstating affairs at the sword's point. Each army had passed its opponent, and mutually intercepted the other's communications. But there was this extreme difference between the two, that the army of the Duke of Brunswick, cut off from all its magazines, had no resource but in victory; whereas that of Napoleon, though severed from the Rhine, had a clear line of retreat, in case of disaster, to the Maine and the Danube.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xvi. 72, 79. Jom. ii. 284, 285. Bign. v. 471, 478. Lucches. ii. 141, 151.

It would have been well for the Prussians had they continued and given battle in this concentrated position; but the intelligence of the advance of Davoust and Murat upon Naumburg, which arrived at headquarters on the night of the 12th, led to a renewed separation, attended in the end with the most frightful disasters. Conceiving that the French Emperor had no intention of immediate combat, and being anxious for the safety of that town where the principal magazines of the army were placed, the Duke of Brunswick came to the ruinous resolution of again dividing his forces; and while Hohenlohe was left in position near Jena, as a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the army, the principal body, with the King at its head, moved at daylight for Sulza, and at night arrived on the heights of AUERSTADT. Thus at the very moment when Napoleon, with above a hundred thousand men, was making his dispositions for a general battle on the day following, and surmounting the difficulties of the approach to the enemy's position on the heights in his vicinity, the Prussian general dislocated the imposing mass of his soldiers, and diverging to the left with two-thirds of his forces, engaged in a hazardous flank-march of ten leagues in presence of his antagonists, leaving a comparatively inconsiderable rearguard to be crushed by more than double its force in its position at Jena. Such was the dearth of provisions which already prevailed in the Allied camp from the capture of their magazines by the enemy, that no regular supply of bread was dealt out to the men after the long and fatiguing march;²

39.
The Prussian army is again divided. The King marches to Auerstadt.

Oct. 13.

² Lucches. ii. 141, 144. Jom. ii. 284, 285. Bign. v. 472. Dum. xvi. 79, 83.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

but great numbers lay down, wearied and supperless, to sleep on the ground which was to cover their graves on the morrow.

40.
Napoleon's
dispositions
for the
battle.

Meanwhile Napoleon, never suspecting this division of the enemy's force, and supposing they were to follow the principles of the Great Frederick, which were to combat in concentrated masses and on as confined a field of battle as possible, was endeavouring, with his wonted energy, to overcome the all but insurmountable difficulties of the passage of the Landgrafenberg, by which access was to be afforded to his columns for the attack of the Prussian position. No sooner had the French light troops dislodged the enemy's patrols from these important heights, than the Emperor repaired to them in person, from whence he distinctly beheld the portion left of the Prussian army still reposing at leisure on its formidable position on the opposite ridge. Not doubting that he would have to deal with their whole force on the following day, he pressed without intermission the march of his columns; and soon arranged the forces of Lannes, who with his infantry first reached its summit by the steep and rugged ascent, in such formidable masses around its declivities on the other side, that the enemy, who were now sensible of their error in abandoning so important a point, and were making preparations to retake it, were obliged to desist from the attempt. This valuable height, therefore, from which the whole of the Prussian position and all the movements of their troops were distinctly visible, remained in the hands of the French; and its elevation not only gave them that advantage, but entirely concealed from the observation of the Prussians the rapid concentration of troops on the Jena side of the mountain, which would at once have revealed the intention of a decisive attack on the following day. Still the difficulty of surmounting the ascent was very great, and for artillery and waggons it was as yet totally impassable.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
285, 286.
Saalf. iii.
301, 305.
Camp. de
Saxe, i.
260.

Nothing, however, could long withstand the vigour of

Napoleon and his followers. He stood on the spot till the most rugged parts of the ascent were widened by blasting the solid rock, or smoothed by pioneers; and when the men were exhausted, revived their spirits by himself working with the tools, and exhibiting his old experience as a gunner, in surmounting the difficulty of dragging the cannon up the pass. Animated by such an example, and the vigorous exertions of the successive multitudes who engaged in the task, the difficulties which the Prussian generals deemed altogether insurmountable were rapidly overcome; before eight in the evening the ascent was passable for cavalry and artillery; and at midnight the whole corps of Lannes, with all its guns and equipage, reposed in crowded array on the ridges and flanks of the mountain. The Imperial Guard, under Lefebvre, lay on its summit; Augereau on its left; Soult and Ney received orders to march early in the morning before daybreak to the right, in order to turn the enemy by his left, after the combat was begun; Murat bivouacked during the night near Dornburg, but he was ordered up to Jena, and was in reserve before the action was far advanced; while Davoust and Bernadotte were directed to advance from Naumburg, the first upon Apolda, in order to threaten the enemy's rear, the second upon Dornburg, to cut off his retreat to the Prussian dominions. The two armies now lay so near that their fires were within cannon-shot, and the lines of sentinels in communication: the lights of the Prussians, dispersed over a space of six leagues, threw a prodigious glow over the whole heavens to the northwest; those of the French, concentrated in a small space, illuminated the heights in the middle of their position. Surrounded by his faithful Guards, the Emperor, after having despatched his last orders to his marshals, wrapped himself in his cloak, and shared the frigid bivouac of the soldiers on the summit of the Landgrafenberg.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

41.

And vigorous efforts to surmount the Landgrafenberg.

¹ Jom. ii.
285, 286.
Bign. v. 473,
474. Dum.
xvi. 83, 94.
Saalf. iii.
301, 307.
Camp. de
Saxe, i.
260.

At four in the morning of the 14th he was already on

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

42.

Situation of
the armies
on both
sides, on
the morning
of the 14th.

horseback, and, surrounded by his generals, rode along the front of the line of Suchet's and Gazan's divisions, which were first to be engaged, and were already under arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the Prussian army is turned, as the Austrian was a year ago at Ulm; it now only combats to secure the means of retreat. The corps which should permit itself to be broken would be dishonoured. Fear not its renowned cavalry; oppose to their charges firm squares and the bayonet." Loud acclamations rent the air at these words: but the morning was still dark; the first streaks of dawn were only beginning to appear, and a thick cold fog obscured every object around. Burning with impatience, the soldiers awaited the signal of attack, but for two long hours they were kept shivering in their lines. At length at six, when the day, though still misty, was light, and the Emperor judged that his marching columns would be so far advanced on their respective routs as to justify the commencement of the action in front, he gave the signal for the attack. Meanwhile the Prussians, little suspecting the tempest which was about to burst on them, were securely reposing in their position, and, anticipating a day of complete rest on the 14th, had made no provision either for marching or battle. This fatal security had been increased by the opinion generally entertained at Hohenlohe's headquarters, that the bearer of the flag of truce who had appeared at their advanced posts on the preceding day, and had been forwarded with his despatches to the king, brought proposals of peace, and that nothing serious would be attempted till his answer was received. Their position was strong and admirably chosen: secure from attack on either flank, and approachable in front only by narrow and steep defiles, in which, if the heads of the enemy's columns were vigorously resisted and hindered from deploying, horse, foot, and cannon would be jammed up together, and the disaster of Hohenlinden might have been repaid with interest to the French army.

But the departure of the king with nearly two-thirds of the army, and the total absence of any preparations for an attack on the part of those who remained, deprived them of the advantages which they might otherwise have gained from this position, and relieved Napoleon from a risk in the outset of the campaign, greater, perhaps, than he underwent even during the perilous changes which signalled its later stages.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Lucches.
ii. 154, 155.
Saalf. iii.
305, 307.
Personal
observation.

Great was the astonishment of the Prussian outposts, when, through the gray mist of the morning, they beheld the French battalions close upon them, and advancing swiftly in the finest order to the attack. They made, however, a gallant resistance, and did their utmost to prevent the French, led by Suchet, from debouching from the defiles at the mouth of which they were stationed; but being altogether unprepared for the attack, and completely surprised, they were not long able to make good their post, and fell back, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, to the main body of the army. The ground thus gained by Suchet was of the utmost importance, for it enabled the heads of the French columns, after emerging from the defiles, to extend themselves to the right and left, and gain room for the successive corps as they came up to deploy. Roused by the first discharge of firearms in front, Prince Hohenlohe rode through the mist from his headquarters in the rear at Capellendorf towards the front; but, still confident that it would only prove a skirmish, he said to General Muffling, "that his troops should remain quiet in their camp till the fog had risen; and that, if circumstances demanded it, he would move forward the division of Grawert, as he did not wish the Saxons to combat at all that day." Soon, however, messengers arrived in breathless haste from the outposts with urgent demands for assistance, and Grawert was rapidly advanced towards Vierzehn-Heiligen to support Tauenzein, who there with difficulty held his ground against the impetuous attacks of Suchet. Meanwhile the

43.
Battle of
Jena, 14th
October.
—
Atlas,
Plate 40.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Lucches.
ii. 154, 155.
Jom. ii. 286,
287. Dum.
xvi. 94, 97.

44.
Defensive
measures of
the Prus-
sians.

whole army of the Prussians, alarmed by the sharp and incessant fire of musketry in their front, stood to their arms, and reinforcements were sent to the points in advance which were menaced: but in spite of all their exertions the enemy gained ground; the villages of Closwitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which the lines of Hohenlohe were posted, were successively carried; and all the low grounds in front of his position were filled with troops. Still the mist was so thick as to be almost impenetrable; the contending bodies could not see each other till they were within a few yards' distance; and under cover of this veil, and in the midst of the confusion arising from an unexpected attack, the movements of the assailants were completed, the defiles passed, and the precious moments, when the heads of their columns might have been driven back into the gorges by a vigorous attack, as those of the Imperialists had been at Hohenlinden, for ever lost.¹

At length at nine o'clock, the increasing rays of the sun dispersed the fog, and his light shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. Then, and not till then, the Prussians perceived the full magnitude of the danger. On every side they were beset by assailants, no longer struggling through steep and narrow gorges, but deployed, with all their cavalry and artillery, on the open expanse to which these led. Directly in their front, the whole corps of Lannes, having made itself master of the villages at the foot of the Prussian position, was preparing to ascend the slope on which the latter stood: immediately to the right, Ney, and beyond him Soult, had already cleared the defiles, and were drawn up in line or column on the open ground; while Augereau on the left was pressing forward to turn their flank; and the Imperial Guard, with Murat's cavalry, were stationed in reserve on the slopes of the Landgrafenberg. Above ninety thousand men had outflanked on either side, and were preparing to crush forty thousand, in a strong position,

indeed, but totally inadequate to so desperate an encounter. Surprised, but not panic-struck, the Prussians drew up their lines in admirable order in the form of an obtuse triangle, with the apex in front, to avoid the danger of being turned on their flanks; and instructions were despatched to Ruchel, who, with the reserve, twenty thousand strong, was at a short distance on their right, to hasten his march to the scene of action. Before he could arrive, however, the battle had commenced: the preparatory movements were made on either side in the finest style — the French columns advancing, and the Prussian retiring to their chosen ground with all the precision of a field-day.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
97, 105.
Jom. ii. 286.
Saalf. iii.
306.

But though they stood their ground bravely, and received their assailants with a close and well-directed fire, the odds were too great to give any hopes of success. Ney, indeed, whose impetuous courage led him to begin the attack before his columns were properly supported, and who had, by a charge of cuirassiers, carried a battery of thirteen pieces on an eminence, which severely galled his soldiers, was for a few minutes in imminent danger. The Prussian cavalry broke the French horse, and enveloped the infantry in such numbers as would inevitably have proved fatal to less resolute troops; but the brave marshal instantly formed his men into squares, threw himself into one of them, and there maintained the combat by a rolling fire on all sides, till Napoleon, who saw his danger, sent several regiments of horse, under Bertrand, who disengaged him from his perilous situation. But on all other points the French obtained early and decisive success. Ney, extricated from his difficulties, with an intrepid step ascended the hill, and after a sharp conflict carried the important village of Vierzeun-Heiligen, in the centre of the Prussian position. In vain Hohenlohe formed the flower of his troops to regain the post; in vain these brave men advanced in parade order, and with unshrinking firmness, through a storm of musketry

45.
Commence-
ment of the
battle.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

and grape; the troops of Lannes came up to Ney's support, and the French established themselves in such strength in the village as to render all subsequent attempts for its recapture abortive. Emboldened by this success, Ney next attacked the right of the Prussian line towards Isserstadt, which Augereau with the French left had already carried. A devouring fire ran along the whole right wing, and the French were for some time arrested by the intrepid resistance of their adversaries; but the odds were too great, and, despite of all their efforts, the Prussians were compelled to give ground in that quarter. But on the left of Vierzehn-Heiligen, they obtained some advantage: their numerous and magnificent cavalry made several successful charges on the French infantry, when advancing on the open ground beyond its enclosures; several cannon were taken, and Hohenlohe for a short time flattered himself with the hope of obtaining decisive success.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
97, 115.
Jom. ii. 286,
287. Bign.
v. 475, 476.
Saalf. iii.
306. Luc-
ches. ii. 156.

46.
The Prus-
sians are
defeated.

Matters were in this state when the approach of Ruchel with his corps, twenty thousand strong, to the field of battle from the right, confirmed the Prussian general in these flattering anticipations; and he despatched a pressing request to him to direct the bulk of his forces to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, already the theatre of such desperate strife.* Thither, accordingly, the brave Prussian directed his steps; but before he could arrive at the decisive point, matters had essentially changed for the worse, and he came up only in time to share and augment the general ruin. The lapse of time had now enabled the French to bring their immense superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at all points: Soult, by a heavy and well-directed fire, had driven the cavalry from

* At this crisis, Hohenlohe wrote to Ruchel—"It is highly gratifying to me to hear at this moment that your Excellency has arrived to my support. Send all the force you can to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the chief point of attack. You are a brave man and sincere friend. At this moment we beat the enemy at all points; my cavalry has captured some of his cannon."—Dum. xvi. 114.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

the field on their left; while Lannes and Augereau, pressing them at once in front and flank on their right, had forced back the infantry above half a mile. Emerging from the villages which had been the theatre of such obstinate conflict, the French forces advanced with loud shouts and in irresistible strength towards the Prussians, who, weakened and dispirited, and in some places almost mown down by the terrible fire of their adversaries, were now yielding on all sides. Up to this time, however, their retreat was conducted in the most orderly manner. Napoleon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and from his station on the heights in the rear, sent orders to Murat with the whole cavalry to advance and complete the victory. This terrible mass was irresistible. Fifteen thousand horse, fresh, unwearied, in the finest array, animated by the shouts of triumph which they heard on all sides, bore down with loud cheers on the retreating lines of the Prussians. In an instant the change was visible. In vain their cavalry, so brilliant and effective in the early part of the day, strove to make head against the assailants, and cover the retreat of the infantry and cannon: their horses, wearied by eight hours of fighting or fatigue, were unable to withstand the fresh squadrons and ponderous cuirassiers of Murat, and by their overthrow contributed to the disorder of the foot-soldiers. After a gallant resistance, the lines were broken: horse, foot, and cannon pressed tumultuously together to the rear, closely followed by the bloody sabres of Murat. In the general confusion all order was lost: the infantry and cavalry were blent together, the guns and caissons abandoned to the victors.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
97, 120.
Bign. v. 476.
Jom. ii. 287.
Saalf. iii.
307, 308.
Camp. de
Saxe, i.
262, 263.

In the midst of this appalling scene, the columns of Ruchel, still in battle array, emerged through the cloud of fugitives to stem the torrent.* It was a movement

* The rapid change for the worse in the prospects of the Prussians since he first approached the field, may be discerned in the altered tone of the next letter despatched to him by Prince Hohenlohe—"Lose not a moment in advancing with your as yet unbroken troops. Arrange your columns so that through your open-

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

47.

Arrival of
Ruchel, who
is over-
whelmed.

extremely similar to the arrival of Desaix on the field of Marengo: but he had to meet Napoleon, not Melas. The fresh troops, though advancing in good order, and with an undaunted countenance, were speedily assailed on all sides: an ephemeral advantage gained by their cavalry was rapidly, in the disorder of success, turned into disaster: in front they were charged with the bayonet by the French grenadiers, in flank assailed by an endless succession of Murat's dragoons; the villages of Romstedt and Capellendorf were strewn with their dead; and Ruchel himself, while bravely animating his men, was wounded in the breast by a musket-ball, and carried off the field. After a terrible combat of an hour's duration, this powerful reserve, which in any other circumstances would have changed the fortune of the day, was broken, dispersed, and almost totally annihilated. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre. In frightful disorder the whole army rushed like an impetuous torrent from the field: but nearly the whole right wing was cut off by the rapidity of Soult's advance, and made prisoners. Almost all the artillery of the Prussians was taken, and the victors entered Weimar pell-mell with the fugitives, at the distance of six leagues from the field of battle. Behind that town, on the road to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe, at six o'clock, collected twenty squadrons, whose firm countenance till nightfall gave some respite to the wearied foot-soldiers, now dispersed through the fields in every direction; while Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the bloody theatre of death, distributing prizes to those who had most distinguished themselves, and giving directions for the care and consolation of the wounded.¹

While this terrible disaster was befalling the united corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the King of Prussia was combating under very different circumstances, but with

ings there may pass the broken bands of the battle: be ready to receive the charges of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitives, and has driven into one confused mass the infantry, cavalry, and artillery."—LUCCHESINI, ii. 157.

¹ Dum. xvi.
120, 133.
Bign. v. 475,
476. Luc-
ches. ii.
157, 158.
Hard. ix.
305, 306.
Saalf. iii.
307, 308.

little better success, on the plateau of AUERSTADT. Little expecting any engagement on the morrow, this fine army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick in person, had bivouacked in close array around the village of that name: the Queen was only prevailed on by the most pressing entreaties to retire late in the evening, with a slender guard, to Weimar. Informed of the occupation of Naumburg by a considerable force, the Duke directed the division of Schmettau to occupy the heights of Koessen, and present themselves in battle array before the enemy, whom he supposed to be at the utmost a few thousand strong, while under their cover the remainder of the army leisurely continued its march towards the Elbe. These orders were obeyed; but Schmettau's division, contenting themselves with occupying the heights in the neighbourhood, neglected to send forward detachments to seize the defile of Koessen—an omission which was speedily taken advantage of by Davoust on the morning of the 14th, who, advancing from Naumburg according to his directions, early seized upon this important pass. At six on that morning, the French marshal had received an order from Napoleon, dated three o'clock A.M., from his bivouac on the Landgrafenberg, in which he announced his intention to attack in a few hours the Prussian army, which he imagined to be concentrated in his front, and ordered Davoust to march without loss of time upon Apolda, in order to fall upon their rear, leaving him the choice of his route, provided he took a part in the action. The despatch added: "If the Prince of Pontecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned to him at Dornburg." Davoust instantly repaired to the headquarters of Bernadotte, who at that moment was in communication with his corps in the neighbourhood of Naumburg, and showed him this order, proposing that they should march together to Apolda;¹ but that officer, relying on the ambiguous expression in the

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

48.

Preparatory
movements
which led to
the battle of
the King's
army.

Oct. 14.

¹ Dum. xvi.
137, 141.
Bign. v. 480.
Jom. ii. 290.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

despatch—which indicated that the Emperor “hoped he would be in the position assigned to him at Dornburg”—did not conceive himself entitled to deviate from his previous instructions, and set out with his whole corps in the direction of that town.

49.
Battle of
Auerstadt.

Atlas,
Plate 41.

Left thus to his own resources, Marshal Davoust notwithstanding began his march in the direction which Napoleon had assigned. His forces were considerable, amounting to twenty-six thousand infantry and four thousand horse—a body perfectly adequate to its destined task of falling on the rear of the Prussian army, when defeated in front by Napoleon, but little calculated to withstand the shock of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, whom the King was leading in person to the encounter. The Prussians, on their side, were as little prepared for an action; and, deeming their march sufficiently secured by Schmettau’s division on the heights of Koessen, were in open column and straggling, advancing on their march towards the Elbe, when suddenly, at eight o’clock, they were met on the plateau by the vanguard of Davoust, which had emerged from the long and steep ascent so well known to travellers who visit that memorable field, and was already drawn up in battle array on its summit. The thick mist which here, as at Jena, concealed the movements of the opposing armies, prevented the troops seeing each other till they were only a few yards distant; and both parties deeming their adversaries only an inconsiderable detachment, fell back to collect forces to clear their advance,—the Prussians, to drive the enemy back again down the defile, and secure the flank of the army from insult; the French, to clear their front, and pursue their route to Apolda.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
290, 291.
Dum. xvi.
139, 147.
Bign. v. 480,
481. Saalf.
iii. 306.
Personal ob-
servation.

50.
Additional
forces come
up on both
sides.

Speedily reinforced, both sides returned to the charge. Davoust supported the advanced guard by the whole division of Gudin, with instructions to maintain themselves to the last extremity on the level space at the upper end

of the defile, in order to gain time for the remainder of the corps to debouch; while the King of Prussia, impatient at the check given to the march of his army, ordered Blucher, with two thousand five hundred hussars, to ride over the Sonnenberg and clear the plateau of the enemy. Little anticipating the formidable resistance which awaited them, the Prussian cavalry were thrown into disorder by the close and steady fire of the French infantry, which speedily formed themselves into squares. Their cavalry were, indeed, overthrown by the overwhelming numbers of the Prussian horse; but all the efforts of that gallant body, even when guided by the impetuosity of Blucher, were shattered against the compact mass of Gudin's infantry, and the terrible discharges of grape which issued from his artillery. Surprised at the obstinacy of the resistance, the King, adopting the opinion of Marshal Moellendorf, who insisted that it was only a detached column which occasioned the delay, and disregarding the advice of the Duke of Brunswick, who strongly counselled a general halt, and formation of the army in order of battle, till the mist cleared away and the enemy's force could be ascertained, continued the attack by means merely of successive divisions as they came up to the ground. The divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange were ordered to pass the defile of Auerstadt, where the road runs through a winding hollow skirted with copse-wood or rough slopes, and advance to the support of the discomfited cavalry. The former, who first emerged from the defile, was directed to assail the flank of Gudin's division, which had advanced on the plateau beyond the village of Hassenhausen. At this moment the mist was dissipated, and the sun shone in full brilliancy on the splendid squadrons and regular lines of the Prussians.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
292, 293.
Saalf. iii.
306. Dum.
xvi. 139,
150.

The Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of the infantry, and led them gallantly to the attack, while Schmettau and Blucher pressed them with their respec-

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

51.

Desperate
conflict
which en-
sued at the
summit.

tive divisions of foot and horse on the opposite flanks. But the brave troops of Gudin, forming themselves into squares, resisted all the charges with unconquerable resolution; and the nature of the ground, which permitted the successive divisions to come up to the support of either side only by degrees, the one by the long and winding defile of Auerstadt, the other up the steep ascent of Koessen, rendered it impossible for the Prussians to bring all their overwhelming force to bear at once upon the enemy. The conflict, therefore, was more equal than might have been imagined, and most severe. The French troops, stationed behind the hedges, enclosures, and garden-walls of Hassenhausen, kept up an uninterrupted and murderous fire upon the enemy. The Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded by a ball in the breast while leading on a charge. Schmettau experienced the same fate. Wartensleben had his horse shot under him; and the Prussians, discouraged by the loss of their leaders, wavered in the attack, which, being made in line, and not in column, was not pressed with the requisite vigour. Still the terrible discharge of artillery and fire-arms continued. Gudin's division had lost nearly half its numbers, and it was evident they could not long maintain their ground against their redoubtable and hourly increasing adversaries.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
292, 293.
Dum. xvi.
139, 156.
Bign. v. 482.
Saalf. iii.
306.

52.
Arrival of
other divi-
sions on the
field. Pro-
gress of the
battle.

From this peril, however, they were at length relieved by the arrival of the other divisions of Davoust's army. Morand was the first who got up the defile. His troops, as they successively arrived on the summit, drew up on the left of Gudin, towards the Sonnenberg; and shortly after Friant, with his division, debouched upon the right, and extended to the foot of the Speilberg. The combat was now equal, or rather the advantage was on the side of the French, for their three divisions were superior in strength to those of Schmettau, the Prince of Orange, and Wartensleben, to which they were opposed. Prince William of Prussia, at the head of a powerful body of

CHAP.
XLIH.
1806.

cavalry, which had surmounted the Sonnenberg and arrived on the French left, furiously assailed Morand's division immediately after it formed; but these veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into squares, and with rapid discharges received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. In vain these gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds up to the very muzzles of the French muskets. In vain they rode round and enveloped their squares: ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls; impenetrable the hedge of bayonets which the front rank, kneeling, presented to their advances. The heroic devotion of Prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge; still the fire continued, still the bayonets remained firm. At length he himself was wounded, half his followers were stretched on the field, and the remainder sought refuge in disorder, partly on the heights of the Sonnenberg, partly in the enclosures of Neu Zulza.¹

Jom. ii.
192, 193.
Dum. xvi.
156, 161.
Bign. v. 483.
Saalf. iii.
306.

While this desperate conflict was going on on the left of Hassenhausen, the division of Friant had debouched from the defile, extended itself on the ground to its right, and chased the enemy who assailed it back to the village and heights of Speilberg, which were speedily carried. The left of the Prussians was thus threatened; but it was not there that the principal danger lay. The progress of Morand on their right was much more alarming. On that side, not content with repulsing the furious attacks directed against them, the French had now assumed the offensive, and were rapidly pressing forward to the heights of Sonnenberg, from whence their guns would command the whole field of battle, and render untenable the position of the Prussian reserves, which had hitherto taken no part in the action. Sensible that the battle was irrecoverably lost if these important heights fell into the hands of the enemy, the King put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and bravely led them to the

53.
Desperate
struggle
around the
Sonnenberg
on the Prus-
sian right.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xvi.
161, 164.
Bign. v. 483,
484. Jom.
ii. 294.
Lucches. ii.
146, 147.

54.
The Prus-
sian reserve
advances,
and is over-
thrown.

charge. But if the attack was gallant, the defence was not less obstinate: Morand himself was to be seen at the head of his regiments, and for some minutes the balance quivered. Insensibly, however, the French gained ground, and at length their artillery, dragged up to the summit of the heights, was placed in battery, and opened such a tremendous fire of grape and cannister upon the enemy's columns, as completed their discomfiture in that quarter; and with the blood-stained Sonnenberg and the village of Rehausen, the whole left of the field of battle fell into the hands of the invaders.¹

The experienced eye of Marshal Davoust now told him that the moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived. The heights at Eckartsberg commanded the line of the enemy's retreat, as those of Sonnenberg did the field of battle: by moving forward his centre and seizing that important point, their defeat would be rendered complete, and all possibility of their rallying prevented. Thither, accordingly, Gudin's division advanced, driving before them the broken remains of Schmettau's and Wartensleben's divisions, which had lost nearly half their numbers during the sanguinary strife in which they had been engaged. But the Prussians made one effort more to regain the day. Their broken battalions, which had retired from the field, were rallied under cover of the powerful reserve commanded by Kalkreuth, who assumed the direction upon Moellendorf being wounded: this consisted of two divisions which had hitherto taken no part in the action, and were placed in front; while the whole cavalry, re-formed under Blucher's orders, was posted in a second line immediately behind the infantry, to take advantage of any hesitation which might appear in the enemy's columns. Wearied by a morning's march and four hours' hard fighting, the French soldiers had now to withstand the shock of fifteen thousand fresh troops, to whom they had no corresponding reserve to oppose. Had the quality of the troops on the opposite sides been equal, this power-

ful addition to the enemy's forces, at such a moment, must have proved decisive: but nevertheless they were totally defeated; and this last success put the keystone to the arch of Marshal Davoust's fame. Though strongly posted on an eminence, and protected by the fire of a powerful battery, they were charged with such intrepidity by Gudin's division, supported by a part of Friant's, that they were driven from their position with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. At the same time, Morand repulsed an attack against the troops which he had stationed on the heights of Sonnenberg: the artillery, from that commanding position, carried death through all the ranks of the enemy; and at length his gallant forces descended from the eminence, and, carrying all before them, drove the reserves opposed to their advance through the defile of Auerstadt. Thither Blücher's cavalry followed the retreating columns: the Guards still kept their ranks, and retired in good order in open square, and by their firm countenance enabled the broken infantry to rally at a distance from the field of battle, where Davoust reposed amidst his heroic followers.¹

The King of Prussia, who, during this disastrous day, had manifested the most signal coolness and intrepidity, and, during the repeated charges which he made at the head of his troops, had lost two horses killed under him, gave directions for the army to retreat in the direction of Weimar, intending to fall back on the corps of Prince Hohenlohe, of whose disaster he was still ignorant. But as the troops, in extreme dejection, and with little order, were following the great road which leads to that place, they were suddenly startled in the twilight by the sight of an extensive line of bivouac fires on the heights of Apolda. These lights were made by the corps of Bernadotte, who, adhering to his original instructions to march to Dornburg, had arrived in this position, after passing that town, late in the evening, and, ignorant of the com-

¹ Dum. xvi.
164, 171.
Jom. ii. 294.
Lucches. ii.
146, 148.
Bign. v.
485, 486.

55.
Disastrous
retreat of the
Prussians
during the
night from
both fields
of battle.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Dum. xvi.
171, 177.
Jom. ii. 295,
297. Hard.
ix. 306, 307.
Saalf. iii.
307.

56.
Meeting of
the two dis-
comfited
armies in
their flight.

² Dum. xvi.
171, 178.
Jom. ii. 295,
298. Bign.
v. 486, 487.
Hard. ix.
307. Luc-
ches. ii. 148.

bats which had taken place, was preparing to fall on the rear of the Prussian army on the following day. His too strict adherence to the letter of the orders he had received deprived him of the glory of sharing in either battle, endangered Davoust's corps, and had wellnigh cost him his own life, from the indignation of the Emperor: but, nevertheless, this sudden apparition of a fresh corps of unknown strength upon the flank of their line of retreat at that untimely hour, compelled the Prussians to change their direction and abandon the great road.¹*

About the same time, obscure rumours began to circulate through the ranks of a disaster experienced on the same day at Jena; and soon the appearance of fugitives from Hohenlohe's and Ruchel's corps, flying in the utmost haste across the line which the troops retiring with the King were following, announced but too certainly the magnitude of the defeat sustained in that quarter. A general consternation now seized the men—despair took possession of the firmest hearts, as the cross-tide of the battalions flying from Jena mingled in increasing numbers with the wreck which had survived the fight of Auerstadt. The confusion became inextricable, the panic universal. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and, leaving their guns, horses, and ammunition waggons, fled in mingled disorder across the fields, without either direction, command, or rallying point.² The King himself

* Napoleon's anger at Bernadotte, on account of his not supporting Davoust, and taking a share in the battle of Auerstadt, knew no bounds. "If I should send him to a council of war," said he, "nothing could save him from being shot. I will not speak to him on the subject; but I will let him see what I think of his conduct. He has too much honour not to be aware himself that he has committed a disgraceful action." In truth, however, Napoleon had no sufficient grounds for this ebullition. If Bernadotte did not take a part in the action, it was because his own latest instructions expressed a hope that he should go to Dornburg rather than march toward Auerstadt with Davoust. Had he violated these instructions, and, in consequence, the Prussian army had escaped by Dornburg, its natural and most probable line of retreat, what defence could Bernadotte have offered for his conduct? "I was piqued," said that marshal, "to be addressed in the language of authority by Davoust; but I did my duty. Let the Emperor accuse me if he pleases, I will answer him. I am a Gascon, but he is still more so."—BOURRIENNE, vii. 161, 162.

narrowly escaped being made prisoner during the tumult and horrors of the night; and it was not till five in the morning that, by a long circuit, he arrived at Sommerda, where he received the official news of the melancholy disaster at Jena, accompanied by the letter, offering an accommodation, so insidiously despatched by Napoleon the day before that great victory.

Such were the astonishing battles of Jena and Auerstadt, which, in a single day, prostrated the strength of the Prussian monarchy; and did that in a few hours which the combined might of Austria, Russia, and France, in the Seven Years' War, had been unable to effect. The subsequent disasters of the campaign were but the completion of this great calamity—the decisive strokes were given on the banks of the Saale. The loss of the Prussians was prodigious: in the two fields there fell nearly twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides nearly as many prisoners; and two hundred pieces of cannon, with twenty-five standards, were taken. Ten thousand of the killed and wounded fell at Auerstadt—an honourable proof that, if infatuation led them into the field, valour inspired them when there. Nor was that victory bloodless to the conquerors: their total loss was fourteen thousand men; of whom seven thousand five hundred belonged to Davoust's corps—a striking indication of the dauntless intrepidity with which they had fought.¹ Napoleon,* with

57.
Loss on both
sides in
these ac-
tions.

¹ Dum. xvi.
177. Camp.
de Saxe, i.
265. Dum.
xvi. 180.

* Napoleon's official account of the battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign, is characterised by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and that unflinching jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible. Davoust was the real hero of the day, since, with thirty thousand men, he had defeated the King of Prussia in person, at the head of sixty thousand. His own achievement in overthrowing forty thousand, or, including Ruel, sixty thousand, with ninety thousand veteran troops, including the whole cavalry of Murat, is nothing in comparison. Nevertheless, he represents the action as all fought in one field; speaks of the enemy, eighty thousand strong, as being commanded by the King and the Duke of Brunswick in person, and after dilating fully on his own achievements, dismisses the wonderful exploits of Davoust in the following words:—"On our right, the corps of Marshal Davoust performed prodigies. Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues, with the bulk of the enemy's troops, who were seeking

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

58.
Unparalleled
disasters
of the re-
treat.

his usual disregard of truth, called his whole loss in both battles four thousand, little more than a fourth part of its real amount.*

Great as were these results, however, they were but a part of the effects which ultimately flowed from these memorable battles. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians exceeded anything hitherto recorded in modern history, and were equalled only by the still greater calamities which followed the flight from Waterloo. No provision had been made for such a contingency; no rallying point assigned, no line of march prescribed, no magazines collected. The extraordinary circumstance of the four principal generals of the army—the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Moellendorf, General Schmettau, and General Ruchel—being killed or disabled by wounds, left the confused mass of fugitives without a head. The unparalleled calamity of the survivors from two different defeats, experienced on the same day, crossing each other, and becoming intermingled during the horrors of a nocturnal retreat, rendered it impossible for them to know whose orders were to be obeyed. Thus, when morning dawned on the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenlohe, and the Duke of Brunswick, collected, as chance threw them together, in disorderly groups, and inspired only with a common panic, fled in different directions, as accident or intelligence guided their steps. Vast numbers of stragglers wandered at large through the fields, or hurried with so little knowledge of the country, from the scene of

to debouch on the side of Koessen. That marshal has displayed alike the distinguished bravery and firmness of character which are the first qualities of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Daultanne, chief of the staff, and by the rare intrepidity of his brave corps." Who could imagine that it was the glorious battle of Auerstadt which was here narrated? The injustice to Davoust is so manifest that it is admitted even by the eulogists of Napoleon.—See BIGNON, v. 487, 488; and *Fourth Bulletin*, 1806, in *Camp. de la Saxe*, i. 265.

* Davoust's loss at Auerstadt was 270 officers and 7200 privates, killed and wounded. Of these 134 officers and 3500 privates belonged to Gudin's division of 7000 men: in other words, more than a half of that band of heroes had

danger, that, instead of avoiding, they rushed headlong into the jaws of the enemy. It is in the extraordinary confusion arising from this disastrous retreat, and the terror which seized the minds of both officers and men at finding themselves thus huddled together with soldiers to whom they were perfect strangers, that the true cause of the unparalleled disasters which followed the battle of Jena is to be found.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

¹ Dum. 178,
182. Bign.
vi. 3, 5.
Jom. ii. 297.
Hard. ix.
307.

The effect of the general consternation which prevailed speedily appeared in the fate which befell the fragments of the mighty army. Six thousand fugitives, almost without leaders, had taken refuge, the day after the battle, in Erfurth, whose embattled walls and almost inaccessible citadels promised the means of at least a temporary defence. It contained also the grand park and reserve artillery stores of the army, with the greater part of its camp equipage. Thither also the Prince of Orange, Marshal Moellendorf, and a great number of the wounded of distinction, besides seven thousand private soldiers, also wounded, had been conveyed. Such, however, was the terror of the governor at finding himself thus suddenly overwhelmed by a mass of wounded and stragglers, incapable of aiding in the defence, but who would speedily consume his slender stock of provisions, that he thought the best thing he could do was to negotiate a capitulation, on condition that the officers should retire on their parole into Prussia, and the private men remain prisoners of war.² On these terms the place surrendered, and with it fourteen thousand men, including

59.
Capture of
Erfurth with
14,000 men.
Oct. 15.

Atlas.
Plate 39.

² Dum. xvi.
200, 202.
Jom. ii. 298.
Lucches. ii.
159.

fallen. This was the bravest action fought by the French troops during the whole contest: but the valour both of the corps and the division was inferior to that displayed by the English in more than one action of the Peninsular war, if the number of killed and wounded, a fair test with armies both of which have been victorious, is taken as a criterion. At Talavera, out of 19,500 English soldiers, 5000 were killed and wounded; nearly the same proportion as fell of the victors at Auerstadt: but at Albuera, out of 7000 English troops, only 1500 were unwounded at the close of the fight; and 8481 red-coats fell at Waterloo, out of a force of native English not exceeding 29,000 men.—See DUMAS, xvi. 177; NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, iii. 541; and WELLINGTON'S *Official Account of the Battle of Waterloo*, Ann. Reg. 1815, App. to Chron.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

60.
The King
of Prussia
gives the
command
to Hohen-
lohe, and
retires to
Magdeburg.

Oct. 16.

the dying Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange; a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and immense military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Hohenlohe, who had retired, covering the retreat of the fugitives beyond Weimar with a considerable body of cavalry, in good order, at nightfall on the 14th found himself so completely overwhelmed by the crowd of stragglers who attached themselves during the night to his squadrons, that by degrees his array melted away; and it was only by making frequent circuits, and repeatedly crossing the fields, that he was enabled to reach Dernstedt at seven on the following morning, at the head of sixty horsemen. On the day following, the King, who had arrived at Sondershausen, accompanied only by his aides-de-camp, conferred the command of all the troops which had combated at Jena and Auerstadt upon Prince Hohenlohe, with the exception of the two divisions under the orders of Kalkreuth, the reserve at the latter battle, which it was thought would still be in some sort of order; but in the general confusion this corps had dispersed like the rest, and there remained only eight battalions around his standard. Magdeburg was assigned as the rallying point to the army, within the almost impregnable walls of which fortress it was hoped the wreck of its once mighty array could be reorganised, and a defensive struggle maintained till the arrival of the Russians from the Vistula, and of the reinforcements which were collecting in the interior of the kingdom. Thither accordingly the King repaired, attended only by a few horsemen, to make preparations for the reception of the army; and there he was quitted by the British envoy, Lord Morpeth, who, seeing no chance of diplomatic concerns being attended to amidst the general confusion, returned to London to render an account to his bewildered cabinet of the extraordinary events which he had witnessed in the outset of his mission.¹

But if there was any one thing more than another in

¹ Dum. xvi.
184, 192.
Bign. vi. 7,
8. Hard.
ix. 307.

which the genius of Napoleon shone prominent, it was in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. The present was not an opportunity to be lost of displaying this essential quality of a great general. Without an instant's delay, therefore, he prepared to pursue the extraordinary advantages he had gained. From all parts of Germany his forces had been assembled to one point, in order to strike the decisive blow. That done, the next object was to disperse them like a fan over the conquered territory, to carry everywhere the impression of their victory, and the terrors of their arms. On the night after the battle, Napoleon, instead of retiring to rest, sat up dictating orders to all the corps of his army for the directions they were to follow in pursuing the enemy. On the extreme right, Bernadotte, whose numerous corps was still untouched, received orders to advance from Apolda to Neustadt, to cut off the line of retreat from Weimar to Naumburg, and so shut out the army from the great road to Magdeburg. Davoust was to return to Naumburg to hold that important post, and keep himself in readiness to debouch on the Elbe before the enemy could arrive there; Soult was to move on Buttelsstadt, the point in rear of the fields of battle, where the greatest number of fugitives had assembled; Murat and Ney to march direct upon Erfurth, and reduce that important place: while Lannes and Augereau were directed to take a position in advance of Weimar; and the Imperial Guard and Napoleon's headquarters were transferred to that town. The general object of Napoleon in these movements was, that while the corps of Soult, Murat, and Ney, pursued the broken remains of the Prussian army to Magdeburg, those of Bernadotte, Lannes, Davoust, Augereau, and the Guard, under his immediate orders, should cross the Elbe at Barby, Dessau, and Wittenberg, and, moving upon Berlin and Spandau, intercept the line of retreat of the Prussians to Stettin and the Oder.¹ This was the more easy, as

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

61.

Measures of
Napoleon to
follow up
the victory.

¹ See the
orders in
Dum. xvi.
192, 193.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

62.

Soults defeats
Kalkreuth.

the French held the chord of the arc along which the Prussians had to move.

Soult was the first who came up with the enemy. At Greussen his cavalry reached the retiring squadrons of Kalkreuth's division, which alone preserved any semblance of an army. That general proposed a suspension of arms, in order to gain time, declaring that he knew an armistice had been concluded, and for the purpose of arranging its conditions repaired to the advanced posts in order to a conference with the French general. The terms, as might be expected, could not be agreed on. The statement was made in perfect good faith, under the impression founded on the letter from Napoleon offering an accommodation, written the day before, but not received till the night after the battle; and it gave the Prussian commander leisure to cause a considerable part of his forces to defile in safety to the rear. Enraged at finding himself thus overreached, Soult, the moment the conferences were broken off, attacked the Prussian rearguard posted in front of Greussen, which, after a short resistance, was cut to pieces, and the victors entered that town pell-mell with the vanquished. Following up his success, the French marshal, early the following morning, resumed the pursuit, and came up with the enemy at Nordhausen, where they were again defeated with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, and three thousand men. Unable, from want of provisions, to keep his men together, and having no other means of escape to any part of his forces, the Prussian general divided his troops into two bodies, with instructions to follow different routes to Magdeburg. An almost total dispersion immediately followed this order. The stragglers came into that fortress by companies, squadrons, and groups of single men in hardly any array; and thus was the disorganisation of the only divisions of the army which still preserved their ranks rendered complete within three days after the battle.¹ Collecting prisoners at every step, Soult continued rapidly to advance, and on the 21st

Oct. 15.

Oct. 16.

¹ Dum. xvi.
191, 200.
Jom. ii. 299.
Norv. ii. 465,
466. Luc-
ches. ii. 161.
Oct. 21.

his vanguard reached the Elbe, and planted their victorious standards around the walls of Magdeburg.

A more important action awaited the arms of Bernadotte. This able chief, whose too literal adherence to the letter of his instructions had deprived him of his share of the laurels of Auerstadt, was burning with anxiety to achieve some exploit worthy of the deeds of his comrades and his own renown, when fortune threw the wished-for opportunity in his way. Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, who commanded the Prussian reserve, fourteen thousand strong, stunned by the intelligence of the disasters of the army at Jena, was preparing to make the best of his way back to Magdeburg and the Elbe, when he was beset on all sides at Halle by the corps of Bernadotte. The Prussians who were brought into action had not shared in the preceding defeats: notwithstanding the great superiority of force on the part of the French, they made a brave resistance; and there might be seen what elements of success existed in their army had they been opposed by less, or guided by greater ability. Assailed with the utmost impetuosity by the vanguard of the French, under Dupont, at Passendorf, they were driven in haste back to the islands in the Saale, over which the road passes; but in that defile they stood firm, and, supported by a cloud of light troops who lined the dikes on either hand along the margin of the stream, long withstood their assailants, and debarred all access to the gates. After an obstinate resistance, however, a column of grenadiers, headed by Dupont himself, rushed across the bridges, carried the guns which enfiladed them; and, rapidly pursuing their success, pushed on and made themselves masters of the town.¹

The Prussians had now no alternative to gain time for the retreat of their main body to Magdeburg, but to prevent as long as possible the French troops from debouching from the gates on its opposite side: and the gallant efforts of the Duke of Würtemberg long delayed them at that

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

63.

Prince Eugene of Würtemberg is defeated by Bernadotte at Halle. Oct. 17.

¹ Saalf. iii. 307, 308. Jom. ii. 300, 301. Dum. xvi. 214, 223.

64.

Desperate action which ensued on his retreat.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

important point ; but at length the increasing numbers of the French, and the murderous fire of the artillery which they brought up and planted on the ramparts, drove the Prussians from their strongholds in the gardens and walls of the suburbs, and enabled the columns to issue from the gates. Charged while retreating in open square along the level plain, the Prussians, during a running fight of four leagues, sustained severe loss from the enemy, and lost nearly their whole artillery. Still they combated with heroic resolution, and yet kept their ranks, when the pursuit ceased on the approach of night. Then the combat terminated on the right bank of the river ; but on the left bank a greater disaster awaited the Allied arms. Three thousand Prussians had broken up from their quarters near Magdeburg, in order to join the main body of the reserve at Halle, and, ignorant of the occupation of that town by the French, fell into the midst of such superior forces that they were almost all either killed or made prisoners. Honourable as this affair was to the Prussians, it augmented in an alarming degree the dangers of the army by dissipating its last regular corps : four thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed twelve hundred men ; while the broken remains of the vanquished crossed the Elbe at Dessau in such haste, that they were unable completely to burn the bridge behind them, which was speedily restored by the French, who established themselves in force on the right bank, and drew their posts round Magdeburg.¹

Oct. 19.
¹ Jom. ii.
 300, 301.
 Dum. xvi.
 214, 223.
 Saalf. iii.
 307, 308.

65.
 Saxony is
 overrun by
 the French.
 Oct. 18.

² On Oct.
 18, 1813.

Meanwhile the other corps of the army continued their triumphant progress, with hardly any opposition, through Saxony. Four days after the battle of Auerstadt, Marshal Davoust took possession of Leipsic : strange coincidence, that the French army should for the first time enter that city on the very day on which, seven years afterwards, they were there to experience so terrible an overthrow !² Napoleon gave testimony of the rigorous warfare which he

was about to commence against English commerce, by there issuing an edict of extraordinary severity against British merchandise.* Rapidly following up his success, Davoust, two days afterwards, reached Wittenberg, at the very time that the retiring Prussians were preparing to blow up its great bridge over the Elbe; the French grenadiers rushed so rapidly over it, that the enemy had not time to set fire to the train, and thus that important passage was secured. On the same day, Lannes made himself master of the passage at Dessau. Thither Napoleon followed with his Guards three days afterwards; and, regarding the capture of Berlin as certain and a secondary object, he already began to give directions for the march of his troops from the Elbe to the Oder. Davoust's corps was pushed on towards that capital—Napoleon having permitted, as a reward for his transcendent heroism at Auerstadt, that his corps should be the first to enter the capital of the fallen monarch.^{1†}

Oct. 19.

Oct. 23.

¹ Bign. vi.
8, 9. Jom.
ii. 302.
Dum. xvi.
223, 227.
Lucches.
ii. 162.

Such was the rapidity of the French advance, that they arrived round Magdeburg before a large portion of the broken Prussians had taken refuge within its walls. Napoleon saw clearly the importance of accumulating as large a number as possible of the enemy in a situation where it was evident they would ere long become his prisoners, and therefore he gave orders to leave the entrance to the place open, and dispersed his cavalry in

66.
Investment
of Magde-
burg, which
is abandon-
ed by Ho-
henlohe.
Oct. 22.

* "Your city," said Napoleon, "is known throughout Europe as the principal depot of English merchandise, and on that account the enemy most dangerous to France. The Emperor and King commands—1. Within four-and-twenty hours immediately following this notification, every banker, merchant, or manufacturer, having in his possession any funds *the produce of English manufactures*, whether they belong to a British subject or the foreign consigne, shall declare their amount in a register appointed for that special purpose. 2. As soon as these returns are authentically received, domiciliary visits shall be made to all, whether they have declared or not, to compare the registers with the stock in hand to ascertain its exactness, and punish by military execution any attempt at fraud or concealment." Well may the honest General Mathieu Dumas exclaim, "What a deplorable abuse of victory!"—DUMAS, xvi. 225.

† Bernadotte was unavoidably detained a day longer than he was ordered in marching to the Elbe, and in consequence did not cross that river till the 23d

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

all directions to drive the stragglers into that devoted fortress.* Murat's horsemen, in consequence, inundated the adjacent plains; and the garrison of the town, ill provided with subsistence, already began to feel the pangs of hunger from the multitude of useless soldiers who were driven to its shelter. Summoned to surrender by Marshal Soult, the governor replied, that he hoped to gain the esteem of the besiegers by an honourable defence; but the confusion of the garrison, and the evident discouragement of the multitudes of insulated men who thronged round the gates, rendered it more than probable that his resistance could not be prolonged for a very long period. Hohenlohe, despairing of preventing the investment of the place with so disorganised a wreck as was collected within its walls, and aware that the want of provisions would soon compel its surrender, resolved to depart with all the forces which still maintained the appearance of order, and make for the great line of fortresses on the Oder; but such was the universal confusion which prevailed, that he could only collect fifty battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons in a state to keep the field. With these he departed on the day following, leaving fifty skeleton battalions, hardly containing in all twelve thousand combatants, within the walls.¹

Upon leaving Magdeburg, Hohenlohe, abandoning Berlin to its fate, made for Stettin, situated near the mouth of

¹ Bign. vi.
10, 11. Dum.
223, 237.
Jom. ii.
304, 303.

and 24th, instead of the 21st and 22d, before which time the corps of the Duke of Würtemberg had defiled through Magdeburg, and was in full march for the Oder. This escape of a considerable part of the best organised corps of the Prussians excited to the highest degree the indignation of Napoleon, who took occasion bitterly to reproach him with this delay, as well as with his conduct in not marching with Davoust to Auerstadt. Already were to be seen the germs of that mutual discontent which, seven years afterwards, on those very plains, brought Bernadotte in arms against the French Emperor on the field of Leipsic. —BIGNON, vi. 9; DUMAS, xvi. 230.

* "Magdeburg," said Napoleon, "is a net where all the isolated men who have wandered about since the battle may be taken. We must, therefore, invert our manœuvres, and beat all the country for fifteen leagues around: we shall thus collect numbers of prisoners, and also gain accounts of the direction taken by the strong columns of the enemy, of whose route we have as yet no certain intelligence."—DUMAS, xvi. 232.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

67.

Who is pur-
sued and
assailed.

the Oder, by the route of Spandau. But when he drew near to the latter place, he received intelligence that on that very day it had capitulated to the first summons of the advanced posts of the cavalry under Murat, and that Davoust on the same day was to make his entrance into the capital. Driven thus to a circuit to avoid the captured towns, he moved by Gransee and Zeydenick, in order to reach before the enemy, if possible, the defile of Löcknitz, near Stettin, which would have secured his retreat to that important fortress. Aware of the importance of anticipating the Prussian general in these movements, Napoleon sent Murat forward with the cavalry, to get before him to the defile, while Lannes advanced as rapidly as possible in pursuit of his steps with his indefatigable infantry. By forced marches, Murat got the start even of the horsemen who formed the advanced-guard of Hohenlohe's corps; and on leaving Zeydenick, the point where the road from Spandau and Berlin falls in with that from Magdeburg to Stettin, they were assailed by that active officer himself, at the head of Lasalle's dragoons. Confounded at being thus anticipated in a quarter where they expected a leisurely retreat, the Prussian horse made but a feeble resistance. Even the renowned regiment of the Queen's dragoons was repulsed after a short effort, surrounded, and almost cut to pieces; and the Prussian cavalry were compelled to fall back on Templin, while their main body had to renounce all hope of pursuing the direct road to Stettin. Driven thus from his line of retreat, and his right flank being exposed to the attack of Marshal Lannes, Hohenlohe, after waiting at Gransee three hours in the vain hope of being joined by Blücher, who had retreated to the same quarter, changed his direction, and moved upon Boitzenberg, where he arrived on the 27th, hoping to reach Stettin by this circuitous route of Prentzlow; but in attempting to do so, the unhappy prince found himself again beset by his indefatigable pursuers.¹

Oct. 26.

Oct. 27.

¹ Dum. xvi.
275, 285.
Jom. ii. 308,
312. Hard.
ix. 313.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

68.

Is utterly
defeated at
Prentzlow.
Oct. 28.

No sooner was Murat informed of his change of direction, than he marched across the country all night, from the one road to the other, again got before him, and assailed the Prussian horse at once in front and flank with his terrible dragoons, on the following morning, as they were continuing their march two leagues beyond Prentzlow. To troops wearied by incessant marching for a fortnight together, and discouraged by such a succession of disasters, the shock of his victorious squadrons was irresistible: the Prussian cavalry were speedily broken, and fell back in disorder to the suburbs of Prentzlow, already encumbered with infantry and artillery. To complete their misfortunes, Marshal Lannes appeared at this critical moment on their right flank, having, with indefatigable perseverance, marched all night from Templin on the direct road. Murat now summoned Hohenlohe to surrender, which the latter refused, and brought up a powerful battery of cannon to answer the fire of the French artillery, which was severely galling his troops as they attempted to debouch from the town. This battery was immediately attacked and carried, and a regiment of infantry and cavalry which advanced to support it broken and made prisoners. Prince Augustus of Prussia, at the head of his regiment, which was still two leagues in the rear of Prentzlow, was surrounded, and after heroically resisting the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers, during a march in hollow square of four miles, was at length made prisoner, with almost all his men, while bravely resisting to the last.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
285, 290.
Jom. ii. 308,
310. Hard.
ix. 312.

69.

And compelled
to surrender.
Profound
grief of the
Prussian
troops.

Overwhelmed by such a multitude of calamities, and seeing no chance of escape, while every hour increased the forces against him by permitting the formidable battalions of Lannes to arrive on his rear and flank, Prince Hohenlohe, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a capitulation, was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition that the officers should be dismissed on their parole. With him were taken fourteen thousand

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

men, including the flower of the Prussian army; the Guards, six chosen regiments of cavalry, forty standards, and fifty pieces of field-artillery. Notwithstanding the many defeats and disastrous circumstances which had occurred, this grievous surrender did not take place without the most profound grief on the part of the Prussian troops. The officers retired from the circle where it had been agreed to in stern silence, or shedding tears; many of them fiercely and indignantly accused their commanders of treachery, and invited their comrades to cut their way through the enemy, sword in hand. The private soldiers, by loud sobs and lamentations, gave vent to their grief, and, flinging their muskets on the ground, slowly and mournfully pursued their way into the town; while a loud flourish of trumpets, the quick rattle of drums, and the triumphant shouts of the soldiers, announced the successive arrival of the French regiments at the scene of their triumph.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
275, 299.
Jom. ii. 308,
312. Bign.
vi. 19, 21.
Saalf. iii.
309, 310.
Hard. ix.
313.

Meanwhile another Prussian column—consisting of six regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and eight pieces of artillery, which, avoiding Prentzlow, was moving upon Passewalck—was overtaken by Milhaud's light cavalry, and surrendered. Of the army, lately so splendid and numerous, there remained only in the field the corps of the Duke of Weimar and General Blucher. The former of these, which formed the advanced-guard of the host that advanced to the Saale, and had been pushed on through the Thuringian Forest to Verra, with the view of threatening the rear of the French army, had become entirely detached by subsequent events from the principal body, and thus escaped the catastrophes of both defeats. Almost forgotten in the rapid succession of succeeding triumphs, the duke was left to his own discretion; and he no sooner received accounts of the ruin of the main army, than he took steps for making the best of his way back to the Elbe. He had much difficulty in steering his course through the numerous corps of enemies which traversed

70.
March and
escape of
the Duke
of Saxe-
Weimar.

CHAP.
XLIH.

1806.

Oct. 26.

¹ Thiers, vii.
194, 195.
Dum. xvi.
269, 272,
303, 306.
Bign. vi. 23.

the intervening country in every direction ; but by great exertions he contrived to escape, and, rallying to his standard a considerable detachment of Ruchel's corps, which had been separated from the remainder, reached the Elbe in safety at Stendal, by Seesen, Lutter, and Schladen, with fourteen thousand men. He was there superseded in the command by the King of Prussia, and his corps passed into the hands of General Winning, who gave it a day's rest at Kyritz. As the approach of the French corps rendered those quarters dangerous, he broke up and retired towards the Oder, and by good fortune, and no small share of skill, he succeeded in reaching Kratzemberg, near the lake of Muritz, in the first week of October, where he joined Blucher with the cavalry which had escaped from Auerstadt. Their united forces now amounted to twenty-four thousand men.¹

71.
Disgraceful
surrender
of Stettin
and Cüstrin.

Meanwhile the fortresses on the Oder fell in the most disgraceful manner. The day after the capitulation of Hohenlohe, a brigade which had escaped from the wreck of his corps, presented itself at the gates of Stettin ; the governor sternly refused them admittance, upon the pretence that his provisions were only adequate to the support of his own garrison. Next day, however, he capitulated, on the first summons, to the advanced-guard of Marshal Lannes ; and the French, without firing a shot, became masters of a fortress of the first order, armed with a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by six thousand men. The brigade of Prussians, shut out from its walls, was soon after surrounded at Anclam and made prisoners. Encouraged by these repeated successes, the French soldiers deemed nothing beyond the reach of their arms ; and the advanced-guard of Davoust's corps, which had traversed the district between the Elbe and the Oder without meeting with any enemies, presented itself before Cüstrin, and threatened the garrison with a severe bombardment if they did not

Oct. 29.

instantly capitulate. This menacing outpost consisted merely of a regiment of foot, and had only two pieces of artillery at its command. On the other hand, the governor of the town had ninety pieces of cannon mounted on the ramparts, and four hundred in the arsenal; four thousand brave men for a garrison, and every requisite for a prolonged defence. Nevertheless, such was the terror produced by Napoleon's arms, and such the skill with which the French officer, General Gauthier, concealed the real amount and description of his force, that the Prussians capitulated almost on the first summons; and one of the strongest places in the kingdom, amply garrisoned, situated in an island of the Oder, and invested only on one side, had the disgrace of surrendering to a regiment of foot with only two pieces of cannon. The besiegers could not approach it to take possession till the garrison furnished them with boats.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
11, 17. Bign.
vi. 23. Jom.
ii. 314.
Thiers, vii.
168, 169.

These disgraceful capitulations, at which the brave troops involved in them were so much exasperated that it was with difficulty they could be induced to yield obedience to their officers in carrying them into execution, demonstrated that the Prussian generals were so overwhelmed by the magnitude of their misfortunes, that they deemed the monarchy irrevocably ruined, and that *sauve qui peut* had become the only remaining principle of their conduct. Astonished at his good fortune in effecting the reduction of such a fortress without firing a shot, Marshal Davoust inspected the fortifications on the day following, which he found in the best condition; and, deeming his base on the Oder now sufficiently secured, pushed on his light troops to Posen, in Prussian Poland; while six thousand Bavarians formed the investment of Glogau, the only remaining stronghold on its banks which was still in the hands of the enemy; and Augereau established himself at Frankfort. Meanwhile Napoleon, after resting a day at Wittenberg, which he ordered to be put in a respectable posture of defence, in order to give him the com-

72.
Reflections
on these
events. De-
pots at Er-
furt and
Wittenberg
formed by
Napoleon.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

Nov. 3.
 1 Dum. xvii.
 13, 20. Bign.
 vi. 23. Jom.
 ii. 314.
 Thiers, vii.
 168, 169.

73.
 Blücher's
 corps is
 pursued to
 Lübeck.

mand of the bridge over the Elbe, and where he established one of his chief depots, was busied with preparations for securing his rear during the perilous advance, so far from the base of the operations, in which he was about to engage. The grand park of artillery was established at Wittenberg, where immense depots of ammunition and provisions were ordered to be formed; while, at Erfurth, a grand depot was by his provident care formed for the collecting of horses from all parts of Germany. All the cavalry regiments were directed through that town, while those on foot were mounted, and those indifferently provided with horses soon found themselves in possession of hardy and powerful steeds.¹

The only corps of the Prussian army which had hitherto escaped destruction was that formed by the union of Blücher's cavalry with the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's infantry, and commanded by the former of these generals. Before this junction was effected, Blücher's cavalry had been hard pressed by a brigade of horse under the French general, Klein, and escaped in consequence of his affirming that an armistice had been concluded on the propositions for an accommodation sent to Napoleon after the battle by the King of Prussia. Whether the Prussian general really believed the report to that effect, which unquestionably prevailed through the whole army at that time,² or whether he made use of this very questionable military stratagem as a device to extricate his troops from present danger, does not appear; and therefore neither praise nor blame can in this uncertainty be awarded on the subject. But this much is clear, that if he knowingly affirmed a falsehood, as the French assert, no necessity, how pressing soever, no advantage, how great soever, can suffice as any apology.* Though the

² Hard. ix.
 320.

³ See Bign.
 vi. 7, and
 Nov. ii. 466.

* But when the French historians inveigh with such severity against Blücher's conduct on this occasion, and affirm, "In the campaigns of the Revolution, the Austrian generals have frequently had recourse to that strange *ruse de guerre*—the French never,"³ they forget or wilfully conceal immediately preceding events, on which they bestow no sort of censure. What is to be

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

resistance of this corps, however, was more honourable, its ultimate fate was not less calamitous. No sooner was Napoleon informed of the junction of these two corps in the north of Prussia, than he ordered their pursuit by forces so considerable, that escape became impossible. Bernadotte was instructed to follow closely on their footsteps; while Murat was despatched by a circuit to cut them off, on the right, from Stralsund and Rostock, under the cannon of which they might have found shelter; and Soult threw himself on the left, to bar the communication with the lower Elbe. Blucher arrived at Boitzenburg the day after the ill-fated Hohenlohe had left that town; and having there learned the catastrophe which had befallen that brilliant portion of the army, he renounced all hope of retiring before the enemy, and retraced his steps in order to unite with General Winning and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's corps, which he effected at Kratzemberg on the day following. Finding himself now at the head of eighteen thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, he resolved to move to the right, recross the Elbe, raise the siege of Magdeburg, and, supported by that fortress and Hameln, maintain himself as long as possible in the rear of the Emperor's army.¹

Oct. 28.

Oct. 29.

¹ Dum. xvi.
308, 318.
Saulf. iii.
311, 312.
Jom. ii. 217.

The project was boldly conceived and intrepidly followed out; but the three corps now directed against him, numbering nearly sixty thousand combatants, rendered

said to General Lecourbe, who, in November 1799, escaped destruction at the hands of the Austrian general Starray, solely by falsely affirming that a negotiation for peace was commenced? to Launtes and Murat, in the campaign of Austerlitz, who won the bridge of Vienna by the fallacious declaration that an armistice had been concluded, which they well knew was not the case? or to the latter of these marshals, who a few days afterwards tried a similar piece of deceit with Kutusoff, and was only foiled by the superior finesse of that astute commander? All the French historians, Bignon, Norvins, and Thiers, mention these unworthy stratagems not only without censure, but with the highest admiration.² It would be well, if, in making such random assertions, they would calculate less confidently on the want of information or recollection in their readers; and if, in the survey of the conduct of their own officers, they would display a little of that warm anxiety for the great principles of public morality, to which they so loudly appeal when any violation of it occurs to their disadvantage on the part of their enemies.

² Rapp, 57,
58, 59. Bign.
iv. 406. Ant.
chap. xl. § §
104, 105,
108. Thiers,
vi. 261, 262.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

74.
Where he is
shut up.
Nov. 1.

Nov. 2.

Nov. 3.

Nov. 4.

Nov. 5.

its execution impossible. A sharp conflict took place with his rearguard at Nossentin, in which five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the French; and the next day the junction of Bernadotte with Soult rendered it necessary for the gallant Prussian to be more circumspect. An opportunity, however, soon occurred of taking his revenge. Next day the French hussars were charged and put to the rout by the Prussian light dragoons, at the entrance of a defile. Colonel Gerard and three hundred horsemen were made prisoners: but the cavalry having fallen back on the support of their infantry, headed by Bernadotte in person, the Prussians were in their turn repulsed with severe loss. Finding the enemy's forces so considerable, that all chance of making good his way to the lower Elbe was out of the question, Blucher resolved to fall back by Gadebusch on Lübeck, where he hoped to find resources to recruit his wearied troops, and the decayed bastions of which he flattered himself he would soon be able to put in a respectable state of defence. Before arriving at that city, he was summoned by Bernadotte to surrender, and informed that he was beset by forces triple his own. "I will never capitulate," was the brief and characteristic reply of the Prussian general; and, continuing his march, he entered Lübeck on the evening of the 5th, closely followed by his indefatigable pursuers. In the course of the pursuit, a detachment of twelve hundred Swedes fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who treated them with unusual courtesy and kindness. From the gratitude of the Swedes for this treatment, arose the interchange of good deeds which terminated in his elevation to the throne of Gustavus Adolphus. At that period, events, in appearance the most trivial, were big with the fate of nations.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
308, 321.
Bign. vi. 23,
24. Jom. ii.
317. Saalf.
iii. 311, 312.

Unfortunately for Lübeck, it was still surrounded by a ruined wall and deep ditches filled with water; and this gave Blucher an excuse for representing it as a

military post, and disregarding all the remonstrances of the magistrates, who loudly protested against this violation of their neutrality. Hastily planting the few heavy cannon which he still retained to defend the principal gates, Blucher caused the greater part of his forces to defile through the town, and take post on the low marshy ground on the opposite side, on the confines of the Danish territory. At daybreak on the following morning the French columns were at the gates, and every preparation was made for an instant assault. In spite of a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the old walls, the French approached with their accustomed gallantry to the assault. The corps of Bernadotte advanced against the Burg-Thor, the gate which looked to the north; that of Soult approached the Huxtor-Thor and Muhlen-Thor, the gates of Hanover. After sustaining a terrible discharge from the bastions, which were armed with the Prussian field-pieces, the French advanced-guard, under Generals Merle and Frère, succeeded in breaking through with their hatchets the exterior pallisades of the Burg-Thor, and, rapidly following the Prussian regiments which held that outwork, entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of the adjoining bastions. At the same moment Soult's divisions threatened the gates opposed to their attack; but so murderous was the fire which the Prussians kept up from the walls flanking their approaches, that the assailants were unable to make any progress, till Bernadotte's divisions, having penetrated into the town, threatened to take the defenders in rear.¹

Even then, nevertheless, the brave Prussians at this gate, to the number of two thousand, faced both ways, and, besieged in their turn, sustained the double attack from within and without. Posted on the roofs of houses, and on the summits of the ramparts, they kept up an incessant fire till their cartridges were exhausted, when they were all either killed or made prisoners. So rapid,

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

75.

And is there
defeated
after a des-
perate con-
flict.

Oct. 6.

¹ Dum. xvi.
322, 328.
Jom. ii. 317,
318. Hard.
ix. 322.
Bign. vi. 24.

76.

Desperate
defence of
the town.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

however, was the advance of the French through the Burg-Thor, that Blucher, who had retired to his lodgings, after having made his dispositions, to dictate orders, had barely time to mount his horse with his son and a single aide-de-camp, and ride off: all the rest of his staff were made prisoners. Having joined the remaining troops in the town, that brave general, with his gallant followers, prolonged the defence. He himself repeatedly charged along the Konig-Strasse at the head of a body of cavalry, but was unable to clear it of the French soldiers, who had now broken into the houses near the gate, and from thence kept up a fire of such severity upon the street as rendered it impossible for the dragoons to advance to its further extremity. Presently the besiegers brought up their field-pieces, the guns on the ramparts were turned upon the town, and repeated discharges of grape from both sides swept the pavement, and occasioned a terrific slaughter. With invincible resolution, however, the Prussians maintained the combat. From street to street, from church to church, from house to house, the conflict continued. Blood flowed on all sides. The incessant rattle of the musketry was almost drowned in some quarters by the cries of the wounded and the shrieks of the inhabitants, who in that day of woe underwent all the horrors consequent on a town being carried by assault. By degrees, however, the superior numbers of the French, who were soon reinforced by part of Murat's corps, prevailed over the heroic resolution of the Prussians. With difficulty Blucher succeeded, towards evening, in collecting five thousand men, with whom he forced his way through by the gate of Holstein, and rejoined his cavalry, which lay at Schwertau on the opposite side of the town, near the Danish frontier; while the remainder of his corps in the town, consisting of eight thousand men, were slain before nightfall in that fearful fight, or fell into the hands of the enemy.^{1*}

¹ Dum. xvi.
332, 333.
Jom. ii. 317,
318. Bign.
vi. 24, 25.
Saalf. iii.
313. Hard.
ix. 322.

* The French writers made it a just reproach to the English army that its

The situation of Blucher, with his cavalry and this slender body of infantry, was now altogether desperate. He was driven up to Ratkau, in the extremity of Germany, on the very edge of the Danish territory, where a powerful body of troops was collected to prevent his entrance. In the night he received intelligence that Travemunde, a fortified town on the sea-coast, to which he proposed to have retired, had been taken by Murat, along with a battalion which he had sent forward to garrison that important post, where he hoped to have embarked; and to complete his misfortunes, information arrived in the morning that the salt-marshes between Schwertau and that town were not passable by the army. At the same time a flag of truce arrived from Murat, while his numerous squadrons had already driven the Prussian infantry out of Schwertau, and were closing in, in all directions, on his last position. Overcome by stern necessity, the hardy veteran, with tears in his eyes, agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which all his troops laid down their arms. On this occasion were taken ten battalions and fifty-three squadrons, amounting to four thousand foot-soldiers, and three thousand seven hundred cavalry, with forty pieces of cannon, the remainder of his fine train of artillery having been left on the ramparts of Lubeck.¹

To complete the disasters of the Prussian monarchy, nothing was wanting but the surrender of Magdeburg; and that important bulwark was not long of falling into

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

77.

He retires
to Ratkau,
and is there
made pri-
soner.

¹ Dum. xvi.
333, 339.
Jom. ii. 317,
319. Hard.
ix. 321, 322.
Saalf. iii.
313.

78.

Fall of Mag-
deburg.

soldiers committed such disgraceful excesses at San Sebastian, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajos, when these fortresses fell by assault. It is the duty of the historian to condemn equally such outrages, by whomsoever committed; and certainly in this work no veil shall be thrown over those atrocities when they come to be recounted. But it would be well if they would reserve a little of their humane indignation for the sufferers under their own soldiery on similar catastrophes. On this occasion, though they pass it lightly over, the cruelties and devastation committed by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps for two days after the town was taken, notwithstanding all the efforts of these marshals, were equal to the very worst deeds that ever stained the British arms.—See the frightful details, drawn with a graphic hand, in *Lettre de Villers à la Comtesse Fanny Beauharnais*, Amst. 1808.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the hands of Marshal Ney. Although its garrison was in great part composed of fugitives of all regiments, who had made their escape into that asylum from the disastrous fields of Jena and Auerstadt, yet such was the strength of its works, and the ample store of provisions and magazines of all sorts which existed within its walls, that a prolonged defence might confidently have been anticipated. Nevertheless, if its fall was not quite so disgraceful as that of Stettin and Cüstrin, it was such as to affix a lasting stigma on the Prussian arms. After fifteen days of a blockade, Marshal Ney commenced operations in form; but before having recourse to the tedious method of regular approaches, he resolved to try the effect of a bombardment. Furnaces for this purpose were heated, and arrangements made to throw four-and-twenty pound shot, red-hot, into every part of the town, while a copious array of bombs was prepared to bring terror and conflagration upon the inhabitants. It was not necessary, however, to proceed to these extremities. The citizens of Magdeburg preserved a vivid traditional recollection of the horrors which their forefathers underwent after the memorable storm by Count Tilly in 1631, when the whole town was reduced to ashes. No sooner, therefore, did the first flaming projectiles begin to descend upon their houses than they besieged General Kleist, the governor, with entreaties for a surrender. That officer, deeming the Prussian monarchy destroyed, and seeing no use in singly prolonging a contest now become hopeless, agreed to a capitulation on the same terms as Stettin, in virtue of which this important frontier town, the bulwark of the monarchy, with its redoubtable ramparts still untouched, and not even an outwork lost, containing twelve thousand troops in arms, and four thousand in hospital, six hundred pieces of cannon, eight hundred thousand pounds of powder, a pontoon train complete, and immense magazines of all sorts, fell into the hands of the enemy, who hardly mustered a greater force without its walls.¹

Nov. 8.

¹ Dum. xvi.
343, 347.
Jom. ii. 319.
Bign. vi. 26.
Saalf. iii.
313.

After these stunning calamities, it was not to be expected that the fortresses on the Weser, which were now left far in the rear of the storm of war, should long continue to hold out. A host of fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt had taken refuge in these strongholds, particularly Hameln and Nienburg; into the former of which General Lecocq, who had been separated in the confusion of the disastrous night which followed these battles, had thrown himself with four thousand men who still preserved a military array. There he speedily found himself blockaded by the forces of the King of Holland, who had advanced by Würzburg and Paderborn to the banks of the Weser. The disastrous state of the monarchy gave him too plausible a ground for assailing the fidelity of the besieged. "You are insulated," said he, "without hope of succour. Abandoned, and more than a hundred leagues in the rear of the victorious invaders, what can your efforts do to avert the fall of the Prussian monarchy?" These arguments, supported by the official intelligence of the fall of Magdeburg and the surrender of almost all the fragments of the army, produced the desired impression; and it was speedily agreed that the fortress should be evacuated, the private soldiers made prisoners, and the officers return on their parole to Prussia. A mutiny broke out among the soldiers upon learning the terms of this disgraceful capitulation; but it was speedily suppressed by Savary's dragoons, the men disarmed, and the fortress, in admirable condition, delivered over, with five thousand prisoners, to the French. Nienburg speedily followed the same example, and, with its untouched fortifications and garrison of three thousand men, capitulated to the victors; and with it all the elements of resistance expired between the Weser and the Oder.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

79.

Fall of
Hameln and
Nienburg on
the Weser.

Nov. 20.

Nov. 25.

¹ Dum. xvi.
347, 351.
Bign. vi. 27.

While the arms of Napoleon, guided by his penetrating eye, were reaping in this astonishing series of successes the fruits of the victories of Jena and Auerstadt, the Emperor himself, occupied alike with military and

80.

Napoleon
detaches
Saxony from
the coalition.

1806.

diplomatic objects, was preparing the means of further triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of the power which fortune and genius had thus combined to place at his disposal. His first care was to detach Saxony from the coalition ; and after the defeat of its army in those disastrous days, and occupation of its territory by the conquerors, this was easily accomplished. The Saxons have a hereditary jealousy of the Prussians, by whom they have a presentiment they are one day to be swallowed up. Necessity, not inclination, had brought them into the field with their ambitious neighbours ; and they gladly availed themselves of the first opportunity to range their forces on the side to which their secret inclinations had long pointed, and which seemed to be recommended alike by prudence and necessity. Early in the campaign, Napoleon had addressed to them a proclamation, in which he called on them to assert their national independence, and throw off that withering alliance with Prussia from which nothing but ultimate ruin was to be anticipated.* This address had already produced a great impression on the Saxon troops, when the victory of Jena seemed to dissolve at once the bonds which held the two nations together. Improving on these dispositions, Napoleon assembled the Saxon officers, three hundred in number, who had been made prisoners at Weimar, strongly represented to them the impolicy of any longer uniting their arms to those of their natural enemies the Prussians ; and offered, upon their subscribing the oath tendered to them of fidelity to its fortunes, to admit them into the Confederation of the Rhine. Gladly the

Oct. 17.

* "Saxons ! the Prussians have invaded your territory. I have come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops, and incorporated them with their own ranks. You must, forsooth, shed your blood, for interests not merely foreign but adverse to those of your country ! Saxons ! your fate is now in your own hands. Will you float in uncertainty between those who impose and those who seek to liberate you from the yoke ? My success will secure the independence of your country and your prince. The triumph of the Prussians would rivet on you eternal chains. To-morrow they will demand Lusatia ; the day after, the right bank of the Elbe. But what do I say ? Have they not already done so ? Have they not long endeavoured to force

officers, for themselves and the troops under their command, subscribed the conditions; and immediately they were all, with the private soldiers, six thousand in number, sent back to Dresden. The Elector shortly after recalled the remainder of his forces from the Prussian standard; he accepted first neutrality, then an alliance with the conqueror; and before the war in Poland was concluded, his troops were to be seen actively engaged under the French eagles. Such was the origin of that intimate union which, down to the close of the war, subsisted between Napoleon and the Saxon government, and which, though in the end fraught with numberless calamities to that electorate, must ever command respect, from the fidelity with which its engagements were adhered to under adverse fortune.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

¹ Dum. xvi.
204, 207.
Bign. vi. 3,
4.

It was shortly after having detached Saxony from the Prussian, and united it to his own alliance, that Napoleon received an answer from the King of Prussia to the elusory proposals of accommodation made by him before the battle of Jena, and which that unhappy monarch eagerly caught at after that disaster, as the only light that seemed to break upon his sinking fortunes. The times, however, were not now the same: there was no longer any need of dissembling; the Prussian army was routed, and he was not the man to let slip the opportunity of completing its destruction. He therefore coldly replied, that it was premature to speak of peace when the campaign could hardly be said to have commenced; and that, having resolved to try the fate of arms, the king must abide by its issue. At the same time, he made amends to

81.
Refuses to
treat with
Prussia.

Oct. 18.

your sovereign to recognise a feudal supremacy which would soon sweep you from the rank of independent nations? Your independence, your constitution, your liberty, would exist only in recollection; and the spirits of your ancestors, of the brave Saxons, would feel indignant at seeing you reduced, without resistance, by your rivals, to a slavery long prepared by their councils, and your country reduced to the rank of a Prussian province." None could descant more fluently than Napoleon on the withering effect to inconsiderable states of an alliance with a greater power; for none put it in force so invariably towards his own tributary states.—DUMAS, xvi. 205.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the infantry of Lannes' corps, which, in consequence of their not having been mentioned by Murat in his report of the successes at Prentzlow, in which they had borne so glorious a part, had not been mentioned in the bulletin regarding that event, by replying to a letter of remonstrance from Lannes on the subject. "You and your soldiers are children. Do you suppose I do not know all you have done to second the cavalry? There is glory enough for all. Another day it will be your turn to fill the bulletins of the Grand Army." When Lannes read these words to his soldiers, they were so transported with joy that they raised the cry "Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!" Nothing could have more completely answered the secret wishes of the Emperor than both the title with which he was saluted by these brave men, and the circumstances so closely resembling those of the Roman legions under which it arose.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
236, 239.
Jom. ii. 301.
Thiers, vii.
195, 196.

82.
Napoleon
visits Pots-
dam and the
tomb of Fre-
derick.
Oct. 25.

Following the march of his victorious armies, Napoleon continued his progress, by Weimar, Naumburg, Wittenberg, and Potsdam, towards Berlin. On the march he passed the field of Rosbach, the well-known theatre of the Prussian victory over the French, and ordered the column erected in commemoration of that triumph, which had been thrown down by the soldiers of his army, to be preserved from further injury, and transported as a trophy to Paris. At Potsdam he visited, with eager haste, the palace of Sans-Souci and the tomb of the Great Frederick. Everything in the apartments of the illustrious monarch had been preserved as when he breathed his last: the book which he read shortly before his death remained on the table; the furniture was untouched; the writing materials still there: the simplicity of all surprised the conqueror, who was accustomed to the magnificence of St Cloud. By a singular coincidence, but one of the many with which the history of Napoleon is full, he visited the sepulchre on the anniversary of the day on which Alexander, just a year before, on the same spot, had sworn

fidelity to Frederick-William. Such had been the confusion of the Prussian flight, that on the tomb there still remained the cordon of the black eagle, the scarf and sword of the hero, which he had worn in the Seven Years' War, as well as the standards of his guard. With deep emotion Napoleon approached the awful monument; but even at that solemn moment unworthy feelings gained the ascendancy. He himself seized the venerable relics, and sent them with indecent haste off to Paris. "I will make a present of them," said he, "to the Hotel des Invalides: the old veterans of the Hanoverian war will receive with religious respect all that once belonged to one of the greatest captains of whom history has made mention." Such an act could not injure the dead; his glory was enshrined in imperishable lustre in the page of history: but it lowered the living, and sullied the triumph of Jena by an unbecoming act of rapacity. Little did Napoleon at that moment anticipate the advent of times when the Prussians, now so humbled, were to have the mastery of his proudest trophies, and naught was to remain but veneration for the remains of the dead to protect his own ashes in a foreign and far distant land from the rude hand of the spoiler.^{1*}

¹ Bign. vi.
11, 12. Jom.
ii. 302, 303.
Dum. xvi.
249, 250.

This interesting episode did not interrupt for a moment the military movements of the corps immediately around the person of the Emperor. The same weakness and infatuation appeared there, as elsewhere, to have seized the

* How much more honourable as well as magnanimous was the conduct of the Russian officer who, instead of destroying the monument erected at Coblenz to commemorate the campaign of 1812, simply engraved below the inscription the words, "Seen and approved by the Russian governor of Cologne, January 1, 1814." It is for the interest of all nations to preserve the trophies of their enemy's victory and the remains of the dead from insult; for it is impossible to foresee how soon they may themselves suffer from an opposite system. Nor is such forbearance without its reward. It obliterates the disgrace of defeat in the magnanimity of subsequent victory. The Pillar of Austerlitz, in the Place Vendôme, is now a monument not less to German generosity than to French valour. It would be well for the memory of Napoleon if more instances of moderation in victory, and regard for the vanquished, were mingled with his military triumphs.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

83.

Berlin,
Spandau,
and Charlottenburg
occupied by
the French.
Oct. 25.

Prussian authorities. On the same day Marshal Davoust, agreeably to the promise of Napoleon, headed the splendid vanguard which, with all the pomp of war, entered Berlin. No words can describe the mingled feelings of rage, astonishment, and despair, which animated the inhabitants at this heart-rending spectacle, occurring in less than a fortnight after hostilities had commenced.

With speechless grief they gazed on the proud array which defiled through their gates, and drank deep, in the agony of that dreadful moment, of the punishment for the political sins of their government during the last ten years. On the same day the strong fortress of Spandau, with its strong citadel and a garrison of twelve hundred men, surrendered, without firing a shot, to Marshal Lannes;* and Napoleon, after inspecting that stronghold, on the day following made his triumphal entry into the capital. He had not the same delicacy towards the feelings of its inhabitants which he had previously evinced towards those of Vienna: the palace of Charlottenburg would have answered his purpose of a residence as well as that of Schoenbrun had done; but he seemed as anxious to lacerate the feelings of the Prussians as he had been to spare those of the Austrians, and determined to punish ten years of subservience and ten days of warfare more than he had done the inveterate hostility of twelve campaigns. Surrounded, therefore, by all the splendour of the empire, in the midst of a brilliant staff, preceded by his splendid Guards on horseback in their richest attire, and environed by

Oct. 26.

Oct. 27.

* Napoleon spoke thus of this fortress:—"The citadel of Spandau, situated on the Spree, fully victualled for two months, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of open trenches. But such was the general confusion that the batteries were not even armed."—19th *Bulletin*. It is evident that treachery, or selfishness equivalent to treachery, occasioned the sudden fall of so many of the Prussian fortresses at this period; and Bignon tells us that he became convinced of that when, on being sent by the Emperor to superintend the capitulation of Spandau, he found the governor, Benckendorf, occupied with no other consideration but disputes with the French commander as to some wretched culinary articles which he alleged the capitulation authorised him to remove!—BIGNON, vi. 13.

Berthier, Duroc, Davoust, and Augereau, Napoleon, in his usual simple costume, made his triumphal entry under the arch erected to the honour of the Great Frederick. The "observed of all observers," the object of eager gaze to the speechless assembled multitude, the mighty conqueror traversed the long street which leads from the gate Charlottenburg, and advancing through an innumerable crowd, in whom passion, admiration, and wonder were mingled in some cases with joy, alighted at the gates of the old palace.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

¹ Thiers,
vii. 175.
Dum. xvi.
250, 252.
Bign. vi. 13.
Hard. ix.
313.

Prince Hatzfeld, one of the leaders of the war party, in the total absence of any authority emanating from the King, had been besought by the principal inhabitants to take an interim direction of affairs, and assume the command of the burgher guard. In doing so he had issued a proclamation, in which he said, "Nothing remains for us now but to assume a pacific attitude: our cares should not extend beyond what is within our own walls: that constitutes our sole interest, and as it is of the highest importance, we should bestow our exclusive attention upon it." This prince, as the chief of the pacific authorities, presented himself at the head of the magistrates before Napoleon at Potsdam, and was well received. He again waited on him when he arrived at the palace; but the conqueror received him with a severe air, and averting his head said, "Do not present yourself before me; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates." Shortly after the astonished nobleman withdrew, he was arrested by orders of Napoleon, who had commanded him to be seized *and executed* before six o'clock that evening. In fact he had transmitted to Prince Hohenlohe a letter, containing military details in regard to what he had seen at Potsdam when waiting on Napoleon, which had been intercepted by Davoust and brought to the Emperor. The imperious commands of the conqueror left his subordinate authorities no alternative but submission; although Berthier, shocked at the deed of violence

84.
Affair of
Prince
Hatzfeld.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Rapp, 109,
110. Hard.
ix. 315.

which was in contemplation, did his utmost to avert the storm, and even refused to write out the warrant, which Rapp was called in to do. He could not, however, prevent Napoleon from ordering another murder as atrocious as that of the Duc d'Enghien, and the death-warrant was signed, and Rapp was directed to send it to Davoust for immediate execution.¹

85.
His pardon
by Napo-
leon.

The former brave and generous man, at his own imminent hazard, took upon himself to delay its transmission; and in the mean time the Princess of Hatzfeld, having arrived in the antechamber of the palace, was informed of the danger of her husband, and sank in a swoon on the floor. Rapp advised her, after she recovered, to endeavour to throw herself in Napoleon's way at the hotel of Prince Ferdinand, where he was going in a short time; she did so, and fell at his feet in the extremity of despair. Her grief and beauty touched Napoleon, who, though subject to violent fits of passion, was not insensible to generous emotions. Rapp warmly seconded the return to feelings of humanity, and orders were despatched to Davoust to suspend the execution till further directions. Meanwhile the princess was enjoined to repair to the palace, whither Napoleon soon after returned. He ordered her to be brought into the room which he occupied. "Your husband," said he with a benign air, "has brought himself into a distressing situation; according to our laws, he has incurred the penalty of death. General Rapp, give me the letter: take it; read, madam. Is it your husband's writing?" She did so trembling. "I cannot deny his subscription," she replied, almost fainting with emotion. Napoleon then took it from her, tore it, and threw it into the fire. "I have no longer any proof; your husband is pardoned." He then desired Rapp to bring him back immediately from Davoust's headquarters; that officer ventured to admit that he had not even sent him there:² the Emperor manifested no displeasure, but on the contrary seemed gratified at the

² Rapp, 109,
110. Bign.
vi. 14. Hard.
ix. 315.

delay which had taken place in the execution of the order.*

Shortly after his arrival at Berlin, Napoleon paid a visit of condolence to Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great King of Prussia, and father of Prince Louis who fell at Saalfeld, and manifested the most delicate attentions to the widow of Prince Henry, as well as the Princess Electoral of Hesse-Cassel. At the same time he addressed an animated proclamation to his troops, in which he recounted with just pride their astonishing exploits, and promised to lead them against the Russians, who, he foretold, would find another Austerlitz in the

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

86.

Napoleon's
proclama-
tion and ad-
dresses to
his soldiers.
Oct. 30.

* It is always pleasing to record a generous action, and doubly so when it occurs in an enemy; but justice compels the admission that, by delaying the transmission of this order, Rapp conferred a greater favour on Napoleon than on the intended victim of his passion; for the one he saved only from death, the other from the guilt of murder. Rapp informs us that the Prince of Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam on the 25th, and it was for the account transmitted to Hohenlohe on that day of what he there saw that he was about to be condemned. The 25th was the day on which Davoust entered Berlin. The information objected to was collected, and the letter written, therefore, before the prince had come under the military government of the French Emperor. There is no law against a private citizen, or a civic authority of one nation, transmitting to its military officers details which have come to his knowledge regarding an enemy, when not yet subject to their authority—Napoleon himself called on the French prefects and magistrates to do so a hundred times. If the circumstance of Hatzfeld having collected and transmitted this information, while on a civil mission to the Emperor at Potsdam, exposed him to the penalty of death, what is to be said to Savary the year before, who, by orders of Napoleon, when conferring with the Emperor Alexander on the proposed terms of accommodation, obtained and brought to him military details of inestimable importance in regard to the temper and strength of the Allied army on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz;¹ or to Napoleon himself, who in 1797 transmitted orders to his brother Joseph, when holding the sacred office of ambassador at Rome, to do all in his power to revolutionise the Eternal City, and overturn the papal authority.² What the Prince of Hatzfeld did was no more than all ambassadors do, or than Napoleon invariably required from all his diplomatic agents. The character of the intended transaction may be judged of by what Berthier, with generous warmth, said on the occasion—"Your majesty will surely not shoot a man connected with the first families in Berlin for so trifling a thing; the supposition is impossible—you will not do so;" and from his positive refusal to write out the order, as well as from Rapp's delaying its transmission. Had the prince been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duc d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm, an act of deliberate murder. History, therefore, cannot award to Napoleon the praise of having pardoned, on this occasion, a criminal who had forfeited his life either by the laws of war or the principles of justice; but it must not refuse the meed due to a conqueror who returns to generous feelings, after having

¹ Sav. ii. 112,
113. Ante,
chap. xi.
§ 116.

² Ante, chap.
xxv. § 72;
and Corresp.
Confid. de
Napoleon, iv.
199, 201.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

heart of Prussia.* Next day he reviewed the corps of Marshal Davoust on the road to Frankfort, and, assembling the officers in a circle, assured them of the admiration which he felt for their achievements, and the grief which he had experienced at the numerous losses which had thinned their ranks. "Sire," answered the marshal, "the soldiers of the third corps will ever be to you what the tenth legion was to Cæsar." Already, in the emulation of the different corps, the mutual knowledge and attachment of the officers and men, were to be found the happy effects of that permanent organisation into separate armies and divisions, which, first of the moderns, Napoleon had adopted from the ancient conquerors of the world.¹

¹ Dum. xvi.
259, 261.

87.
Unpardon-
able severity
of Napoleon
to the Duke
of Bruns-
wick.

While Napoleon and his followers were thus indulging in an excusable pride at the retrospect of their wonderful achievements, the Prussian officers who had traversed the country, or reached the capital in virtue of the several capitulations which had been granted, were exposed to the most grievous humiliation. The officers of the Guard, especially, who had escaped from the wreck of Hohenlohe's corps, were ostentatiously marched by the Emperor through Berlin to Spandau. Words cannot describe the mortification of those high-spirited young men, at the unparalleled calamities in which their inconsiderate

were led, in a moment of irritation, to command an atrocious deed; and joyfully seizes on this incident as illustrative of that ascendancy which, in his cooler moments, humane feelings obtained over ruthless passion in the mind of this extraordinary man.—RAPP, 108.

* "Soldiers! you are worthy defenders of my crown, and of the great people. As long as you are animated with your present spirit nothing can resist you. Behold the result of your labours! One of the first powers in Europe, which recently had the audacity to propose to us a shameful capitulation, is annihilated. The forests and defiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers would not have traversed in seven years, we have surmounted in seven days, besides, during the same period, fighting four combats and a great battle. We have arrived at Potsdam and Berlin sooner than the renown of our victories! We have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, including those of the royal guards, six hundred pieces of cannon, three fortresses, twenty generals, while half the army regret their not having had an opportunity of firing a shot. All the Prussian provinces, from the Elbe to the Oder, are in our hands. Soldiers! the Russians boast that they are advancing

passions had involved their country; wherever they went crowds beset their steps, some lamenting their sufferings, others reproaching them as the authors of all the public misfortunes. Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an especial manner the object of invective. His states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died.^{1*}

¹ Bign. vi.
15, 33, 34.
Camp. de
Saxe, ii.
155, 295.

The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in

88.
And to the
Queen of
Prussia, and
the Elector
of Hesse-
Cassel.

to meet us: let us march to encounter them; we will spare them the half of their journey; they will find an Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. A nation which has so speedily forgot the generosity which we manifested towards it after the battle when its Emperor, its court, the wreck of its army, owed its safety entirely to the capitulation which we granted to it, is a nation that will never be able to contend with us."—DUMAS, xvi. 259, 260.

* "If the Duke of Brunswick," said the bulletin, "has richly deserved the animadversions of the French people, he has also incurred that of the Prussian army and people: of the latter, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war; of the former, who complain of his manœuvres and military conduct. The false calculations of the young may be pardoned, but the conduct of that old prince, aged seventy-two, is an excess of insanity, and his catastrophe can excite no regret. What can there be respectable in gray hairs, when to the faults of age are united the inconsideration and folly of youth? For these extravagancies he has justly incurred the forfeiture of all his dominions."—23d and 27th *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe*, ii. 216, 293.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy.* The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions. Animosity to England was the secret motive for all those acts of robbery. So strongly was Napoleon influenced by these feelings that he made no attempt to disguise that it was the ruling principle which governed all his measures towards the vanquished.† The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, in favour of whom the Prussian plenipotentiaries then at Berlin made the strongest representations, shared the same fate; while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs¹—"I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to

¹ Bign. vi.
15, 33, 34,
23d and
27th Bulle-
tins. Camp.
de Saxe, ii.
155, 195,
214.

* "All the world accuses the Queen as the author of all the calamities which have befallen the Prussian nation. The public indignation is at its height against the authors of the war, especially Gentz, a miserable scribbler, who sells himself for money. After her ridiculous journey to Erfurt and Weimar, the Queen entered Berlin a fugitive and alone. Among the standards we have taken are those embroidered by the hands of this princess, whose beauty has been as fatal to her people as that of Helen was to the citizens of Troy."—27th and 23d *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe*, ii. 215. It is worthy of observation, that M. Gentz, who is here stigmatised as a miserable hireling sold to England, was one of the most distinguished writers of the age, and one with whom Sir James Mackintosh, the eloquent apologist of the French Revolution, maintained a constant and valued correspondence down to the time of his death. That distinguished author, in reply to a letter from Gentz, which he received at Bombay, where he then was holding a high judicial appointment, thus speaks of the pamphlet to which Napoleon alluded:—"I received by the mail your two precious fragments. I assent to all you say, sympathise with all you feel, and admire equally your reason and your eloquence throughout your masterly fragment. I have read your letter fifty times since I received it, with the same sentiment which a Roman in the extremity of Mauritania would have felt, if he had received an account of the ruin of his country after the battle of Pharsalia, written the morning after that calamity, with the unconquerable spirit of Cato, and the terrible energy of Tacitus. He would have exulted that there was something which Cæsar could not subdue, and from which a deliverer and avenger might yet spring."—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 304. Certainly of all the unaccountable peculiarities in the mind of Napoleon, the most extraordinary is his total insensibility to the ultimate ascendant of truth over falsehood, and the extent to which he calculated on palming off falsehood and misrepresentation on the credulity or ignorance of mankind.

† M. Bignon, who was present on the occasion, gives the following curious

beg their bread." When a conqueror, in the midst of his greatest triumphs, uses such insulting language to the vanquished, and makes such an atrocious use of his victory, it is impossible to sympathise with his fall, and Waterloo and St Helena are felt to be a just measure of moral retribution.

"Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futuræ,
Et servare modum rebus, sublata secundis.
Turno tempus erit, magno quum obtaverit emptum
Intactum Pallanta, et quum spolia ista diemque
Oderit."*

Meanwhile the French armies, without any further resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the armies of the Republic, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoleon had taken only twenty-four thousand francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of one hundred and fifty-nine million francs (£6,360,000) on the countries at war with France, of

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

89.
Enormous
contribu-
tions levied
on Prussia
and the
north of
Germany.

account of the conversation which led to the dethronement of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel:—"Duroc and I said everything we could, during breakfast, in favour of the Elector. He only petitioned to be allowed to resume possession of his estates; his fortresses were all to be ceded to the French arms; his troops, twelve thousand strong, were to be joined to their forces, and a heavy contribution paid. These offers appeared to make a considerable impression on the Emperor, especially the offer of so many troops; but after musing a while, he said abruptly, 'Bah! Brunswick, Nassau, Cassel: all these princes are essentially English; they will never be our friends,'—and instantly set out for a review. Two days afterwards appeared the 27th bulletin, containing the announcement of their dethronement."—See BIGNON, vi. 35.

* "O mortals! blind in fate, who never know
To bear high fortune, or endure the low!
The time shall come when Turnus, but in vain,
Shall wish untouched the trophies of the slain—
Shall wish the fatal belt were far away,
And curse the dire remembrance of the day."

DRYDEN'S *Virgil*, x. 530.

CHAP.

XLIII.

1806.

which one hundred million was to be borne by the Prussian states to the west of the Vistula, twenty-five million by the Elector of Saxony, and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden, equivalent to at least £12,000,000 sterling, if the difference between the value of money in England and Germany is taken into account, was levied with unrelenting severity; and the rapacity and exactions of the French agents employed in its collection aggravated to a very great degree the weight and odious nature of the imposition. Saxony, in the scourging contributions with which she was overwhelmed, had soon abundant cause to regret the French alliance; while Berlin, as well as the Hanoverian and Prussian states which had been occupied, experienced, in the rapacity of General Clarke and his subordinate agents, all the bitterness as well as the humiliation of conquest.¹

Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor,*—an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation; while General Clarke, governor of Berlin, acting towards the magistrates as if they were already his subjects, barbarously shot a burgomaster of the town of Kyritz,† whose only fault was that he had, when destitute of any armed force, been unable to resist the abstraction of the arms of the burgher guard and local militia by Colonel Schill, who commanded a flying detachment, that still, in

¹ Hard. ix. 317. Bign.
vi. 51, 53.
Bour. vii.
219.

90.
Cruelties
exercised
towards the
conquered
districts.

* The oath was in these terms:—"I swear to exercise with fidelity the authority which is committed to me by the Emperor of the French, and to act only for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to concur with all my power in the execution of all the measures which may be ordered for the service of the French army, and to maintain no correspondence with its enemies."
—BIGNON, vi. 51.

† At a dinner given by Louis XVIII. in 1815, to the King of Prussia, this murder became the subject of conversation. "Sire," said Clarke, then Duke of Feltre, "it was an unhappy error."—"Say, rather, an unworthy crime!" replied the indignant monarch.—HARD. ix. 318.

the open country, maintained its fidelity to the colours of the monarchy. Even the highest authorities gave way to the indiscriminate passion for pillage: "the name of General Clarke," says Bourrienne, "became justly odious from every species of exaction, and a servile execution of all the orders of Napoleon;" while the great reputation of the conqueror of Auerstadt was disgraced by the pillage of the noble library at Tempelberg, the country-seat of Baron Hardenberg, minister of state, which took place by his authority, while he was in person occupying the edifice.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

¹ Hard. ix.
317. Bign.
vi. 51, 53.
Dum. xvii.
40, 49. Bour.
vii. 219.

These evils great as they were, and disgraceful to the arms and generals of France, were however, in the ordinary case, only transitory; but it soon became evident that in the case of Prussia and the adjoining states they were to be permanent, and that the iron grasp of the conqueror was to be not only laid, but retained, on the north of Germany. Early in November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of Stettin, and of Cüstrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders of provinces into which it was divided. Receivers-general were appointed in each province, charged with collecting its whole revenue and all the war contributions imposed on it, and their transmission to the French governors. Magistrates, police, gendarmes, all were nominated by the authority of Napoleon; the whole civil and military government of the country was concentrated in his hands. Clarke was governor-general, aided in the details of government by Count Daru, whose great capacity soon appeared in the admirable order which he introduced into every branch of the administration, and which would have

91.
Military or-
ganisation
of the coun-
try from the
Rhine to the
Vistula.

Nov. 3.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

been worthy of the highest admiration if it had not been rendered instrumental to the most cruel and universal system of public extortion. The same system of government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by grievous contributions, in exacting which the Dutch generals and troops were peculiarly conspicuous. The Emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. Careful, at the same time, to mingle with these important civil changes such deeds as might captivate the imaginations of his subjects, he paraded before the deputation which came to Berlin from the senate of Paris, to congratulate him on his victories, three hundred and forty grenadiers of his Imperial Guard, each bearing a standard taken from the enemy in this short campaign—the most splendid display of military trophies seen in Europe since the triumphs of the Roman generals.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
54, 61. Bign.
vi. 72. Bour.
vii. 217, 219.

92.
Negotia-
tions with
Prussia, and
the first de-
mands of
Napoleon
acceded to.

Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. The misfortunes of the King rendered it almost indispensable that a respite should be obtained on any terms, while it was not less advantageous for Napoleon to reap at once the fruits of his triumphs, without undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a winter campaign in the frozen plains of Poland. Plenipotentiaries, accordingly, were appointed on both sides: on that of France, Duroc; on that of Prussia MM. Lucchesini and Rastrow. There was no need of lengthened conferences; the situation of the parties gave to the one the power of demanding whatever he pleased, and deprived the other of that of withholding anything which was required. Napoleon insisted that Prussia should renounce all the provinces she possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, pay a contribution of a hundred millions of francs for the

expenses of the war, cease to take any concern in the affairs of Germany, and recognise in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine whatever titles the conqueror chose to confer upon them. Not daring to refuse these conditions, and yet unwilling to take upon themselves the responsibility of making so great a sacrifice, the Prussian envoys referred the matter to the King and his cabinet. They returned an answer agreeing to all the exactions which were required; but in the interval matters had essentially changed for the worse, the wreck of the Prussian armies had been almost totally destroyed, and the demands of Napoleon rose in proportion.¹

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

Oct. 27.

¹Bign. vi.
48, 49.
Lucches. ii.
182, 186.
Martens,
viii. 537.

Perpetually haunted by the idea that it was the influence of England which he required to combat, and that the northern powers were brought into the field only to maintain her cause, he next insisted that the Prussian troops should retire entirely to Königsberg and the small portion of the monarchy which lies to the east of the Vistula; that Colberg, Dantzic, Graudentz, Thorn, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Nienburg, should be placed in the hands of the French; and that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter any part of the Prussian territory.* In agreeing to terms so ruinous to the monarchy, the Prussian plenipotentiaries could hardly expect that the King would ratify them; but so desperate had its affairs now become, that it was of importance to obtain a delay even of a few days, in the departure of Napoleon for Posen, in order to gain time for the arrival of the Russian troops on the Vistula. They signed the

93.
Convention
signed by
the plenipo-
tentiaries.

* "He was persuaded," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "that it was the intrigues of England which had arrayed the northern courts against France, which had brought about the refusal of the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of Paris, and pushed forward Prussia into the field of battle. It was England, therefore, which it had become necessary to strike in Prussia; and it was on the conduct of the cabinet of London, in regard to the restitution of conquests, that the Emperor announced he would measure his own steps for the future fate of the Prussian monarchy."—LUCCHESINI, ii. 176, 177; BIGNON, vi. 44.

CHAP.
XLIII.1806.
Nov. 16.

convention at Charlottenburg accordingly, stipulating only for its ratification by the King of Prussia. In fact, however, no hope remained to either side that it would lead to a permanent accommodation; for, a few days before the truce was concluded, Talleyrand openly announced to the Prussian plenipotentiaries that they must look for no restitution of his conquests by the Emperor Napoleon, and that the vast territory from the Rhine to the Vistula would be retained until a general peace, as a means of compelling England to surrender its maritime acquisitions, and forcing Russia to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had recently been invaded by its arms. Thus the unhappy Prussian monarchy was made responsible for the ambition or successes of other powers, over whose measures it had no sort of control; and the negotiations at Berlin, diverging from their original object, were degenerating into a mere manifesto of implacable hostility against the cabinets of London and St Petersburg.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
66, 67. Bign.
vi. 48, 49.
Lucches. ii.
182, 185.
186. Martens,
viii.
537.

94.
Which the
King of
Prussia
refuses to
ratify.

The severity of the terms demanded, as well as their express assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, what was to be gained by the cession of three-fourths of its dominions, and its fortresses still unsubdued on the Vistula, to the French? Reft as he was of his kingdom and his army, the King still preserved his honour, and nobly resolved to continue faithful to his engagements. He declined, therefore, to ratify the armistice, which was presented to him for signature at Osterode, by Duroc, on the part of France, and at the same time published a melancholy but noble proclamation, in which, without attempting to disguise his hopes, or conceal the deplorable state of his affairs, he rose superior to the storms of fortune,² and declared his

² Lucches.
ii. 223, 225.
Bign. vi. 48,
49. Dum.
xvii. 69, 71.

resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia.* This refusal was anticipated by Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

CHAP.
XLIII.
1806.

To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree of the 21st November, against the commerce of Great Britain. But this subject is too vast to be adequately touched on in the close of a chapter embracing such a variety of objects as the present; and it will be fully enlarged on in a subsequent one, which will include also the Milan decree which followed in 1807, the Continental System, and the Orders of Council adopted as a measure of retaliation by the British government.

95.
Famous
Berlin de-
cree against
English
commerce.

Napoleon set out from Berlin for the Vistula soon after he had fulminated this anathema against English commerce, and at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hope which his subsequent conduct never realised: "France," said he, "has never recognised the partitions of Poland; but, nevertheless, I cannot proclaim your independence until you are resolved to defend your rights as a nation at every sacrifice, even that of life itself. The world reproaches you with having, in your continual civil dissensions, lost sight of the true interests and safety of your country. Taught by your misfortunes, now unite, and prove to the world that the same spirit animates the whole

96.
Affairs of
Poland. Na-
poleon's lan-
guage to the
Polish depu-
ties.

Nov. 29.

* "Matters," said the proclamation, "had arrived at that pass, that Prussia could no longer hope to obtain peace, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices. It was not in his power to make the Russian forces retrograde, since already their own frontiers were menaced. The Emperor of France has shown a determination, even when he acceded to the basis of a negotiation, not to suspend for one moment his military operations; and he has protracted the conferences till his successes enabled him to declare that the conquest of Prussia should afford him the means of dictating peace to England and Russia. Compelled thus to resume hostilities, the King is not without hopes of yet bringing them to a successful issue. He hopes that the governors of the fortresses on the Vistula will not imitate the weakness of those on the Oder

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

Polish nation." Universal acclamations attended his arrival at Posen; all the population advanced to meet his carriage; four magnificent triumphal arches were erected to the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Count Palatine Radzerminski, at the head of the deputation from Great Poland, addressed him in terms of Eastern adulation, mingled with strange expressions, which proved prophetic: "The universe knows your exploits and your triumphs; the west beheld the first development of your genius; the south was the recompense of your labours; the east became to you an object of admiration; *the north will be the term of your victories*. The Polish race, yet groaning under the yoke of the Germanic nations, humbly implores your august highness to raise up its remnant from the dust."—Napoleon replied,—"That which has been destroyed by force cannot be restored except by force. I would with pleasure behold the independence of Poland restored, and a barrier formed by its strength against the unbounded ambition of Russia; but petitions and discourses will not achieve this work; and unless the whole nation, including nobles, priests, and burghers, unites and embraces the firm resolution to conquer or die, success is hopeless. With such a determination it is certain; and you may always rely on my powerful protection."¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
60, 64.

While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to

and Elbe, and all the disposable forces of the monarchy will hasten to unite their colours on the Vistula and the Wartha to the brave Russian battalions. Such a proof of courage and constancy is not new to the Prussian nation. In the Seven Years' War the capital and provinces were also occupied by the enemy; but the firmness and intrepidity of the nation brought it safe through all its perils, and excited alike the admiration and astonishment of posterity. Then Prussia combated alone the greatest powers of Europe: now the powerful and magnanimous Alexander is about to take his place by her side, with all the forces of his vast empire. Their cause is the same; they will stand or fall together."—DUMAS, xvii. 70, 71.

advance to support the flanks of the invading force. To Jerome Buonaparte, who commanded the ninth corps, consisting of twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Würtembergers, and who had Vandamme for his adviser, was intrusted the difficult task of reducing the six fortresses of Silesia—Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz—containing in all a force nearly equal to his own. Glogau, however, with its garrison of three thousand men, made but a show of resistance, and, early in December, fell into the hands of the French. The other bulwarks of the province exhibited more determination, and operations in form were commenced against them. Mortier, on the extreme left, was intrusted with the subjugation of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, and the occupation of Hamburg, which was accomplished with hardly any resistance. Having done this, he advanced to observe Stralsund and the Swedes; while a fresh reserve was collecting on the Elbe, under the command of Louis, King of Holland. Thus, though the Grand Army was advancing by rapid strides to the shores of the Vistula, its flanks on either side were protected by subordinate corps; and fresh forces, stationed in echelon in the rear, overawed the intermediate states, and kept up the communication with the Rhine. The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while a hundred thousand were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland.¹

Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such prodigious efforts over so great an extent of surface rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor, eighty thousand were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. "In what more triumphant circumstances," said the Emperor, "can we call on the youth of France to flock to our standards? They will have to traverse, in joining their comrades, the capital of their enemies, and fields of battle made illustrious by immortal

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

97.

Advance of
Jerome into
Silesia, of
the French
army to the
Vistula, and
Mortier to
Hamburg.

Dec. 8.

¹ Bign. vi.
69, 71. Dum.
xvii. 50, 53.

98.

Levy of a
new con-
scription in
France.
Dec. 5.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

victories.” It may easily be conceived with what transports this appeal was received by a nation so passionately attached to military glory as the French, and the Emperor resolved to turn it to the best account. Not content with this great addition to his prospective resources, he instituted corps of volunteers to receive the numerous and enthusiastic youth, whom even the conscription could not drain off in sufficient numbers ; additional battalions were added to the Imperial Guard, the troops of Hesse taken in a body into French pay, and the most energetic measures adopted to augment as much as possible the military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine. Detailed instructions were at the same time transmitted to Marmont in Illyria, and the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, to have their forces disposed on the Austrian frontiers in the most advantageous position ; and the King of Bavaria was informed by the Emperor himself of all that he should do for the defence of his dominions. The activity displayed in the fortresses on the Adige, the Isonzo, and the Inn, looked as if he was making preparations rather for a defensive struggle in the plains of Bavaria, or the fields of Italy, than for a decisive stroke at Russia on the shores of the Vistula.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
69, 71. Dum.
xvii. 50, 55.
See the orders in Dum.
xvii. Pièces
Just.

99.
Treaty between
France and
Saxony.

Dec. 15.
² Dum. xvii.
88, 89. Martens, viii.
552, and
555.

A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed at Posen on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king ; he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at twenty thousand men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign—a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation—while, by a subsidiary treaty, signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes of the house of Saxony were also admitted into the Confederacy.²

Such was the astonishing campaign of Jena, the most marvellous of all the achievements of Napoleon, that in which success the most unheard-of attended his steps, and his force appeared most irresistible to the bewildered nations. Europe had hardly recovered the shock arising from the fall of Austria in three months, during the campaign of Austerlitz, when she beheld Prussia overthrown in as many weeks by the shock of Jena. Without halting one day before the forces of the enemy, without ever once pausing in the career of conquest, the French troops had marched from the Rhine to the Vistula; the fabric reared with so much care by the wisdom and valour of Frederick the Great had fallen by a single blow; and one of the chief powers of Christendom had disappeared at once from the theatre of Europe. Three hundred and fifty standards, four thousand pieces of cannon, six first-rate fortresses, eighty thousand prisoners, had been taken in less than seven weeks. Of a noble array of a hundred and twenty thousand men, who had so lately crowded on the banks of the Saale, not more than fifteen thousand now followed the standards of the King to the shores of the Vistula.¹ Results so astonishing were altogether unprecedented in modern Europe: they recalled rather the classic exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, or the fierce inroads of Timour or Genghis Khan, than anything yet experienced in Christendom. But they possessed this superiority over the achievements of antiquity or the sanguinary conquests of modern barbarism, that it was not over inexperienced tribes or enervated nations that the triumphs had been won, but the most warlike nation of the civilised world that had been overthrown, and the army which had not long before withstood the banded strength of Europe which had been dissolved.

The talents displayed by Napoleon in this campaign, though of a very high order, were not equal to the transcendant abilities evinced at Ulm and Austerlitz. Doubtless the celerity with which the hazardous advance of the

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

100.
Immense
results of the
campaign.

¹ Jom. ii.
325.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

101.

Talent and
rashness dis-
played by
Napoleon
during the
campaign.

Duke of Brunswick across the Thuringian Forest to turn the French left and interpose between the Rhine and their army, was turned to the best account, and the Prussians cut off from their magazines and communications at the very moment they were endeavouring to inflict that injury on the enemy: the vigour of the fight at Jena, and the incomparable energy with which the mighty host which there conquered was dispersed in pursuit of the broken remains of the enemy, and incessantly pressed on till they were totally destroyed, were worthy of the highest admiration. But in the very outset of the campaign, he exposed himself to unnecessary hazard, and but for a change of position on the part of the bulk of the Prussian army, of which he was ignorant, might have been involved in as great a catastrophe as the rout on the banks of the Isar had been to the Imperialists. To advance and attack the Prussian army, strongly posted at Jena, through the narrow and rugged defiles of the Landgrafenberg, was a greater piece of rashness in military conduct than it was in the Archduke John to advance against Moreau through the pines of Hohenlinden. Napoleon has told us this himself,—“The first principle of the military art,” says he, “is never to fight with a defile in your rear; for if defeated in such a station, total ruin is hardly avoidable.”¹ Had the whole Prussian army, a hundred thousand strong, continued posted at the opening of the defiles as it was only the day before, instead of a rearguard of forty thousand only, the French would probably have never been able to debouch, and a disastrous defeat have been experienced. There was little of the usual calculation of means to end in this great commander, when he himself, with eighty thousand men, was opposed only to Hohenlohe with forty thousand, while Davoust, with thirty thousand, was left to struggle with the King in person, at the head of sixty-five thousand. No man knew better than Napoleon that such combinations were against the

¹ Nap. Mem.
Book ix.
124, 125,
on Waterloo.

first principles, not merely of the military art, but of common sense applied to such subjects. But the truth is, that the campaign of Austerlitz had given him an undue confidence in his destiny ; he deemed himself invincible, because he had always hitherto proved so ; and already were to be seen the symptoms of that fatal rashness which was to lead him to the Moscow retreat and the disasters of Leipsic.

After making every allowance for the magnitude of the defeat sustained by the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, and the extraordinary circumstance of the fugitives from these two fields getting intermingled during their nocturnal flight, there is something extraordinary and almost unaccountable in the sudden prostration of the monarchy. Had the people been lukewarm or disaffected in the cause, this result would have admitted of easy solution ; but this was very far indeed from being the case : public spirit ran high, patriotic ardour was universal, and unanimity unprecedented against Gallic aggression existed among all classes. Yet in the midst of this ardent and enthusiastic feeling, pusillanimity the most disgraceful was generally evinced, and fortresses all but impregnable surrendered at the first summons of a contemptible enemy ! Where were the soldiers of the Great Frederick, where the constancy of the Seven Years' War, when Magdeburg, Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau lowered their colours without firing a shot, and the weakness of these garrisons permitted the army on the Vistula to be reinforced at the decisive moment by forty thousand men, who otherwise would have been chained round their walls ? These unprecedented capitulations demonstrate that, however high was the spirit of part of the nation, the same feelings were not universal, and that the kingdom of Prussia, newly cemented by the genius of Frederick, had not yet acquired that general patriotic spirit which can withstand the severer shocks of adversity, and constitutes the only secure basis of national independence. And the English

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

historian who recollects how the energies of his own country were prostrated in a similar manner after the battle of Hastings, will probably be inclined to judge charitably of an infant nation placed in such trying circumstances ; and feel a deeper thankfulness for that long career of national independence, that unbroken line of national glory, which has formed the indomitable public spirit of his own country, and constitutes the unseen chain which has so long held together the immense fabric of the British dominions.

103.
General
despond-
ency which
it occasions
in Europe.

In proportion to the unbounded enthusiasm which these wondrous events excited in France, was the despondency which they diffused through the other states of Europe. Alarm now seized the most sanguine, despair took possession of the most resolute. The power which had risen up in Europe to vanquish and destroy seemed beyond the reach of attack. Every effort made against it, every coalition formed for its overthrow, had led only to fresh triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of its strength. The utmost efforts of Austria, supported by all the wealth of England and all the military strength of Russia, had sunk in the conflict ; and now a few weeks had sufficed to dissipate that admirable army which the Great Frederick had bequeathed as the phalanx of independence to his country. The thoughtful and philanthropic, more even than the multitude, were penetrated with apprehensions at these portentous events.* They looked back to ancient times, and read in the long degradation of Greece and the Byzantine empire, the conse-

* See, in particular, Sir James Mackintosh's letter on this subject, *Memoirs*, i. 304. "I do not," says he, "despair of the fortunes of the human race. But the moral days and nights of these mighty revolutions have not yet been measured by human intellect. Who can tell how long that fearful night may be before the dawn of a brighter to-morrow? Experience may, and I hope does, justify us in expecting that the whole course of human affairs is towards a better state ; but it does not signify to us, supposing that many steps of this progress may be to the worse. The race of man may reach the promised land ; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity of all that we can discover, except with the eyes of

quences of their subjugation by the military force of Rome, and could anticipate no brighter prospect for futurity than the ultimate resurrection of Europe after many ages of slavery and decline. So little can the greatest intellects anticipate the future course of events in a society so perpetually influenced by new moving powers as that of modern Europe; and so necessary is it, in forming a judgment on the ultimate consequences of existing changes, not merely to look back to the lessons of history, but to take into account also the hitherto unexperienced influence of fresh causes rising into action in the ever-varying scene of human affairs.

That bright dawn, however, which philanthropy looked for in vain, and philosophy was unable to anticipate in the dark gloom of the political horizon, the ardent mind of a hero had already begun to descry; and, what is very remarkable, he fixed on the precise circumstances in the temper of the times which were destined to make it ultimately expand to all the lustre of day. "I reckon much," said Blücher to Bourrienne at Hamburg, whither he had retired on his parole from Lübeck, "on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral; but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honour and a passion for national glory. Be assured, when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination, they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a landwehr such as

104.
Blücher's
opinion of
the probable
resurrection
of Germany.

speculation, seems very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France seems the least part of the evil: an evil greater than despotism, or rather the worst form of despotism, approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established.—*Sir J. Mackintosh to M. Ogilvie*, Feb. 24, 1808.—*MACKINTOSH'S Memoirs*, i. 383.—It is curious, but not unnatural, to observe the earliest and warmest advocates of the French Revolution most gloomy in their anticipations of its ultimate effects. Ardour of imagination, the habit of looking before the multitude into the ultimate consequences of passing events, a sincere desire for the good of mankind, naturally produced in the same minds, in 1790 and 1806, these opposite results.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. England will yield us its subsidies; we shall renew our alliances with Russia and Austria. I know well the principles of the coalition. The sole object which the Allied sovereigns have in view is to put a limit to the system of aggression which Napoleon has adopted, and which he pursues with the most alarming rapidity. In our first wars against France, at the commencement of its Revolution, we fought for the rights of kings, in which, for my part, I felt very little interest: but now the case is totally changed; the population of Prussia makes common cause with its government; the safety of our hearths is at stake; and reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation. I look forward without anxiety to the future, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your Emperor. The time may come when *Europe in a body, humiliated by his exactions, exhausted by his depredations, will rise up in arms against him.* The more he enchains different nations, the more terrible will be the explosion when they burst their fetters. Who can now dispute the insatiable passion for aggrandisement with which he is animated? No sooner is Austria subjugated than Prussia is destroyed; and though we have fallen, Russia remains to continue the strife. I cannot foresee the issue of this struggle; but supposing it to be favourable to France, it will come to an end. You will speedily see new wars arise, and if we hold firm, France, worn out with conquests, will at length succumb."¹

¹ Bour. vii.
205, 206.

Blucher was right in these anticipations. It is not in the suffering but the prosperity of nations that the seeds of ruin are in general to be found; the anguish and humiliation which are the consequences of weakness, disunion, or corruption, are often the severe school of ultimate improvement. If we would discern the true cause of the fall of Prussia, we must go back to the vacillation

and selfishness which characterised its national councils during the ten prosperous years which succeeded the treaty of Bâle in 1795: which caused it to temporise when the moment for action had arrived, and brought it in heedless security to the very edge of perdition; which lowered the national feeling by sacrificing the national honour, and paralysed the arms of its allies by inspiring distrust in the good faith of its government. In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena, is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations any more than individuals; it is the flow of unbroken prosperity, which, by promoting the growth of the selfish passions, is the real source, in most cases, of irremediable ruin. Those twin curses of humanity, despotism and democracy, act in precisely the same way on the sources of public welfare, by poisoning the fountains of individual exertion, and inducing in the active members of society a slavish submission to the authority of the irresistible executive, or a selfish prosecution of their own interest, instead of a generous devotion to the public good. Till this last stage of national degradation has arrived, there is always a hope of revival to its fortunes. No misfortunes are irremediable as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken; no calamities irreparable but those which undermine their virtue.

CHAP.
XLIII.

1806.

105.

Salutary
ultimate re-
sult of this
suffering to
Prussia.

CHAPTER XLIV.

CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU. DEC. 1806—MARCH 1807.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

1.

Advance of
the French
and Rus-
sians to the
Vistula.

THE campaign of Jena had destroyed the power of Prussia; inconsiderate valour had yielded to overwhelming force and skilful combination; with more justice the King than the people could say with Francis I. at Pavia, *Tout est perdu hors l'honneur*. But Russia was still untouched; and while her formidable legions remained unsubdued, the war, so far from being completed, could hardly be said to have seriously commenced. Napoleon felt this. On the Trebbia, at Novi, at Dürrenstein, and Austerlitz, the French had experienced the stern valour of these northern warriors; and he counted the hours, as the mortal conflict approached, which was to bring either universal empire or irreparable ruin in its train. Nor were the Russians less desirous to commence the struggle. Confident in the prowess of their arms—proud of the steady growth of an empire, the frontiers of which have never yet receded, and which its meanest peasant believes is one day to subdue the world—they anticipated a glorious result from their exertions, and, without underrating the forces of their opponents, indulged a sanguine hope that the north would prove the limits of their power, and that, while they repelled them from their own frontiers, they would afford the means of liberation to oppressed Europe. The severity of a Polish winter could not deter these undaunted combatants. Eager

for the conflict, both the mighty hosts approached the Vistula; and, at a period of the year when some respite is usually given in ordinary war to suffering humanity, they commenced a new campaign, and advanced through a snowy wilderness to the bloody field of Eylau.

Alexander had displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses which his army had sustained in the campaign of Austerlitz. Thirty fresh squadrons and fifty-one battalions had been added to its amount, all the chasms occasioned by the casualties of war supplied, and the new French organisation into divisions universally adopted.* Nor was this all:—Anxious to rouse the religious enthusiasm of his subjects, and deeply impressed with the magnitude of the struggle which was approaching, he had called out a defensive militia of six hundred thousand men, and excited their devout loyalty to the highest degree by a proclamation, in which Napoleon was repre-

2.
Military
preparations
of Russia.

* The Russian army was organised into eighteen divisions, each of which was composed of six regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of heavy cavalry, ten of light, two batteries of heavy cannon, three of light or horse artillery, and a company of pioneers; in all for each, eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and seventy-two pieces of cannon; about 12,000 men. The army was thus divided:—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cannons.
1. Guard, under Grand-duke Constantine,	33	35	84
2. Polish army—Eight divisions, under Ostermann, Sacken, Gallitzin, Touchkoff, Barclay de Tolly, Doctoroff, Essen, Gortchakoff, afterwards Kamenskoi,	147	170	504
3. Army of Moldavia—Five divisions under Michelson as general-in-chief, commanded by Wolkonsky, Zacomilsky, Milaradowitch, Meindorf, and the Duke of Richelieu,	90	100	306
4. Intermediate corps under the Count Apraxin, consisting of the divisions of General Ritchoff, Prince Labanoff, and Gortchakoff,	54	30	144
Total,	324	335	1038

besides the local corps in Georgia, Finland, and garrison battalions. The whole regular force was about 380,000 men; but in no country is the difference between the numbers on paper and in the field so great as in Russia, and the troops engaged in the campaign of Poland never exceeded 80,000 men.—See JOMINI, ii. 335; and WILSON, 4.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹ Jom. ii.
335. Hard.
ix. 375, 376.
Dum. xvii.
99. Wilson,
Polish War,
10, 11.

3.
Composi-
tion and
character of
her armies.

sented as the relentless enemy of the Christian religion, and they were called on to shed their best blood in defence of the faith of their fathers.* This proclamation excited the ridicule of a large part of Europe, still tainted by infidel fanaticism, and not then awakened to the impossibility of combating revolutionary energy with any other weapons but those of religious fervour. But it was admirably calculated for the simple-minded people to whom it was addressed, and excited such an enthusiasm, that not only was this immense armament without difficulty raised, but, contrary to usual custom, the peasants drawn for the regular army joyfully left their homes, and marched with songs of triumph, amidst the blessings of their countrymen, towards the frontier, the anticipated scene of their glory or their martyrdom.¹

The troops who were now pressing forward to defend the western frontiers of the empire were very different from those with whom the French had hitherto, for the most part, contended in the fields of Germany or the Italian plains. The forces of civilisation, the resources of art, were exhausted; the legions of Napoleon had reached the old frontier of Europe; the energy of the desert, the hosts of Asia were before them; passions hitherto, save in la Vendée, unexperienced in the contest, were now brought into action. Religious enthusiasm, patriotic ardour, the fervour of youthful civilisation, were arrayed against the power of knowledge, the discipline of art, the resources of ancient opulence. There was to be seen the

* "Buonaparte," said this proclamation, which was read in all the Russian churches, "after having, by open force or secret intrigue, extended his power over the countries which he oppresses, menaces Russia, which Heaven protects. It is for you to prevent the destroyer of peace, of the faith, and of the happiness of mankind, from seducing the orthodox Christians. He has trampled under foot every principle of truth; in Egypt he preached the Koran of Mahomet, in France manifested his contempt for the religion of Jesus Christ by convoking Jewish synagogues. Do you love your fellow-creatures? Fly the persecutor of Christians. Do you desire to be saved? Oppose an invincible barrier to his advances. He has dared to the combat God and Russia; prove that you are the defenders of the Most High and of your country. Chase far from your frontiers that monster; punish his barbarity to so many innocent persons,

serf but recently emancipated from the servitude of his fathers, whose mother and sisters had checked the lamentations of nature when he assumed the military habit, and bade him go forth, the champion of Christendom, to present glory and future paradise; there the peasant, inured from infancy to hardy exercise, ignorant alike of the enjoyments and the corruptions of urban society, long accustomed to rural labour, and habituated equally to the glow of a Russian bath or the severity of a Scythian winter; there the Cossack, whose steed, nourished on the steppes of the Don, had never yet felt the curb, while his master, following his beloved Hetman to the theatre of action, bore his formidable lance in his hand, his pistols and sword by his side, and his whole effects, the fruit of years of warfare, in the folds of his saddle. Careless of the future, the children of the desert joyfully took their way to the animating fields of plunder and triumph; mounted on small but swift and indefatigable horses, they were peculiarly adapted for a country where provisions were scanty, forage exhausted, and hardships universal. The heat of summer, the frost of winter, were alike unable to check the vigour of their desultory operations; and when the hosts on either side were arrayed in battle, and the charge of regular forces was requisite, they often appeared with decisive effect at the critical moment. Urging their horses to full speed, they bore down, by the length of their spears and the vehemence of their onset, the most powerful cavalry of Western Europe.¹*

¹ Wilson,
viii. 28. Personal
observation.

whose blood cries aloud to Heaven for vengeance. God will hear the prayer of the faithful; he will shield you with his power; he will cover you with his grace. Your exploits will be celebrated by the church and by your country; immortal crowns or abodes of eternal felicity await you."—HARDENBERG, ix. 376.

* "Mounted," says Wilson, "on a little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk with ease at the rate of five miles an hour, or dispute in his speed the race with the swiftest, with a short whip on his wrist, as he wears no spur, armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, the Cossack never fears a competitor in single combat; but in the Polish war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge; and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

4.

Imprudent
division of
her forces
by the in-
vasion of
Moldavia.

If the whole disposable Russian forces had been united upon the Vistula, they would have presented an imposing mass of a hundred and fifty thousand warriors, against which all the efforts of Napoleon would, in all probability, have been exerted in vain. But by a strange and unaccountable infatuation, at the very moment when this formidable contest awaited them on the Polish plains, a large portion of their disposable force was drawn off to the shores of the Danube, and a Turkish superadded to the already overwhelming weight of the French war. Of the causes which led to this unhappy diversion, and the grounds which the cabinet of St Petersburg set forth in vindication of their aggression on the Ottoman dominions, a full account will be given in the sequel of this work; * but, in the mean time, its effect in causing a most calamitous division of the Russian force is too obvious to require illustration. At Eylau the hostile forces on either side were nearly equal, and both retired without any decisive advantage from that scene of blood; ten thousand additional troops would there have overthrown Napoleon, and driven him to a disastrous retreat, while fifty thousand of the best troops of the Muscovite empire were uselessly employed on the banks of the Danube. At the same time it must be remembered that the war in Moldavia was resolved on, and the necessary orders transmitted, before the disasters in Prussia were known, or the pressing necessity for succour on the Vistula could have been anticipated; the battle of Jena was fought on the 14th October, and on

the protruding pikes. The cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arms and skill of the Cossack; but in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, when the cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and, in a few moments, five hundred and thirty Cossacks reappeared in the field, equipped with the spoils of the slain. But they did not permanently wear them; the steel trophies were conveyed by subscription to the Don and the Volga, where they are inspected as trophies of their prowess, and respected as the pride of their kindred and glory of their nation."—WILSON, 27, 28. When the author saw the Cossacks of the Don and the Guard at Paris in May 1814, this description was still precisely applicable.

* See *infra*, Chap. LXIX. on the Turkish War.

the 23d November, General Michelson entered Moldavia, and commenced the Turkish campaign. But though the Russian cabinet is thus not answerable for having given orders to commence an additional war unnecessarily in the midst of the desperate struggle in the north of Germany, yet it cannot be relieved of the responsibility of having, without any adequate cause, provoked hostilities in the southern provinces of its empire, at a time when the contest in Saxony, if not commenced, might at least have been easily foreseen, when the resolution to annul the treaty, signed by d'Oubril at Paris, had been already taken, and all the strength of Europe was required to meet the encounter with the conqueror of Austerlitz on the banks of the Elbe.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.
Nov. 23.

¹ *Jom. ii.*
336, 337.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 209.
Bign. vi. 57.

While Russia, distracted by the varied interests of her mighty dominions, was thus running the hazard of destruction by the imprudent division of her forces in presence of the enemy, Napoleon was extremely perplexed at Posen by the consideration of the Polish question. The destiny of the Sarmatian people, which enters so deeply into the solution of every political combination of the nineteenth century, here stood in the very foremost rank, and called for immediate decision. The advance of the French armies through Prussian Poland towards Warsaw, the ambiguous, but still encouraging words of the Emperor to the numerous deputations which approached him, had awakened to the highest degree the hopes and expectations of that unfortunate, but impassioned race. A solemn deputation from Great Poland, headed by Count Dzadiniki, waited upon Napoleon, and announced an approaching insurrection of the Polish nation, headed by their nobles, palatines, and chiefs: a great excitement

5.
Embarrass-
ment of Na-
poleon on
the Polish
question.

* The determination to refuse the ratification of the treaty, signed at Paris by d'Oubril, was taken at St Petersburg on the 25th August—the Dniester was passed on the 23d November. The resolution to provoke a Turkish war, therefore, was taken after it was known that a continued struggle with the enemy, whose strength they had felt at Austerlitz, had become inevitable.—*Ante*, Chap. XLII. § 72.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹Jom. i. 328.
Oginski, ii.
335, 336,
338.

prevailed in Lithuania, and symptoms of alarming effervescence were visible even in Galicia. The crisis was of the most violent kind; an immediate decision was called for by imperious necessity; Napoleon was much at a loss how to act, and the question was warmly debated by the council assembled at his headquarters.¹

6.
Arguments
in favour of
the restora-
tion of Poland.

On the one hand, it was urged by the friends of Poland, "that the only ally in the east of Europe, on whom France could really and permanently depend, was now preparing to range itself by her side, and enter into a contest of life or death in her support. The alliances of cabinets may be dissolved, the friendships of kings may be extinguished, but the union of nations, founded on identity of interest and community of feeling, may be calculated upon as of more lasting endurance. But what people was ever impelled towards another by such powerful motives, or animated in the alliance by such vehement passions, as Poland now is towards France? Alone of all great nations, in ancient or modern times, she has been partitioned by her powerful and ambitious neighbours, struck down to the earth by hostile armies, and swept, by repeated spoliations, from the book of existence. Her nationality is destroyed, her people scattered, her glories at an end. Is it possible that these injuries can be forgotten, that such unparalleled calamities should leave no traces behind them, in the breasts of the descendants of the Sarmatian race? Is it not certain, on the contrary, that they have left there profound impressions, ineradicable passions, which are ready, on the first favourable opportunity, to raise throughout the whole scattered provinces of the old republic an inextinguishable flame? Where has the Emperor found such faithful followers, such devoted fidelity, as in the Polish legions of the Italian army, whom Muscovite barbarity drove to seek an asylum in foreign lands? Is it expedient to refuse the proffered aid of a hundred thousand such warriors, who are ready

to fly to his standards from the whole wide-spread fields of Sarmatia?

“True, they are undisciplined—without arms, fortresses, magazines, or resources—but what does all that signify? Napoleon is in the midst of them; his invincible legions will precede them in the fight; from his enemies and their spoilers his victorious sword will wrest the implements of war; in the example of his followers, they will see the model of military discipline. The Poles are by nature warriors; little training or organisation is requisite to bring them into the field. When the regular forces of Germany had sunk in the conflict, their tumultuary array chased the infidels from the heart of Austria, and delivered Vienna from Mussulman bondage. Nor is it merely a temporary succour which may be anticipated from their exertions; lasting aid, a durable alliance, may with confidence be expected from their necessities. Surrounded by the partitioning powers, they have no chance of independence but in the French alliance; the moment they desert it, they will be again crushed by their ambition. Not only the nationality of Poland, but the individual safety of its whole inhabitants, must for ever bind them to their deliverers; they well know what cruel punishments and confiscations would await them should they again fall under the Muscovite yoke. In restoring the oldest of European commonwealths, therefore, not only will a memorable act of justice be done, a memorable punishment of iniquity inflicted, but a durable alliance on the frontier of civilisation will be formed, and a barrier erected against the inroads of barbarism in the people who, in every age, have devoted their blood to combating its advances.”¹

Specious as these arguments were, and powerfully as they appealed to the generous feelings of our nature, it may be doubted whether they were not opposed by others of greater solidity. “It is in vain,” it was urged in reply, “to dwell on the misfortunes of Poland, or repre-

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

7.
Security for
the perma-
nence of her
alliance with
France.

¹Jom. ii. 328.
Oginski, ii.
337.

8.
Arguments
on the other
side, against
interfering
on behalf of
the Poles.

sent her partition as an unavoidable calamity for which her inhabitants are noways answerable. Such a misfortune may doubtless sometimes occur to a small state surrounded by larger ones; but was that the case in the present instance? On the contrary, Poland was originally the most powerful nation in the north: her dominions extended from the Euxine to the Baltic, and from Suabia to Smolensko. All Prussia, great part of the Austrian dominions, and a large portion of Russia, have at different times been carved out of her wide-spread territories. So far from being weaker than Russia, she was originally much stronger; and the standards of the Jagellons and the Piasts have more than once been planted in triumph on the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, her history for the last five hundred years has been nothing but a succession of disasters, illuminated at intervals by transient gleams of heroic achievement; and, notwithstanding the valour of her inhabitants, her frontiers have, from the earliest times, been constantly receding, until at length she became the prey of potentates who had risen to importance by acquisitions reft from herself. So uniform and undeviating a course of misfortune, in a kingdom so brave, so enthusiastic, and so populous, as even at the moment of its partition to contain sixteen millions of inhabitants, argues some incurable vice in its domestic institutions. It is not difficult to see what this vice was, when we contemplate the uniform and fatal weakness of the Executive, the disorders consequent on an elective monarchy, the inveterate and deadly animosity of faction, and the insane democratic spirit of a plebeian noblesse, which made John Sobieski, a century before its final destruction, prophesy the approaching ruin of the commonwealth.

“Such being the character of Polish institutions, as they have been ascertained by experience, and proved by the ruin of the commonwealth, it becomes a most serious question whether it is for the interest of France, for the

aid of such an ally, to incur the certain and inveterate hostility of the three northern powers. That Russia, Prussia, and Austria will thenceforth be combined in an indissoluble alliance against France, if Poland is restored, and the rich provinces now enjoyed by them from its partition wrested from their vast dominions, is evident; and, whatever may be thought of the strength of the Sarmatian levies, there can be but one opinion as to the military resources which they enjoy. What aid can Polish enthusiasm bring to the French standards, to counterbalance this strong combination of the greatest military powers of Europe? A hundred thousand horsemen, brave, doubtless, and enthusiastic, but destitute of fortresses, magazines, and resources, and inhabiting a level plain, unprotected by mountains, rivers, or any natural frontier, and open on all sides to the incursions of their well-organised opponents. Supposing that, by the aid of the vast army and still vaster reputation of Napoleon, they shall succeed at this time in beating back the Russian hosts, and wresting Lithuania from their grasp, what may not be apprehended from the appearance of Austria on the theatre of conflict, and the debouching of a hundred and fifty thousand men in the rear of the Grand Army, when far advanced in the deserts of Muscovy? That the cabinet of Vienna is preparing for the conflict is evident; that she is arming is well known; fear and uncertainty as to the future alone restrain her forces. But the stroke which by restoring Poland severs Galicia from her empire, will at once determine her policy, and bring the Imperial legions in formidable strength to the banks of the Elbe. Even supposing that, by an unprecedented series of victories, these dangers are averted for the moment, and the French battalions, loaded with honours, regain the Rhine, how is Poland, still torn by intestine faction, and destitute of any solid institutions, without fortresses, or the defence of mountain ranges, to withstand her formidable military neighbours? How is

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

France, at the distance of four hundred leagues, to protect a power whose internal weakness has always been such that it has never been able to protect itself against its own provinces? If a barrier is to be erected against Russian ambition, and a state formed dependent on the French alliance for its existence, far better to look for it in Prussia, whose history exhibits as remarkable a rise as that of Poland does a decline, and the solidity of whose institutions, not less than the firmness of her national character, has been decisively exhibited in her contest with all the military forces of Europe during the Seven Years' War."¹

¹ *Jom. ii.*
320.

10.
Napoleon
adopts a
middle
course, and
rouses only
Prussian
Poland.

Pressed by so many difficulties, and struck in an especial manner by the danger of bringing the forces of Austria upon his rear, while engaged in the hardships of a winter campaign in Poland, Napoleon resolved upon a middle course.* Irrevocably fixed upon humbling Prussia to the dust, and entirely indifferent to the irritation which he might excite among its people, he resolved to rouse to the uttermost the inhabitants of Prussian Poland; but at the same time sedulously to abstain from any invitations to Galicia to revolt, and even to hold out no encouragement to the Russian provinces of Lithuania to join the standard of Polish independence. Kosciusko, who, since his heroic achievements in 1794, had lived in retirement near Fontainebleau, was invited by Napoleon to join his countrymen; and a proclamation, drawn up in his name, was even published in the French papers, in which he promised speedily to put himself at their head; but the course of time soon dispelled the illusion, and it became

* "I love the Poles," said he to Rapp, after having received one of their deputations; "their ardour pleases me. I could wish to render them an independent people, but it is no easy undertaking. Too many nations are interested in their spoils—Austria, Russia, Prussia. If the match is once lighted, there is no saying where it would stop. My first duty is towards France, and it is no part of it to sacrifice its interests to Poland—that would lead us too far. We must leave its destinies in the hands of the supreme disposer of all things—to Time. It will possibly teach us hereafter what course we ought to pursue."—*BOUR. vii.* 250.

painfully evident to the Poles that their illustrious hero, despairing of success, or having no confidence in their pretended allies, was resolved to bear the responsibility of no future insurrections under such auspices.* In fact, he had been profoundly affected by the indifference manifested by all the European powers to the fate of Poland on occasion of the final partition, and thoroughly impressed with the idea that no efficacious co-operation could be expected from any of them. While, therefore, he rendered full justice to the military talents of Napoleon, he did not the less despair of seeing the deliverance of Sarmatia in good faith attempted by his despotic arms. The task of rousing the Poles in the Prussian dominions was therefore committed to Dombrowski and Wybicki; the former of whom had acquired a deserved celebrity at the head of the Polish Legion in Italy, while the latter possessed such influence with his countrymen as to promise great advantage to the cause of Napoleon.¹

At the same time, every care was taken to excite the feelings and diminish the apprehensions of the Poles of Prussia; heart-stirring proclamations in Kosciusko's name were addressed to them by the generals of their nation in the Italian army; but that brave man himself, faithful to the oath he had taken to the Emperor of Russia, and aware of the delusive nature of Napoleon's support, refused to take any part in these proceedings; resisted all the brilliant offers which he made to induce him to engage in his service, and even had the boldness, in foreign journals, to disavow the letter which the French government had published in his name. Notwithstanding this reserve, however, the advance of the French armies to Warsaw,

11.
Forged proclamations issued in Kosciusko's name, and great excitement in Poland.

* "Kosciusko," said this fabricated epistle, dated 1st November, "is about to place himself in the midst of you. He sees in your deliverers no ambitious conquerors; the great nation is before you; Napoleon expects you; Kosciusko calls you. I fly to your succour, never more to leave your side. Worthy of the great man whose arm is stretched forth for your deliverance, I attach myself to your cause never again to abandon it. The bright days of Poland have returned; we are under the ægis of a monarch accustomed to overcome difficulties by miracles."—HARDENBERG, ix. 329.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

and the sedulous care which they took to save the inhabitants from every species of insult or contribution, produced an extraordinary excitement in the Polish provinces. Universally they were hailed as deliverers—the substantial benefits, the real protection, the fostering tranquillity of the Prussian administration, were forgotten in the recollection of ancient achievements, and, incited by the heart-stirring prospect of coming independence, the nation was fast running into its ancient and ruinous anarchy. The public exultation was at its height when Napoleon arrived at Posen: several regiments were already formed in Prussian Poland; and the arrival of the French troops in Warsaw, which the Russians evacuated at their approach, was universally hailed as the first day of Polish restoration.¹

¹ Oginski,
ii. 337, 338.
Hard. ix.
344, 347.
Bign. vi. 79,
81.

12.
Napoleon's
ambiguous
bulletin on
the subject.
Dec. 1.

Napoleon was not insensible to the important effects of this national enthusiasm, both in augmenting the resources of his own army, and intercepting those of his opponents; but at the same time he felt the necessity of not rousing all Poland in a similar manner, or incurring the immediate hostility of Austria, by threatening the tenure by which she held her Polish acquisitions. He resolved, therefore, to moderate the general fervour, and confine it to the provinces of Prussia, where it was intended to excite a conflagration; and this was done by the bulletin which appeared on the 1st December:—"The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and the sentiment of nationality, is not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but it has become more profound from misfortune. Their first passion, the universal wish, is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their chateaus to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the nation, and to offer their children, their fortune, their influence, in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have everywhere resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs. Is, then, the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is the nation destined to resume

its existence and independence? From the depth of the tomb is it destined to start into life? God alone, who holds in his hands the combination of great events, is the arbiter of that great political problem, but certainly never was an event more memorable or worthy of interest." Situated as Napoleon was, the reserve of this language was an act of humanity as well as justice to the unhappy race whose destiny it still held in suspense; but it contributed powerfully to allay the rising enthusiasm of the Russian and Austrian provinces of the ancient commonwealth; and the prudent, despairing of any national resurrection from such an ally, began to ask, "if the restoration of the republic of Poland could in good faith be expected from the man who had extinguished the liberty of his own country?"¹

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹ Oginski, ii. 339. Bign. vi. 80, 81. Lucches. ii. 226.

One chance, and only one, remained to Napoleon of smoothing away the difficulties which surrounded the restoration of Poland, and that consisted in the proposal, which at this time he made to Austria, to exchange its share of Poland for its old province of Silesia. During the negotiation with Prussia for a separate peace, he only held out the prospect of this exchange in a doubtful manner to the cabinet of Vienna; but no sooner had the King of Prussia refused to ratify the armistice of Charlottenburg, than General Andréossi was authorised to propose it formally to that power. Count Stadion replied, that the good faith of the Imperial government would not permit them to accept a possession whose surrender was not assented to by Prussia; and it would indeed have been an extraordinary fault in policy, as well as breach of morality, to have thus despoiled a friendly power and reopened an ancient wound, at the very moment when a concentration of all energies was required to resist the enemy who threatened to destroy all the European states. In consequence of this refusal, the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to Poland, became still more guarded; and, although a provisional government and local administra-

13.
Napoleon proposes to Austria to exchange Galicia for Silesia, which is refused.

Dec. 15.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

tion were formed at Warsaw, yet none but natives of Prussian Poland were admitted to any share in the direction of affairs. Meanwhile the conduct of Austria was so dubious as to inspire no small disquietude for the rear of the Grand Army. Already sixty thousand men were assembled in Bohemia; new troops were daily directed towards Galicia, and the greatest activity was displayed in forming magazines in both these provinces. When questioned concerning these armaments, the cabinet of Vienna returned only evasive answers, alleging the necessity of making their frontiers respected by the numerous armies by which they were surrounded. Napoleon saw well that the Austrians were dissembling, but he concealed his resentment, and merely sent General Andréossi to Vienna to keep a more vigilant eye on the warlike preparations which were going forward.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
90, 91.
Hard. ix.
349, 350.
Thiers, vii.
227.

14.
Napoleon's
strong de-
claration in
favour of
Turkey.

During his stay at Posen, the French Emperor made, on repeated occasions, the strongest professions of his resolution to support the Turks against the invasion of the Russians. To the Prussian plenipotentiaries at Charlottenburg he declared, "That the greatest of all the evils which Prussia has occasioned to France by the late war, is the shock they have given to the independence of the Ottoman Porte; as the imperious commands of the Emperor of Russia have brought back to the government of Wallachia and Moldavia the hospodars, justly banished from their administration; which, in effect, reduces their principalities to the rank of Russian provinces. But the full and complete independence of the Ottoman empire will *ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor*, as it is indispensable for the security of France and Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence. In conformity with these principles, the Emperor is determined that, until the Sultan shall have recovered the full and entire command both of Moldavia

and Wallachia, and is completely *secured in his own independence*, the French troops will not evacuate any part of the countries they have conquered, or which may hereafter fall into their power."¹ The same resolution was publicly announced in the bulletins, when intelligence of the ill-judged invasion of the principalities arrived; and yet, within six months afterwards, though Turkey had faithfully and gallantly stood to the French alliance under circumstances of extreme peril, Napoleon, as will shortly appear, signed a treaty at Tilsit, by which not only were Wallachia and Moldavia ceded to Russia, but provision was made for the partition of the whole Turkish dominions in Europe!

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹ Lucches.
ii. 186, 187.
Thiers, vii.
267.

While this great political question was under discussion, during the fortnight that the Emperor's stay continued at Posen, the army in great force approached the Vistula; but the severity of the weather, and the incessant fatigue of the troops, in the long and dreary marches through that monotonous country at so inclement a season, produced a general feeling of despondency among the soldiers, and gave rise to a fermentation which even Napoleon deemed alarming. To the intoxication consequent on the victory of Jena had succeeded a mortal disquietude, when, immediately after such glorious successes, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged on in the depth of winter to begin a new campaign, amidst pathless snows and gloomy forests. Even the heroic Lannes was so impressed with these difficulties, that he wrote to Napoleon in the strongest terms, advising the cessation of hostilities, and describing the anarchy and confusion which prevailed in Poland, from which no efficient aid could be expected.* In order to dispel these sinister presenti-

15.
His proclamation to his soldiers on the anniversary of Austerlitz.

* "Après le succès de la guerre de Prusse, Lannes aurait voulu qu'on s'arrêtât sur l'Oder, et ne s'était pas imposé la moindre contrainte dans l'expression de cette opinion. Parvenu à Bromberg à la suite d'une marche pénible, il écrivit à Napoleon qu'il venait de parcourir un pays

CHAP.
XLIV.1806.
Dec. 2.

ments, Napoleon took advantage of the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz to address an animating proclamation to his army. "Soldiers! this day year, at this very hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalions fled in terror before you, or, surrounded on all sides, laid down their arms to their conquerors. On the day following they read the words of peace, but they were deceitful. Hardly had they escaped, by the effects of a generosity perhaps blamable, from the disasters of the third coalition, than they set on foot a fourth; but the new ally on whose skilful tactics they placed all their hopes is already destroyed. His strongholds, his capital, his magazines, two hundred and eighty standards, seven hundred field-pieces, five first-rate fortresses, are in our power. The Oder, the Wartha, the deserts of Poland, have been alike unable to restrain your steps. Even the storms of winter have not arrested you an instant; you have braved all, surmounted all. Everything has flown at your approach. In vain have the Russians endeavoured to defend the capital of the ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula: the brave and unfortunate Poles, when they behold you, imagine that they see the soldiers of Sobieski returning from his memorable expedition! Soldiers! we shall not again lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce liberty and its colonies. On the Elbe and the Oder we have conquered Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope,

sablonneux, stérile, sans habitants, comparable, sauf le ciel, au désert qu'on traverse pour aller d'Egypte en Syrie; que le soldat était triste, atteint de la fièvre, ce qui était dû à l'humidité du sol et de la saison; que les Polonais étaient peu disposés à s'insurger, et tremblants sous le joug de leurs maîtres; qu'il ne fallait pas juger de leurs dispositions d'après l'enthousiasme factice de quelques nobles attirés à Posen par l'amour du bruit et de la nouveauté; qu'au fond ils étaient toujours *légers, divisés, anarchiques*, et, qu'en voulant les reconstruire en corps de nation, on épuiserait inutilement le sang de la France pour une œuvre sans solidité et sans durée."—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 267.

and the Spanish colonies. Who has given the Russians right to hope that they can balance the weight of destiny? Who has authorised them to overturn such great designs? Are not they and we the soldiers of Austerlitz?" Even in the forests of Poland, and amidst ice and snow, the thoughts of Napoleon were incessantly fixed on England and the East; and it was to overthrow her power on the banks of the Ganges that a campaign was undertaken in the depth of winter on the shores of the Vistula.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.
1806.

¹ Bign. vi.
75, 76. Bour.
vii. 251, 252.

This proclamation, dictated by a profound knowledge of the French character, produced an extraordinary effect upon the soldiers. It was distributed with profusion over all Germany, and none but an eyewitness could credit the influence which it had in restoring the spirit of the men. The veterans in the front line forgot their fatigues and privations, and thought only of soon terminating the war by a second Austerlitz on the banks of the Vistula; those who were approaching by forced marches in the rear, redoubled their exertions to join their comrades in the more forward stations, and counted the days till they gained sight of the eagles which appeared to be advancing to immortal renown. The better to improve upon these dispositions, and at the same time establish a durable record of the glorious achievements of his troops, Napoleon, by a decree published on the same day, gave orders for the erection of a splendid edifice on the site of the convent of the Madeleine, at the end of the Boulevards Italiens at Paris, with the inscription — "The Emperor Napoleon to the soldiers of the Grand Army." In the interior were to be inscribed, on tablets of marble, the names of all those who had been present in the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; on tablets of gold, the names of all those who had fallen in these memorable conflicts. There also were to be deposited the arms, statues, standards, colours, and monuments of every description, taken during the two campaigns by the Grand Army. Every year a great solemnity was to

16.
Its great
effect. For-
mation of
the Temple
of Glory at
Paris.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹ Bour. vii.
254. Las
Cas. i. 370.
Bign. vi. 77.
Thiers. vii.
213, 214.

commemorate, on the 2d December, the glory of these memorable days; but, in the discourses or odes made on the occasion, no mention was ever to be made of the Emperor: like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, his exploits, it was well known, would only be the more present to the mind from being withdrawn from the sight.¹

17.
Napoleon's
plans for its
construction.

This project took a strong hold of the imagination of Napoleon: he gave immediate orders for the formation of plans for the edifice, and the purchase of all the buildings in the vicinity, in order to form a vast circular *place* of uniform buildings around it; and, as a previous decree had directed the construction of the Bourse or public exchange on that situation, he shortly after directed the minister of the interior to look out for another isolated situation for that structure, "worthy of the grandeur of the capital, and the greatness of the business which will one day be transacted within its walls." The Place which it fronted was to retain its title "de la Concorde," "for that it is," said Napoleon, "which renders France invincible." He was desirous that the monument should be an imitation of the Pantheon, or some other Grecian temple, and constructed entirely of the most durable and costly materials. The interior, in the form of an amphitheatre, was to be arranged with seats of solid marble; iron, bronze, and granite, intermingled with letters of gold, were alone to be employed in the inside. Among the designs presented, he at once fixed on that which has since been adopted for that exquisite structure.* Such

Letter, 7th
March 1807.

* "Je ne veux rien en bois. Les spectateurs doivent être placés, comme je l'ai dit, sur des gradins de marbre formant les amphithéâtres destinés au public.—Rien, dans ce temple, ne doit être mobile et changeant; tout, au contraire, doit y être fixé à sa place.—Il ne faut pas de bois dans la construction de ce temple.—Du granit et du fer, tels doivent être les matériaux de ce monument.—Il faut chercher du granit pour d'autres monuments que j'ordonnerai, et qui, par leur nature, peuvent permettre de donner trente, quarante, ou cinquante ans à leur construction.—J'ai entendu un monument tel qu'il y en avait à Athènes, et qu'il n'y en a pas à Paris. Toutes les sculptures intérieures seront en marbre, et qu'on ne me propose pas des sculptures propres aux salons et aux salles-à-

was the origin of those beautiful edifices, the Church of the Madeleine and the Exchange at Paris; and which, carried on through other reigns, and completed under another dynasty, with that grandeur of conception and perseverance in execution by which the public edifices in Paris are distinguished, will for centuries attract the educated from all countries to Paris, as the centre of modern architectural beauty. To the world, at that time, Napoleon revealed no other design in the structure of the Madeleine than that of a monument to the Grand Army; but, penetrated with the magnitude of the mission with which he was persuaded he was intrusted—that of closing the wounds of the Revolution—he in his secret heart destined for it another and a greater object. He intended to have made it an expiatory monument to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution—a design which he did not propose to declare for ten years, when the fever of revolutionary ideas was in a great measure exhausted;¹ and therefore it was, that he directed its front to face the centre of the Place Louis XV., where those august martyrs had perished, and constructed it on the site of the Madeleine, near which

¹ Thiers, vii.
213, 215.
Bour. vii.
254, 255.
Bign. vi. 77,
78. Las Cas.
i. 370, 371.

manger des femmes des banquiers à Paris. Tout ce qui est futile n'est pas simple et noble; tout ce qui n'est pas de longue durée ne doit pas être employé dans ce monument. Je répète qu'il n'y faut aucune espèce de meubles, pas même des rideaux."—NAPOLEON au Ministre de l'Intérieur, Finkenstein, 30 May 1807; THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*.—Napoleon was endowed with the real soul of an artist; like Michael Angelo, he would have placed another Pantheon in the air. Had fortune not made him the first general, he was qualified to have become the greatest artist of modern times—another proof among the many which history affords of the truth of Johnson's observation, that "genius is nothing but strong natural parts accidentally turned in one direction." Yet, strange mixture of the great and the little in that extraordinary mind, even when engaged with those lofty designs destined to perpetuate glorious deeds to remote ages, he could not forget the senseless jealousies of the moment. His observation as to the sculptures in the salons of the bankers' wives at Paris was a hit at Madame Recamier, the object of his extreme jealousy on account of her beauty, which almost balanced his colossal fame, and whose suite of rooms had been richly ornamented in that style,—another proof of the truth of the same great moralist's observation, "that no one ever raised himself from a private station to great eminence among men, who did not unite commanding qualities to meannesses which would be inconceivable in ordinary men."

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

18.
Vast efforts
of Napoleon
to recruit
his army,
and secure
his flanks
and rear.

their uncoffined remains still lay in an undistinguished grave.*

The commencement of a winter campaign, which would obviously be attended with no ordinary bloodshed, required unusual precautions for the protection of the long line of communication of the Grand Army, and the efforts of Napoleon were incessant to effect this object. The march of troops through Germany was urged forward with all possible rapidity; some attempts at insurrection in Hesse were crushed with great severity; the conscripts, as they arrived from the Rhine or Italy at the different stations in the Prussian states, were organised and sent into the field almost before they had acquired the rudiments of the military art; and the subsidiary contingents of Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and the states of the Rhenish confederacy, raised to double their fixed amount. By these means not only were the rear and communications of the Grand Army preserved from danger, but successive additions to its active force were constantly obtained; while at the same time Austria, whose formidable armaments on the Bohemian frontier already excited the attention of the Emperor, and had given rise to pointed and acrimo-

Napoleon's
secret design
in this edifice.

* "No one but myself," said he, "could restore the memory of Louis XVI., and wash from the nation the crimes with which a few galley-slaves and an unhappy fatality had stained it. The Bourbons being of his family, and resting on external succour, in striving to do so, would have been considered as only avenging their own cause, and have increased the public animosity. I, on the contrary, sprung from the people, would have purified their glory, by expelling from their ranks those who had disgraced them, and such was my intention; but it was necessary to proceed with caution: the three expiatory altars at St Denis were only the commencement; the Temple of Glory on the foundation of the Madeleine was destined to be consecrated to this purpose with a far greater éclat. It was there that, near their tomb, above their very bones, the monuments of men, and the ceremonies of religion, would have raised a memorial to the memory of the political victims of the Revolution. This was a secret which was not communicated to above ten persons; but it was necessary to allow it to transpire in some degree to those who were intrusted with the preparation of designs for the edifice. I would not have revealed the design for ten years, and even then I would have employed every imaginable precaution, and taken care to avoid every possibility of offence. All would have applauded it; and no one could have suffered from its effects. Everything, in such cases, depends on the mode and time of execution. Carnot

nious remonstrances from his military envoy, General Andréossi, to the cabinet of Vienna, was overawed.*

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

19.

Enormous
contribu-
tions levied
on all the
conquered
states.

How to maintain these vast and hourly increasing armaments was a more difficult question; but here, too, the indefatigable activity of the Emperor, and his grinding system of making war support war, contrived to find resources. Requisitions of enormous magnitude were made from all the cities in his rear, especially those which had been enriched by the commerce of England: Napoleon seemed resolved that their ill-gotten wealth should, in the first instance, be devoted to the necessities of his troops. The decrees against English commerce were everywhere made a pretext for subjecting the mercantile cities to contributions of astounding amount. Fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) were, immediately upon its occupation, demanded from Hamburg as a ransom for its English merchandise, seized in virtue of the decree of 21st November; and it only escaped by the immediate payment of sixteen millions, (£640,000.) In addition to this, that unhappy city, which had taken no part in hostilities against France, was ordered to furnish at once fifty thousand greatcoats for the use of the troops; while Lübeck, which had been successively pillaged by the

would never have ventured under my government to write an apology for the death of the King, but he did so under the Bourbons. The difference lay here; that I would have marched with public opinion to punish it, whilst public opinion marched with him, so as to render him unassailable."—LAS CASES, i. 370, 371.

* In an audience of the Emperor of Austria, which that general obtained, he said with more of military frankness than diplomatic ambiguity—"The Emperor Napoleon fears neither his avowed nor his secret enemies. Judging of intentions by public acts, he is too clear-sighted not to dive into hidden dispositions; and in this view, he would infinitely regret if we were compelled to arrive at the conclusion, that the considerable armaments which your Majesty has had on foot since the commencement of hostilities were intended to be directed, in certain events, against himself. Your Majesty appears to have assembled on the flank of the French army all your disposable forces, with magazines beyond all proportion to their amount. The Emperor asks what is the intention of this army while he is engaged with Russia on the banks of the Vistula? Ostensibly intended for the preservation of neutrality, how can such an object be its real destination, when there is not the slightest chance of its being threatened."—BIGNON, vi. 88.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

troops of Blucher and Bernadotte, was compelled to yield up four hundred thousand lasts of corn,* and wood to the value of sixty thousand pounds; Leipsic redeemed its English merchandise for ten million of francs, (£400,000,) while all the other Hanse Towns were subjected to equally severe requisitions; and the great impost of one hundred and sixty-nine millions of francs (£6,800,000,) imposed after the battle of Jena, was everywhere collected from the Prussian territories with a rigour which greatly added to its nominal amount. Under pretext of executing the decree against English commerce, pillage was exercised in so undisguised a manner by the French inferior agents, that it attracted in many places the severe animadversion of the chiefs of the army. Thus, while the decrees of the Emperor professed to be grounded on the great principle of compelling the English government, by the pressure of mercantile embarrassment, to accede to the liberty of the seas, in their execution he had already departed from their ostensible object; and, while the merchandise seized was allowed to remain in the emporiums of British commerce, its confiscation was made a pretext for subjecting neutral states or towns to inordinate requisitions for the support of the Grand Army.^{1†}

¹ Bour. vii. 247, 248.
Bign. vi. 98, 99. Hard.
ix. 371, 382.

20.
Positions
and force of
the French
on the Vis-
tula.

By these different means Napoleon was enabled, before the middle of December, not only to bring a very great force to bear upon the Vistula, but to have the magazines and equipments necessary for enabling it to keep the field, during the rigours of a Polish winter, in a

* Each last weighs 2000 kilogrammes, or about half a ton.—Bour. vii. 249.

† As an example at once of the enormous magnitude of these contributions, and the provident care of the Emperor for the health and comfort of his troops, reference may be made to his letter to the French governor of Stettin, from which contributions to the amount of twenty million francs (£800,000) were demanded, though the city only contained thirty-two thousand inhabitants. "You must seize goods to the amount of twenty millions, but do it by rule, and give receipts. Take payment as much as possible in kind; the great stores of wine which its cellars contain would be of inestimable importance. It is wine which in winter can alone give the victory."—BIGNON, vi. 99.

complete state of preparation. He was particularly solicitous for the increase and remounting of his cavalry, which had suffered extremely during the fatiguing marches of the preceding campaign. Four splendid regiments of cuirassiers, and five of light horse, formed by the sedulous care of Murat, were ordered up from Naples; and an immense establishment for cavalry was organised at Spandau, where all the horses taken from the enemy, and all that could be purchased, were collected, and distributed among the different corps which required them. The army in Italy was put on the war footing, to overawe Austria, and raised to 52,000 men. Fifty thousand more were on their march from the interior for the Grand Army. In all 300,000 men, in Germany, Italy, and Poland, were assembled round the standards of Napoleon, which, after making all deductions, promised to afford 150,000 ready for active service in the field. To make room for this immense force, the front was advanced towards the enemy. Davoust and Murat had entered Warsaw at the end of November, which was abandoned by the Prussians at their approach; and two days afterwards they crossed the Vistula, and occupied the important *tête-de-pont* of Praga on its right bank, which was in like manner evacuated without a struggle. On the right Lannes supported them, and spread himself as far as the Bug; while on the left, Ney had already made himself master of Thorn, and marched out of that fortress, supported by the cavalry of Bessières and followed by the corps of Bernadotte. In the centre, Soult and Augereau were preparing with the utmost activity to surmount the difficulties of the passage of the Vistula at Plock and Modlin. Thus eight corps were assembled, ready for active service, on that river, which, even after taking into view all the losses of the campaign, and the numerous detachments requisite to keep up the communications in the rear, could in all bring a hundred thousand men into the field;¹ while the powerful reinforcements

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

21.
And of the
Russians.

on their march, through Prussia and Poland, promised to enable the Emperor to keep up the active force in front at that great numerical amount.

The Emperor Alexander was far from having an equal force at his disposal. The first army, under Benningsen, consisting of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred and twenty-five squadrons, could muster forty-five thousand men, organised into four divisions, under Ostermann Tolstoy, Sacken, Prince Gallitzin, and Sidmaratski. It arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November. The second, consisting also of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred squadrons, arranged in the divisions of Touchkoff, Doctoroff, Essen, and Aurepp, was about thirty thousand strong, its regiments having not yet filled up the chasms made by the rout of Austerlitz. The wreck of the Prussian forces, re-organised and directed under the able management of General Lestocq, did not number more than fifteen thousand men, when the requisite garrisons for Dantzic and Graudenz were completed from its shattered ranks. Thus the total Allied forces were not above ninety thousand strong, and, for the actual shock of war in the field, not more than seventy-five thousand men could be relied on. This imposing array was under the command of Field-marshal Kamenskoi, a veteran of the school of Suwarroff, nearly eighty years of age, and little qualified to measure swords with the conqueror of Western Europe. But the known abilities of Benningsen and Buxhowden, the two next in command, would, it was hoped, compensate for his want of experience in the novel art of warfare which Napoleon had introduced.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
99, 105.
Jom. ii. 338.
Bign. vi. 109.

22.
Positions of
the troops,
and their
evacuation
of Warsaw:
Alexander's
proclama-
tion to his
soldiers.

Headquarters had been established at Pultusk since the 12th November: Warsaw, all the bridges of the Vistula, were in the hands of the Allies; and the firmness of their countenance gave rise to a belief that they were disposed to dispute the passage of that river with the invaders. Until the arrival of the second army under Buxhowden, however, which was advancing by forced marches from

the Niemen, they were in no condition to keep their ground against the French; and it was deemed better to give them the moral advantage arising from the occupation of the Polish capital, than to hazard a general engagement with so decided an inferiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishes, therefore, the Russians fell back at all points, their advanced posts were all withdrawn across the Vistula, and Warsaw, evacuated on the 28th, was occupied by Davoust on the 30th November. Previous to the opening of the winter campaign, Alexander addressed the following proclamation to his soldiers:—

“ Prussia formerly was the barrier between France and Russia, when Napoleon’s tyranny extended over all Germany. But now the flame of war has burst out also in the Prussian states, and after great misfortunes, that monarchy has been struck down, and the conflagration now menaces the frontiers of our territory. It would be useless to prove to the Russians, who love the glory of their country, and are ready to undergo every sacrifice to maintain it, how such events have contributed to render our present efforts inevitable. If honour alone compelled us to draw our sword for the protection of our allies, how much more are we now called upon to combat for our own safety? We have in consequence taken all the measures which the national security requires—our army has received orders to advance beyond the frontier—Field-marshal Kamenskoi has been appointed to the command, with instructions to march vigorously against the enemy—all our faithful subjects will unite their prayers with ours to the Most High, who disposes of the fate of empires and battles, that he will protect our just cause, and that his victorious arm and blessing may direct the Russian army, employed in the defence of European freedom.”¹

Nov. 30.
¹ Dum. xvii.
 94, 100.
 Jom. ii. 338,
 339. Bign.
 vi. 109, 110.

Sensible of the inferiority of its forces to those which Napoleon had assembled on the Vistula from all the states of Western Europe, the Russian cabinet made an application to the British government for a portion of those

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

23.

Application
for assist-
ance in
money to
England.
Its impoli-
tic refusal.

subsidies which she had so liberally granted on all former occasions to the powers who combated the common enemy of European independence; and, considering that the whole weight of the contest had now fallen on Russia, and the danger had now approached her own frontiers, they demanded, not without reason, a loan of six millions sterling, of which one was to be paid down immediately for the indispensable expenses connected with the opening of the campaign. It was easy to see, however, from the answer to this demand now, that the spirit of Pitt no longer directed the British councils. The request was refused by the ministry on the part of government; but it was proposed that a loan should be contracted for in England for the service of Russia, and that, for the security of the lenders, the duties on English merchandise, at present levied in the Russian harbours, should be repealed, and in lieu thereof, the same duties should be levied at once in the British harbours, and applied to the payment of the interest of the loan to the British capitalists. This strange proposition, which amounted to a declaration of want of confidence, both in the integrity of the Russian government and the solvency of the Russian finances, was of course rejected, and the result was, that *no assistance, either in men or money, was afforded by England to her gallant ally in this vital struggle*. An instance of parsimony and blindness beyond all example calamitous and discreditable, when it is considered that Russia was at that moment bearing the whole weight of France on the Vistula, and that England had at her disposal twenty millions in subsidies, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers in Europe.¹

¹ Hard. ix.
399, 400.
Bign. vi.
107, 108.
Letter to
Marquis
Douglas.
Jan. 13,
1807.

24.

The Rus-
sians assume
the offen-
sive.

Dec. 11.

No sooner had the advanced guards of Buxhowden's army begun to arrive in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, than Kamenskoi, whose great age had by no means extinguished the vigour by which he was formerly distinguished, made a forward movement. Headquarters were advanced to Nasielsk, and the four divisions of Benningsen's army

cantoned between the Ukra, the Narew, and the Bug ; while Buxhowden's divisions, as they successively arrived, were stationed between Golymin and Makow ; and Les-tocq, on the extreme right of the Allies, encamped on the banks of the Drewentz, on the great road leading to Thorn, was advanced almost up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this general advance was to circumscribe the French quarters on the right bank of the Vistula ; and as it was known that Napoleon with his Guards was still at Posen, hopes were entertained that his troops would be entirely driven from the right bank before his arrival, and the river interposed between the winter quarters of the two armies.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

¹ Dum. xvii.
121, 125.
Jom. ii. 339.
Bign. vi.
110.

No sooner did Napoleon hear of this forward movement of the Russians, than he broke up from his quarters at Posen on 16th December, and arrived at Warsaw two days afterwards. No words can do justice to the warlike and patriotic enthusiasm which burst forth in that capital when they beheld the hero whom they hailed as their deliverer actually within their walls, and saw the ancient arms of Poland affixed to the door of the hotel where the provisional government of Prussian Poland was established. The nobility flocked into the capital from all quarters ; the peasantry everywhere assembled in the cities, demanding arms ; the national dress was generally resumed ; national airs were universally heard ; several regiments of horse were speedily raised, and before the conclusion of the campaign, thirty thousand men were enrolled in disciplined regiments, from the Prussian provinces alone of the ancient monarchy. To secure for themselves the powerful support of the French Emperor, the Polish leaders were desirous not only that the entire Sarmatian nation should be restored, but that a prince of his own family should be placed on its throne. With this view they suggested Murat, the Emperor's brother-in-law, whose great reputation, especially as a cavalry officer, and his chivalrous character, seemed to point him out as pecu-

25.
Napoleon
advances
to Warsaw.
General en-
thusiasm
there.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

liarily adapted for a nation whose nobles had boasted, in the days of their glory, that if the heaven itself were to fall, they would support it on the points of their lances. But Napoleon knew both the Poles and Murat too well to go into any such proposal. "I have not here," said he, "to beg a throne for my family—I have thrones enough to bestow without asking. Tell the Poles it is not by means of precautions, and personal calculations, that nations are delivered from a foreign yoke. I have come here for the general interest of Europe, to engage in one of the most difficult of enterprises, from which the Poles have more to gain than any other people. Their national existence is at stake, and not merely the general interests of Europe. If by unbounded devotion they second me sufficiently to secure success, I will award to them their independence. If not, I will do nothing, and leave them to the Russians and Prussians." The general enthusiasm did not make Napoleon forget his policy: the provisional government was established by a decree of the Emperor, only "until the fate of *Prussian Poland* was determined by a general peace;" and the prudent began to entertain melancholy presages in regard to the future destiny of a realm thus agitated by the passion of independence, and the generous sentiments of patriotic ardour, with only a quarter of its former inhabitants to maintain the struggle against its numerous and formidable enemies.¹

Jan. 1,
1807.

¹ Bign. vi.
92. Camp.
de Saxe, iii.
178, 179.
Thiers, vii.
276, 279.

26.
And re-
sumes the
offensive
against the
Russians.

Having taken the precaution to establish strong *têtes-de-pont* at Praga the outwork of Warsaw, Modlin, Thorn, and all the bridges which he held over the Vistula, Napoleon lost not an instant in resuming the offensive in order to repel this dangerous incursion of the enemy. Davoust, who formed the advanced guard of the army, was pushed forward from Praga on the road towards Pultusk, and soon arrived on the Bug; and, after having reconnoitred the whole left bank of that river, from its confluence with the Narew to its junction with the Vistula, made prepara-

CHAP.
XLIV.1806.
Dec. 11.

Dec. 12.

Dec. 21.
Dec. 22.
1 Jom. ii.
339. Dum.
xvii. 126,
128. Wil-
son, 73, 74.27.
Forcing of
the passage
of the Ukra
by the
French.

tions for effecting the passage at Okernin, a little below the junction with the Ukra. The Cossacks and the Russian outposts lined the opposite bank, and the difficulties of the passage were considerable; but they were not in sufficient force to dispute it in a serious manner; and after some sharp skirmishing, the experienced talents of General Gauthier, who was intrusted with the enterprise, established the French on the right bank, where they soon after sustained a severe action with the Russian advanced guard at Pomichowo. The Muscovites, however, returned in greater force; and the result was, that the French advanced guards were cut off, and the detachment to which they belonged fell back to the *tête-de-pont* established at the river. Meanwhile Soult and Augereau in the centre advanced to Plonsk, and Ney and Bernadotte, with Bessières' cavalry, moved forward on the left from Thorn to Soldau and Biezun, in such a manner as to threaten to interpose between the detached corps under Lestocq and Benningsen's main body, which was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Nasielsk.¹

This partisan warfare continued for ten days without any decisive result on either side; but the arrival of Napoleon at Warsaw was the signal for the commencement of more important operations. On the 23d December, at daybreak, he set out from that capital for the army, with the Guards and Lannes' corps, and no sooner arrived at the advanced posts of Davoust, than he dictated on the spot directions for forcing the passage of the Ukra, which had hitherto bounded all their incursions.* The opera-

* "Napoleon," says Rapp, "no sooner arrived in sight of Okernin, than he reconnoitred the position of the Russians, and the plain which it was necessary to pass before arriving at the river. Covered with woods, intersected by marshes, it was almost as difficult to traverse as the fieldworks, which were bristling with Cossacks, were to carry on the opposite bank. The Emperor surveyed them long and with close attention; but as the thickets of wood in some places intercepted his view, he caused a ladder to be brought, and ascended to the roof of a cottage where he completed his observations. He then said, 'It will do—send an officer,' and when he arrived, dictated on the spot the minute directions for the movement of all the corps during the operation, which are preserved in Dumas, xvii. 137."—RAPP, 125.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

Dec. 24.

tion was carried into effect with the happiest success at Czarnovo, and with that ardour with which the presence of the Emperor never failed to animate the troops. After a severe action of fourteen hours, the passage was forced, and Count Ostermann, who commanded the Russian rear-guard, retreated upon Nasielsk. In this well-contested affair each party had to lament the loss of about a thousand men. Kamenskoi, finding the barrier which covered the front of his position forced, gave orders for concentrating his forces towards Pultusk on the Narew, and the Allies accordingly fell back at all points. They were vigorously pursued by the French, and another desperate conflict took place next day in front of Nasielsk, between General Rapp and the Russians under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, in which the latter were worsted, but not without a severe loss to the assailants. In this warm conflict the opposite bodies had become so intermingled that Colonel Ouvaroff, an aide-de-camp of Alexander, was made prisoner by the French; while Count Philippe de Ségur, destined for future celebrity as the historian of the still more memorable campaign of 1812, and attached to Napoleon's household, fell into the hands of the Russians. On the same day Augereau fought from daybreak till sunset at Lochoczyn on the Ukra, with the divisions opposed to him, which at length began to retire. Thus the Russians, pierced in the centre by the passage of the Ukra at Czarnovo and Lochoczyn, and the combat at Nasielsk, were everywhere in full retreat. No decisive advantage had been gained; but the initiative had been taken from the enemy, and his divisions, separated from each other, were thrown into eccentric lines of retreat, which promised every moment to separate them more widely from each other.¹

¹ Wilson,
75, 76. *Jom.*
ii. 340.
Dum. xvii.
140, 153.

Kamenskoi, though a gallant veteran, was altogether unequal to the perilous crisis which had now arrived. The army, separated into two parts, of which one was moving upon Golymin, the other falling back towards

Pultusk, was traversing a continual forest, through roads almost impassable from the mud occasioned by a long-continued thaw, and the passage of innumerable carriages, which had broken it up in all parts. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, he issued orders to sacrifice the artillery, which impeded the retreat—gave directions to arrest the supplies destined for the army at Grodno, and himself took the road of Lomza. Deeming such an order wholly unnecessary, and the result of that approaching insanity which soon after entirely overset the mind of the veteran marshal, Benningsen took the bold step of disobeying it; and, in order to gain time for the artillery and equipages to defile in his rear, he resolved to hold fast in the position of PULTUSK, with all the troops which he had at his disposal. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Russians, to whom the fatigues and privations of a retreat, at a season when sixteen hours out of the twenty-four were involved in total darkness, and the roads, bad at all times, were in many places several feet deep of mud, had been the severest trial of discipline and courage. No sooner, however, was it known that they were marching towards a chosen field of battle, than their hardships and difficulties were all forgotten, and the troops which, from mid-day on the 25th, successively arrived at Pultusk, took up their ground in parade order, full of enthusiasm for the battle on the morrow. Before it was dark, sixty battalions and fifty-five squadrons, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, in all about forty thousand men, were here assembled; while the division of Doctoroff, with part of those of Sacken and Gallitzin, were opposed at GOLYMIN to Augereau's corps, one division of Davoust's, and one of Murat's cavalry. Three Russian divisions, viz. those of Essen, Aurepp, and Touchkoff, were at such a distance in the rear, both of Pultusk and Golymin, that they could not be expected to take any part in the actions which were approaching.¹

The object of Napoleon in these complicated operations

¹ Wilson,
77, 80. *Jom.*
ii. 341.
Dum. xvii.
159, 162.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

29.

Object of
Napoleon
in these
movements.

was in the highest degree important ; and the vigour of Benningsen and Prince Gallitzin, joined to the extreme shortness of the days and the horrible state of the roads, alone saved the Allies from a repetition of the disasters of Auerstadt and Jena. His right wing, under Lannes, was intended to cut Benningsen's army off from the great road through Pultusk ; his centre, under Davoust, Augereau, Soult, and Murat, was destined to penetrate by Golymin and Makow to Ostrolenka, directly in the rear of that town, and two marches between Benningsen and the Russian frontier ; while the left wing, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, was to interpose between Lestocq and the Russian centre, and throw him back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven up to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blucher, to surrender. A more masterly project never was conceived ; it was almost a repetition of the semicircular march of the Grand Army round Mack at Ulm ; and the hesitation of Kamenskoi between an advance and a retrograde movement, served to offer every facility for the success of the enterprise. The celerity of the Russian retreat, the sacrifice of seventy pieces of their heavy artillery, the dreadful state of the roads, which impeded the French advance, and the impervious intervening country, which separated their numerous corps from each other, alone defeated this profound combination, and prevented the arrival at Pultusk and Golymin, before the enemy, the corps which were there destined to fall upon their retreating columns, or bar the road to the frontiers of Russia.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
340, 341.
Dum. xvii.
162, 164.

30.

Description
of the field
at Pultusk,
and of the
positions of
the two hos-
tile armies.

The position of Pultusk is the only one in that country where the ground is so far cleared of wood as to permit of any considerable armies combating each other in a proper field of battle. An open and cultivated plain on this side of the river Narew, there stretches out to the south and east of that town, which lies on the banks of

its meandering stream. A succession of thickets surround this open space in all directions, excepting that on which the town lies ; and on the inside of them the ground rises to a semicircular ridge, from whence it gradually slopes down towards the town on one side, and the forest on the other ; so that it is impossible, till this barrier is surmounted, to get a glimpse even of the buildings. There the Russians were drawn up in admirable order in two lines—their left resting on the town of Pultusk, their right on the wood of Moszyn, which skirted the little plain, the artillery in advance ; but a cloud of Cossacks swarmed in front of the array, and prevented either the force or composition of the enemy from being seen by the French as they advanced to the attack. Sacken had the command of the left ; Count Ostermann Tolstoy of the right ; Barclay de Tolly, with twelve battalions and ten squadrons, occupied a copsewood in front of the right ; while Bagavout, with twenty battalions and ten squadrons, was placed in front of the left, covering the town of Pultusk : Benningsen was stationed in the centre ;—names destined to immortal celebrity in future wars, and which, even at this distant period, the historian can hardly enumerate without a feeling of exultation and the thrilling interest of former days.¹

Lannes, with his own corps, and the division Gudin from that of Davoust—in all about thirty-five thousand men—resolved to force the enemy in this position, and for this purpose he, early on the morning of the 26th, advanced to the attack. The woods which skirted the little plain, occupied by the Russian light troops, in front of their position, were forced by the French voltigeurs after an obstinate resistance, and a battery which galled their advance, and which could not be withdrawn, was carried by assault. No sooner, however, had the French general, encouraged by this success, surmounted the crest of the ridge, and advanced into the open plain, than the cloud of Cossacks dispersed to the right and left, and

¹ Wilson,
77, 78. Jom.
ii. 341.
Dum. xvii.
162, 165.

31.
Battle of
Pultusk.
Dec. 26.
Atlas.
Plato 42.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

exposed to view the Russian army drawn up in two lines, in admirable order, with a hundred and twenty guns disposed along its front. Astonished, but not panic-struck by so formidable an apparition, Lannes still continued to press forward, and as his divisions successively cleared the thickets, and advanced to the crest of the hill, they deployed into line. This operation, performed under the fire of all the Russian cannon, to which the French had as yet none of equal weight to oppose, was executed with admirable discipline, but attended with a very heavy loss, and the ground was already strewed with dead bodies when the line was so far formed as to enable a general charge to take place. It was attended, however, with very little success. The soil, cut up by the passage of so many horses and carriages, was in many places knee-deep of mud; heavy snow-showers at intervals obscured the heavens, and deprived the French gunners of the sight of the enemy; while the Russian batteries, in position and served with admirable skill, alike in light and darkness sent their fatal storm of grape and round-shot through the ranks of the assailants. Notwithstanding these obstacles, however, the French advanced with their wonted intrepidity to the attack, and gradually the arrival of their successive batteries rendered the fire of cannon on the opposite sides more equal. Suchet, who commanded the first line, insensibly gained ground, especially on the French right, where the division of Bagavout was stationed; but Benningsen, seeing the danger, reinforced that gallant officer with fresh troops: a battalion of the French infantry was broken and cut to pieces by the Russian horse, and the rout in that quarter became so serious that Lannes was compelled to advance in person, with his reserve, to repair the disorder. By his efforts the forward movement of the Russians in that direction was arrested, and their victorious columns, charged in flank, while disordered by the rapidity of their advance, were forced to give ground, and resume their former position in front of Pultusk.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
164, 168.
Jom. ii. 342.
Wilson, 79,
80. Rapp,
127.

Meanwhile another of Suchet's columns, on the left of the French, had commenced a furious attack on the advanced post in the wood on the right of the Russians, occupied by Barclay de Tolly. After a violent struggle the Russians were driven back; reinforced from the town, they again regained their ground, and drove the French out of the wood in disorder. Lannes, at the head of the 34th regiment, flew to the menaced point, and again in some degree restored the combat: but Barclay had regained his lost position and menaced the French extreme left. At this time, Gudin's division of Davoust's corps, coming up, began an unexpected attack on the Russian right; Ostermann Tolstoy upon this brought up the Russian reserve, and after a murderous conflict, which lasted till long after it was dark, a frightful storm separated the combatants. Neither party could boast of decisive success; but the Russians remained masters of the field of battle till midnight, when they crossed the Narew by the bridge of Pultusk, and resumed their retreat in the most orderly manner; while the French also retreated to such a distance that next day the Cossacks, who patrolled eight miles from the field of battle towards Warsaw, could discover no traces of the enemy. The losses were severe on both sides: on that of the French they amounted to six thousand men; on that of the Russians to nearly five thousand; and the twelve guns which they lost in the morning were never regained.¹

On the same day on which this bloody battle took place at Pultusk, a serious conflict also occurred at Golymin, about thirty miles from the former field of battle. Davoust and Augereau, supported by a large party of Murat's cavalry, there attacked Prince Gallitzin, who, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, had taken post at the entrance of the town, to gain time for his artillery and carriages to defile through the forest in his rear. His force was successively augmented, however, in the course of the day, by the arrival of other troops from

CHAP.

XLIV.

1806.

32.

Which turns out to the disadvantage of the French.

¹ Wilson, 79, 80. *Jorn.* ii. 341, 342. *Dum.* xvii. 168, 174.

33.

Combat of Golymin.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

Dec. 24.

Dec. 26.

Sacken's and Doctoroff's corps, and before nightfall twenty-eight battalions and forty squadrons were assembled in line. Operations in that quarter had begun at daylight on the 24th, which in that inclement season was at eight in the morning; the bridge of Kollosump, over the Ukra, was carried by a brilliant charge by Colonel Savary; but that of Lochoczyn resisted all the efforts of the French, and it was only when it became no longer tenable, from the number who had crossed at Kollosump, that orders for the evacuation of the post were given. Continuing his march all the succeeding day, Augereau found himself, on the morning of the 26th, in presence of Prince Gallitzin, who was advantageously posted on the right of Golymin. As the French battalions and squadrons successively arrived on the ground, and deployed to the right and left, they were severely galled by the Russian artillery stationed in front of their positions; but they bravely formed line, and advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the attack, though few of their guns could as yet be brought up to reply to the enemy. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the assault was impetuous, and, despite all their efforts, the French, after several hours' hard fighting, had not gained any ground from the enemy. But while this severe conflict was going on in front, a division of Murat's cavalry, advancing on the road from Czarnovo,* was discerned driving before it a body of Cossacks who had been stationed in that village; while a powerful mass of Davoust's infantry, which had broken up that morning from Stretzegoczyn, joined the horse in front of Czarnovo, and their united mass, above fifteen thousand strong, bore down upon the troops of Gallitzin, already wearied by a severe combat of several hours' duration.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
176, 182.
Wilson, 82.
Jom. ii. 342.
Rapp, 127.

This great addition to the attacking force must have proved altogether fatal to the Russian troops, had they not shortly after received considerable reinforcements

* A village on the road from Lochoczyn to Golymin, about a league distant from the latter town.

from the corps of Doctoroff and Touchkoff, which in some degree restored the equality of the combat. Davoust, with the divisions Morand and Friant, so well known from their heroic conduct on the plateau of Auerstadt, charged vehemently through the woods which skirted the open space in front of Golymin; throwing off their haversacks, the Russian infantry met them with the bayonet; but after repulsing the French advance, they were themselves arrested by the murderous fire of the tirailleurs in the wood. Nearly encircled, however, by hourly increasing enemies, Prince Gallitzin withdrew his troops towards evening into the village, but there maintained himself with heroic constancy till nightfall, vigorously repulsing the repeated attacks of the conquerors of Jena and Auerstadt. Davoust, after occupying all the woods around the town, detached a brigade of horse to cut off the communication by the great road with Pultusk; and they succeeded in clearing the causeway of the Cossacks and light horse who were posted on it. But the French dragoons, following up their success, were assailed by so murderous a fire from the Russian voltigeurs, standing up to the middle in the marshes on either side of the road, that half their number were slain; General Rapp, while bravely heading the column, had his left arm broken, and the discomfited remnant sought refuge behind the ranks of their infantry. When night closed on this scene of blood, neither party had gained any decisive advantage; for if the French had taken twenty-six pieces of cannon, and a large train of carriages which had stuck fast in the mud, the Russians still held the town of Golymin, and had inflicted upon them a loss of above four thousand men,^{1*} while they had not to lament the destruction of more than half the number, in consequence chiefly of their great

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

34.
Its doubtful issue.¹ Rapp, 127,
128. Dum.
xvii. 183,
185.

* The 47th Bulletin admits a loss of 800 killed and 2000 wounded on the part of the French at Golymin and Pultusk; and as their usual practice was to allow only a loss of a third to a fourth of its real amount, this would seem to imply that they lost on these occasions at least 10,000 or 12,000 men.—See 47th Bulletin in *Camp. en Prusse*, iii. 222.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

superiority in artillery to their assailants. As the order for retreat still held good, Prince Gallitzin, at midnight, resumed his march for Ostrolenka.

35.
Napoleon
stops his
advance,
and puts
his army
into winter
quarters.
Dec. 19
and 24.

Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance thus experienced by his lieutenants on both the roads on which his corps were advancing, and the unsatisfactory issue of the combats in which they had been engaged, Napoleon was still not without hopes of effecting the grand object of his designs—the isolating and surrounding the enemy's centre or left wing. On the extreme left of the French, Bernadotte and Ney had succeeded, after several severe actions, particularly one at Soldau, which was taken and retaken several times, and where the Prussians behaved with the most heroic resolution, in interposing between Lestocq and the Russian forces on the Ukra, and throwing the Prussian general back towards Königsberg. If Soult could have effected the movement on Makow which was prescribed to him, he would have been directly in the rear of the troops who had combated at Pultusk and Golymin, who must have been reduced to the necessity of laying down their arms, or cutting their way through against great odds. But the frightful state of the roads, which in many places were three feet deep of mud, and the rudeness of the season, which alternately deluged the marching columns with drenching rain, driving sleet, and melting snow, rendered it totally impossible for that enterprising officer to effect the forced marches necessary to outstrip and get into the rear of the enemy; and the Russians, retiring to Ostrolenka and Hohenstein, still found the line of their retreat open. On the 28th, Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Golymin; but having there received certain intelligence that the Russians must arrive at Makow before Soult could possibly get thither, he saw the object of the campaign was frustrated, and resolved to put his men into winter quarters. On that day, accordingly, he issued orders to stop the advance of the troops at all points;¹ they were put into cantonments

Dec. 28.

¹ Dum. xvii.
185, 191.
Jom. ii. 342,
343. Wil-
son, 82, 83.

between the Narew and the Ukra, and the Emperor himself returned with the Guards to Warsaw.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

36.

The Russians also go into winter quarters.

On the side of the Russians, repose had become nearly as necessary; the weather was as unfavourable to them as to the French. Their infantry, equally with the enemy's, had shivered up to the knees in mud at Pultusk; their cavalry, equally with his, sank in the marshes of Golymin: the breaking up of the roads was more fatal to them than their opponents, as the guns or chariots, which were abandoned, necessarily fell into hostile hands; and experience had already begun to evince, what more extended observation has since abundantly confirmed,¹ that exposure to an inclement season was more fatal to the troops of the north than those of the south of Europe. In these circumstances it was with the most lively satisfaction that they perceived that Napoleon was disposed to discontinue the contest during the remainder of the rigorous season; and their troops, retiring from the theatre of this bloody strife, were put into cantonments on the left bank of the Narew, after having evacuated the town and burned the bridge of Ostrolenka.²

¹ Larrey's Surgical Campaign. *Infra*, c. lxxiii. § 78.

² Dum. xvii. 191, 194. *Jom.* ii. 344.

This desperate struggle in the forests of Poland in the depth of winter made the most lively impression in Europe. Independent of the interest excited by the extraordinary spectacle of two vast armies, numbering between them a hundred and fifty thousand combatants, prolonging their hostility in the most inclement season, and engaging in desperate conflicts amidst storms of snow, and when the soldiers on both sides were often sunk up to the middle in morasses, bivouacking for sixteen hours together without covering on the cold damp ground, or plunging fearlessly into streams swollen by the rains and charged with the ice of a Polish winter, there was something singularly calculated to awaken the passions in the result of this fearful contest. Both parties loudly claimed the victory: *Te Deum* was sung at St Petersburg; the cannon of the Invalides roared at Paris; and

37.

Results of this winter campaign, and impression which it produces in Europe.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

Benningien, imitating in his official despatches the exaggerated accounts of the French bulletins, asserted a complete victory at Pultusk, under circumstances where a more faithful chronicler would only have laid claim to the honour of a divided combat. The French indignantly repelled the aspersion on their arms, and pointed with decisive effect to the cantonments of their troops, for evidence that the general result of the struggle had been favourable to their arms. But though there was no denying this, when the Russian troops, instead of having their advanced posts between the Ukra and the Vistula, had now retired behind the Narew at Ostrolenka, still enough was apparent on the face of the campaign to excite the most vivid hopes on the one side, and serious apprehensions on the other, throughout Europe. It was not to win merely eighty miles of forest, interspersed with the wretched hamlets or squalid towns of Poland, that the Emperor had left Warsaw at the dead of winter, and put so vast an army in motion over a line thirty leagues in length. There was no claiming of the victory on both sides at Austerlitz or Jena; the divided trophies of the late engagements indicated a struggle of a very different character from those which had preceded them; it was evident that the torrent of French conquest, if not permanently stemmed, had at least been checked. The interest excited by these events, accordingly, was intense over all the Continent, and still more so in England; and hopes began to be entertained that the obstinate valour of the north would at length arrest the calamities which had so long desolated Europe. Happy would it have been if the cabinets of Vienna and St James's had improved on these dispositions, and taken advantage of the pause in the career of universal conquest, to render effectual aid to the powers who now threw the last die for the independence of Europe on the shores of the Vistula. But recent calamities had prostrated the strength of the Austrian monarchy, and shaken the nerves of its rulers; and

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

the administration of affairs in Great Britain had fallen into the hands of a party whose minds had been so perverted by long and impassioned opposition to Mr Pitt's policy, that they could not see that the time had now arrived when it was loudly called for, and might be followed out with a certainty of success. Hence the opportunity of decisive interposition was allowed to pass over without anything being done by either power; and to Austria was bequeathed, in consequence, the overthrow of Wagram—to England, the costly and bloody efforts of the Peninsular campaigns.¹

¹ Wilson,
82, 83.
Dum. 206.

The French army, which was now put into winter quarters, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, including forty thousand horse: so wonderfully had the levies in France and the allied states compensated the consumption of human life during the bloody battles and wasteful marches which had occurred since they arrived on the banks of the Saale. The cantonments, from the extreme right to left, extended over a space of fifty leagues, forming beyond the Vistula the chord of the arc which that river describes in its course from Warsaw to Dantzic. The left wing, under Bernadotte, was, from its position, most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; but no apprehensions were entertained of its being disquieted, as that marshal, whose rallying point was Osterode, could speedily receive succour, in case of need, from Marshal Ney, who lay next to his right, and would thus have fifty-five thousand men under his command. The centre and right wing, nearly a hundred thousand strong, were almost detached from the left wing, and lay more closely together on either side of Warsaw. To provide subsistence for so great a multitude amidst the forests and marshes of Poland was no easy matter; for its fertile plains, though the granary of Western Europe,² raise their admirable wheat crops only for exportation, and present, in proportion to their extent of level surface, fewer resources for an army than

33.
Positions of
the French
army in
winter quar-
ters.

² Dum. xvii.
198, 208.
Jom. ii.
344.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

any country in Europe. But it was in such subordinate though necessary cares, that the admirable organisation and indefatigable activity of the Emperor shone most conspicuous.

39.
Napoleon's
measures
to provide
supplies and
secure his
canton-
ments.

Innumerable orders, which for a long time back had periodically issued from headquarters, had brought all the resources of Germany to the supply of the army in Poland. Convoys from all quarters were incessantly converging towards the Vistula, and supplies of every sort, not only for the maintenance of the soldiers, but for the sick and wounded, as well as the munitions of war, transported in many thousand carriages, were brought up from the Rhine and the Danube in abundance. So great was the activity in the rear of the army, that the roads through Prussia bore rather the appearance of a country enriched by the extended commerce of a profound peace, than of a district lately ravaged by the scourge of war. Great hospitals were established at Thorn, Posen, and Warsaw; thirty thousand tents, taken from the Prussians, were cut down into bandages for the use of the wounded; immense magazines formed all along the Vistula, and formidable intrenchments erected to protect the *têtes-de-pont* of Praga, Thorn, and Modlin on the Vistula, and Sierock on the Narew. Though the blockade of Dantzic was not yet formally commenced, yet it was necessary to neutralise the advantages which the enemy derived from the possession of so important a fortress on the right of their line; and for this purpose a French division, united to the contingent of Baden and the Polish levies, was formed into the tenth corps, and placed under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. It soon amounted to twenty-seven thousand men, and began to observe the fortresses of Dantzic and Colberg; while Napoleon evinced his sense of the dubious nature of the struggle in which he was engaged, by sending for his experienced lieutenant, Massena, from the scene of his easy triumphs amidst the sunny hills of Calabria, to a sterner conflict on the frozen fields of Poland.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
345. Dum.
xvii. 205,
208. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
3.

The repose of the army at Warsaw was no period of rest to the Emperor. Great care was taken to keep alive the spirits of the Poles, and conceal from them the dubious issue of the late conflict; and for this purpose it was announced that almost all the prisoners taken from the Russians had either been marched off for France, or already entered the ranks of the Grand Army; while the eighty pieces of cannon, which they had been forced to leave behind them in their retreat, were ostentatiously placed before the palace of the republic. Orders were at the same time sent to Jerome to press the siege of the fortresses in Silesia which still remained in the hands of the Prussians. The pusillanimous and unaccountable surrenders of Stettin and Cüstrin have already been mentioned;* and in the consequences which immediately flowed from those disgraceful derelictions of duty, was soon made manifest of what vast importance it is that all officers, even in commands apparently not very considerable, should, under all circumstances, adhere to the simple line of duty, instead of entering into capitulations from the supposed pressure of political considerations. The transport of artillery and a siege equipage from the Rhine or the Elbe to the Oder would have taken a very long period, and prolonged the reduction of the interior line of the Prussian fortresses; but the surrender of Cüstrin to the summons of a regiment of infantry and two pieces of cannon, enabled Vandamme speedily to surround Glogau with a formidable battering-train, which, before the first parallel was completed, induced its feeble governor to lower his colours.¹

From the vast military stores captured in that town, a battering-train for the reduction of Breslau was immediately obtained, and forwarded along the Oder with such rapidity that, on the 15th December, the trenches before that place, the capital of Silesia, *à cheval* on the Oder, and a fortress of the first order, were opened, and a heavy

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

40.

Reduction
of the for-
tresses in
Silesia.Atlas.
Plate 34.

Dec. 2.

¹ Dum. xvii.
217, 220.
Jom. ii. 220.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 22.

41.

Siege and
fall of
Breslau.
Dec. 15.

* Ante, Chap. XLIII. § 71.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

Dec. 31.

¹ Dum. xvii.
214, 223.
Jom. ii. 250.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 22.

42.
Capture of
Brieg and
Schweid-
nitz, and
total con-
quest of
Silesia.

Jan. 17.

bombardment kept up upon the town. The defence, however, was somewhat more creditable to the Prussian character, and proved of what inestimable importance it would have been to the monarchy had the French arms been in like manner delayed before the walls of the other fortresses. Twice during its continuance Prince Anhalt, who with a few battalions and a levy of peasants still maintained himself in Upper Silesia, approached the besiegers' lines, and endeavoured to throw succours into the town; but on the first occasion his efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the French and Bavarians, who formed the covering force; and in the last attack he was totally defeated, with the loss of two thousand men. Soon after, a severe frost deprived Breslau of the protection of the wet ditches, and the governor, despairing of being relieved, and seeing the besiegers' succours rapidly and hourly augmenting by the arrival of military stores from Glogau, surrendered with the garrison of six thousand men; the private men being prisoners of war, the officers dismissed on their parole not to serve against France till exchanged. By this acquisition, three hundred pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of all sorts fell into the hands of the conquerors.¹

This great achievement made the reduction of the other fortresses in Silesia a matter of comparative ease, by furnishing, close at hand, all the resources necessary for their reduction. They were almost forgotten, accordingly, and fell without being observed into the hands of the invaders. Brieg surrendered almost as soon as it was invested. Kosel was taken in silence, after a siege of a few days. Napoleon, delighted with these acquisitions, which entirely secured the right flank of his army, and were of the greater importance from the menacing aspect of the force which Austria was collecting on the Bohemian frontier, named Jerome Buonaparte governor of the province of Silesia; and after having drawn all the resources out of its rich cities and powerful fortresses

which they were capable of yielding, for the prosecution of operations against Dantzic and the strongholds on the Lower Vistula, despatched Vandamme, with twelve thousand men, to besiege Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Glatz, the only remaining towns in the upper province which still hoisted the Prussian colours.* The reduction of these strong fortresses, which had been the object of several campaigns to the Great Frederick, did not take place for some months afterwards, and was hardly noticed by Europe amidst the whirl of more important events on the Lower Vistula.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.
1806.

¹ Dum. xvii.
95, 101.
Jom. ii.
251.

The task of reducing the fortified towns on the Lower Oder, and between that and the Vistula, was allotted to Marshal Mortier. He took a position, in the middle of December, at Anclam; and, upon his approach, the Swedish forces retired to Stralsund. While in this station he drew his posts round Colberg, and several skirmishes occurred with the Prussian garrison of that place. Matters remained in that situation till the end of January, when the blockade of that fortress was more closely established, which continued till the conclusion of the campaign. More important operations took place at Dantzic and Graudenz, the siege of both which places was much facilitated by the great military stores taken in the towns of Silesia. They were brought down the Oder to near its mouth, and thence transported by land to the neighbourhood of these fortresses;² and with such vigour did Marshal Lefebvre push forward the operations,

43.
Operations
on the left
towards
Pomerania
and Dant-
zic.

² Dum. xvii.
223, 237.
Jom. ii. 387.

* As fast as these fortresses in Silesia fell into the hands of Napoleon, they were by his orders totally dismantled, and their fortifications razed to the ground. Their inhabitants were seized with consternation when they beheld these rigorous orders carried into full execution, and anticipated a total separation from the Prussian monarchy, to which they were much attached, from so complete a destruction of the barrier raised with so much care, both against Austria and Russia. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the determination of the French Emperor to reduce Prussia to the rank of a third-rate power; but the policy, with reference to the future interests both of France and Germany, of destroying the chief barrier of both against Muscovite aggression, was extremely doubtful.—See MONTVERAN, *Hist. Const. de la Situat. de l'Angleterre en 1816*, 147; and DUMAS, xvii. 99, 100.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1806.

especially against the former of these towns, that before the end of January considerable progress had been made in the works.

44.
Operations
of Marmont
in Illyria.

On the return of Napoleon to Warsaw, he received detailed accounts of the operations of Marmont in Illyria since the commencement of hostilities in October. For a long period, and during the time when it was understood that a negotiation was on foot between the two governments, a sort of tacit suspension of arms existed between the French marshal and the Russians; but when it was distinctly ascertained that hostilities had been resumed, the flames of war extended to the smiling shores of the Adriatic sea. The Muscovites, strengthened by the arrival of Admiral Siniavin with a powerful squadron, resumed the offensive, and compelled Marmont to abandon the point of Ostro, and fall back on Old Ragusa, where he fortified himself in a strong position in front of the town, and resolved to await the arrival of his flotilla and reinforcements. Encouraged by this retrograde movement, the Russians, six thousand strong, supported by some thousand Montenegrins, advanced to the attack; but they were anticipated by the French general; and after a sharp action, the new levies were dispersed, and the regular troops compelled to take refuge within the walls of Castel Nuovo, after sustaining a loss of six hundred men.¹

Sept. 29.

Sept. 30.
¹ Dum. xvii.
240, 256.

45.
Napoleon's
efforts to
stimulate
the Turks
to vigorous
resistance.

At the same period, a courier from Constantinople brought intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia. This was an event of the very highest importance, promising, as it did, to effect so powerful a diversion in the Russian forces; and Napoleon therefore resolved to improve to the uttermost so auspicious a change by contracting the closest alliance with the Turkish government. Though General Michelson had early gained considerable advantage, and was advancing towards Belgrade, which had fallen into the hands of Czerny George and the insurgent Servians, yet the disasters of the Prus-

sian war had opened the eyes of the cabinet of St Petersburg, when it was too late, to the imprudence of which they had been guilty in engaging at once in two such formidable contests. Accordingly thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons (about twenty-five thousand men) were ordered to advance with all possible rapidity from the plains of Moldavia to the banks of the Bug. Anxious to derive every possible advantage from this great diversion, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople, General Sebastiani, to use the greatest efforts to induce the Turkish government to enter vigorously into the contest; while to Marshal Marmont he gave orders to send French officers into all the Ottoman provinces, with orders to do their utmost everywhere to rouse the Mussulman population against the Muscovite invaders.* At the same time, the relations of France with Persia and Turkey were considered of such paramount importance, that they were made the subject of a special message to the senate, which declared — “The Emperor of Persia, tormented, as Poland was for sixty years, by the intrigues of Russia, is animated by the same sentiments as the Turks. He has resolved to march upon the Caucasus to defend his dominions. Who could number the duration of the wars, the number of campaigns,

* These instructions to Marmont are well worthy of attention, both as evincing the views which Napoleon already entertained in regard to the Ottoman empire, and setting in a clear light his subsequent perfidious conduct in abandoning that power to the ambition of Russia, by the treaty of Tilsit. “A courier, just arrived from Constantinople, has announced that war against Russia is declared: great enthusiasm prevails at that capital; twenty regiments of Janissaries have just set out from its walls for the Danube, and twenty more will speedily follow from Asia. Sixty thousand men are at Hirsova; Pasha Oglou has assembled twenty thousand at Widdin. Send immediately five engineer officers and as many of artillery to Constantinople—aid the pashas in every possible way with counsel, provision, and ammunition. It is not unlikely that I may send you with 25,000 men to Widdin, and there you will enter into connexion with the Grand Army, of which you would form the extreme right. Twenty-five thousand French, supported by sixty thousand Turks, would soon force the Russians not to leave 30,000 men on the Danube, as they have done, but to forward twice that number to defend their own frontiers in that quarter. Send twenty or thirty officers to the pashas, if they demand so many; but the period for the employment of troops is not yet

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

1 Jom. ii.
345, 349.
Bign. vi.
121.46.
Delightful
residence of
the French
at Warsaw.

which would be required one day to repair the calamities consequent upon the Russians obtaining possession of Constantinople? Were the tiara of the Greek faith raised again, and extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should see in our own days our provinces attacked by clouds of barbarians; and if, in that tardy struggle, civilised Europe should happen to fall, our culpable indifference would justly excite the reproaches of posterity, and would become a subject of opprobrium in history." Memorable words! when the events which subsequent times have brought about, and the objects of political apprehension in our own time, are taken into view.¹

The residence of the French generals and officers at Warsaw appeared a perfect Elysium after the fatigues and privations to which they had been exposed. The society of that capital is well known to be one of the most agreeable in Europe, from the extraordinary talents and accomplishments of the ladies of rank of which it is composed. No person can have mingled in those delightful circles without perceiving that the Polish women are the most fascinating in Europe. Endowed by nature with an ardent temperament, an affectionate disposition, and an exalted imagination, they have, at the same time, all the grace and coquetry which constitute the charm of

arrived. The Turks may be relied on as faithful allies, because they hate the Russians; therefore be not sparing in your supplies of all sorts to them. An ambassador from Persia as well as Turkey has just been at Warsaw; the court of Ispahan also, as the sworn enemy of Russia, may be relied on as our friend. Our relations with the Eastern powers are now such that we may look forward *shortly to transporting 40,000 men to the gates of Ispahan, and from thence to the shores of the Indus*:—projects which formerly appeared chimerical are now no longer so, when I receive ambassadors from the Sultan, testifying a serious alarm at the progress of Russia, and the strongest confidence in the protection of France. In these circumstances, send your officers over all the Turkish provinces; they will make known my disposition towards the Grand Seigneur, and that will exalt the general enthusiasm, while at the same time you will be able to acquire for me information which may prove in the highest degree useful. In a word, general, *I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and wish to do it all the good in my power*; let that principle regulate all your actions. I consider the Turkish declaration of war against Russia as the most fortunate circumstance that could possibly have occurred in my present situation."—JOMINI, ii. 347-349.

Parisian beauty, and yet retain, at least in rural situations, the domestic virtues and simplicity of manner which nurse in infancy the national character of the English people.* Speaking almost every language in Europe with incomparable facility—conversing alternately in French, German, Italian, Russian, and sometimes English, with the accent of a native—versed in the literature and history of all these countries, and yet preferring to them all the ruins of their own wasted land—enthusiastic in their patriotism, and yet extended in their views—with hearts formed in the simplicity of domestic life, minds cultivated during the solitude of rural habitation, and manners polished by the elegance of metropolitan society—they approach as near as imagination can figure to that imaginary standard of perfection which constitutes the object of chivalrous devotion. Melancholy reflection! that the greatest charms of society should be co-existent with the most vicious and destructive national institutions; and that its principal excellencies should have been called forth by the miserable and distracted customs which had brought the Polish nation to a premature dissolution![†]

¹ Personal observation. Savary, iii. 17.

If such are the attractions of Warsaw, even to a passing traveller, it may easily be believed what it appeared to the French officers after the rude encounters of Pultusk and

* This observation applies to the character of the female part of the Polish rural nobility. Those who have made Warsaw or other great capitals their habitual residence, have too often contracted the vices incident to a polished and corrupted society.

† "It may with truth be said," says Savary, "that the Polish women are fitted to inspire jealousy to the most accomplished ladies in the civilised world: they unite, for the most part, to the manners of the great world a depth of information which is rarely to be seen even among the French women, and which is infinitely superior to what is usually to be met with in the most accomplished urban society. It would appear that, being obliged to pass more than half the year on their estates, they devote themselves to reading and mental cultivation; and hence in the capitals, where they go to pass the winter, they so frequently appear superior to all their rivals."—SAVARY, iii. 17.

"I did not require to learn," says Duroc, "that the Polish women are the most agreeable in Europe; but it was not till I arrived in Poland that I became acquainted with the full extent of their charms. The attractions of Warsaw are indescribable. It contains several agreeable circles—one charming."—*Letter of Duroc to Junot*, Dec. 17, 1806; D'ABRANTÈS, ix. 350.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

47.
Enthusiastic
reception of
the French
by the Polish
women.

Golymin. From all parts of Prussian Poland the great families flocked to her capital, and soon formed a society, in the midst of the horrors of war, which rivalled any in Europe in splendour and attractions. Abandoning themselves without reserve to the delightful prospects which seemed to be opening on their country, the Polish women saw in the French officers the deliverers of Sarmatia, the invincible allies who were to restore their long-lost country, to renew the glories of the Piasts and the Jagellons. A universal enthusiasm prevailed; fêtes and theatrical amusements succeeded each other in diversified magnificence; and, following the general bent, even the intellectual breast of Napoleon caught the flame, and did homage to charms which, attractive at all times, were, in that moment of exultation, irresistible. A transient but very vehement amour entranced his senses without touching his heart. But these fairy scenes were of short duration; his pleasures never for a moment interfered with his duties; he was indefatigable in preparation during the short interval of repose; and war, in its most terrible form, was destined soon to arouse all from this transient period of enchantment.¹

¹ Sav. iii.
17.

48.
Kamenskoi
goes mad,
and Ben-
ningsen
assumes the
command.
Headvances
against Ber-
nadotte.

When the French were put into cantonments on the right bank of the Vistula, the situation of the Russian army was such, that it could hardly be said to have a commander. Kamenskoi retired far to the rear to Grodno, where he went out in his shirt to the streets, and gave unequivocal proofs of mental derangement. Buxhowden commanded his own corps, while Benningsen did the same with his; and the mutual jealousy of these officers for a time prevented the one from obeying the commands of the other; but at length the appointment of the latter to the supreme command restored unity to the operations of the army. Fortunately for the Russians, the suspension of hostilities, and the interval of fifteen leagues which separated their cantonments from those of the enemy, prevented them from suffering under this division of

council; and when Benningsen assumed the command, he resolved to carry out the design of Buxhowden, and, instead of allowing the army to repose in its cantonments, commence an offensive movement with the whole army against the French left under Bernadotte and Ney, which had extended itself so far as to menace Königsberg, the second city of the Prussian dominions, and the capital of the old part of the monarchy. Many reasons recommended this course. It was evident that Napoleon would turn to the best account the breathing-time afforded him in winter quarters. His army would be recruited and strengthened, his cavalry remounted, his magazines replenished on the Vistula: the fortresses at its mouth were already observed; and when the mild season returned in May, there was every reason to fear that he would be as solidly established on the line of that river by the capture of Colberg, Graudenz, and Dantzic, as he was now on the Oder and in Silesia by the reduction of the fortresses of that province. In addition to this, the situation of Bernadotte and Ney, who had extended their cantonments beyond what was either necessary or prudent, and in such a way as almost to indicate an offensive intention, suggested a hope, that by a rapid movement their corps might be isolated and destroyed before the bulk of the Grand Army, grouped round Warsaw, could advance to their relief.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.
1807.

Impressed with these ideas, the Russian army, seventy-five thousand strong, with five hundred pieces of cannon, was everywhere put in motion, crossed the Narew, and marched upon the Bobr. The corps of Benningsen and Buxhowden, so long separated, effected a junction at Bialla on the 14th January: and on the 15th headquarters were established at that place. Essen was left with two divisions on the Narew to mask this forward movement; and there he was soon after joined by the divisions from Moldavia. This great assemblage of force was the more formidable, that it was entirely unknown to the enemy,

¹ Wilson,
83, 84.
Dum. xvii.
295, 297.
Jom. ii. 351.
Sav. iii. 26,
27.

49.
Rapid ad-
vance of
Benningsen
towards
Königsberg.
—
Atlas.
Plates 39,
44.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Jan. 17.

Jan. 19.

Jan. 20.

¹ Wilson,
83, 85.
Dum. xvii.
295, 302.
Jom. ii.
352.

being completely concealed by the great forest of Johansberg and the numerous chain of lakes, intersected by woods, which lie between Arys in East Prussia, and the banks of the Vistula. Rapidly advancing, after its columns were united, the Russian army moved forward between the lakes of Spirding and Löwentin; and on the 17th headquarters were established at Rhein in East Prussia. Meanwhile the cavalry, consisting of forty squadrons under Prince Gallitzin, pushed on for the Alle, on the roads leading to Königsberg and Bischofstein: and on the other side of that river surprised and defeated the light horse of Marshal Ney, which had advanced in pursuit of Lestocq to Schippenbeil, within ten leagues of Königsberg. Thus on the 20th January, the Russian army, perfectly concentrated, and in admirable order, was grouped in the middle of East Prussia, and was within six marches of the Lower Vistula, where it might either raise the blockade of Dantzic and Graudenz, or fall with a vast superiority of force upon Bernadotte or Ney, still slumbering in undisturbed security in their cantonments.¹

50.
He surprises
Ney's corps.

Had Benningsen been aware of the scattered condition of Marshal Ney's corps, he might, by the admission of the French military historians, have destroyed the whole before it could by possibility have been united and put in a condition to give battle. As it was, great numbers of his detached parties were made prisoners, and the conduct of the marshal in first, by his senseless incursions attracting the enemy, and then, by his undue dispersion, exposing himself to their attacks, drew down a severe reproof from Napoleon.* But a glance at the map must be sufficient to show that great and decisive

* He severely blamed the marshal "for having, by an inconsiderate movement, attracted the enemy, and even endeavoured to engage Marshal Soult, who declined to follow him, in the same expedition. You will immediately resume the winter quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair, the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—DUMAS, xvii. 303.

success was at this moment within the grasp of the Russian general; and that if, instead of making a long circuit to reach the head of Marshal Ney's corps, scattered over a space of eighteen leagues, and drive it back upon its line of retreat towards Warsaw, he had boldly thrown himself, three days earlier, upon its flank, he would have separated it from the centre of the army, and driven both it and Bernadotte to a disastrous retreat into the angle formed by the Vistula and the Baltic Sea. The movement of Benningsen to the head of Ney's column, however, having prevented this, he turned his attention to Bernadotte, who had received intelligence of his approach, and had rapidly concentrated his corps from the neighbourhood of Elbing at Mohrungen. Meanwhile the Russian army continued its advance; on the 22d, Jan. 22. headquarters were established at Bischofstein, and the Cossacks pushed on to Heilsberg; and on the same day, a severe action took place at Seeberg, from whence the French cavalry, under Colbert, were driven in the direction of Allenstein. Ney, now seriously alarmed, despatched couriers in all directions to collect his scattered divisions, and on the 23d resumed his headquarters at Neidenburg, extending his troops by the left towards Gilgenburg to lend assistance to Bernadotte.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
297, 307.
Jom. ii. 353.
Wilson, 84,
85.

Bernadotte, informed by despatches from all quarters of this formidable irruption into his cantonments, was rapidly concentrating his troops at Mohrungen, when Benningsen, with greatly superior forces, fell upon him. The Russian troops, fifteen thousand strong, were posted in rugged ground at Georgenthal, two miles in front of that town. General Makow, with the advanced guard of the Russians, there engaged with the French before sufficient forces had come up; and after a sanguinary conflict, in which the eagle of the 9th French regiment was taken and retaken several times, and finally remained in the hands of the Russians, suffered the penalty of his rashness by being repulsed towards Liebstadt. In this

51.
Bernadotte,
attacked
near Moh-
rungen,
escapes with
difficulty.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

bloody affair both parties had to lament the loss of two thousand men, and the Russian general, Aurepp, was killed. It was the more to be regretted that this premature attack had been made, as Lestocq was at the moment at Wormditt, or five leagues distant on the right; Gallitzin, with five thousand horse, at Reichau, at the same distance on the left; Ostermann Tolstoy at Heiligenbeil, and Sacken at Elditten, all in the immediate neighbourhood; so that, by a concentration of these forces, the whole French corps might with ease have been made prisoners. As it was, Prince Michael Dolgorucki, who had been detached by Prince Gallitzin towards Mohrungen in consequence of the violent fire heard in that direction, fell upon the rear of Bernadotte's corps, penetrated into the town, made several hundred prisoners, and captured all his private baggage, among which, to his eternal disgrace, were found, as in the den of a common freebooter, silver plate, bearing the arms of almost all the states in Germany, ten thousand ducats recently levied for his own private use, and two thousand five hundred for that of his staff, from the town of Elbing.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
115. Wilson, 85.
Dum. xvii.
307, 319.
Jom. ii.
353.

52.
Graudenz is relieved, and the French left wing driven back by the Russians.

The narrow escape, both of Ney and Bernadotte, from total destruction in consequence of this bold and vigorous enterprise, excited the utmost alarm in the French army. Bernadotte fell back rapidly to Osterode, where he entered into communication with Ney, and from thence towards Thorn on the Lower Vistula, by Strassburg, severely pressed by the Cossacks, who almost totally destroyed his rearguard, and made many thousand prisoners. Headquarters were advanced by Benningsen on the 26th to Mohrungen, where they remained, from the exhaustion of the troops, till the 2d February. Taking advantage of the aid thus obtained, the brave and active Lestocq succeeded in raising the blockade of Graudenz, the key to the Lower Vistula; and throwing in supplies of ammunition and provisions, which enabled that important

fortress to hold out through all the succeeding campaign. The whole French left wing raised their cantonments, and fell back in haste, and with great loss, towards the Lower Vistula ; and the alarm, spread as far as Warsaw, gave the most effectual refutation to the false accounts published in the bulletins of the successive defeats of the Russian army.* At the same time intelligence was received of the arrival of the Russian divisions from the army of Moldavia, on the Narew and the Bug, where they effected their junction with General Essen, and raised the enemy's force in that quarter to thirty thousand men.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Wilson,
86, 87.
Dum. xvii.
307, 322.
Bign. xi.
115, 116.

These untoward events made a great impression on the mind of Napoleon, who had never contemplated a renewal of active operations till his reinforcements from the Rhine had arrived at headquarters, and the return of the mild season had enabled him to resume hostilities without the excessive hardships to which his troops during the later stages of the campaign had been exposed. The cold was still extreme: the Vistula and the Narew were charged with enormous blocks of floating ice, which daily threatened to break down the bridges over them; the earth was covered with snow; the heavens exhibited that serene deep-blue aspect which indicated a long continuance of intense frost; magazines there were none in the country which was likely to become the theatre of war; and though the highly cultivated territory of Old Prussia offered as great resources as any of its extent in Europe† for an invading army, yet it was impossible to expect that it could maintain,

53.
Dangerous
situation of
Napoleon.

* "In Bernadotte's baggage, taken at Mohrungen, were found curious proofs of the arrangement for stage effect and false intelligence, made by all the officers of the French army, from the Emperor downwards. An order was there found, giving the most minute directions for the reception of Napoleon at Warsaw, with all the stations and crossings where 'Vive l'Empereur!' was to be shouted; and official despatches of all the actions of the campaign in which Bernadotte had been engaged, for publication, and private despatches giving the facts as they really occurred, for the Emperor's secret perusal. These papers are still in the possession of General Benningsen's family."—WILSON'S *Polish Campaign*, 86—*Note*.

† The territory of Old Prussia is not naturally more fertile than the adjoining

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Dum. xvii.
322, 324.
Jom. ii.
354.

for any length of time, the enormous masses who would speedily be assembled on its surface. But there was no time for deliberation; matters were pressing; the right of Benningsen was now approaching the Lower Vistula, and in a few days the Russian army would raise the blockade of Dantzic, and, resting on that fortress as a base from whence inexhaustible supplies of all sorts might be obtained by sea, would bid defiance to all his efforts.¹

54.
Vigour of
Napoleon in
assembling
his army.

Jan. 23.

It was in such a crisis that the extraordinary activity and indefatigable perseverance of Napoleon appeared most conspicuous. Instantly perceiving that active operations must be resumed even at that rude season, he despatched orders from the 23d to the 27th January, for the assembling of all his army; and as, with the exception of Bernadotte and Ney, they all lay in contonments not extending over more than twenty leagues, this was neither a tedious nor a difficult operation. Bernadotte was enjoined to assemble around Osterode, Lefebvre at Thorn to observe Dantzic, Soult at Prasnycz, Davoust at Pultusk, Ney at Neidenburg, Bessières and Murat at Warsaw with the Imperial Guard and cavalry. Though breathing only victory in his proclamations to his troops, he was in reality making every preparation for defeat; Lefebvre received orders to collect all the forces at his disposal, without any regard to the blockade at Dantzic, in order to secure the fortress and bridge of Thorn, the direct line of retreat across the Vistula from the theatre of war, while Lannes was disposed as a reserve on the right, and Augereau on the left bank of that river. On the 27th, orders were given to all the columns to march,

ing provinces of Poland, but nevertheless it is as rich and cultivated as they are sterile and neglected. On one side of the frontier line are to be seen numerous and opulent cities, smiling well-cultivated fields, comfortable hamlets, and an industrious and contented population; on the other, endless forests of pine, wretched villages, a deplorable agriculture; squalid huts beside a few gorgeous palaces. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the vicious and ruinous political institutions which have prevailed amidst the mingled anarchy, tyranny, and democracy of Old Poland. This difference, so well known to

and early on the morning of the 30th the Emperor set out from Warsaw.* Soult was directed to march by Willenberg and Passenheim on Allenstein: thither also Ney was to move, by Hohenstein, and Davoust from Pultusk by Ortelsburg; Augereau, who had been brought over from the left to the right bank of the Vistula, was to advance to it from Plonsk, by Neidenburg and Hohenstein; Murat was to hasten up with his cavalry, so as to form the advanced guard of Soult; while Bessières, with the Imperial Guard, was to follow in reserve. On the left Bernadotte was to retreat in the direction of Thorn; while, on the extreme right, the corps of Lannes (under the command of Savary) was to take post at Sierock, between the Bug and the Narew, to observe Essen; and Oudinot with his grenadiers was to push on through Warsaw to Ostrolenka, where he would be in a position either to assist Savary or the Grand Army. The object of Napoleon in these movements was, that while, by the retreat of his left wing under Bernadotte, he drew on the Russians towards Thorn and the lower Vistula, he should, by rapidly throwing forward his own right, consisting of four corps and the reserve cavalry, to Allenstein, turn their left flank, and cut off their retreat to the Niemen.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Dum. xvii.
322, 325.
Jom. ii.
354, 355.

Following thus his usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in the rear of the enemy during his advance, Napoleon moved towards Allenstein, where he arrived on the 2d February with the corps of Soult, Augereau, and Ney; while Davoust was at a short distance still further on his right, at Wartenburg. Already he had interposed between Benningsen and Russia; the

55.
Napoleon
marches for
the rear of
Benning-
sen.

travellers, repeatedly attracted the attention even of the military followers of the French army. See SEGUR, *Camp. de Russie*, i. 127; and JOMINI, ii. 354.

* The orders given by Napoleon to all the marshals and chief officers of his army on this trying emergency, may be considered as a masterpiece of military skill and foresight, and deserve especial attention from all who desire to make themselves acquainted either with his extraordinary activity and resources, or with the multiplied cares which, on such an occasion, devolve on a commander-in-chief.—See the whole in DUMAS, xvii. 330-374; *Picces Just.*

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Feb. 1 and 2.

Feb. 3.

¹ Wilson,
89, 90.
Jom. ii. 355.
Dum. xvii.
330, 340.

56.
Who dis-
covers his
design, and
falls back.

only line of retreat which lay open to that officer was to the north-east, in the direction of Königsberg and the Niemen. The Russian army was stationed between the Passarge and the Alle, from Guttstadt and Heilsberg on the latter river, to Liebstadt and Wormditt in the neighbourhood of the former; but these movements of Napoleon induced Benningsen to concentrate his divisions and move them to the eastward, in the direction of Spiegelberg and the Alle, on the 1st and 2d of February, in order to preserve his communications with the Russian frontier. The whole troops assembled in order of battle on the following day, in a strong position on the heights of Jonkowo, covering the great road from Allenstein to Liebstadt, its left resting on the village of Mondtken. Napoleon instantly directed Davoust to march from Wartenburg to Spiegelberg with his whole corps, in order to get round the left flank of the Russians; while Soult received orders to force the bridge of Bergfried, over the Alle, in rear of their left flank, by which he would be enabled to debouch upon their line of retreat and communications; and this attack was of such importance, that Davoust was to support him with two of his divisions.¹

It would have been all over with the Russians if these orders had been carried into full execution without their being aware how completely they were in course of being encircled. But by a fortunate accident the despatches to Bernadotte, announcing the design, and enjoining him to draw Benningsen on towards the Lower Vistula, had previously fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, and made that general aware of his danger. He immediately despatched orders to the officer at Bergfried to hold the bridge to the last extremity, which was so gallantly obeyed, that though Soult assailed it with all his corps, and it was taken and retaken several times, yet it finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The situation of Benningsen, however, was still very critical; he was compelled to

fall back to avoid being turned in presence of very superior forces, and by his lateral movement from Mohrungen he had become entirely separated from Lestocq, who was in the most imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed by the superior forces of Bernadotte. Fortunately, however, from the despatches being intercepted, that marshal remained entirely ignorant, both of what was expected from him, and of the great advantages which remained in his power; and Lestocq, without being disquieted, was enabled to check his advance and make preparations for a retreat, which lay open to him from Freistadt, where he had been covering the revictualing of Grandenz, by Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode, and Mohrungen to Liebstadt; while Benningsen himself, on the night of the 3d, broke up from Jonkowo, and retired in the same direction.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.
1807.

¹ Wilson,
89, 92.
Jom. ii. 355,
356. Dum.
xvii. 330,
349.

By daybreak the French army, headed by Murat with his numerous and terrible dragoons, was in motion to pursue the enemy; and as the Russians had been much retarded during the night by the passage of so many pieces of cannon and waggons through the narrow streets of Jonkowo, the enemy soon came up with their rear-guard. By overwhelming numbers the latter were at length forced from the bridge of Bergfried by Soult; but they rallied in the villages behind it, and, forming barricades with tumbrils, waggons, and chariots, effectually checked the advance of the enemy until the carriages in the rear had got clear through. They then retired, obstinately contesting every inch of ground, which they did with such effect, that the French lost fifteen hundred men in the pursuit, without inflicting a greater loss on their adversaries. Nor were any cannon or chariots taken—a striking proof of the orderly nature of the retreat, and the heroism with which the rearguard performed its duty, when it is recollected that Napoleon, with eighty thousand men, thundered in close pursuit; and that, from the state of the roads, the march, which

^{57.}
The French
pursue the
Russians,
who resolve
to give
battle.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Feb. 4.

had been ordered upon three lines, could take place on two only. Soult and Davoust continued to manœuvre, in order to turn the Russian left, while Murat and Ney pressed their rearguard. On the night of the 4th, the Russians retired to Wolfsdorf, where they stood firm next day. But this continued retreat in presence of the enemy was now beginning to be attended with bad effects, both upon the health and spirits of the soldiers. The commissariat in their army was then wretched; magazines there were none in the country which was now the theatre of war; and the soldiers, when worn out with a night-march over frozen snow, had no means of obtaining subsistence but by prowling about to discover and dig up the little stores which the peasants had buried for the use of their families. The men everywhere lay on the bare ground in intense frost, with no other bed but the snow, and no covering but their great-coats, which were now little better than rags. They were not as yet inured to retire before the enemy; and the murmur against any further retreat was so loud, that Benningsen resolved to fall back only to a chosen field of battle; and, upon examining the map, that of PREUSSISCH-EYLAU was selected for this purpose. No sooner was this announced to the troops than their discontents were appeased; the hardships of the night-marches were forgotten; and from the joyful looks of the men, it would rather have been supposed they were marching to tranquil winter quarters, than to the most desperate struggle which had occurred in modern times.¹

¹ Wilson,
92, 94.
Jom. ii. 356.
Dum. xvii.
349, 352.

58.
Combat of
Landsberg.
Feb. 6.

Severe actions, however, awaited these brave men ere they reached the theatre of final conflict. On the night of the fifth the army moved to Landsberg, where the troops from Heilsberg joined them, notwithstanding a bloody combat with Marshal Davoust. On the following day, the rearguard, under Bagrathion, posted between Hoff and that town, was assailed with the utmost vehemence by Murat, at the head of the reserve cavalry ten

CHAP.
XLIV.
1807.

thousand strong, and the principal part of the corps of Soult and Augereau. The approach of these formidable masses, and the imposing appearance of their dragoons, as well as the balls which began to fall from the French batteries, occasioned great confusion among the cannon and carriages in the streets of the town. But with such resolution did the rearguard maintain their position, that, though they sustained a heavy loss, the enemy were kept at bay till night closed the carnage, and relieved the Russian general from the anxieties consequent on so critical a situation in presence of such enormous forces of the enemy. Two battalions of Russians were trampled under foot in the course of the day or cut down, chiefly by one of their own regiments of horse dashing over them, when broken and flying from Murat's dragoons. Benningsen upon this supported the rearguard by several brigades of fresh troops, and the combat continued with various success till night, when both armies bivouacked in presence of each other; that of the French on the heights of Hoff, that of the Russians on those which lie in front of Landsberg, and the little stream of the Stein separating their outposts from each other. In this untoward affair the Russians sustained a loss of two thousand five hundred men, among whom was Prince Gallitzin, whose chivalrous courage had already endeared him to the army; but the French were weakened by nearly as great a number. During the night the whole army again broke up, and without further molestation reached Eylau at seven the next morning, when it passed through the town, and moved quietly to the appointed ground for the battle on the other side, where it arrived by noonday.¹

Feb. 7.
¹ Dum. xvii.
354, 355.
Wilson, 94,
95. Jom. ii.
356.

This rapid concentration and retreat of the Russians isolated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and gave too much reason to fear that it might be cut off by the superior forces of Bernadotte and Ney, who were now pressing on it on all sides. But the skilful movements of the Prussian general extricated him from a most perilous situation.

59.
Combat of
Liebstadt,
and retreat
of Lestocq.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Feb. 5.

Feb. 7.
1 Jom. ii.
356, 357.
Dum. xvii.
352, 353.60.
Relative
forces on
both sides.

On the 5th, he set out from Mohrunen, and his horse encountered the cavalry of Murat near Deppen, while the head of the column of infantry was at the same time charged by Ney, who had crossed the Passarge to intercept his progress near Waltersdorf. The heroic resistance of the advanced guard, only three thousand strong, gave time for the main body to change the line of its march, and escape in the direction of Schloditten; but it proved fatal to itself, as almost the whole were slain or made prisoners, with twelve pieces of cannon. The firm countenance of the cavalry, however, defeated all the efforts of Murat, who in vain charged them repeatedly with six thousand horse; and after baffling all his attacks, they retired leisurely, and in the best order, covering the march of the infantry all the way; crossed the Passarge at Spanden, and arrived on the 7th in safety at Hussehnien in the neighbourhood of Eylau.¹

Thus, after sustaining incredible hardships, and undergoing serious dangers, the whole Russian army was at length concentrated on one field of battle, and about to measure its strength with the enemy. It was reduced, by the fatigues and losses of this winter campaign, to sixty-five thousand men, assembled around Eylau, to which, if ten thousand be added as Lestocq's division, which might be expected to co-operate in the approaching action, the whole amount that could be relied on for the shock was seventy-five thousand, with four hundred and sixty pieces of cannon. The French, after deducting the losses of this dreadful warfare, exclusive of Bernadotte, who did not arrive on the ground for two days after, could still bring eighty thousand men into the field, including nearly sixteen thousand horse; but they had not above three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. Thus the two armies were nearly equal—the French superiority in numbers, and especially in cavalry, being counterbalanced by the advantage which the Russians had in that important arm, the artillery. Their spirit and courage were at the

same level ; for if the French could recall with deserved pride the glorious achievements of the campaign, and a long course of almost unbroken victories, the Russians, on their side, had the triumphs of Suwarroff in Turkey, Poland, and the Italian plains, to recall : and if the former were impelled by the ardour of a revolution, converted by consummate genius into that of military conquest, the latter were buoyant with the rising energy of an empire whose frontiers had never yet receded before the standards of an enemy.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹Dum.xv.ii.
10. Wilson,
98, 99.

The Russian rearguard, ten thousand strong, under Bagrathion, was leisurely retiring towards Eylau, and at the distance of about two miles from that village, when it was attacked by the French infantry. The Russians were at first compelled to give way, but the St Petersburg dragoons, whose rout had occasioned such loss to their own comrades on the preceding day, emulous to wipe away their disgrace, assailed the enemy so opportunely in

61.
Bloody combats round Eylau the day before the battle.

* The following is the account given by Dumas of the troops present in arms, in January 1807, under Napoleon on the Vistula :—

	Infantry and Artillery.	Cavalry.
Imperial Guard under Bessières,	9,109	3,829
————— Oudinot,	6,046	
First Corps, Bernadotte,	18,073	950
Second do. Augereau, . . .	10,000	
Third do. Davoust, . . .	19,000	757
Fourth do. Soult, . . .	26,329	1,495
Fifth do. Lannes, . . .	16,720	1,399
Sixth do. Ney, . . .	15,158	881
Cavalry do. Murat, . . .	753	14,868
 Total on the Vistula, . . .	 123,188	 24,179
Detached, viz., Mortier, in Pomerania,	15,868	1,254
————— Jerome and Vandamme,		
in Sillesia, . . .	18,232	2,207
————— Lefebvre, Dantzic, . . .	23,248	547
————— Dumonceau, Hanover,	6,898	689
 Total, . . .	 187,434	 28,876

If from this mass of 113,000 infantry and 24,000 cavalry, there be deducted 19,000 absent, under Bernadotte, 18,000 under Lannes, 6,000 under Oudinot, and 14,000 lost or left behind during the march from Warsaw, there will remain, on their own showing, 90,000 in line at Eylau, and that agrees nearly with Sir Robert Wilson's estimate.—DUMAS, vol. xviii. 592 ; WILSON, 99. Thiers makes the effective French force at Eylau 74,000 men—*Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 361. The medium of 80,000 is probably very near the mark.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Feb. 7.

flank, when emerging from the tumult of the charge, that they instantly cut to pieces two battalions, and made prize of their eagles. Disconcerted by this check, the French gave no further molestation to the Russian rearguard, which retired into Eylau. By a mistake, however, the division destined to occupy that important station evacuated it, along with the rest of the army; and though Benningsen instantly ordered it to be reoccupied by fresh troops, the French had, meanwhile, entered in great numbers, and the assailing division, under Barclay de Tolly, had a rude contest to encounter in endeavouring to regain the lost ground. By vast exertions, however, they at length succeeded in expelling the enemy. The French again returned in greater force; the combat continued with the utmost fury till long after sunset. Fresh reinforcements came up to the Russians: twice Barclay carried the village after dark, by the light of the burning houses, and he was as often expelled by the enthusiastic valour of the French. At length they were driven out of the town, which, from lying in a hollow, and being commanded on the French side, was no longer tenable after the enemy had brought up their heavy artillery. But that gallant commander, with this heroic rearguard, intrenched himself in the church and churchyard, which stands on an eminence by the road on issuing from the town on the other side, and there maintained a sanguinary resistance till past ten at night, when he was severely wounded. Then the object of the strife having been gained by the heavy artillery having all arrived by the road of Schloditten, and taken up its position on the field of battle behind the village, the unconquered Russians were withdrawn from the churchyard, which, with its blood-stained graves and corpse-covered slopes, remained in the hands of Napoleon.¹

¹ Wilson,
97, 98, 100.
Jom. ii. 357,
358. Dum.
xviii. 6, 8.
Bign. vi.
126.

Never in the history of war did two armies pass a night under more awful and impressive circumstances than the rival hosts that now lay, without tent or cover-

ing, on the snowy expanse of the field of Eylau. The close vicinity of the two armies; the vast multitude assembled in so narrow a space, intent only on mutual destruction; the vital interests to the lives and fortunes of all which were at stake; the wintry wildness of the scene, cheered only by the watch-fires, which threw a partial glow on the snow-clad fields around; the shivering groups who in either army lay round the blazing fires, chilled by girdles of impenetrable ice; the stern resolution of the soldiers in the one array, and the enthusiastic ardour of those in the other; the liberty of Europe now brought to the issue of one dread combat; the glory of Russia and France dependent on the efforts of the mightiest armament that either had yet sent forth, all contributed to impress a feeling of extraordinary solemnity, which reached the most inconsiderate breast, oppressed the mind with a feeling of anxious thought, and kept unclosed many a wearied eyelid in both camps, notwithstanding the extraordinary fatigues of the preceding days. But no sooner did the dawn break, and the quick rattle of musketry from the outposts commence, than these gloomy feelings were dispelled, and all arose from their icy beds with no other feelings but those of joyous confidence and military ardour.¹

The evacuation of Eylau on the preceding night, had led Napoleon to suppose that the enemy were not to give battle on the succeeding day; and, overwhelmed with the extraordinary fatigues he had undergone since leaving Warsaw, during which time he had been daily occupied in business or marching twenty hours out of the twenty-four, he retired to a house in the town, and there, amidst all the horrors of a place carried by assault, fell into a profound sleep. The two armies were within half cannon-shot of each other, and their immense masses disposed in close array on a space not exceeding a league in breadth. The field of battle consisted of an open expanse of unenclosed ground, rising into swells, or small

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

62.

Anxious
situation of
both armies
in their
night
bivouac.¹ Wilson,
101. Jom.
ii. 358.

63.

Description
of the field
of battle,
and the posi-
tions of
either army.Atlas,
Plate 43.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

hills, interspersed with many lakes : but as the whole surface was covered with snow, and the water so thoroughly frozen as to bear any weight either of cavalry or artillery, it was everywhere accessible to military operations. The little town of Eylau, situated on a slight eminence and surmounted by a Gothic steeple, was the only salient point of the field. On the slope to its right, looking from the French position, was the churchyard, the scene of so desperate a strife on the preceding day. The ground rose gently in its front and was interspersed with some small hills, amidst which the dense masses of the Russians were barely visible through the twilight of a wintry day obscured by mist and driving snow. The Russian right, under Touchkoff, lay on either side of Schloditten ; the centre, under Sacken, occupied a cluster of little open hills, intercepted by lakes, in front of Kutschitten ; the left, under Ostermann Tolstoy, rested on Klein-Sausgarten and Serpalten ; the advanced-guard, ten thousand strong, with its outposts extending almost to the houses of Eylau, was under the command of Bagrathion ; the reserve, in two divisions, was led by Doctoroff. The whole army in front was drawn up in two lines with admirable precision : the reserve, in two close columns behind the centre ; the foot artillery, consisting of four hundred pieces, was disposed along the front of the lines ; the horse artillery, embracing sixty guns, cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, in reserve behind the centre and wings, in order to support any point which might appear to require assistance. Lestocq, with his division, had not yet come up ; but he had lain at Hussehnien, the preceding night, which was only three leagues off, and might be expected to join before the battle was far advanced.¹

¹ Dum. xviii.
12, 13. Jom.
ii. 359, 360.
Wilson,
101. Thiers,
vii. 376.

The French position, generally speaking, was more elevated than that of the Russians, with the exception of the right, where it was commanded by the heights of Klein-Sausgarten. The town of Eylau, however, occu-

pied in force by their troops, was situated in a hollow, so low that the roofs of the houses were below the range of cannon-shot from the Russian position, and the summit of the church steeple, which stands on an eminence, alone was exposed to the destructive storm. Davoust was in rear on the right, and received orders, as soon as he came up, to attack the villages of Klein-Sausgarten and Serpalten, occupied by the enemy. The division St Hilaire of Soult's corps was at Rothenen; between that village and Eylau, Augereau was established, and was destined to advance against the Russian main body and the strong batteries placed opposite: Soult, with his remaining two divisions, occupied Eylau on the left, and was to aid him when he moved forward; the Imperial Guard and cavalry of Murat were in reserve behind the centre, ready to support any attack which might appear likely to prove unsuccessful. Orders had been despatched to Ney to attack the Russian right as soon as the action was warmly engaged; and it was hoped he would arrive on the field at least as soon as Lestocq on the other side, upon whose traces he had so long been following. Lannes had been detained by sickness at Pultusk, and his corps, placed under the orders of Savary, afterwards Duke of Rovigo, was observing the Russian forces left on the Bug and the Narew. Napoleon's design, when he saw that the Russians stood firm, and were resolved to give battle, was to turn their left by the corps of Marshal Davoust, and throw it back on the middle of the army; but, the better to conceal this object, he commenced the action soon after daylight by a violent attack on their right and centre. The Russian cannon played heavily, but rather at hazard, on the hostile masses in front of Eylau; while the French guns replied with fatal effect from their elevated position down upon the enemy, whose lines were exposed from head to foot to the range of their shot.¹

Presently the centre, under Augereau, advanced in massy columns, while St Hilaire's division of Soult's corps,

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

64.

Distribu-
tion of the
French
forces.

¹ Wilson,
101. Jom. ii.
360, 361.
Dum. xviii.
915.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

65.

Battle of
Eylau.
Defeat of
Augereau.
Feb. 8.

the whole preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, marched with an intrepid step against the Russian left-centre, so as to unite Augereau's with Davoust's attack, and forty guns of the Imperial Guard, posted on an eminence near the church of Eylau, to cover their attack, opened a heavy fire on the great central Russian battery. These troops had not advanced above three hundred yards, driving the Russian tirailleurs before them, when the Russian cannon-shot, from two hundred pieces, admirably directed, ploughed through the mass, and so shattered it, that the whole body of Augereau's corps inclined to the left towards Schloditten, to get under the shelter of a detached house which stood in the way. A snow-storm at the same time set in and darkened the atmosphere, so that neither army could see its opponent; but nevertheless, the deadly storm of bullets continued to tear the massy columns of the French, and the cannonade was so violent as to prevent Soult from rendering them any effectual support. A masked battery of seventy-two pieces opened on their front with a tremendous fire of grape. In a quarter of an hour, half of the corps were struck down. Augereau's divisions were already severely shaken by this murderous fire, when they were suddenly assailed on one side by the right wing of the Russians, under Touchkoff, and on the other by their reserve and a powerful body of cavalry, under Doctoroff. So thick was the snow-storm, so unexpected the onset, that the assailants were only a few yards distant, and the long lances of the Cossacks almost touching the French infantry, when they were first discerned. The combat was not of more than a few minutes' duration: the corps, charged at once by foot and horse with the utmost vigour, broke and fled in the wildest disorder back into Eylau, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, who made such havoc, that the whole, above sixteen thousand strong, were, with the exception of fifteen hundred men, taken or destroyed;¹ and Augereau himself, with his two

¹ Wilson,
101, 102.
Jom. ii. 261.
Dum. xviii.
17, 18. Bign.
vi. 129, 130.
Thiers, vii.
383.

generals of divisions, Desgardens and Heudelet; was desperately wounded.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

66.

Imminent
danger of
Napoleon.

Napoleon was apprised of this disaster by the fugitives who rushed into Eylau; and the snow-storm clearing away at the same time, showed him the Russian right and centre far advanced, with their light troops almost at the edge of the town. He himself was stationed at the churchyard on its eastern side, which had been the scene of such a sanguinary conflict on the preceding night; and already the crash of the enemy's balls on the steeple and walls of the church showed how near danger was approaching. The serried masses of the Old Guard stood firm in and around the cemetery, while the branches of the trees above their heads were constantly rent or falling from the enemy's cannon-balls. Presently one of the Russian divisions, following rapidly after the fugitives, entered Eylau by the eastern street, and charged, with loud hurrahs, to the foot of the mount where the Emperor was placed with a battery of the Imperial Guard and his personal escort of a hundred men. Had a regiment of horse been at hand to support the attack, Napoleon must have been made prisoner; for though the last reserve, consisting of six battalions of the Old Guard, was at a short distance, he might have been enveloped before they could come up to his rescue. The fate of Europe then hung by a thread, but in that terrible moment the Emperor's presence of mind did not forsake him;* he instantly ordered his little body-guard, hardly more than a company, to form line, in order to check the enemy's advance, and despatched orders to the Old Guard to attack the column on one flank, while a brigade of Murat's horse charged it on the other.¹ The Russians, disordered by success, and ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within their grasp,

¹ Bign. vi.
130. Dum.
xviii. 19, 20.
Jom. ii. 362,
363. Wil-
son, 101,
102. Thiers,
vii. 379, 385.

* ——— "Stetit aggerere fultus

Cæspitis, intrepidus vultu; meruitque timeri,
Non metuens."

LUCAN, *Pharsalia*, v. 316.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

67.
Grand
charge by
the cavalry
and Impe-
rial Guard
on the Rus-
sian centre.

were arrested by the firm countenance of the little band of heroes who formed Napoleon's last resource; and before they could re-form their ranks for a regular conflict, the enemy were upon them on either flank, and almost the whole division was cut to pieces on the spot.*

The disorder produced by the repulse of St Hilaire's division, and the almost total destruction of Augereau's corps, however, was such, that the French Emperor was compelled to strain every nerve to repair it. For this purpose he prepared a grand charge by the whole cavalry and Imperial Guard, supported in rear by the divisions of Soult, which occupied Eylau and its vicinity, now stripped of any other defenders. The onset of this enormous mass, mustering fourteen thousand cavalry and twenty-five thousand foot-soldiers, supported by two hundred pieces of cannon, was the more formidable, that the thick storm of snow, as favourable now to them as it had before been to the enemy, prevented them from being perceived till they were close upon the first line of the enemy. The shock was irresistible: the front line of the Russians was forced to give ground, and in some places thrown into disorder; their cavalry crushed by the enormous weight of the seventy squadrons which followed the white plume of Murat; and a desperate mêlée ensued, in which prodigious losses were sustained on both sides. The Russian battalions, though broken, did not lay down their arms or fly, but, falling back on such as yet stood firm, or

* "I never was so much struck with anything in my life," said General Bertrand at St Helena, "as by the Emperor at Eylau at the moment when, alone with some officers of his staff, he was almost trodden under foot by a column of four or five thousand Russians. The Emperor was on foot, and Berthier gave orders instantly for the horses to be brought forward; the Emperor gave him a reproachful look, and instead ordered a battalion of his Guard, which was at a little distance, to advance. He himself kept his ground as the Russians approached, repeating frequently the words, 'What boldness! what boldness!' At the sight of the grenadiers of his Guard the Russians made a dead pause; the Emperor did not stir, but all around him trembled." — LAS CASES, ii. 151. See also *Relation de la Bataille d'Eylau, par un Témoin Oculaire. Camp. en Prusse et Pologne*, iv. 45.

uniting in little knots together, still maintained the combat with the most dogged resolution. Instantly perceiving the extent of the danger, Benningsen, with his whole staff, galloped forward from his station in the rear to the front, and at the same time despatched orders to the whole infantry of the reserve to close their ranks, and advance to the support of their comrades engaged. These brave men, inclining inwards, pressed eagerly on, regardless of the shower of grape and musketry which fell on their advancing ranks, and, uniting with the first line, charged home with loud hurrahs upon the enemy. But the onset of the French was at first irresistible. In the shock, the Russian division of Essen was broken, and Murat's horse, pursuing their advantage, swept through several openings, and got as far as the reserve cavalry of Benningsen. Already the last reserve batteries of the centre were discharging grape with the utmost vehemence on the terrible assailants ; but no sooner did Platoff, who was in the rear of all, see them approaching with loud cries, and all the tumult of victory, than he gave orders to the Cossacks of the Don to advance. Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge, their long lances in rest, their blood-horses at speed : in an instant the French cuirassiers were broken, pierced through, and scattered. Retreat was impossible through the again closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit ; while five hundred and thirty Cossacks returned, each cased in the shining armour which he had stripped from the dead body of an opponent. At all other points the enemy were, after a desperate struggle, driven back, and several eagles, with fourteen pieces of cannon, remained in the hands of the victors.¹

¹Thiers, vii.
385, 386.
Dum. xviii.
19, 30. Jom.
ii. 362. Wil-
son, 103,
104.

The battle appeared gained : the French left and centre had been defeated with extraordinary loss ; their last reserves, with the exception of part of the Guard, had

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

68.

Great suc-
cess of Da-
voust on
the French
right.

been engaged, without success; to the cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* and the shouts of enthusiasm with which they commenced the combat, had succeeded a sullen silence along the whole line in front of Eylau; the Russians were several hundred paces in advance of the ground which they occupied in the morning; and a distant cannonade on both sides evinced the exhaustion and fatigue which was mutually felt. Lestocq had not yet arrived, but he was hourly and anxiously expected, and the addition of his fresh and gallant corps would, it was hoped, enable Benningsen to complete the victory. But while all eyes were eagerly turned to their right, where it was expected his standards would first appear, a terrible disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, took place on the left. Davoust, who was intrusted with the attack which was intended to be the decisive one in that quarter, had long been arrested by the firm countenance of Bagavout and Ostermann Tolstoy; but at length the increasing numbers and vigorous attacks of the French prevailed. Friant, whose division headed the attack, carried Serpalten, and, pushing on beyond it, the village of Klein-Sausgarten fell into his hands. It was again reconquered by the Russians, but finally remained in the possession of their antagonists.¹

¹ Wilson,
104. Dum.
xvii. 20, 25.
Jom. ii. 363.

69.
Bagavout is
defeated on
the Russian
left.

Nor was the action less warmly contested at Serpalten. Supported by a battery of thirty pieces of artillery and part of the reserve, Bagavout returned to the charge, and there for long made head against the superior forces of St Hilaire and Morand at the head of one of Soult's and one of Davoust's best divisions. At length the two lines advanced to within pistol-shot, when the Russians gave way; the cannoneers, bravely resisting, were bayoneted at their guns, and the pieces were taken. They were now reinforced by two regiments which Benningsen sent to their support, and the French, in their turn, were charged in flank by cavalry, broken, and driven back upwards of three hundred yards. But notwithstanding this success

at Serpalten, the progress of the enemy at Klein-Sausgarten was so alarming, that the Russians were unable to maintain themselves on the ground they had so gallantly regained. Friant debouched from it in their rear in great strength; and, rapidly continuing his advance from left to right of the Russian position, he had soon passed, driving everything before him, the whole ground occupied by their left wing; the guns so fiercely contested were abandoned by the Russians; and, continuing his triumphant course in their rear, he carried by assault the hamlet of Auklappen, and was making dispositions for the attack of Kutschitten, which had been the headquarters of Benningsen during the preceding night, and lay directly behind the Russian centre. Never was change more sudden; the victorious centre, turned and attacked both in flank and rear, seemed on the point of being driven off the field of battle; already the shouts of victory were heard from Davoust's divisions, and vast volumes of black smoke, blown along the whole Russian centre and right from the flames of Serpalten, evinced in frightful colours the progress of the enemy on their left.¹

¹ Wilson,
104, 105.
Dum. xviii.
21, 29. Jom.
ii. 363, 364.

The firmness of Benningsen, however, was equal to the emergency. Orders were despatched to the whole left wing to fall back, so as to come nearly at right angles to the centre and right; and although this retrograde movement, performed in presence of a victorious enemy, was necessarily attended with some disorder, yet it was successfully accomplished; and after sustaining considerable loss, the Russian left wing was drawn up, facing outwards, nearly at right angles to the centre, which still retained its advanced position, midway between the ground occupied by the two armies where the fight began in the morning. As the Russian left drew back to the neighbourhood of the centre, it received the support of the reserves, which Benningsen wheeled about to the assistance of the discomfited wing;² and although Friant

70.
Benningsen
throws back
his left to
arrest the
evil.

Atlas,
Plate 44.

² Wilson,
104, 105.
Jom. ii. 363,
364. Dum.
xviii. 21,
29.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

carried Kutschitten, this was the last advantage he gained in that quarter, and the victorious columns of Davoust were at length arrested.

71.
Lestocq at
length ap-
pears on the
Russian
right, and
restores the
battle.

The battle was in this critical state, with the French victorious on one wing and the Russians on the centre and the other, but without any decisive advantage to either side, when the corps of Lestocq, so long expected, at length appeared on the extreme Russian right, driving before him the French battalions which were stationed near the village of Altholf. Orders were immediately despatched to him to defile as quickly as possible in the rear of the Russian right, so as to assist in the recapture of Kutschitten behind their centre, where St-Hilaire had established himself in so threatening a manner. These directions were rapidly and ably performed. Moving swiftly over the open ground in the rear of the Russian right in three columns, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Kutschitten an hour before it was dark, with seven thousand men, having left two thousand to occupy Altholf, and lost nearly a thousand in the course of the march that morning, which had been a constant fight with Marshal Ney's corps. Dispositions for attacking the village and cutting off the retreat of the enemy were instantly made. A terrible cannonade was kept up on its houses, and the Prussians, under cover of the guns, charging in three columns, carried it with irresistible force, destroying or making prisoners the 51st and one battalion of the 108th regiments stationed there, with an eagle, and recovering the Russian guns which had been abandoned on the retreat from Serpalten. Not content with this great success, Lestocq immediately re-formed his divisions in line, with the cavalry and Cossacks in rear, and advanced against the hamlet of Auklappen and the wood adjoining. The division of Friant, wearied by eight hours' fighting, was little in a condition to withstand these fresh troops, flushed by so important an advantage. The combat, however, was

terrible: Davoust was there; his troops, though exhausted, were more than double the numbers of the enemy; and he made the utmost effort to maintain his ground—"Here," said the marshal, "is the place where the brave should find a glorious death; the cowards will perish in the deserts of Siberia." Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, Friant was driven out of the wood, after an hour's combat, with the loss of three thousand men; the Russians, by a bold attack of cavalry, regained the smoking walls of Auklappen, and the whole Allied line was pressing on in proud array, driving the enemy before them over the open ground between that ruin and Sausgarten, when night drew her sable mantle over this scene of blood.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.
1807.

The battle was over on the centre and left, and already the French lines were illuminated by the fire of innumerable bivouacks, when both armies were startled by a sharp fire, succeeded by loud shouts, on the extreme right of the Russians, towards Schloditten. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney's corps, which, following fast on the traces of Lestocq, had at nightfall entered Altholf, driving the Prussian detachments which occupied it before him, and had now carried Schloditten, and even pushed on to Schmoditten, so as to interrupt the Russian communications with Königsberg. Benningsen immediately ordered the Russian division of Kamenskoi, which had suffered least in the battle, to storm the village, which was executed at ten at night in the most gallant style. The loud cheers of their victorious troops were heard at Eylau; and Napoleon, supposing that a general attack was commencing, for which he was little prepared, gave orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to the position which he had occupied in front of the wood when the action commenced in the morning, and this terminated the changes of this eventful day.²

¹ Dum. xviii.
30, 35.
Wilson, 105,
106. Jom.
ii. 364, 365.

^{72.}
Schloditten
is carried
by Ney, and
retaken by
Bennings-
sen.

² Wilson,
106, 107.
Dum. xviii.
35, 37. Jom.
ii. 365. Bign.
vi. 133, 134.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

73.

Benning-
sen, con-
trary to the
wishes of
his officers,
resolves to
retreat.

From the mortification, however, of retiring before an enemy in an open field, Napoleon was relieved by the measures adopted by the Russian general. At eleven at night a council of war was held by the generals on horseback, as to the course which the army should pursue. It was strongly represented by Ostermann Tolstoy, the second in command, and Generals Knoring and Lestocq, that at last Buona-
parte had been defeated in a pitched battle, and that it would be to the last degree impolitic to destroy the moral effect of such an advantage by retreating before him, and thus giving him a fair pretext for representing it as a victory; that they were ready instantly or next day to follow up their success, and attack the enemy wherever they could find him; and that, at all events, they would pledge their heads that, if the general-in-chief would only stand firm, Napoleon would be driven to a disastrous retreat. Strong as these considerations were, they were overbalanced, in Benningsen's estimation, by still stronger. He knew that his own loss was not less than twenty thousand men, and though he had every reason to believe that the enemy's was still heavier, yet the means of repairing the chasm existed to a greater degree in the hands of Napoleon than his own; Ney, whose corps had suffered comparatively little, had just joined him; Bernadotte, it was to be presumed, would instantly be summoned to headquarters; and these fresh troops might give the enemy the means of cutting him off from Königsberg, in which case, in the total destitution for provisions which prevailed, the most dreadful calamities might be apprehended. Influenced by these considerations, Benningsen, who was ignorant of the enormous magnitude of the losses which the French had sustained, and who, though a gallant veteran, had lost somewhat of the vigour of youth, and had been thirty-six hours on horseback with hardly any nourishment, persevered in his opinion.¹ He accordingly directed the

¹ Wilson,
108, 109.
Jom. ii. 365,
366. Dum.
xviii. 37, 39.

order of march, which began, at midnight, by Mühlhausen towards Königsberg, without any molestation from the enemy. They took post at Wottemberg, three leagues in front of that town, where the wearied soldiers, after a struggle of unexampled severity, were at length enabled to taste a few hours of repose.

Such was the terrible battle of Eylau, fought in the depth of winter, amidst ice and snow, under circumstances of unexampled horror; the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred during the war; and in which, if Napoleon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had wellnigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never in modern times had a field of battle been strewed with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians twenty-five thousand had fallen, of whom above seven thousand were already no more: on that of the French upwards of thirty thousand were killed or wounded, and nearly ten thousand had left their colours, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterwards. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced: the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of twelve eagles taken from their antagonists; while the French had captured sixteen of the Russian guns, and fourteen standards. Hardly any prisoners were made on either side during the action; but six thousand of the wounded, most of them in a hopeless state, were left on the field of battle, and fell into the hands of the French.¹*

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

74.
Results of
the battle,
and losses
on both
sides.

¹ *Jom. ii.*
365. *Dum.*
xviii. 39, 40.
Wilson,
108, 109,
111.

* The official accounts of this great battle on both sides are so much interwoven with falsehood as to furnish no clue whatever to the truth. That of Napoleon is distinguished by more than his usual misrepresentation. He states his loss at 1900 killed and 5700 wounded, in all 7600.² Judging by his usual practice, which was to avow a loss about a fourth of its real amount, this would imply a loss of 30,000 men. At St Helena he admitted that he lost 18,000;³ and considering that the Russians acknowledge a loss of above 20,000, that their artillery throughout the day was greatly superior to that of the French, and that they sustained no loss in any quarter comparable to that of Augereau's corps, which was so completely destroyed that its remains were immediately incorporated with the other corps, and itself disappeared

² 58th *Bulle-*
tin.

³ *Month.*
Melanges,
286.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

75.

Aspect of
the field of
battle on the
following
day.

Never was spectacle so dreadful as that field presented on the following morning. Above fifty thousand men lay in the space of two leagues, weltering in blood. The wounds were, for the most part, of the severest kind, from the extraordinary quantity of cannon-balls which had been discharged during the action, and the close proximity of the contending masses to the deadly batteries, which spread grape at half musket-shot through their ranks. Though stretched on the cold snow, and exposed to the severity of an Arctic winter, the sufferers were burning with thirst, and piteous cries were heard on all sides for water, or assistance to extricate the wounded men from beneath the heaps of slain, or load of horses by which they were crushed. Six thousand of these noble animals encumbered the field, or, maddened with pain, were shrieking aloud amidst the stifled groans of the wounded. Broken gun-carriages, dismounted cannon, fragments of blown-up caissons, scattered balls, lay in wild confusion amidst casques, cuirassiers, and burning hamlets, casting a livid light over a field of snow. Subdued by loss of blood, tamed by cold, exhausted by hunger, the foemen lay side by side amidst the general wreck. The Cossack was to be seen beside the Italian; the gay vine-dresser from the banks of the Garonne lay athwart the stern peasant from the plains of the Ukraine. The extremity of suffering had extinguished alike the fiercest and the most generous passions. According to his usual custom, Napoleon in the afternoon rode over this dreadful field, accompanied by his generals and staff, while the still burning piles of Serpalten and Sausgarten sent volumes of black smoke over the scene of death. But the men exhibited none of

entirely from the Grand Army, it may safely be concluded that this estimate is not exaggerated. "Our loss," says the Duchess of Abrantès, "at Eylau was enormous—Why conceal the truth? The Emperor avowing the truth at Eylau would have appeared to me more truly great than putting forth an official falsehood which no child could believe, more especially if he was nephew or son of Col. Semelé of the 24th regiment of the line, one of the finest in the army, and itself equal almost to a brigade, which was to a man destroyed."—D'ABRANTÈS, ix. 367. Thiers makes the French loss 10,000 men, a number

their wonted enthusiasm ; no cries of *Vive l'Empereur !* were heard ; the bloody surface echoed only with the cries of suffering or the groans of woe. "The spectacle," said Napoleon in his bulletin, "was fitted to inspire princes with the love of peace, and a horror of war." It is this moment which the genius of Le Gros has selected for the finest and most inspired painting that exists of the Emperor, in that noble work which, amidst the false taste and artificial sentiment of Parisian society, has revived the severe simplicity and chastened feeling of ancient art.¹ *

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Dum. xviii.
40, 41. Wilson,
109.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 14, 15.
Thiers, vii.
394.

For nine days after the battle, the French remained at Eylau, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and apparently awaiting some pacific overture from the enemy. The only movement of any consequence which was attempted was by Murat, with twelve regiments of cuirassiers, who approached the Russian position in front of Königsberg ; but he was defeated by the Allied horse, with the loss of four hundred killed and three hundred prisoners. Elated with this success, the Cossacks became daily more enterprising in their incursions. Night and day they gave the enemy no rest in their position ; the French foraging parties were cut off ; and to such a length was this partisan warfare carried, and so completely did the superiority of the Cossacks in its conduct appear, that during the ten days the Emperor remained at Eylau, upwards of fifteen hundred of his cavalry were made prisoners, and brought into Königsberg. Meanwhile the relative situation of the two armies was rapidly changing : the Russians, with the great seaport of Königsberg in their rear, were amply supplied with every-

76.
Inactivity
and losses of
the French
after the
battle.

Atlas,
Plate 44.

Feb. 14.

ridiculously small ; the more especially as he admits that the reports of the different corps engaged presented a total of 13,000 or 14,000 wounded more or less severely.—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 394, note.

* This admirable painting, the masterpiece of modern French art, is to be seen in the Luxembourg at Paris, standing forth in dark simplicity amidst its meretricious compeers : it is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun or Tempesta, and in grandeur of thought and effect far excels any British work of art since the days of Reynolds.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Wils. 109,
111. Dum.
xviii. 49, 51.

77.
Napoleon
calls in all
his rein-
forcements,
and pro-
poses peace.

Feb. 15.

thing, and their wounded carefully nursed in the great hospitals of that city; while the French, still starving on the snows of Eylau, and unable, from the superiority of the Russian horse, to levy requisitions in the surrounding country, were daily reduced to greater straits from want of provisions, and totally destitute of all the accommodations requisite to withstand the rigour of the season.¹

Meanwhile Napoleon, however, was not idle. The day after the battle he issued orders for all the troops in his rear to advance by forced marches to the scene of action. The cuirassiers of Nansouty, which had not been engaged, arrived in consequence two days after. Lefebvre received orders to suspend the blockade of Dantzic, and concentrate his corps at Osterode, in order to form a reserve to the army, and co-operate with Savary, who had the command of Lannes' corps on the Narew. All the bridges on the Lower Vistula were put in a posture of defence, and Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau. Such, however, had been the havoc in the army, that the Emperor, notwithstanding these great reinforcements, did not venture to renew hostilities, or advance against Königsberg, the prize of victory, where he would have found the best possible winter-quarters, and the steeples of which were visible from the heights occupied by his army.* Even the critical position of the Russian army, with its back to the sea and the river Pregel, where defeat would necessarily prove ruin, could not induce Napoleon to hazard another encounter; and finding that the Russians were not disposed to propose an armistice, he determined himself to take that step. For this purpose, General Bertram was sent to Benningsen's outposts with proposals of peace

* When Napoleon began the battle of Eylau, he never doubted he would be in Königsberg next day. In his proclamation to his soldiers, before the action commenced, he said, "In two days the enemy will cease to exist, and your fatigues will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose." And on the same day Berthier wrote to Josephine—"The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen on the road to Russia; to-morrow Königsberg will receive the Emperor."—WILSON, 113.

to the King of Prussia. The Russian general sent him on to Memel, where the latter was, with a letter strongly advising him not to treat, and representing that the fact of Napoleon proposing an armistice after so doubtful a battle, was the best evidence that it was not for the interest of the Allies to grant it. The terms proposed were very different from those offered after the triumph of Jena; there were no more declarations that the house of Brandenburg must resign half its dominions, or that he would make the Prussian nobles so poor that they should be reduced to beg their bread.¹*

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Feb. 17.
¹ Hard. ix.
395, 399.
Lucches.
Bign. vi.
154, 155.

Frederick-William, however, was not led to swerve from the path of honour even by this tempting offer. Widely as the language of the French Emperor differed from that which he had formerly employed, and clearly as his present moderation evinced the extent of the losses he had sustained at Eylau, still the existing situation and recent engagements of the Prussian monarch precluded his entering, consistently with national faith, into a separate negotiation. The Emperor of Russia had just given the clearest indication of the heroic firmness with which he was disposed to maintain the contest, by the vigorous campaign which he had commenced in the depth of winter, and the resolution with which he had sustained a sanguinary battle of unexampled severity. The conduct of England, it is true, had been very different from what it had hitherto been during the Revolutionary war, and hardly any assistance had been received either from its arms or its treasures by the Allies, engaged in a contest of life and death on the shores of the Vistula.

78.
Which is
refused by
Prussia.

* Napoleon's letter to the King of Prussia was in these terms—"I desire to put a period to the misfortunes of your family, and organise as speedily as possible the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediate power is necessary for the tranquillity of Europe. I desire peace with Russia—and, provided the cabinet of St Petersburg has no designs on the Turkish Empire, I see no difficulty in obtaining it. Peace with England is not less essential to all nations; and I shall have no hesitation in sending a minister to Memel to take part in a con-

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

But this disgraceful and parsimonious disposition had recently relented, and some trifling succours had just been obtained from the British government, which, although unworthy for England to offer, were yet gratefully received, as indicating a disposition on the part of its cabinet to take a more active part in the future stages of the struggle.* Under the influence of these feelings and expectations, the Prussian government, notwithstanding the almost desperate situation of their affairs, and the occupation of nine-tenths of their territories by the enemy's forces, refused to engage in any separate negotiation,—an instance of magnanimous firmness in the extremity of danger which is worthy of the highest admiration, and which went far to wipe away the stain that their former vacillating conduct towards Napoleon had affixed on the Prussian ministers.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
158. Parl.
Deb. ix. 987.
Hard. ix.
398. Luc-
ches. i. 290,
291.

79.
Napoleon
retreats and
goes into
canton-
ments on
the Pas-
sarge.

Foiled in his endeavours to seduce Prussia into a separate accommodation, Napoleon was driven to the painful alternative of a retreat. Orders were given on the 17th for all the corps to fall back, the advanced posts being strengthened, in order to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of what was going forward, or commencing a pursuit. Eylau was evacuated; six hundred wounded were abandoned to the humanity of the enemy; and the army, retiring by the great road through Landsberg, spread itself into cantonments on the banks of the Passarge, from Hohenstein, where it takes its rise, to

gress of France, Sweden, England, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey. But as such a congress may last many years, which would not suit the present condition of Prussia, your Majesty therefore will, I am persuaded, be of opinion that I have taken the simplest method, and the one which is most likely to secure the prosperity of your subjects. At all events, I entreat your Majesty to believe in my sincere desire to re-establish amicable relations with so friendly a power as Prussia, and that I wish to do the same with Russia and England.”
—HARD. ix. 396; SCHOELL, viii. 37-405.

* They consisted only of £80,000 in money. A further subsidy of £100,000, and £200,000 worth of arms and ammunition, with the promise of future succours, was furnished by the British government in May following, in return for a solemn renunciation, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, of all claim to the Electorate of Hanover.—HARD. ix. 397; *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 23: *Parl. Deb.* ix. 987.

Braunsberg, where it falls into the Baltic sea. Bernadotte was on the left on the Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden; Soult in the centre, from Zeildorst to Mohrungen; Davoust on the right, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, at the point where the Alle and the Passarge approach most nearly to each other: Ney formed the advanced-guard at Guttstadt between the Passarge and the Alle. Headquarters were established at Osterode in the centre of the line, along with the guard and the grenadiers of Oudinot, who had been brought up; the bulk of the army being thus quartered between that place and Wormditt. Lefebvre received orders to return to Thorn, unite with the Polish and Saxon contingents, and resume the siege of Dantzic, the preparations for which had been entirely suspended since the general consternation which followed the battle of Eylau.¹

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Wilson,
115, 116.
Dum. xviii.
56, 64.

Benningsen hastened to occupy the country which the enemy had evacuated, and on the 25th February his headquarters were advanced to Landsberg. As the Russian army passed over the bloody fields of Eylau and Hoff, still encumbered with dead, and strewn with the remains of the desperate contest of which they had recently been the theatre, they felt that they had some reason to claim the advantage in those well-fought fields; and Benningsen issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he now openly claimed the victory.* Napoleon also addressed his soldiers; but though it was with his usual confidence, yet it was impos-

80.
The Russians advance, and also go into cantonments. Both parties claim the victory at Eylau.

* Benningsen said—"Soldiers! As the enemy was manœuvring to cut us off from our frontiers, I made my army change its position in order to defeat his projects. The French, deceived by that movement, have fallen into the snare laid for them. The roads by which they followed us are strewn with their dead. They have been led on to the field of Eylau, where your incomparable valour has shown of what Russian heroism is capable. In that battle more than thirty thousand French have found their graves. They have been forced to retire at all points, and to abandon to us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage. Warriors! you have now reposed from your fatigues; forward! let us pursue the enemy, put the finishing-stroke to our glorious deeds, and after having, by fresh victories, given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country."—Dumas, xviii. 67.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

sible to conceal from the men, or from Europe, that the Grand Army had now for the first time retreated, and that the remains of their comrades on the field of battle had to trust to the humanity of an enemy for their sepulture.* In truth, however, not only the battle, but the objects of the winter campaign, had been equally divided. It was not to draw the French army from the Vistula to the Passarge, a distance of above a hundred miles, that Benningsen had concentrated his troops, and resumed offensive operations in the depth of winter; and it was not to retire from within sight of the steeples of Königsberg to the wretched villages on the latter stream, that Napoleon had fought so desperate a battle at Eylau. The one struck for Dantzic, the other for Königsberg, and both were foiled in their respective objects: fifty thousand men had perished without giving a decisive advantage to either of the combatants.¹

¹Dum.xviii.
64, 67. Wilson, 116.

81.

Operations
of Essen
against
Savary.
Combat of
Ostrolenka.

Atlas,
Plate 39.

To this period of the Polish war belong the operations of Essen and Savary on the Narew and the neighbourhood of Ostrolenka. Savary had occupied that town with a large part of Lannes' corps, who, as already mentioned, was sick; and Essen having received considerable accessions of force from the army of Moldavia, which raised his disposable numbers to twenty thousand men, received orders, early in February, to attack the French in that quarter. The object was to engage their attention, in order to prevent any reinforcements being drawn from that corps to the main army, then advancing to the decisive battle of Eylau. Essen advanced with his corps on each side of the river Narew. That commanded by the Russian general in person on the right bank encountered Savary, who was supported by Suchet with his brilliant

* Napoleon's address was as follows:—"Soldiers! we were beginning to taste the sweets of repose in our winter quarters, when the enemy attacked the first corps on the Lower Vistula: we flew to meet him; pursued him, sword in hand, for eighty leagues; he was driven for shelter beneath the cannons of his fortresses, and beyond the Pregel. In the combats of Bergfried, Deppen, Hoff, and the battle of Eylau, we have taken sixty pieces of cannon, sixteen standards; killed, wounded, or taken more than 40,000 Russians; the brave who have

division ; a rude conflict ensued, in which the Russians were finally worsted. Greater success, however, attended their efforts on the left bank : supported by the fire of fifty pieces of artillery, they drove back the French to the walls of Ostrolenka, and, entering pell-mell with the fugitives, penetrated into the principal square, and were on the point of obtaining decisive success. At this critical moment, Oudinot, who was marching from Warsaw with his division of grenadiers, six thousand strong, to join the Grand Army, arrived with his division of fresh troops, and, uniting with Suchet, who halted in the midst of his pursuit on the right bank to fly to the scene of danger, succeeded, after a bloody encounter in the streets, in driving them into the sand-hills behind the town, where a destructive cannonade was kept up till nightfall. In this affair the Russians lost seven guns and fifteen hundred men, and the French as many ; but having succeeded in their object in defending the town, and keeping the communication of the Grand Army open with Warsaw, the latter with reason claimed the victory.¹

The battle of Eylau excited a prodigious sensation in Europe, and brought Napoleon to the very verge of destruction. Had a ministry of more capacity in military combination been then at the head of affairs in England, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the triumphs of 1813 might have been anticipated by seven years, and the calamities of Europe at once arrested. The first accounts of the battle received through the French bulletins rendered it evident that some disaster had been incurred, and the anxious expectation everywhere excited by this unsatisfactory communication was increased by the long interval which ensued before the

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

¹ Sav. iii.
36, 39. Wil-
son, 119.
Jom. ii. 367,
368. Dum.
xviii. 69,
75.

82.
Immense
sensation
excited by
the battle of
Eylau in
Europe.

fallen on our side have fallen nobly, like true soldiers. Their families shall receive our protection. Having thus defeated the whole projects of the enemy, we will draw near to the Vistula, and re-enter our winter quarters : whoever ventures to disturb our repose shall repent of it—for beyond the Vistula, as beyond the Danube, in the depth of winter as in the heat of summer, we shall always be the soldiers of the Grand Army.”—DUMAS, xviii. 63.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Russian accounts arrived. At length, when, from Benningsen's report, it appeared that he claimed the victory, and, from the stationary condition of the Russian army in front of Königsberg, and the ultimate retreat of the French to the banks of the Passarge, that these pretensions were not devoid of foundation, the public transport rose to the highest pitch. It was confidently expected that, now that Napoleon had for once been decisively foiled, the Austrians would instantly declare themselves, and their sixty thousand men in observation in Bohemia, be converted into a hundred thousand in activity on the Elbe.* To stimulate and support such a combination, the public voice in England loudly demanded the immediate despatch of a powerful British force to the mouth of the Elbe; and, recollecting the universal exasperation which prevailed in the north of Germany at the French in consequence of the enormous requisitions which they had everywhere levied from the inhabitants, whether warlike or neutral, there cannot be a doubt that the appearance of fifty thousand English soldiers would have been attended with decisive effects both upon the conduct of Austria and the future issue of the war. Nothing, however, was done; the English ministry, under the direction of Lord Howick, notwithstanding the most urgent entreaties from Russia and Prussia, sent no succours in men or money. The decisive period was allowed to pass by without anything being attempted in support of the common cause, and the British nation, in consequence, had the Peninsular war to go through to

* "I trembled," says Jomini, speaking in the person of Napoleon, "lest 150,000 of those mediators had appeared on the Elbe, which would have plunged me into the greatest difficulties. I there saw that I had placed myself at the mercy of my enemies. More than once I then regretted having suffered myself to be drawn on into those remote and inhospitable countries, and having received with so much asperity all who sought to portray its danger. The cabinet of Vienna had then a safer and more honourable opportunity of re-establishing its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813, but it had not resolution enough to profit by it, and my firm countenance proved my salvation."—JOMINI, ii. 369.

regain the vantage-ground which was then within their grasp.*

It is the most signal proof of the obstinacy with which the British government, under the direction of Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, adhered to their ill-timed system of withdrawing altogether from Continental affairs, that they clung to it even after the account of the battle of Eylau had arrived in London, and it was universally seen over Europe that a crisis in Napoleon's fate was at hand. In the end of February 1807, earnest applications were made by the cabinets of St Petersburg and Berlin for the aid of a British auxiliary force to menace the coasts of France and Holland, and land on the shores of Pomerania. The advantage was pointed out of "despatching, without a moment's delay, on board the swiftest ships of Great Britain, a strong British auxiliary land force to co-operate with the army of Gustavus Adolphus, and thereby compel the French to retreat. They were engaged in the siege of Stralsund, and in laying waste that province; and if the British force did not arrive in sufficient time to dislodge them, they might steer for some harbour in the Baltic, from whence their junction with the Allied armies could certainly be effected." Lord Howick replied on the 10th March—"The approach of spring is doubtless the most favourable period of military operations; but in the present juncture the Allies *must not look for any considerable aid from the land force of Great Britain.*"¹

In proportion to the sanguine hopes which this bloody contest excited in Germany and England, was the gloom and depression which it diffused through all ranks in France. The Parisians were engaged in a vortex of

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

83.

Unwise
refusal of
military
succour by
England.

¹ Lucches.
ii. 295, 296.
Desp. be-
tween Eng-
land and
Russia in
1806 and
1807, p.
130.

* "Repeated and urgent applications were made in February and March 1807 for an English army, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to co-operate with the Swedish forces in Pomerania, but in vain. Some subsidies were granted in April, but no troops sailed from England till July, when they consisted only of 8000 men, who were sent to the island of Rugen."—*Ann. Reg.* 1807, p. 23; LUCCHESINI, ii. 290, 296.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

84.

Universal
consterna-
tion at Paris
on the news
being re-
ceived of
Eylau.

unusual gaiety; balls, theatres, and parties succeeded one another in endless succession, when the news of the battle of Eylau fell at once on their festivities like a thunderbolt. They had learned to distrust the bulletins; they saw clearly that Augereau's divergence had been occasioned by something more than the snow-storm. The funds rapidly fell, and private letters soon circulated, and were eagerly sought after, which gave a true and even exaggerated account of the calamity. Hardly a family in Paris but had to lament the loss of some near relation or intimate friend: the multitude of mourners cast a gloom over the streets; the general consternation suspended all the amusements of the capital. The most exaggerated reports were spread, and found a ready reception by the excited population. One day it was generally credited that Napoleon had fallen back behind the Vistula; the next that a dreadful engagement had taken place, in which he himself, with half his army, had fallen. So far did the universal consternation proceed, that the members of the government began to look after their own interests in the approaching shipwreck; and even the imperial family itself was divided into factions, Josephine openly supporting the pretensions of her son, Eugene, to succeed to the throne, and the Princess Caroline employing all the influence of her charms to secure Junot, governor of Paris, whom she held in silken chains, in the interest of her husband Murat.¹

¹ Sav. iii.
42, 43.
D'Abr. ix.
356, 364.

85.

Napoleon
demands a
third con-
scription
since the
beginning of
the war.

The general gloom was sensibly increased when the message of Napoleon, dated March 26, to the conservative senate, announced that a fresh conscription was to be raised of eighty thousand men, in March 1807, for September 1808. This was the *third* levy which had been called for since the Prussian war began; the first when the contest commenced, the second during the triumph and exultation which followed the victory of Jena, the third amidst the gloom and despondency which succeeded the carnage of Eylau. No words can do justice to

the consternation which this third requisition excited amongst all classes, especially those whose children were likely to be reached by the destructive scourge. In vain the bulletins announced that victories were gained with hardly any loss. The terrific demand of three different conscriptions, amounting to no less than *two hundred and forty thousand men, in seven months*, too clearly demonstrated the fearful chasms which sickness and the sword of the enemy had made in their ranks. The number of young men who annually attained the age of eighteen in France, which was the period selected for the conscription, was about two hundred thousand. Thus, in half a year, more than a whole annual generation had been required for a service which experience had now proved to be almost certain destruction. So great was the general apprehension, that the government did not venture to promulgate the order until, by emissaries and articles in the public journals, the public mind had been in some degree prepared for the shock. When it was announced, Regnault St Jean d'Angely, the orator intrusted with the task, shed tears; and even the obsequious senate could not express their acquiescence by any of the acclamations with which they usually received the imperial mandates. So powerful was the public feeling, so visible and universal the expression of terror in the capital, that it was found necessary to assuage the general grief by a clause, declaring that the new levy was at first to be merely organised as an army of reserve for the defence of the frontier, under veteran generals, members of the conservative senate. These promises, however, proved entirely elusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Caudine forks, or the murder of the guerillas in the fields of Spain.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 167,
169, Bign.
vi. 239.

Meanwhile the prodigious activity of the Emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organise

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

86.

Immense
activity of
Napoleon to
repair his
losses.

the new levies, wring the sinews of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depots on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts, for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony, provided for the remounting of the cavalry and the artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions everywhere in Germany,* furnished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the Emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was in fact making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. By indefatigable exertions, and forcing up every sabre and bayonet from the rear, he was ere long enabled to calculate on eighty thousand combatants ready for action on every point which might be threatened on the Passarge: but this was all he could rely on out of three hundred and thirty thousand French and their allies, who formed, or were marching to reinforce, the Grand Army. No less than sixty thousand were in hospital, or had become marauders, and had never rejoined their colours since the desperate shock at Eylau. All the fortresses

* The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost incredible extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoleon at this time; and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own acts, indispensable for the equipment of his troops. By an imperial decree, in March 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish—

200,000 pairs of shoes;
50,000 great-coats;
16,000 coats;
37,000 waistcoats.

M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execu-

on the Rhine and on the Flemish frontier were armed, and put in a posture of defence. The new levy was directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organised into battalions with the coast-guard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and la Vendée. "It is necessary," said he, "that at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surround our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which cover our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation."¹

¹ Bign. vi.
238, 239.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 3.

Neither Napoleon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau. Nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterwards said to the ministers of the French Emperor, "We can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master;" and such, in truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoleon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the *prestige* of opinion or the fervour of passion, whether democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an un-

87.
Extreme
danger of
Napoleon's
situation at
this juncture.

tion of this order, had no alternative but to contract with *English houses* for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the result was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that too at a time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort! A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807 will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources: the magnitude of them almost exceeds belief.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 293, 294.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

broken series of triumphs, are indispensable to the existence of such an authority. It has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has perilled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoleon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances. It obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest.* It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoleon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage-ground which he had gained; which was at once the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain except by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin.

88.
Ruinous
effect of the
surrender of
the Prussian
fortresses.

The Polish winter campaign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the common cause, and in an especial manner to the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lestocq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left, and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right. Whereas, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear—Ney around the walls of Magdeburg, Davoust before Stettin,

* When Lord Ellenborough gave his consent to the second advance of the British to Cabul, in 1841, under Generals Nott and Pollock, he said in his despatches to these generals, "Recollect, a second disaster like that of the Coord-Cabul Pass will lose us our Indian Empire."

Cüstrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches against two French corps; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks, before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organise the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoleon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula—a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line, when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Benningsten's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johansberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland; and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and, if executed with more vigour at the moment of attack, would have led to the most important results. His subsequent retreat in presence of the Grand Army, without any serious loss, and the desperate stand he made at Eylau, as well as the skill with which the attacks of Napoleon were baffled on that memorable field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of that age of glory. Napoleon's advance to Pultusk and Golymin, and subsequently his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg, in the depth of winter, were distinguished by all his usual skill in combination and vigour in execution; but the results were very different from what had attended the turning of the Austrian and Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena. Columns were here cut off, communications threatened, corps planted in the rear, but no tremendous disasters such as had previously been experienced were sustained; the Russians fronted quickly and fought desperately on

89.
Observations on the movements of both parties.

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

every side, and from the hazardous game the assailant suffered nearly as much as the retiring party. A striking proof of what so many other events during the war conspired to demonstrate, that a certain degree of native resolution will often succeed in foiling the greatest military genius, and that it was as much to the want of that essential quality in his opponents, as to his own talents, that the previous triumphs of Napoleon had been owing.

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR FOX'S ADMINISTRATION. FEB. 1806—MARCH 1807.

IF history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and calamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military exploit appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national dispositions. Mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, social interests, the abstract sciences, are cultivated; the violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness; but

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

1.

Important
civil changes
which ori-
ginated dur-
ing the war.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. Selfishness, like a gangrene, then comes to overspread the state, and generosity of feeling, equally with elevation of thought, are lost in the pursuit of private interest. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires ; but we shall look in vain in the authors or statesmen of either for the original thought, vigorous expression, or disinterested feeling, which characterised the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoleon.

2.
Effects of the
accession of
the Whigs
to power.

The accession of the Whig ministry to the direction of affairs was an event eminently calculated to afford full scope for the practical application, to the measures of the legislature, of those ideas of social improvement which the agitation and excitement of the preceding fifteen years had caused to take deep root among a large proportion of the thinking part of the people. The men who had now succeeded to the helm embraced a considerable part of the aristocracy, much of the talent, and still more of the philanthropy of the state. For a long course of years they had been excluded from power ; and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attention to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when the leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which revolutionary principles receive when adopted by the

highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country.

The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system, in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censures which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evident, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoleon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting which can exist in a free country are altogether unequal to those which are at the command of a despotic one, whether monarchical or democratic, unless in those rare periods of public excitement when the intensity of patriotic feeling supplies the want of powers of compulsion on the part of the executive. Accordingly, throughout the whole war, great difficulty had been experienced by the British government in providing a proper supply of soldiers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment—the jealousy of a free constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom—and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve, in 1803, had not been such as to hold out any inducement for a repetition of the attempt. It had not produced thirty-five thousand effective soldiers, though fifty thousand had been the number voted by parliament, and ordered to be raised. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued—it being thought that in a country

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

3.

Their plan
for a new
system for
the recruit-
ing of the
army.

CHAP.
XLV.
1806.

where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service was over might endanger the state, by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment. But the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system, by the introduction of enlistments for a *limited* period of service.

4.
Great
change in
the com-
position of
the army.
Arguments
in support
of it by Mr
Windham.

It was argued in parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially by Mr Windham—"The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel, and when the champion falls the cause is lost. The notion of a levy *en masse* or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened that, when the army was defeated, the contest has been restored by the efforts of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never, perhaps, be made capable of producing much effect in war till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which more than any other two have

decided the present fate of the world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries, then irretrievably worsted, a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men burning with patriotic ardour were around the Emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity.

“Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, how are they to be obtained? above all, how are we to insure to this country, what unquestionably it has never had, a never-failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things—choice or force. In the Continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes; and undoubtedly, wherever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry and force them to become soldiers, there can be no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country. Not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes—a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer suffice,

5.
Impracticability of forced conscription.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

that something effectual must be done ; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us ; but unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed.

6.
Inefficiency
of voluntary
enlistment.

“ Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us, and yet the experience of thirteen years’ warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupations of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army ? Without this, our means of recruiting must be little better than deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price they ask for them ; and, accordingly, none but the ignorant and thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a height has this arisen, that of late years our only resource has been recruiting boys. Men grown up, even with all the grossness, ignorance, and improvidence incident to the lower orders, are too wary to accept our offers ; we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation the weakness and improvidence of youth. The practice of giving bounties is decisive proof of this ; whatever is bestowed in that way shows that the service does not stand upon its true footing. Men require no temptation to engage in a profession which has sufficient inducements of its own. Never can the system of supplying the army be considered as resting upon its proper basis till the necessity of bounties shall have

ceased, and the calling of a soldier shall be brought to the level with other trades and professions, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is frequently paid for permission to enter.

“The great change by which this might, at first sight, appear likely to be effected, is by raising the pay. But independently of the financial embarrassments which any considerable alteration in that respect would produce, there is an invincible objection to such a change in the licentious habits, inconsistent with military discipline, which an undue command of money would generate among the soldiers. Provisions in sickness and old age ; pensions for the wounded ; honorary distinctions suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party, are much safer recommendations ; but, above all, a change in the period of enlistment from life to a limited time, is the great alteration to which we must look for elevating the attractions of the army. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe except our own, and it is the condition of entering that large and efficient part of our own forces, now a hundred thousand strong, which is composed of the regular militia. That this system will have the effect of inducing men to enter, is so clear, so certain, so totally incontrovertible, that it is unnecessary to urge it. There is no man who would not prefer having an option to having none. Our immense armies in India are all raised, and that too without the slightest difficulty, for limited service. A system of rewards for the regular and faithful soldier should also be established ; and that severity of discipline which is at present so much an object of terror to all persons of regular habits, should be materially softened. Not that it will, in all probability, ever be possible to dispense entirely with corporal punishment in the army ; for there are some turbulent spirits who can only be repressed by the fear of it. But the discipline may be rendered infinitely less

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

7.
Means by
which he
proposed to
render it
more effi-
cient.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

rigorous. By this means a better description of men will be induced to enter the army; and the better men you get, the less necessity there will be for severe punishment. By these changes, also, the temptation to desertion will be greatly diminished, the great and alarming frequency of which, of late years, has been mainly owing to high bounties and bad regulations; and in legislating for this matter, it is material to invest courts-martial with a discretionary power to modify the penalty of desertion most materially, or take it away altogether, if it has been committed only in a moment of intoxication, or from the influence of bad example, or the soldier has made amends by returning to his colours.

8.
Advantages
of short
periods of
enlistment
as securing a
better class
of soldiers.

“It is a mistake to argue that the benefits I have proposed to introduce, being for the most part prospective, and to be reaped only at the end of seven or fourteen years, will not influence the inconsiderate description of men who form the great bulk of our common soldiers. That may be true as it relates to the description of men who, under the combined influence of bounties and intoxication on the one hand, and service for life and flogging on the other, almost exclusively enter our service. But the great benefit which may fairly be expected to result from a measure of the sort now proposed is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless or inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages which the military service holds out. Such considerations may frequently, indeed, have little weight with the young man himself, but will they prove equally unavailing with his relations, arrived at a more advanced period of life, and familiar, from experience, with the difficulty of getting on in every profession? What attracts young men of family into the East India Company’s service, notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a lifetime spent in exile, and a climate so deadly that not one in ten survives it? Not present advantages; for the pay, for the

first ten years, barely equals the young man's expenses. It is ultimate benefits : the spectacle of nabobs frequently returning with fortunes ; the certainty that all who survive will become entitled, after a specified period of service, to pensions, considerable with reference to the rank of life to which they belong. Such considerations may not be so decisive with the lower orders as they are with the higher ; but there is no rank to whom the sight of the actual enjoyment of the advantages of a particular profession will not speedily prove an attraction.

“ To effect these objects, I propose that the term of military service should be divided into three periods—viz. seven, fourteen, and twenty-one years for the infantry, but ten, sixteen, and twenty-five for the artillery and cavalry, in consideration of the additional time requisite to render men efficient in those branches of service. At the end of each of these periods, the soldier is to have right to his discharge. If discharged at the close of the first, he is to have right to exercise his trade or calling in any town of the kingdom ; at the end of the second, besides that advantage, to be entitled to a pension for life ; at the end of the third, to the full allowance of Chelsea, which should be raised to 9d., and in some cases to 1s. a-day. If wounded or disabled in the service, to receive the same pension as if he had served out his full time. Desertion to be punished, in the first instance, by the loss of so many years' service ; in very aggravated cases only, by corporal infliction. Great exaggeration appears to have prevailed as to the benefits to be derived from the volunteer system. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that such a force can be brought to such a state of efficiency as to be able to cope with regular forces. Essential service may be derived from such a force, but not in the line to which they have at present been directed. With a view to bring them back to their proper sphere, as they were originally constituted in 1798, it would be advisable to reduce their allowances and relax their dis-

9.
Proposed
limitation of
that period.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 652, 690.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 48,
50.

10.
Reply of the
former min-
isters on the
subject.

cipline. Those corps only which are in a rank of life to equip themselves, and are willing to serve without pay, should be retained; the remainder of the population should be loosely trained, under regular officers, to act as irregular troops. It is not by vainly imitating the dress, air, and movements of regular troops, that a volunteer force can ever be brought to render effectual service. These are my fixed ideas; but as I find a volunteer force already existing, it would not be politic at once to reduce it. All I propose, in the mean time, is to reduce the period of drilling from eighty-five days to twenty-six, and make other reductions which will save the nation £857,000 a-year; all future volunteers to receive their pay only, and the trained bands* to receive a shilling a-day for fourteen days a-year, but not to be dressed as soldiers, nor drilled and exercised as such. Rank should be taken from the volunteer officers; their holding it is a monstrous injustice to the regular army.”¹

To these arguments it was answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning—“At no period of our history has the science, uniformity, and discipline of the British troops been comparable to what it is at this moment; and for these immense benefits the profession at large are aware we are more indebted to the improvements of the present commander-in-chief, (the Duke of York,) than to any other individual in existence. Under his able administration, the army is considerably superior in number to what it ever was at any former period.* The recruiting, as it now exists, is steadily producing sixteen thousand soldiers a-year; and when the act for its future regulation is generally enforced, which is not yet the case, this number may be expected to be greatly increased. Is this a crisis to break up a system producing, and likely to produce, such results? The average tear and wear of

* Regulars and Militia,	1st January 1802,	242,440
...	1st January 1804,	234,005
...	1st March 1806,	267,554

CHAP.
XLV.
1806.

the army is about fifteen thousand a-year ; so that the present system is not only adequate to the maintenance of its numbers, but likely to lead to its increase. The proposed alteration on the term of service in the army is one of the most momentous that parliament can be called on to discuss ; and for this above all other reasons, that the change, once introduced, is irreparable. Be it good or be it bad in its results, it cannot be departed from ; for when the soldiers have once tasted the sweets of limited, they will never submit to the restraints of unlimited, service. Surely, on so vital a subject, and where a false step once taken is irretrievable, it is expedient to proceed with caution, and make the experiment on a small scale, before we organise all our defenders on the new system.

“The system of enlisting for a limited period is no novelty ; its application on a great and universal scale alone is so. For the three last years our endeavours have been directed, while a superior encouragement was held out to persons entering for general service, to obtain at the same time the utmost possible number of men for limited service in the army—both in the army of reserve, and latterly under the Additional Force Act. If, then, we have failed in obtaining an adequate supply of men even under a limited scale, both in time and space, how can we expect to obtain that advantage by taking away one of these limitations ? If, indeed, we could not, under the present system, obtain an adequate force liable to be detached abroad, there might be a necessity for some change in our system ; but when we have one hundred and sixty-five thousand men liable to be sent abroad, and the only check upon so employing them is the necessity of not weakening ourselves too much at home, why should we preclude ourselves from raising, by the present method, such a description of force as experience has proved, in this country at least, is most easily obtained ? The expiry of the soldier’s term of service must, independent

11.
The limited
enlistment
already par-
tially in
operation.

CHAP.

XLV.

1806.

of any casualties, produce a large chasm in the army ; and what security have we, that if the whole or the greater part of the army is raised in that way, a great, it may be a fatal, breach may not at some future period occur in our ranks at the very time when their services are most required ? What the inconvenience of the soldiers being entitled to their discharge at the end of each period during a war is likely to prove upon experience, may be judged of by recollecting how embarrassing this system some years back was found to be in the militia, notwithstanding the great comparative facility of replacing men when serving at home—an embarrassment so great, that it led as a matter of necessity to the extension of the term of service in that branch of our military system. What reason is there to suppose that the soldiers in the regular army will not be as prone as their brethren in the militia to take advantage of the option of a discharge when their title to demand it arrives ? And if so, and this heavy periodical drain be added to the existing casualties of the troops, what chance have we of keeping up a force which even now wants twenty-five thousand men to complete its ranks ?

12.
The circumstances of Great Britain peculiar, and without precedent in those of any foreign state.

“It is in vain to refer to foreign states as affording precedents in point ; their situation is totally different from ours. In Russia unlimited service prevails, and the same was the case in Austria during the best days of the monarchy. In 1797 a similar regulation to the one under discussion was passed prospectively for the future, to take effect at the expiration of a certain number of years, but it has not yet, I believe, been acted upon ; and if it has, the disasters of Hohenlinden and Ulm afford but little reason to recommend its adoption. Napoleon’s soldiers are all raised by the conscription for unlimited service ; and although, in the old French monarchy, troops in sufficient numbers were certainly obtained by voluntary enlistment for limited periods, yet the period of service was more extended than that now proposed ; and the circum-

stances of that country, abounding in men, with few colonies to protect, and still fewer manufactories to draw off its superfluous hands, and a strong military spirit in all classes, can afford no precedent for this country, where employment from the prevalence of manufactures is so much more frequent — whose population is by nearly a half less—which is burdened with a vast colonial empire, all parts of which require defence—and where the natural bent of the people is rather to the sea than the land service. Nor is the reference to our East India possessions more fortunate; for the enlistment for a limited period prevailed in the Company's European regiments for a number of years, yet the battalions raised in this way were always weak in numbers and inefficient, and were all reduced on that very account during Lord Cornwallis's first government of India. All the prepossessions of Mr Pitt were in favour of limited service—his opinions on this subject were repeatedly stated to the house. The opinions of a great variety of military men were taken on the subject; but these opinions were so much divided, that he arrived at the conclusion that the inconveniences and risks with which the change would be attended more than counterbalanced its probable advantages.

“The proposed changes on the volunteer force appear to be still more objectionable. Admitting that it is desirable to reduce the great expense of that part of our establishment; allowing that, now that the corps have attained a considerable degree of efficiency, it may be advisable to diminish considerably the number of days in which they are to serve at the public expense, is that any reason for substituting a tumultuary array, without the dress, discipline, or habits of soldiers, for a body of men qualified not only to act together, but capable, if drafted into the militia or the line, of at once acting with regular soldiers? Will the volunteer corps exist for any length of time under so marked a system of discouragement as it is proposed to impose upon them, without pay, without

13.
Arguments
against the
reduction of
the volun-
teer force.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 652, 706.14.
And in
favour of
raising the
additional
force re-
quired by
ballot.

rank, without public favour? And is this the moment, when the whole military force of the Continent, with the exception of Russia, is in the hands of our enemies, to incur the hazard of substituting, for a voluntary disciplined, a motley array of undisciplined forces, and run the risk of exciting the disaffection of the powerful bands who, at the call of their sovereign, have so nobly come forward for the public defence? ¹

“At the commencement of the present war we raised eighty thousand men for the militia, and fifty thousand for the regular army, by the operation of the ballot. That system has its evils; but when it is indispensable in a given time to raise a large force for the public service, there is no alternative. In recognising this right, however, which flows necessarily from the acknowledged title of the sovereign power to call for the assistance, in times of public danger, of all its subjects, parliament has been careful to fence it round with all the safeguards which the exercise of a prerogative so liable to abuse will admit of. It is determined by lot; the person drawn has the option to provide a substitute; and this is the footing upon which the militia stands. A still further limitation exists where the call is made, not upon the individual, but the district; and the district is allowed the option, instead of providing the man, to pay a fine; and this is the principle on which the Additional Force Bill, at present in operation, which we are now called on to repeal, is founded. But the ballot for the militia is, by the proposed change, to cease on the termination of the war; it then ceases to be a militia, and becomes a part of the regular force raised by the crown. The act proposed to be repealed is producing at the rate of eighteen thousand recruits a-year; besides the men raised by ballot for the militia. Proposing, as the ministers now do, to abandon at once both these resources, are they prepared to show that the new measures will supply this great deficiency? Would it not be expedient first to try the experiment on

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 967, 990.

a small scale, to be assured of its success, before we commit the fortunes of the state to the result of the experiment? It is an old military maxim, not to manœuvre in presence of an enemy; but the measures now in agitation do a great deal worse, for they not only change the composition of your force, but shake the loyalty and submission of the soldiers, in presence of the most formidable military power Europe has ever witnessed.”¹

The bill met with a most strenuous opposition, although the early divisions which took place upon it evinced a preponderance in favour of ministers;* but it at length passed both houses by a decided majority, the number in the peers being ninety-seven to forty—giving a majority to ministers of fifty-seven. The clauses regarding the volunteer force, however, were abandoned or modified in the ultimate stages of the discussion, the effect of the bill as to them being limited to a proper restriction of the period of permanent duty. But the great principle of enlisting for a limited service was by its passing introduced into the British army, and has never since been totally abandoned; and, considering the great achievements which it subsequently wrought, and the vast consumption of life which the new system adequately supplied, its introduction is to be regarded as a memorable era in the history of the war.²

^{15.}
The bill
passes.² Ann. Reg.
1806, 62.

If called upon to decide in favour of one or other of the able arguments urged on the opposite sides of this important question, it might perhaps be no easy matter to say on which the weight of authority and reason preponderated. But experience, the great resolver of political difficulties, has now settled the matter, and proved that Mr Windham rightly appreciated the principles of human nature on this subject, and was warranted in his belief that, without any increase of pay, limited service, with

^{16.}
Reflections
on the mea-
sure.

* The division which decided the principle of the bill took place on March 14, 1806, when the numbers were—Ayes, 235; Noes, 119: Majority, 116.—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, p. 54.

CHAP.
XLV.
1806.

additional encouragements in the way of retiring allowances and privileges, would provide a force perfectly adequate even to the most extensive military operations of Great Britain. From the official returns, it appears that the rate of recruiting rose in a rapid and striking manner after the system of limited service was adopted, and, before the expiration of a year from the time it was first put in force, had largely increased the annual supply of soldiers for the army.* Though variously modified, the same system prevailed during the remainder of the war, at least to a certain extent, with perfect success in every branch of the service; and to its influence, combined with the improved regulations for discipline, pay, and retiring allowances, great part of the glories of the Peninsular campaigns is to be ascribed. On examining the confident opinions expressed by many eminent and respectable military men on the impossibility of providing an adequate supply of force for the English army by such a method, it is difficult to avoid the inference, that implicit reliance is not always to be placed on the views of practical men in legislative improvements; that their tenacity to existing institutions is often as great as the proneness of theoretical innovators to perilous change. Little credit is to be given to the most eminent professional persons when they claim for the people of a particular country an exemption from the ordinary principles of human nature; and true political wisdom is to be

* OLD SYSTEM.

	RECRUITS.
January 1 to July 1, 1805,	10,923
July 1, 1805, to January 1, 1806,	9,042
January 1 to July 1, 1806,	10,783
July 1, 1806, to January 1, 1807,	6,276

(New system in operation on January 1, 1807.)

NEW SYSTEM.

	RECRUITS.
January 1 to July 1, 1807,	11,412
July 1, 1807, to January 1, 1808,	7,734
Rate of recruiting from January 1 to April 1, 1808,	21,000
Ditto from April 1 to July 1, 1808,	24,000

—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 40, 41.

gathered, not by discarding the lessons of experience, but by extending the basis on which they are founded, and drawing conclusions rather from a general deduction of the history of mankind, than from the limited views, however respectably supported, of particular individuals.

To these observations on Mr Windham's military system, however, one exception must be made in regard to that part of his plan which related to the volunteers. There can be no doubt that in this particular he did not display the same knowledge of human nature which was elsewhere conspicuous in his designs. Admitting that the volunteers were very far indeed from being equal to the regular forces—that their cost was exceedingly burdensome, and that they could not be relied on as more than auxiliaries to the army—still in that capacity they were most valuable, and were not only qualified to render some service by themselves, but of incalculable importance as forming a reserve to replenish the ranks of the regular forces. The campaigns of 1812 and 1813 in Russia and Germany demonstrate of what vast service such a force, progressively incorporated with the battalions of the regular army, comes to be in real warfare, when the ranks of the latter are thinned, and how rapidly they acquire the discipline and efficiency of veteran troops. In this view the tumultuary array of Mr Windham, without the clothing, discipline, or organisation of soldiers, could have been of little or no utility. Nor is it of less moment that the volunteer system, by interesting vast multitudes in the occupations, feelings, and honour of soldiers, powerfully contributes to nourish and expand that military ardour in all ranks which is indispensable to great martial achievements. Veteran troops, indeed, may smile when they behold novices in the military art imitating the dress, manners, and habits of soldiers; but the experienced commander, versed in the regulating principles of human exertion, will not deem such aids to patriotic ardour of little importance, and will willingly

17.
Error of the
ministerial
plan so far
as regards
the volun-
teers.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

fan the harmless vanity which makes the young aspirant imagine that his corps has in a few weeks acquired the efficiency of regular forces. Imitation even of the uniform, air, and habit of soldiers, is a powerful principle in transferring the military ardour to the breasts of civilians. Philopœmen judged wisely when he recommended his officers to be sedulously elegant in their habiliments, arms, and appointments. He was well acquainted with human nature who said, that to women and soldiers dress is a matter of no ordinary importance. Many nations have been saved from slavery by the passion for what an inexperienced observer would call mere foppery.

18.
Temporary
service now
in a great
degree aban-
doned.

In later times, the system of temporary service has been in a great degree superseded in the British army, and nearly all recruits are now enlisted for life. And in weighing the comparative merit of these two opposite systems, it will probably be found that the plan of enlisting men for limited periods is the most advisable in nations in whom the military spirit runs high, or the advantages of the military service are such as to secure at all times an ample supply of young men for the army, and where it is of importance to train as large a portion as possible of the population to the skilful use of arms, in order to form a reserve for the regular force in periods of danger; and that enlistment for life is more applicable to those nations or situations where no national danger is apprehended, and it is the object of government rather to secure a permanent body of disciplined men, subject to no cause of decrease but the ordinary casualties of the service, in the ordinary pacific duties, than spread far and wide through the nation the passion for glory or the use of arms. A provident administration will always have a system established, capable either of contraction or expansion, which embraces both methods of raising soldiers; and this, for nearly thirty years, has been the case with the British army.

Important as the matter thus submitted to parliament

in its ultimate consequences undoubtedly was, when it is recollected what a great and glorious part the British army bore in the close of the struggle, it yet yielded in magnitude to the next great subject which the new ministers brought forward for consideration. This was the ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE—a measure which, in its remote effects, seems destined to affect the fortunes of half the human race. This great change was not finally completed till the following session of parliament; but the preparatory steps were taken in this, and it belongs properly to the present period of English history, which treats of the measures of the Whig administration.

It was urged by Mr Hibbert and the advocates of the West India interest, both in and out of parliament, "The British West India islands were settled, and have ever been cultivated, under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and those acts of parliament, which have confirmed these plantations in the most perfect assurance that they should continue to receive supplies of negroes from Africa. The agriculture of these colonies cannot be carried on except by means of slave labour; and the cultivation of their interior, which is indispensable to their security, cannot be promoted if the slave trade be abolished. If this bill shall pass into a law, the very worst effects may be anticipated from the change, not only to the colonies themselves, but to the general interests of the empire. The commerce which the West Indies maintain is the most important of the whole British dominions. It pays annually in duties to the public treasury upwards of £3,000,000; employs more than sixteen thousand seamen; contributes one-third to the whole exports, and one-third to the imports; takes off £6,000,000 a-year worth of domestic manufactures; and is pre-eminently distinguished above all others by this important feature, that it is all within ourselves, and not liable, like other foreign trade, to be turned to our disadvantage on a rupture with the power with whom it is conducted. This measure,

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

19.
Abolition of
the slave
trade.

20.
Arguments
against the
change by
the West
India inter-
est.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

however, if carried into effect, must in a few years diminish the property vested in the British West India islands, and open the means of rapidly advancing the progress of rival colonies, to whom the advantages of a full supply of negroes will still remain open. It must forbid the supply of losses to the negro population, which originate in accident or diseases peculiar to the climate, and which the most humane and provident management is unable altogether to prevent ; stop the completion of establishments already begun ; and altogether prevent the extension of cultivation into the interior of the islands, without which they can never either attain a state of security, or reach the degree of wealth and splendour of which they are susceptible.

21.

Alleged evil
effects of
abolition of
the trade.

“ The most disastrous effects, both to individuals and the public, may be anticipated from the ultimate consequences of the measure under consideration. Not to mention the confusion and ruin which it must occasion to families ; the capital now sunk in cultivation which it must destroy ; the calamities attendant on revolt and insurrection which it will in all probability occasion ; the emigration it will induce in all who have the means of extricating themselves or their capital from so precarious a situation ; the despair and apathy which it will spread through those who have not means of escape ; what incalculable evils must it produce among the black population ! The abolition of the slave trade is a question which it is at all times perilous to agitate, from the intimate connexion which it has in the minds of the negroes with the abolition of slavery itself, and the necessary effect which it must have in perpetuating the discussion of that subject in the mother country, to the total destruction of all security in the planters, or repose in the minds of the slave population. From the moment that this bill passes, every white man in the West Indies is sleeping on the edge of a volcano, which may at any moment explode and shiver him to atoms. Throwing out of view altogether all

considerations of interest, and viewing this merely as a question of humanity, it is impossible to contemplate without the utmost alarm the perils with which it is fraught. The existence of a Black power in the neighbourhood of the most important island of the British West Indies, affords a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade. It is impossible to contemplate that volcano without the deepest alarm, nor forget that its horrors were produced by well-meant but ill-judged philanthropy, similar to that which is the prime mover in the present question.¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 831.

“It is a total mistake to suppose that the evils, enormous and deplorable as they are, of Central Africa arise from the slave trade. Those evils are the consequence of the cruel habits and barbarous manners of its inhabitants; they existed for thousands of years before the slave trade was heard of, and will continue for thousands of years after it is extinct. Civilise the interior of that vast continent—humanise the manners of its inhabitants—abolish the savage practice of selling or putting to death captives made in war, and you indeed make a mighty step towards extirpating the evils which we all lament. But as long as these savage customs prevail; as long as the torrid zone is inhabited by a thousand tribes engaged in contests with each other, and with all of whom slavery to prisoners made in war is the only alternative for death, it is hopeless to expect that the stoppage even of the whole vent which the purchase of negroes by Europeans affords, would sensibly affect the general prevalence of the slave traffic. What are the fifty thousand whom they annually transport across the Atlantic, to the innumerable multitudes who are driven across the Sahara desert, or descend to Egypt for the vast markets of the Mussulman world? But to suppose that the partial stoppage of it in the British dominions, that the prohibition to transport the

22.

The slave trade asserted not to be the cause of the degraded state of Africa.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

fifteen thousand negroes who are annually brought to our shores, could have a beneficial effect, is ridiculous. So far from producing such a result, its tendency will be diametrically the reverse : it will drive the slave trade from the superior to the inferior channel : from the great merchants of Liverpool, who have done so much—for their own interest, perhaps, but still done so much—to diminish its horrors, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are as yet totally unskilled in its management, and treat the captives with the utmost barbarity. As our own colonies decline from the stoppage of this supply of labourers, those of the other nations who have not fettered themselves in the same way will augment ; the cultivation of sugar for the European market will ultimately pass into other hands, and we shall in the end find that we have cut off the right arm of our commerce and naval strength only to augment the extent and increase the horrors of the slave trade throughout the world.”¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 979, 993.

23.
Arguments
of Mr Wil-
berforce and
others for
the aboli-
tion.

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr Wilberforce, Lord Howick, and Lord Grenville—“ A higher principle than considerations of mere expedience—the dictates of justice—require that this infamous traffic should be abolished. Were it merely a question of humanity, we might consider how far we should carry our interference ; were the interests of the British empire alone involved, it might possibly be a matter of expedience to stop a little short of total abolition. But in this instance, imperious justice requires us to abolish the slave trade. Is it to be endured that robbery is to be permitted on account of its profits ? Justice is still the same ; and you are called upon in this measure, not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but to your own planters ; to interfere between them and their otherwise certain destruction ; and, despite their fears, despite their passions, despite their prejudices, rescue them from impending ruin. This trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in. When it is recollected what

guilt has been incurred in tearing the Africans, by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their social ties, their country, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery ; when it is considered also that the continuance of this atrocious traffic must inevitably terminate in the ruin of the planters engaged in it, surely no doubt can remain that its instant abolition is called for by every motive of justice and expedience.

“ Much is said of the impossibility of maintaining the supply of negroes in the West Indies, if the slave trade is abolished. Are we, then, to believe that the Divine precept, ‘ Increase and multiply,’ does not extend to those islands ? that the fires of youth, adequate to the maintenance and growth of the human species in all other countries and ages of the world, are there alone, in the midst of plenty, unequal to their destined end ? But the fact is adverse to this monstrous supposition ; and it is now distinctly proved that the slave colonies are perfectly adequate to maintain their own numbers.* The excess of deaths above births in Jamaica is now only 1-25th per cent ; and when it is recollected that the registers of mortality include the deaths among the negroes who are newly arrived and set to work, which always amounts, between those who perish in the harbours and shortly after being set to work, to at least 10 per cent, it is evident that the numbers of settled Africans are more than maintained by their own increase. Nor is the argument that the importation of negroes is requisite to cultivate the waste lands in the interior of the islands better founded. If the numbers of the Africans increase, it is altogether incredible that their labours should not be adequate to clear the wastes of those diminutive islands.

24.
Their answer to the assertion of the necessity of the trade to maintain the supply of negroes.

* Excess of deaths above }
births in Jamaica from }

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

... ..

1698 to 1730,

1730 to 1755,

1755 to 1769,

1769 to 1780,

1780 to 1800,

3½ per cent.

2½ per cent.

1½ per cent.

3-5th per cent.

1-25th per cent.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

According to the most moderate computation, it would require the slave trade to be continued for two centuries to cultivate the whole interior of Jamaica and Trinidad ; and can it be endured that so frightful a traffic as this, fraught as it must be with the tearing of above two millions of Africans from their families and country, should be continued for such a period, for an object which, in one-fourth of the time, might, by the native increase of their numbers in those islands, be attained ? *

25.
Alleged
gradual im-
provement
of the race
should the
trade be
abolished.

“ Let us, then, instantly abolish this infamous traffic ; and we may then with confidence look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree the natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection afforded them : and they may gradually be prepared for that character, when the blessings of freedom may be securely extended to them. Throughout all history we shall find that slavery has been eradicated by means of the captives being first transformed into predial labourers, attached to the soil, and from that gradually ascending to real freedom. We look forward to the period when the negroes of the West India islands, become labourers rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country which has extended to them these benefits, and when they may be securely called on to share largely in the defence of those islands, in which at present they are only a source of weakness. The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave trade is, that by closing that supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all their undertakings, we shall *compel* them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their

* It is now completely demonstrated, by an experiment on the greatest scale, that the African race, even when in a state of slavery, is not only able to maintain its own numbers, but rapidly to increase them. In the slave states of America there are 2,200,000 negroes ; and from 1790 to 1830, the whites have augmented in the proportion of 80 to a hundred ; but the blacks in that of 112 to 100. The proportion since that time has been rather, though but little, in favour of the increase of the white race.—TocQUEVILLE's *Democracy in America*, ii. 345, 346, note ; and *Census 1841, America*.

own estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus, not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented, in so far at least as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that, too, on the securest of all foundations—the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

“It is in vain to argue, that, according to the barbarous customs of Africa, captives made in war are put to death, and that if the outlet of the slave trade is closed, the reproach to humanity arising from the sale of captives will be prevented from taking place. The most recent and intelligent travellers, on the contrary, have informed us, what every consideration on the subject *a priori* would lead us to expect, that the existence of the slave trade is itself, and ever has been, the great bar to the civilisation of the interior of Africa, by the temptation held out to the chiefs on the coast to engage in the traffic of negroes, and the continual encouragement thus afforded to the princes in the interior to carry on constant wars, from the vast profit with which the sale of their captives is attended. It forms, in fact, with a great many of these robber chieftains, a chief branch of revenue. If we would promote, therefore, the great and truly Christian work of civilising Central Africa, we must first commence with abolishing the slave trade; for as long as it continues, the selfishness and rapacity of the native chiefs will never cease to chain its unhappy inhabitants to a life of violence and rapacity in the powerful, of misery and degradation in the poor. The argument that, if we do not carry on the slave trade, some other nations will, possibly with less commiseration for the sufferings of the captives, if admitted, would shake to their foundation every principle of public and private morality. At that rate every band of robbers might plead in their justification, that if they

26.
Its demoralising effect
on Africa.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

did not knock down and plunder travellers, other banditti might do the same, and possibly superadd murder to their other atrocities, and therefore the lucrative rapine should not be discontinued. This argument, however, bad as it is, has not even the merit of being founded on fact. If we abolish the slave trade, who is to take it up? The Americans have already preceded us in the race of humanity, and fixed a period in 1808 when the traffic is immediately to cease; and a bill is at present in progress through their legislature, to affix the penalty of death to a violation of this enactment. How are France and Spain to carry it on, when they have hardly a ship on the ocean? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and where is she to get capital to carry it on?

27.
Abolition
tends to
promote the
gradual
abrogation
of slavery
itself.

“The dangers, so powerfully drawn, as likely to result from this measure, are really to be apprehended, not from it, but from another, with which it has no connexion, viz., the immediate emancipation of the negroes. This, it is said, flows necessarily from the step now about to be taken; if you do not follow it up in this manner, you stop short half-way in your own principles; in fact, the ulterior measure, if the first be adopted, cannot be averted. It is to be hoped, indeed, that this great step will, in the end, lead to the abolition of slavery in all our colonies; but not in the way or with the dangers which are anticipated. On the contrary, it is here that another of the great benefits of the measure under consideration is to be found. By the effects of this measure it is to be hoped *slavery will gradually wear out without the intervention of any positive law*, in like manner as it did in a certain degree in the states of Greece and Rome, and some parts of the states of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom; and as has been permitted with the happiest effects in the colonies of Spain and Portugal. In America, measures for the gradual emancipation of the negroes have been adopted, and nothing could conduce more powerfully to insubordina-

tion, than if, by the continuance of the trade, similar steps were not to be induced in the West India islands, and the slaves there were perpetually tantalised by the sight of the superior comforts of their brethren on the mainland. The dangers apprehended *would indeed be real, if immediate emancipation were to be proposed*, for that would produce horrors similar to those which have happened in St Domingo. But nothing of that kind is in contemplation; on the contrary, it is expressly to exclude them, and to induce that gradual emancipation which is called for, alike by justice to the planters and the interests of the slaves themselves, that the measure under discussion is proposed.”¹

CHAP.
XLV.
1806.

¹ Parl. Deb.
viii. 652,
668, 947,
955.

The latter arguments, enforced with much eloquence, and supported by the great principles of Christian charity, prevailed with the legislature. By a series of enactments, passed in the course of the session of 1806, the slave trade was restrained within very narrow limits; and at length, in the succeeding session, it was entirely abolished, and the penalty of transportation affixed to every British subject engaged in it. The numbers were, in the Commons, 283 to 16—majority, 267; in the Peers, 100 to 36—majority, 64: and thus was the stain of trafficking in human flesh for ever removed from the British name.² Lord Grenville concluded his speech with these eloquent words: “I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that eminent person, (Mr Wilberforce,) on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life carried into effect—a measure so truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous prosperity of his country and the welfare of mankind—a measure which will diffuse happiness among millions now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn.”³

28.
The abolition
is
carried.
June 11.

Feb. 23,
1807.

² Parl. Deb.
viii. 672,
995.

³ Parl. Deb.
viii. 664.

There can be no question that this great step was recommended by every consideration of justice and

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

29.

Deplorable
effects of
the change
hitherto on
the negro
race.

humanity; nevertheless its effects hitherto have been in the highest degree deplorable. Never was there a more striking example than this subject has afforded in its later stages of the important truth, that mere purity of intention is not sufficient in legislative measures, and that unless human designs are carried into execution with the requisite degree of foresight and wisdom, they often become the sources of the most heart-rending and irremediable calamities. The prophecy of Mr Hibbert and the opponents of the abolition, that the slave trade, instead of ceasing, would only change hands, and at length fall into the management of desperate wretches who would double its horrors, has been too fatally verified, and to an extent even greater than they anticipated. From the returns laid before parliament, it appears that the slave trade is now *four times* as extensive as it was in 1789, when European philanthropy first interfered in St Domingo in favour of the African race, and twice as great as it was when the efforts of Mr Wilberforce procured its abolition in the British dominions. Great and deplorable as were the sufferings of the captives in crossing the Atlantic, in the large and capacious Liverpool slave ships, they are as nothing compared to those which have since been, and are still, endured by the negroes in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese traders, where several hundred wretches are stowed between decks in a space not three feet high; and in addition to the anguish inseparable from a state of captivity, they are made to endure, for weeks together, horrors like those of the Black-hole of Calcutta. Nearly two hundred thousand captives, chained together in this frightful manner, now annually cross the Atlantic; and they are brought, not to the comparatively easy life of the British West India islands, but to the desperate servitude of Cuba or Brazil; in the latter of which several hundred negroes are worked like animals, in droves together, without a single female among them;¹ and, without any attempt to perpe-

¹ Walsh's
Brazil, ii.
474, 485.

tuate their race, they are worn down by their cruel taskmasters to the grave by a lingering process, which on an average terminates their existence in seven years!*

CHAP.
XLV.
1806.

This lamentable and heart-rending result of such persevering and enlightened benevolence, however, must not lead us to doubt the soundness or humanity of the principles which Mr Wilberforce so eloquently advocated, or to imagine that the general rules of morality are inapplicable to this question, and that here alone in human affairs it is lawful to do evil that good may come of it. The observation, that it was our duty to clear our hands of the iniquity, leaving it to Providence to eradicate the evil in others at the appointed time, was decisive of the justice of the measure; the evident necessity which it imposed on the planters of attending, for their own sakes, to the comforts of the negroes, and providing means for the multiplication of their numbers, was conclusive as to its expedience. It is not the abolition of the slave trade, but the subsequent continuance of

30.
But they are not chargeable on its authors, but subsequent changes.

* The number of slaves annually imported into the slave countries of the New World from Africa in 1789, was somewhat under 50,000, of whom about 15,000 crossed in English vessels—now the number is at least 200,000. It appears from the Consular Returns to parliament, that in 1829, 74,653 slaves were embarked for *Brazil alone* from the African coast, of whom 4579 died in the short passage of one month; and in the first half of 1830 the numbers were no less than 47,258, of whom 8 per cent died on the passage. At the same period 13,000 were annually imported into the Havannah, and at least an equal number into the other slave colonies, making in the year 1830 about 130,000.¹ But these numbers, great as they are, have now received a vast increase from the effects of the British slave emancipation act, passed in 1833. In fifteen months, ending January 1835, there sailed from the single port of Havannah 170 slave ships, each capable of containing, on an average, at least 400 persons; the importation of slaves into Cuba is now above 55,000 a-year, while the numbers imported into Brazil, from the stimulus given to slave labour by the anticipated decline of produce in the British islands consequent on that measure, have increased in nearly the same proportion. Nor is it surprising that, in spite of all the efforts of the British government, and all the vigilance of the British cruisers, this infernal traffic should now advance at this accelerated pace; for such is the demand for slaves, occasioned by the continual decline in the cultivation of sugar in the British West India islands, under the combined influence of heavy taxation and the emancipation act, that the profit on a single cargo of slaves imported into the Havannah is 180 per cent, and the adventurers cannot be considered as losers if one vessel arrives safe out of *three* despatched from the coast of Africa.—*Parl. Pap.* 1830, A. 115, 116.

Enormous present extent and horrors of the slave trade.

¹ *Parl. Pap.* 1830, B. 82, 89, 138.

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

ruinous fiscal exactions, and at last the irretrievable step of unqualified emancipation, which have given this deplorable activity to the foreign slave trade. The increase in the foreign slave colonies for the last twenty years, at a time when the British West India islands were comparatively stationary, has been so rapid, that it is evident some powerful and lasting causes have been at work to occasion it.* These causes are to be found, in a great measure, in the heavy duties on British colonial produce, amounting at first to 30s., then to 27s., and latterly to 24s., on each hundredweight of sugar, from which the foreign growers were exempted in the supply of foreign markets. This enormous burden, which, on an average of prices since 1820, has been very nearly seventy-five per cent on that species of produce, has, notwithstanding all their efforts, for the most part, if not entirely, fallen on the producers.† The disastrous effects of these combined

Immense increase of produce in the slave colonies of late years. Comparatively stationary condition of the British islands.

* Twelve years ago, the only exports of Puerto-Rico were cattle and coffee, and the only sugar she received was from importation. In 1833 she exported 33,750 tons—more than a sixth of the whole British consumption. The export of the sugar from Cuba was, on an average of 1814, 1815, and 1816, 51,000 tons; in 1833 it had risen to 120,000 tons. In 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average exports of sugar from Brazil were 26,250 tons; in 1833, though a bad year, the exports were 70,970 tons. The increase, since the Emancipation Act passed, has been still greater; but no official accounts of these years have yet been made public.—See *Parl. Report* "On the Commercial State of the West Indies," p. 286.

On the other hand, the produce of the British West India islands, during the same period, has been comparatively stationary. The colonial produce exported from those islands to Great Britain in the year 1812, was 154,200 tons of sugar, and 6,290,000 gallons of rum; in 1830, 185,000; and in 1833, 205,000 tons of sugar, and 7,892,000 gallons of rum: the shipping in the first period was 180,000; in the last, 263,330 tons. The total value of the produce of the islands in the first period was £18,516,000; in the last, including all the colonies gained by the peace of Paris in 1814, only £22,496,000.—PEBRER, 399; COLQUHOUN, 378-381; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, 124-126.

Enormous fiscal injustice to which they have been exposed.

† There is no opinion more erroneous than that commonly entertained, that the import duties on sugar, like other taxes on consumption, fall on the purchaser. There is always, indeed, a struggle between the producer and consumer, as to who should bear the burden—but it is not always in the power of the former to throw it on the latter. In this instance the attempt has almost totally failed. It appears from the curious table of prices compiled by Mr Colquhoun, that even during the high prices of the years from 1807 to 1812, the West India proprietors paid from a *third* to a *half* of the duties on sugar, without being able to lay it on the consumers; the average of what they paid for those years being £1,115,251 per annum. The estimated revenue of these

measures cannot be better stated than in the words of Lord Sidmouth: "Much good might have been done by regulations on the coast of Africa, in the middle passage, and in the West Indies. But now we have rashly taken the bull by the horns, and while the consequences have been most injurious to our colonies and ourselves, they have in the same degree been beneficial to the maritime strength, commerce, and navigation of other nations, our rivals in peace and enemies in war; and the mass of human wretchedness, so far as the slave trade itself is concerned, is not only not diminished, but augmented, in its amount, and frightfully aggravated in its degree and character."¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

¹ Pellew's
Life of
Sidmouth,
ii. 430.

"Inani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus unqui,
Ultra quam satis est, virtutem qui petat ipsam."

Nor is this all—the precipitate and irretrievable step of emancipation, forced on the legislature by benevolent

proprietors, during these years, was under £4,000,000; so that, at that period, they paid nearly thirty per cent on their incomes to government. In addition to this, it was proved by the documents laid before the committee of the House of Commons in February 1831, that an annual burden of £1,023,299 was laid on the British West India islands, in consequence of the enhancement of the price of necessary articles to which they were exposed under the restrictive system. In this way, even under the high prices from 1807 to 1812, they were paying at least fifty per cent on their incomes in taxation; and as the price, since that time, of their produce, has fallen at least *two-thirds*, with a reduction of only a *ninth* (3s.) on the import duty, it may be safely concluded, that, since 1820, the West India proprietors have paid, directly and indirectly, at least *seventy-five* per cent on their income to government; and in the years when prices were low, at least a hundred per cent. Nothing more is required to explain the distressed condition of these colonies, even before the emancipation bill was passed, which at once, without any equivalent, confiscated at least sixty per cent of their remaining property. The value of slaves was estimated by Colquhoun, in 1812, at £55 a-head; but in 1833, when the act passed, it had risen to at least £75 overhead, notwithstanding the change in the value of money; and the compensation-money (£20,000,000 on 634,000 slaves) will not, after all deductions are made, yield £25 a-head, or more than thirty-three per cent to the proprietors. Few such instances of the destruction of property by fiscal and legislative enactments are to be found in the history of mankind.—See FERBER, 394 and 397; COLQUHOUN, 59, 325; and *Commons' Reports on West India Affairs*, 7th February 1831.

It is frequently said that the increase in the produce of these colonies, since the peace, is a proof that their alleged distresses are either unfounded or exaggerated. This is a complete mistake; the planters had no other way to meet the enormous fiscal burdens laid upon them, since a diminution in the cost of production was out of the question, after the abolition of the slave trade, but by

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

31.

Ruinous
effects of
emancipa-
tion of
negroes.

but incautious and mistaken feeling, has already occasioned so great a decline in the produce of the British West Indies, and excited such general expectations of a still greater and increasing deficiency, that the impulse thereby given to the foreign slave trade to fill up the gap has been unbounded, and, it is to be feared, almost irremediable.* Since the disastrous measure of emancipation, the agricultural produce of the British West Indies has declined fully a half; in some branches of produce, fallen to a *third* of its former amount; and such is the indolence of the black population, and their general disinclination to steady and combined industry, that cultivation is in general carried on in these islands at a loss; and the time is, it is to be feared, not far distant,

making the utmost exertions to augment its quantity; and thence the increase of colonial produce, which, by perpetuating the lowness of price, rendered it totally impossible for them to lay the enormous import duty, now one hundred per cent, on the consumers. Like a man sunk in a bottomless bog, all the efforts they could make for their extrication, tended only to land them deeper and more irretrievably in the mire.

* The following table shows the decline of colonial produce exported from Jamaica under the first year of the emancipation act:—

Sugar.			Rum.		Coffee.	
Years.	Cwts.	Hogsheads.	Puncheons.	Gallons.	Casks.	lbs.
1834	1,525,154	79,465	30,676	3,189,949	22,384	17,859,277
1835	1,319,023	68,087	27,038	2,660,687	13,495	10,489,292
Decrease,	206,131	11,378	3,638	529,262	8,889	7,369,985

Rapid decline
of West In-
dia produce
since eman-
cipation.

Taking an average of these various sorts of produce, it is evident that, notwithstanding an uncommonly fine season, and the vigorous exertions of the stipendiary magistrates, the produce of the island fell off in one year nearly a fourth of its total amount! The parliament of Jamaica, in their address to the governor of the island on August 10, 1835, observed—"There never was a finer season or more promising appearance of canes; but, nevertheless, the crop is greatly deficient, and many British ships have in consequence returned with half cargoes, some with none at all. Our decided opinion is, that each succeeding crop will progressively become worse. In a few cases the apprentices do work for wages; but the opposite disposition so immeasurably preponderates, that no dependence whatever can be placed on voluntary labour. Knowing, as we do, the prevailing reluctance of the negroes to work of any kind, the thefts, negligences, and outrages of every sort which are becoming of frequent occurrence; seeing large portions of our neglected cane-fields overrun with weeds, and a still larger extent of our pasture-lands returning to a state of nature; seeing, in fact, desolation already overspreading the very face of the land, it is impossible for us, without abandoning the evidence of our senses, to

when it will be totally abandoned, and these noble colonies be consigned to total ruin.

It is in these measures that the real cause of the lamentable increase in the foreign slave trade is to be found; it is the multitude who forced on these measures, who have frustrated all the benevolent efforts of Mr Wilberforce and Mr Fox, and rendered the abolition of the slave trade in the British dominions the remote and innocent cause of boundless misfortunes to the negro race. The British slaves, since the slave trade was abolished, had become fully equal to the wants of the colonies; their numbers, without any extraneous addition, were on the increase; their condition was comfortable and prosperous beyond that of any peasantry in Europe; and large numbers were annually purchasing their freedom from the

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

32.

Which are to be ascribed to the emancipation of the negroes, not to the abolition of the slave trade.

entertain favourable anticipations, or divest ourselves of the painful conviction, that the progressive and rapid deterioration of property will continue to keep pace with the apprenticeship, and that the termination thereof must, unless strong preventive measures are applied, complete the ruin of the colony." Making every allowance for the passions and exaggerations of a tropical climate, the statement here made is too strongly borne out by the decrease in the official returns, and the example of the result of corresponding measures in St Domingo, to leave a doubt that they are, in the main at least, founded in truth.

The following table exhibits the official returns of the exports of the West India islands for the last fifteen years:—

Years.	Sugar.	Molasses.	Rum.	Coffee.	Cocoa.	Pimento.	Shipping.	Ships.
	Cwts.	Cwts.	Gallons.	lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Tons.	
1827	3,551,218	392,441	5,620,174	29,419,598	549,688	2,225,943	243,731	872
1828	4,313,636	508,095	6,307,294	29,987,078	454,909	2,247,893	272,800	1,013
1829	4,152,614	390,626	6,634,750	26,911,785	684,917	3,585,694	263,328	958
1830	3,912,628	249,420	6,752,739	27,460,421	711,913	3,480,318	253,872	911
1831	4,103,800	329,306	7,844,157	20,030,802	1,491,947	4,801,355	249,079	904
1832	3,778,456	558,663	4,713,809	24,073,920	618,215	3,366,183	220,117	828
1833	3,646,204	650,793	5,109,975	19,008,375	2,134,869	4,470,255	248,378	911
1834*	3,343,976	560,366	5,112,399	22,081,489	1,360,325	3,389,402	246,095	918
1835	3,524,209	507,495	5,458,317	14,855,470	439,467	2,536,358	235,179	878
1836	3,001,731	520,535	4,898,168	18,903,426	1,612,304	3,320,976	237,922	900
1837	3,306,775	575,657	4,418,549	15,577,888	1,847,145	2,026,120	226,463	855
1838†	3,520,676	638,007	4,641,210	17,538,655	2,149,637	892,974	235,195	878
1839	2,824,372	474,307	4,021,820	11,485,675	959,641	1,071,570	196,715	748
1840	2,214,764	421,141	3,780,979	12,797,039	2,374,301	999,008	181,731	697
1841	2,151,217	430,221	2,770,161	9,927,689	2,920,298	797,768	174,975	677

* Emancipation Act.

† Termination of Apprenticeship.

—*Porter's Progress of the Nation*, iii. 424, 425.

Nor has the effect of this most disastrous measure been less detrimental on the exports of Great Britain to the West Indies. These, as a matter of course, have declined with the falling off in the produce of the West Indies, and the

CHAP.
XLV.

1806.

produce of their own industry. Here, then, was a *stationary* negro population, rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent feudal serfs of Europe, and from which they might, in like manner, have been emancipated singly, as they acquired property, which all had the means of earning, without either risk to themselves, injury to their masters, or increase to the demand for foreign slave labour. But now all these admirable effects of the abolition of the slave trade have been completely frustrated, and the humane but deluded inhabitants of Great Britain are burdened with twenty millions, to ruin, in the end, their own planters, consign to barbarism their own negroes, cut off a principal branch of their naval strength, and double the slave trade in extent,* and quadruple it in horrors, throughout the world. A more striking instance never was exhibited of the necessity of attending, in political changes, not only to benevolent intentions, but

diminished ability of its inhabitants to pay for the produce of this country, as the following table demonstrates :—

BRITISH EXPORTS TO WEST INDIES IN

1829, . . .	£3,612,085	1837, . . .	£3,456,745
1830, . . .	2,838,448	1838, . . .	3,393,441
1831, . . .	2,581,959	1839, . . .	3,986,598
1832, . . .	2,439,808	1840, . . .	3,574,970
1833, . . .	2,597,589	1841, . . .	2,504,004
1834, . . .	2,680,024	1842, . . .	2,591,425
1835, . . .	3,187,540	1843, . . .	2,497,671
1836, . . .	3,786,453	1844, . . .	2,451,471

—*Porter's Parl. Tables*, xii. 102.

Such has been the effect upon the prices of all sorts of colonial produce, of this great decline in the production of the British West India islands, that the annual consumption of sugar in Great Britain has declined since 1832 from 24 lbs. a-head to 16 lbs. ; while, for this diminished quantity of 16 lbs., the price paid by the nation has been £8,000,000 annually *more* than it formerly was for the larger quantity of 24 lbs.—that is, the nation pays annually *twice the amount nearly of the income-tax* more than it formerly did for two-thirds only of the former supply ! At the same time, the effect of the measure, on the admission of its warmest advocates, has been to double the slave trade over the globe, and increase its horrors in a still greater proportion ! The history of mankind fortunately affords few similar examples of the disastrous effects of ignorant zeal and misguided philanthropy.—See *Parl. Deb.* June 9, 1843. See *Customs Return, Kingston, Jamaica*, 22d August 1835 ; and *Address of Assembly*, August 10, 1835.

* The number of slaves now annually carried across the Atlantic, is double what it was when Wilberforce and Clarkson commenced their philanthropic labours.”—*FOWELL BUXTON on the Foreign Slave Trade*, p. 72.

to prudent conduct; and of the fatal effect of those institutions which, by giving the inhabitants of a particular part of the empire an undue share in the general administration, or admitting the torrent of public feeling to sway directly the measures of government, too often destroy prosperity the most extensive, and occasion calamities the most unbounded.*

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

An important change in the British system of finance was also made by the same administration, which, although not brought forward till the spring of 1807, may be fitly considered now, in order not to interrupt the narrative of the important military events which at that period occurred on the continent of Europe.

The foundation of this plan, which was brought forward by Lord Henry Petty,† on the 29th January 1807, was, that the time had now arrived when it had become expedient to make a provision for a permanent state of warfare; that the bad success of all former coalitions had demonstrated the slender foundation on which any hopes of overthrowing the military power of France on the continent of Europe must rest, while the hostile disposition and immense power of Napoleon gave little hope that any durable accommodation could be entered into with him. "All nations," said his lordship, "that still preserve the shadow even of their independence, have their

33.
Lord Henry
Petty's plan
of finance.
Jan. 29, and
March 3,
1807.

* The British ministry who, in 1834, passed the measures of slave emancipation, are noways answerable for these consequences; on the contrary, they deserve the highest credit for the courage they displayed, in opposition to the wishes of many of their supporters, in carrying through the great grant of twenty millions to the planters—a relief so seasonable and extensive, that hitherto, at least, it has almost entirely, to the persons who received it, prevented the natural consequences of the emancipation from being fully felt. The torrent of public feeling was irresistible; all they could do was to moderate its effects, which, by the protracted period of apprenticeship, and the grant to the slave-owners, was done to a very great degree. The English people must answer for the measure, be its ultimate effects on themselves and the negro race good or bad. The reflection suggested is:—What is the character of national institutions which permit a measure, likely to be attended with such cruel and disastrous consequences, to be forced against their will on a reluctant government?

† Afterwards Lord Lansdowne, a distinguished member of the Whig cabinet of 1830.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

eyes fixed on us as the only means of regaining the freedom they have lost. It becomes the government of Great Britain, seeing the proud eminence on which they are placed, to take an enlarged view of their whole situation, and to direct their attention to that future which, notwithstanding the signal deliverance they have hitherto obtained, seems still pregnant with evil. Our present permanent revenue is above £32,000,000 a-year, being more than three times what it was at the close of the American war; and there can be no doubt that means might be found in additional taxes to pay the interest of loans for several years to come. But looking, as it is now our duty to do, to a protracted contest, it has become indispensable to combine present measures with such a regard for the future, as may give us a reasonable prospect of being enabled to maintain it for a very long period.

34.
Argument
in favour of
it. Advan-
tages of the
sinking-
fund.

“In considering our resources, the two great objects of attention are the sinking-fund and the system of raising the supplies as much as possible within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of war taxes. The first of these is a durable monument of Mr Pitt’s wisdom: it had the support of his illustrious political opponent, Mr Fox; and, however widely these two great men were divided on most other subjects, it at least received that weight of authority which arises from their entire coincidence of approbation. When this system was commenced in 1786, the sinking-fund was only 1-238th part of the debt; whereas it is now 1-63d of the whole debt, and 1-42d of the unredeemed portion: a result at once striking and satisfactory, more especially when it is recollected that it has been obtained in twenty years, whereof fourteen have been years of war. The war taxes, which have been raised to their present amount chiefly by the operation of the heavy direct taxes, were, first, the treble assessed taxes introduced by Mr Pitt, and more lately the property tax, which has been substituted in its room. The

experience of the last year has amply demonstrated the expedience of the augmentation of that impost to ten per cent, which it was our painful duty to propose last year; for under its operation the war taxes have now reached £21,000,000 a-year, and the sinking-fund amounts to £8,300,000 annually.

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

"In the present state of the country, our war expenses cannot be calculated at less than thirty-two millions annually. To provide for this, independent of additional war taxes, which are now so heavy that we are not warranted in calculating on any considerable addition to their amount as likely to prove permanently productive, is the problem we have now to solve. To effect this, it is proposed in this and the three following years to raise a loan of £12,000,000; for the fourth year, or 1810, £14,000,000; and for the ten succeeding years, if the war should last so long, £16,000,000 annually. In each successive year in which these loans shall be raised, it is proposed to appropriate so much of the war taxes as will amount to ten per cent on the sum so raised. Out of this ten per cent the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking-fund to provide for the redemption of the capital. When the funds are at 60, or interest at three per cent, such a system will extinguish each loan in fourteen years after it was contracted. The moment this is done, the war taxes impledged for the redemption of that loan should be repealed. Thus, as the loan of £12,000,000 will, on this supposition, be paid off by 1821, the £1,200,000 a-year of war taxes now pledged to its redemption, will in that year be remitted. Upon examining this system, it will be found that it may be carried on for seven years, viz., from 1807 to 1814, without impledging any part of the income-tax; so that, if peace is then concluded, the whole income-tax may, without violating any part of the present system, be at once remitted — a most desirable object, as that is a burden which nothing

35.
Proposed
measures for
the redemption
of the
successive
loans.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

36.

And for providing the charges on them.

but the last necessity should induce us to perpetuate beyond the continuance of hostilities.

"As, however, the ten per cent on the loan annually contracted is in this manner to be taken from the war taxes, means must be provided to supply that deficiency, which, if the war continues for a long tract of years, will, from the progressive growth of those burdens on the war taxes, become very considerable. To provide for this deficiency, it is proposed to raise in each year a small supplementary loan, intended to meet the sum abstracted for the charges of the principal loan from the public treasury; and this supplementary loan is to be borrowed on Mr Pitt's principle of providing by fresh taxes, laid on in the indirect form, or by the falling in of annuities, for the interest of the debt, and one per cent more to create a fund for its redemption. The loan so required this year will, from the excess of the war taxes above the war expenditure, be only £200,000; the annual charges of which on this principle will be only £13,333: and as annuities to the amount of £15,000 will fall in this year, it will not be necessary, either for the principal or supplementary loan, to lay on any new taxes at present. Taking an average so as to diffuse the burden created by these supplementary loans as equally as possible over future years, and setting off against them the sums which will be gained annually by the falling in of annuities, the result is, that it will only be necessary to raise, in the seven years immediately subsequent to 1810, £293,000 annually by new taxes; a sum incredibly small, when it is recollected that we are now in the fifth year of a renewed war, the most costly and momentous in which the country ever was engaged.

37.

Advantages of the proposed system.

"Under the present system, with regard to the public debt framed upon the acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, no relief whatever will be experienced from the public burdens till a very distant period, probably from 1834 to 1844; and during the later years of the operation of the

sinking-fund, it will throw such immense sums, not less than forty millions annually, loose upon the country, as cannot fail to produce a most prejudicial effect upon the money market, while the sudden remission of taxes to the amount of £30,000,000 a-year, would produce effects upon artisans, manufacturers, and holders of property of every description, which it is impossible to contemplate without the most serious alarm. In every point of view, therefore, it seems to be highly desirable to render the sinking-fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present power, and diffusing over a greater number of years those extensive effects, which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last year of its operation. The arrangements prepared with this view are founded on the superior advantage of applying to the redemption of debt a sinking-fund of five per cent on the actual money capital, instead of one per cent on the nominal capital or amount of stock. This is to be the system applied to the loans of the first ten years; and in return for this advantage, it is proposed that when the present sinking-fund shall have so far increased as to exceed in its amount the interest of the debt then unredeemed, such surplus shall be at the disposal of parliament. By this means a larger sum will be annually applied to the sinking-fund from henceforward than could have been obtained under the old system; the whole loans contracted in future during the war will be redeemed within forty-five years from the date of their creation; and this without violating any of the provisions of the act 1792, establishing the present sinking-fund. Parliament, during the years of its final and greatest operation, will be enabled to administer a very great relief to the public necessities, and obviate all the dangers with which an undue rapidity in the defrayment of the debt would otherwise be attended."¹*

¹ Parl. Deb.
viii. 566,
594.

* The speech of Lord Henry Petty on this occasion is well worthy of the attention of all who wish to make themselves masters of the subject of the

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

38.

Argument
against it
by Lord
Castlereagh
and Mr
Perceval.

In opposition to these able arguments, it was urged by Lord Castlereagh, Mr Canning, and Mr Perceval—"This plan of finance proposes gradually to mortgage for fourteen years the whole of the war taxes for the interest of loans in war—a decided departure from all our former principles, which were to preserve religiously the distinction between war and permanent taxes, and which would, if carried into effect for any considerable time, deprive the nation of almost all the benefit to which it is entitled to look upon the termination of hostilities. The new plan, moreover, will require loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were adhered to. At the end of twenty years it appears, from the calculations laid before parliament, that this excess will amount to the enormous sum of £193,000,000. The whole machinery of the new plan is cumbersome and complicated: the additional charges arising from that circumstance will amount to a very considerable sum. The ways and means intended to prevent the imposition of new taxes in future, viz.—the expired annuities, together with the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt—are equally applicable *pro tanto* to mitigate their increase, under any other mode of raising loans that may be decided on; and their application in this way would be more advantageous than in the other, inasmuch as it is better to avoid contracting debt than to gain relief by a remission of taxation.

39.
Counter
plan pro-
posed by
them.

"It is futile to say that the public necessities compel us to have recourse to the perilous system of mortgaging the war taxes for the interest of future loans. It is here that the great danger of the new system consists: it is in breaking down the old and sacred barrier between the war and peace expenses, that the seeds of inextricable

British finances during the Revolutionary war. It is the most distinct, luminous, and statesmanlike exposition on the subject which is to be found in the whole range of the parliamentary debates after the death of Mr Pitt.

confusion to our finances in future are to be found. It is quite possible, as appears from the authentic calculations before parliament, to obtain the eleven millions a-year required for the deficiency of the war taxes below the war charges, without mortgaging these taxes, without the immense loans required under the new system, and without any material or unbearable addition to the public burdens. The mode in which this great object is to be attained is, by resolving that, when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking-fund in such year, instead of making provision for the interest of such loan in the taxes, the same shall be provided for *out of the interest receivable on the amount of stock redeemed* by the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in that year. Any excess of national expenditure above the thirty-two millions to be fixed as the average amount of war expenditure, to be provided for in the usual manner. The data laid before parliament prove, that under this plan, in fourteen years of war, one hundred and ten millions less will be borrowed than under that proposed by the chancellor of the exchequer;* and though doubtless the sinking-fund will be greatly impaired, yet, after making allowance for its restricted operation from the charge of future loans on its amount, the total

* LORD H. PETTY'S PLAN—

War loans for fourteen years,	£210,000,000
Supplementary loans for do.,	94,200,000

£314,200,000

War taxes rendered permanent,	401,231,000
Unredeemed debt in 1820, at end of same time, .	9,180,000
New taxes imposed,	2,051,000
New loans in 1820,	32,000,000
Sinking-fund in 1820,	17,744,021

LORD CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN—

War loans, £11,000,000 a-year for 14 years, . .	£154,000,000
Debt unredeemed at end of 1820,	358,000,000
War taxes rendered permanent,	none.
New taxes imposed,	2,547,000
New loan in 1820,	11,000,000
Sinking-fund in 1820,	9,180,896

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 1014.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

40.

The ministerial scheme as threatening to break up the sinking-fund.

debt at the expiration of that period will be upwards of forty millions above that now proposed.

“Great evils both to the stockholders and the country must arise from the adoption of the new plan, in consequence of the enormous and inordinate loans, amounting before the close of the new plan to not less than forty or fifty millions of stock annually, which must be contracted. Such immense loans must tend powerfully to lower the value of the public securities, lead to an extensive and undue increase of the circulating medium, and a rapid depreciation in the value of money, attended with the most prejudicial effects upon many branches of industry, and a general insecurity on the part of the holders of property. Above all, the principle of *placing at the disposal of parliament the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed*, is calculated to lead to a much more extensive diversion of that fund from its destined purpose, than the system which Mr Pitt had established; inasmuch as the latter only proposed to derive aid from the sinking-fund during the war, and only to the precise extent of the interest of the sum redeemed within the year, leaving the fund in undiminished extent to operate upon the public debt on the return of peace; whereas the former places the surplus of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, absolutely and unreservedly at the disposal of parliament, in peace as in war, without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802 shall be redeemed within forty-five years from that period. It is easy to foresee that such a power of *appropriating a large part of the sinking-fund* will be too powerful a temptation for the virtue of future governments to resist; and that the practical result will be, that *that noble institution will be irretrievably mutilated*, and the nation lose the whole benefit of the immense sacrifices for the benefit of posterity which it has made during the whole continuance of the present contest.

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

The equivalent proposed to the fundholders of an additional five per cent sinking-fund on the war loans, is entirely deceptive; inasmuch as the depreciation of their property which must ensue from the improvident accumulation of loans in the market, with their necessary concomitant, an extensive and undue paper currency, must much more than compensate any additional value which it might acquire from this augmentation of the means of its liquidation.”¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
viii. 1004,
1018.

The budget for the year 1807 was based on the new plan of finance; it included a loan of only £12,000,000, which was contracted on very advantageous terms, and the whole expenditure was calculated on that system of making preparations for a long and protracted struggle, which the disastrous issue of the Prussian war gave too much reason to apprehend awaited the country.^{2*}

^{41.}
Budget for
1807.
March 4.

² Parl. Deb.
viii. 1075.

The debates on Lord Henry Petty's able plan of finance are of little moment at this time, abandoned as his system soon was amidst the necessities and changes of future years; but the views brought forward on both

^{42.}
Reflections
on this sub-
ject.

* The budget for 1807 was stated by Lord Henry Petty as follows:—

SUPPLY.		WAYS AND MEANS.	
Navy,	£16,997,837	Land and malt, . . .	£2,750,000
Army, ordinary, . .	15,465,311	Surplus of Consolidated	
		Fund,	3,500,000
Extraordinaries arising,	4,333,710	War taxes,	19,800,000
Ordnance,	3,743,715	Lottery,	320,000
Miscellaneous, . . .	1,860,000	Vote of credit, . . .	3,000,000
Vote of credit, . . .	3,000,000	Loan,	12,000,000
		Surplus of 1805, . .	171,000
			£41,541,000
Interest of exchequer		—See <i>Parl. Deb.</i> viii. 1075.	
bills,	1,200,000		
Loyalty loan, . . .	350,000		
Deficiency of malt-tax,			
1805,	200,000		
For Great Britain and			
Ireland,	47,150,573		
Deduct 2-17ths for Ire-			
land,	5,545,677		
Expenditure of Great			
Britain,	£41,604,896		

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

sides were an essential deviation from the great principle of Mr Pitt's financial policy, and presaged the approach of times when the provident policy, so long upheld by his unshaken foresight, was to be abandoned with the common consent of both the great parties alternately intrusted with the administration of affairs. Mr Pitt's principle was to provide the interest of each loan annually contracted, and the one per cent destined for the extinction of its principal, by means of indirect taxes which thereafter formed part of the permanent revenue of the country till the debt was extinguished. But both Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh seem to have imagined that the time had now arrived when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise any increased revenue in this form ; and accordingly the plans of both were characterised by the great and decisive step of providing for the charges of future debt, not by indirect and permanent taxes, but by other means imposing no additional *present* burden on the country, but of course, for that very reason, trenching on its *ultimate* resources. The former proposed to do this by mortgaging the war taxes for the charges of all the debt which might hereafter be contracted, and rendering the amount of those taxes thus mortgaged a permanent part of the peace revenue ; the latter, by leaving untouched the war taxes, but appropriating to the interest of future loans part of the present sinking-fund, and thereby impairing to a proportionate extent its efficiency on the return of peace. Both implied a deviation from the cardinal point of Mr Pitt's system, the providing for the discharge of the interest of all debts out of *indirect taxes religiously set apart for that purpose*. And it is remarkable, as an example how much the fortunes and destinies of a state are often determined by the character and life of a single master-spirit, that this vast change, fraught, as experience has since proved it to have been, with the ruin of our financial prospects, and our probable ultimate subjugation, was simultaneously pro-

posed by the leaders of both Whigs and Tories, as soon as that great statesman and his illustrious rival were laid in their graves.

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

Had the period arrived when it was totally impossible to provide for the charges of new loans by progressive additions to the peace revenue, this change, however prejudicial, would not have been a matter of regret more than any other unavoidable calamity. But experience has now sufficiently demonstrated, that this was very far indeed from being the case ; for, down to the very end of the war, new taxes were imposed to an extent that, *a priori*, would have been thought impossible. In the years 1813 and 1814, the sums annually raised by taxation exceeded seventy millions a-year. As it was, therefore, the discussions which ensued on the rival finance projects of Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh unnecessarily gave the first rude shock to the firm and provident system of Mr Pitt's finance, by breaking down the barrier which had hitherto kept the funds destined for the discharge of the debt sacred from the avidity and shortsighted desires of the people, and accustoming them to regard both the revenue set apart for that purpose, and the war taxes during peace, as a fund to which they might have recourse to relieve the war pressure of the moment.

43.
Prejudicial
effect, in the
end, of these
discussions.

Of the two, if it had become necessary to make choice of one or other, the system of Lord Henry Petty was the most manly and statesmanlike with reference to domestic administration, inasmuch as it was not calculated to trench upon the sinking-fund, until it had become equal to the loans annually contracted, by which means the increase of the amount of the whole debt, after that period, would have been rendered impossible ; and proposed, in the mean time, to pledge the war taxes for the interest and charges of the sums borrowed. Whereas that of Lord Castlereagh proposed at once to lay violent hands upon the sinking-fund for the charges of all future

44.
Lord Henry
Petty's plan
was the
preferable
of the two.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

loans, and yet give the nation the full benefit of the remission of all the war taxes on the return of peace. The former system, however, though well adapted to a state of uniform and long-continued hostility, was totally unsuitable to the varying circumstances and fleeting changes which were likely to ensue in the course of the contest in which the nation was actually engaged ; and by encouraging a morbid sensitiveness to any extraordinary advances at a particular time, beyond what the general system warranted, was too likely to occasion the loss of the fairest opportunities of bringing it to a successful issue. Of this unhappy tendency the issue of the war in Poland, starved out, as we shall presently see it was, by an ill-judged economy on the part of Great Britain, afforded a memorable example. And in the habit acquired by the nation in these discussions to regard the sinking-fund, not as a sacred deposit set apart, like the life insurance of an individual, for the benefit of posterity, but *as a resource which might be instantly rendered available for present necessities*, is to be found the remote cause of the great change of 1813 in our financial policy, and the total departure from any regular system for the redemption of the public debt—a change which is perhaps to be regarded as the greatest evil entailed upon the nation by the moneyed embarrassments and democratic ascendancy of later times.

45.
General
character of
the Whig
measures of
domestic
administra-
tion at this
period.

Long as the preceding summary of the principal domestic measures of the Whig administration has been, it will not in all probability be regretted by the reflecting reader. It is not as the record of mere events, but of thoughts and the progress of opinion, that history is valuable ; and, independent of the importance of the changes which have been discussed upon the future history of the empire, they are in an especial manner worthy of attention, as embodying the principal domestic designs of the great party which, after so long a seclusion from office, at that period held the reins of power ; and which,

besides the acknowledged ability of its leaders, embraced a large portion of the thought and learning of the state. And upon an attentive consideration of these measures, it must be obvious to the candid reader that they were founded on just principles, and directed to important ends; that humanity and benevolence breathed in their spirit, and wisdom and foresight regulated their execution. Above all, they were characterised, equally with the measures of Mr Pitt, by that regard for the future, and resolution to submit to present evils for the sake of ultimate advantage, which is the mainspring of all that is really great or good, both in individuals and nations. On comparing the statesmanlike measures of the Whigs at that period in England, with the frantic innovations which tore society in pieces in France at the commencement of their Revolution, or which have been urged by the Chartists and Socialists in later times in Great Britain, the difference appears prodigious, and is highly deserving of attention. Thence may be learned both the important tendency of free institutions to modify those ardent aspirations after equality which, when generally diffused, are, of all other political passions, the most fatal to the cause of freedom, and the wide difference between the chastened efforts of a liberal spirit, when guided by aristocratic power, and modifying, not governing, the measures of government—and the wild excesses or atrocious crimes, destructive at once to present and future generations, which spring from the surrender of the actual direction of affairs to the immediate control or the passions of the people.

It remains to detail, with a very different measure of encomium, the principal foreign transactions of the Whig administration, from the period when the Prussian war commenced on the continent of Europe.

It has been already mentioned how Sir Home Popham, without authority from the British government, proceeded from the Cape of Good Hope to Buenos Ayres with a small

46.
Foreign
transactions.
Fresh ex-
pedition
to South
America,
and capture
of Monte
Video.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Ante, chap.

xlii. §§

48-51.

March 7.

Oct. 1806.

military force, and how disastrous this expedition ultimately was.¹ But the general transports of joy at the brilliant prospects which this acquisition was supposed to open to British commerce, were so excessive, that government, while they very properly brought Sir Home to a court-martial for his unauthorised proceeding, which in March 1807 reprimanded him for his conduct, had not firmness enough to withstand the general wish that an expedition should be sent to the river La Plata, to wipe away the disgrace which had there been incurred by the British arms, and annex such lucrative dependencies to the British crown. No sooner, accordingly, had it become evident, from the failure of the negotiations for peace at Paris, that a protracted struggle was to be apprehended, than a reinforcement of three thousand men was sent to the British troops in that quarter, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On arriving at the Rio de la Plata, he found the remnant of the English force cooped up in Maldonado, with hardly any provisions, and daily exposed to the insults of the accomplished horsemen of that country. Deeming that town unfit for being rendered a depot and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video—a fortified seaport, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great difficulties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood; but, on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were encountered. The defences of the place were found to be much stronger than had been expected; the whole powder in the fleet was almost blown away in the first five days' firing; intrenching tools were wanting; and four thousand regular troops, with twenty pieces of cannon, a force fully equal to that of the besiegers, were rapidly approaching to raise the siege. In these critical circumstances Auchmuty resolved to hazard an assault, though the breach could as yet scarcely be called practicable; and orders were issued for the attack an

hour before daybreak. Owing to the darkness of the night the head of the column missed the breach, and remained under the ramparts for twenty minutes exposed to a heavy fire, every shot of which told in their dense ranks. As the day dawned, however, it was discovered by Captain Renny, of the 40th regiment, who fell gloriously as he mounted it; the troops, emulating his bright example, rushed in with irresistible violence, cleared the streets of all the cannon which had been placed to enfilade them, and made prisoners all the enemy who attempted any resistance. In this glorious storm, the loss of the British was about six hundred, but twice that number of the enemy fell, and two thousand were made prisoners, besides a thousand who escaped in boats; so that the numbers of the garrison at first had been greater than that of the besieging force.¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.
Feb. 2.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 213,
214. See
Sir S. Auch-
muty's Des-
patch, 652.

It would have been well for the British arms, if their attempts on South America had terminated here; but the discomfiture of Sir Home Popham's expedition to the Rio de la Plata, unhappily led both the government and the nation to conceive, that the honour of the British arms was implicated in regaining the ground they had lost in that quarter. With this view an additional expedition, under the command of General Craufurd, consisting of four thousand two hundred men, which had been sent out in the end of October 1806, destined originally to effect the conquest of Chili, on the other side of Cape Horn, was, when news arrived of the expulsion of the English from Buenos Ayres, ordered to stop short, and attempt the reconquest of that important city. General Craufurd, agreeably to these orders, made sail for the Rio de la Plata, and effected a junction with Sir Samuel Auchmuty at Monte Video in the beginning of June. As the united force now amounted to above nine thousand men, it was deemed advisable to make an immediate attempt on Buenos Ayres; and, in pursuance of express directions from government, the command of the force

47.
A second
expedition
against
Buenos
Ayres is
resolved on.

June 2.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

48.
Prepara-
tions for its
defence.

for this purpose was given to General Whitelocke.* That officer arrived at Monte Video on the 9th May, and preparations were immediately made for the proposed enterprise.

The force which set out on this expedition consisted of seven thousand eight hundred effective men, with eighteen pieces of field artillery. After several fatiguing marches, the whole reached Reduction, a village about nine miles from Buenos Ayres, and having manœuvred so as to deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage, succeeded in crossing the river, with very little loss, at Passo Chico. The army having been assembled on the right bank, orders were given for a general attack on the town. Great preparations for defence had been made by the inhabitants; above two hundred pieces of cannon were disposed, in advantageous situations, in the principal streets, and fifteen thousand armed men were stationed on the flat roofs of the houses, to pour their destructive volleys on the columns who might advance to the attack. The measures of the English general, so far from being calculated to meet this danger, the magnitude of which is well known to all experienced military men, betrayed a fatal and overweening contempt for his opponents. The different columns of attack were directed to advance by the principal streets to the great square near the river Plata; but, by an inconceivable oversight, they were not allowed to load their pieces, and no firing was permitted till they had reached the final place of their destination. The consequence was, that those brave men were exposed, as they advanced through the long streets leading to the great square, without the possibility of returning it, to a destructive shower of musketry,¹ hand-

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 219,
221.

* "As it has been thought advisable," said Mr Windham in his official orders, "that an officer of high rank, as well as talent and judgment, should be sent to take the command of his Majesty's forces in South America, it was his Majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of General Whitelocke."—*Mr Windham's Instructions to General Whitelocke, 5th March 1807; Ann. Reg. 1807, 216.*

grenades, and stones from the tops of the houses, all of which were flat and covered with an armed and enthusiastic population ; while strong barricades were drawn at intervals across the streets, guarded by a plentiful array of heavy artillery.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, however, the formidable nature of which was so fatally experienced by the royal guard of Charles X. in the streets of Paris in 1830, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, by a vigorous attack on the right, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. General Whitelocke himself had gained possession of an advanced post in the centre, and the Recedencia, a commanding station on the left, had also fallen into the hands of the British. But these advantages were dearly purchased ; and in other quarters, the plunging fire to which the troops were exposed, without the possibility of returning it, had proved so destructive, that three regiments had been compelled to lay down their arms, and the attacking force was weakened by the loss of twenty-five hundred men. On the following morning the Spanish general, Linières, offered to restore all the prisoners who had been taken, on condition that the British forces should withdraw altogether from Monte Video, and all the settlements which they held on the Rio de la Plata. Such was the consternation produced by the disasters of the preceding day, and such the difficulties with which the further prosecution of the enterprise appeared to be attended, that, notwithstanding the brilliant success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the capture of so large a portion of the enemy's artillery, these terms were agreed to, and a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole British troops, were withdrawn from the river Plata, was signed on the following day.¹

49.
Failure of
the attack.
July 5.

July 7.
¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 219,
221.

The public indignation knew no bounds when the calamitous issue of this expedition was made known in

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

50.

Court-mar-
tial on
General
Whitelocke,
who is
cashiered.¹ South.
Pen. War,
i. 73.51.
Reflections
on this
event.

Great Britain ; and the outcry was the more vehement, from the glorious successes at Monte Video having inspired the people with an unreasonably low opinion of the South American forces. So violent was the clamour, that government, in order to appease it, were compelled to bring General Whitelocke to trial ; and the court-martial which investigated the charges brought against him, in January 1809, sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from his Majesty's service. No opinion, however, can be formed of the real merits of the case from this decision, whatever may have been the respectability of the officers composing it ; for such was the happy ignorance which then generally prevailed in Great Britain on military subjects, that the members of the court-martial required to be told what the right bank of a river in military language means ;¹ and such is frequently the vehemence and unreasonableness of the public mind in England, on such occasions, that the strength of scarcely any intellect is equal to withstanding the torrent. The examples, also, of Saragossa, Gerona, and Paris have, since that time, abundantly demonstrated that the resistance of an insurgent population, in barricaded streets and on the roofs of stone houses, is often extremely formidable, even to powerful bodies of disciplined troops.

But on a calm retrospect of these transactions, at this distance of time, it cannot be denied that an energetic and skilful general might, in all probability, have extricated the British army, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, from this ill-concerted enterprise. The order to traverse the streets with muskets unloaded, after a desperate resistance was prepared and foreseen, though expressly approved of by the court-martial, seems hardly reconcilable to any rule of military policy or common sense ; and above all, the omission to take advantage of the great success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the powerful train of artillery which he had captured, if not to achieve success, at least to avert dishonour, must justly

be considered as a matter of reproach to the British general. Much allowance must, however, be made for the critical situation of an inexperienced officer, plunged, in his first essay in a separate command, in difficulties under which the intellects of Marmont and Lefebvre subsequently reeled. But the same excuse cannot be made for the government, which selected for so important a service an officer unknown to fame, when many others had proved their capacity even in the comparatively inconsiderable military operations in which England had hitherto been engaged.* But this weight of secret parliamentary influence is the inherent bane of a free constitution ; it appeared afterwards, on a still greater scale, on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, and continued to paralyse all the military operations of England, till the commanding genius of Wellington burst through the trammels, and fixed the flickering light of its glory in a star of unquenchable lustre.¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 219,
224. Dum.
xv. 82, 83.

In other colonial transactions, the British arms during this administration were more prosperous. Curaçoa, early in the year, was taken, with hardly any resistance, by a squadron of frigates under the command of Captain Brisbane ; the advantages of sharing in British commerce, and obtaining the protection of the British flag, having now disposed the planters, in all the colonial possessions of other states, to range themselves under its banners. Soon after, a regular constitution was proclaimed in Hayti, by which slavery was for ever abolished ; property and persons were placed under the safeguard of the law ; the first magistrate of the republic was declared the generalissimo of its forces by sea and land ; and a code established,

52.
Capture of
Curaçoa,
and estab-
lishment of
the repub-
lic of
Hayti.

* The appointment of General Whitelocke over the head of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the hero of Monte Video, appears the strongest confirmation of these remarks, but in reality it is not so ; for that town was stormed on Feb. 2, and General Whitelocke's appointment is dated March 5, in the same year ; so that the one was not known when the other took place. It is the overlooking the many officers who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, India, and at Maida, which forms the real reproach to the British government on this occasion.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

breathing a spirit of wisdom, philanthropy, and moderation. The establishment of such a republican government, coming so soon after the heroic resistance which the negroes had opposed to the attempt at their subjugation by Napoleon, would have been a subject of the highest interest, and deserving of the warmest sympathy of every friend to humanity, were it not that experience has since abundantly proved, what historical information might even then have too clearly led the well-informed to anticipate, that all such attempts at the regeneration of mankind by sudden changes, are not only delusive, but pernicious ; that to give to savages the liberty and institutions of civilisation, is to consign them to immediate suffering and ultimate slavery ; and that every attempt to transfer at once into one age or nation the institutions of another, is as hopeless a task as to expect in the nursery-seedling the strength and solidity of the aged oak, or in the buoyancy and irreflection of childhood the steadiness and perseverance of maturer years.

53.
State of
affairs in
Turkey.

¹ Ante, chap.
xliv. § 4.

This untoward expedition to the shores of the La Plata was not the only one which brought disgrace upon the arms of England at this period—enterprises equally unfortunate took place both on the shores of the Bosphorus and the banks of the Nile. It has been already mentioned,¹ that Russia had unhappily selected the moment when the Prussian war, if not actually commenced, was at least obviously approaching, to invade the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia by the army of General Michelson, and we have noticed the disastrous effect which that distraction of force had upon the issue of the contest on the Vistula. This irruption, however ill-timed or imprudent, when so serious a war nearer home awaited the Russian forces, was not, however, unjustifiable ; on the contrary, it was provoked by the ambition of the French government, and the intrigues of their ambassador at Constantinople, which, by precipitating the Divan into a breach of the existing treaty with

the court of Russia, gave to that power too plausible a ground for resuming its long-cherished schemes of ambition on the banks of the Danube.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

By the treaty of Jassy, which terminated the bloody and disastrous war which the Turks had long waged with the might of Muscovy and the genius of Suwarroff, it had been covenanted that the hospodars, or governors, of Wallachia and Moldavia should not be dismissed from their high functions for the space of seven years; and, by the supplementary treaty of 24th September 1802, it had been expressly stipulated, in addition, that they should not be removed without the consent of Russia.¹ No sooner, however, had it become evident to Napoleon that a war was impending with Prussia and Russia, than he despatched a firm and skilful ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to do everything in his power to produce a rupture between the Turks and Russians, and in this manner effect a powerful diversion to the Muscovite forces on the banks of the Danube. This diplomatic agent was General Sebastiani, a military officer of great experience, and whose subtile and penetrating genius, formerly nourished in a cloister, and since matured amid the experience of camps, was admirably adapted for the mingled acuteness and resolution required in the mission with which he was now intrusted. His secret instructions were, in the first instance, to endeavour to procure the dismissal from the government of these provinces of the Princes Ipsilanti and Morusi, who were in the interest of Russia, and place in their stead princes of the rival families of Suzzo and Callimachi, who it was known would incline to the French alliance.²

54.
Cause of
rupture be-
tween Tur-
key and
Russia.

¹ Martens, v.
291. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
208.

² Bign. vi.
177, 178.
Dum. xvii.
257, 259.
Hard. ix.
366. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
193, 195.

When Sebastiani arrived at the Turkish capital, in August 1806, he found matters in a situation extremely favourable to the attainment of these objects. The Sultaun, in his attempts to introduce the European tactics and discipline into his armies, of the need of which the recent wars with Russia had afforded repeated and fatal expe-

55.
Dismissal of
the hospo-
dars of
Wallachia
and Molda-
via by Sul-
taun Selim.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ See *infra*,
chap. lxi.

rience, and of which a detailed account will be given in a future chapter,¹ had become embarrassed with very serious difficulties. He found himself obstinately resisted not only by the proud and disorderly bands of the Janizaries, but by that powerful party in all the Ottoman provinces who were attached to their national and religious institutions, and regarded the introduction of European customs, whether into the army or the state, as the first step to national ruin. In this extremity, he gladly embraced the proffered council and assistance of the French ambassador, who represented a power which naturally connected itself with the innovating party in every other state, and whose powerful armaments, already stationed in Dalmatia, promised the only effectual aid which could be looked for from the European nations against the Turkish malcontents, whom it was well known Russia was disposed to support. The difficulty arising from the necessity, in terms of the treaty, of consulting Russia in regard to the removal of the obnoxious hospodars, was strongly felt; but the art of Sebastiani prevailed over every difficulty. At a private conference with the Sultaun in person, he succeeded in persuading that unsuspecting sovereign that the clause in the convention of 1802 applied only to the removal of the waiwodes on the ground of maladministration in their respective provinces, but could not extend to a case where it was called for by the general interests of the empire; and that the present was an instance of the latter description, from the notorious intrigues of those princes with the hereditary enemies of the Ottoman faith: and, in pursuance of these representations, a hatti-scheriff appeared on the 30th August, dismissing the reigning hospodars, and appointing Princes Suzzo and Callimachi in their room.²

Aug. 30,
1806.² *Dum.* xvii.
257, 264.
Bign. vi.
177, 179.
Hard. ix.
364, 365.

This decisive step was taken by the Sublime Porte not only without the concurrence of Russia, but without the knowledge of any members of the diplomatic body at Constantinople; and as its immediate effect in producing

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

56.

Energetic
remonstrances of Russia
and Eng-
land, which
produce a
repeal of
the mea-
sure.

a rupture between the Divan and the court of St Petersburg was distinctly foreseen, the effect produced by its promulgation was very great. The Russian ambassador, M. Italinski, loudly complained of the infraction of the treaty, in which he was powerfully supported by Mr Arbuthnot, the minister of Great Britain, who openly threatened an immediate attack on the Turkish capital from the fleets of their respective sovereigns. Sebastiani, however, skilfully availed himself of the advantages which the course of events gave him, to secure and increase the French influence with the Divan. No sooner, therefore, did intelligence arrive of the refusal of the Russian government to ratify the treaty concluded by d'Oubril at Paris, than he renewed his efforts, and, representing the cause of France as now identified with that of the Sublime Porte, loudly demanded that the Bosphorus should be closed to Russian vessels of war or transports, and announced that any continuation or renewal of alliance with England or Russia would be considered as a declaration of war against the French Emperor.¹ These remonstrances proved successful; and a few days afterwards a Russian brig, which presented itself at the mouth of the Bosphorus, was denied admission. These measures irritated so violently the Russian ambassador, that he embarked on board the English frigate Canopus, and threatened instantly to leave the harbour, if the dismissed hospodars were not forthwith reinstated in their possessions. In these efforts he was powerfully seconded by Mr Wellesley Pole, who, in the absence of Mr Arbuthnot, detained by fever at Buyuckdere, presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced, that if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes. Intimidated by this bold language, as well as the haughty air of the person who used it, and secretly aware of the weakness of the defences of the capital on that

¹ Note of
16th Sept.
1806.

Sept. 21.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 208.
209. Bign.
vi. 182, 184.
Hard. ix.
364, 365.

57.
Meanwhile
the Russian
armies in-
vade the
principal-
ties.

Nov. 23,
1806.

² Hard. ix.
364. Bign.
vi. 184.

side, the counsellors of Selim recommended a temporary concession to the demands of the Allied powers; the hospodars were reinstated in their governments, and ample promises made to the Russian ambassador of satisfaction for all his demands. But these conciliatory measures were only intended to gain time; and in a secret conference with Sebastiani, the Sultaun informed that minister that he had only yielded to the storm till he was in a condition to brave it, and that his policy, as well as his inclinations, inseparably united him with the Emperor Napoleon.¹

Matters were now, to all appearance, accommodated between the Divan and the cabinet of St Petersburg; but the great distance between the two capitals brought on a rupture when all cases of irritation had ceased, at the point where their interests came into collision. As soon as intelligence of the dismissal of the hospodars reached the Russian cabinet, they despatched orders to General Michelson, whenever his preparations were completed, to enter the Turkish territory; and when intelligence was received of their being reinstated on the 15th October, which did not arrive at the Russian capital till the beginning of November, it was too late to prevent the fulfilment of the previous orders and the commencement of hostilities. Michelson accordingly entered Moldavia on the 23d November, and having once drawn the sword, the cabinet of St Petersburg had not sufficient confidence in the sincerity of this forced submission on the part of the Sublime Porte, to restore it to its sheath; or possibly they were not sorry of an opportunity of extending themselves towards the Danube, and advancing their permanent schemes of conquest towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the restoration of the hospodars, therefore, their armies continued to advance, driving the Turks before them, to the no small confusion of M. Italin-ski, who had uniformly declared, both in public and private, that, as soon as that event was known at St Petersburg, their march would be countermanded.²

Sebastiani, meanwhile, made the best use of this now unjustifiable invasion, as well as of the consternation produced by the victories of Napoleon in Prussia, to increase the French influence with the Divan. He strongly represented that this was the time, when Russia was already hard pressed by the victorious arms of the French Emperor on the Vistula, to throw their weight into the scale, and regain, in a single successful campaign, the influence and possessions which had been wrested from them by their inveterate enemies during more than a century of previous misfortunes. Persuaded by such plausible arguments, and irritated at the continued stay of the Russian troops in the principalities, after the causes which had justified their entrance into them had ceased, the hesitation of the Divan was at length overcome, and war was formally declared against Russia in the end of the year. To protect the Muscovite ambassador from the fury of the Mussulmans, which was now fully aroused, the Sultaun stationed a guard of janizaries over his palace. Mr Arbuthnot strongly remonstrated against his being sent, according to previous custom, to the Seven Towers. General Sebastiani had the generosity to employ his powerful influence for the same purpose; and, by their united influence, this barbarous practice was discontinued, and M. Italinski was permitted to embark on board the English frigate Canopus, by which he was soon after conveyed into Italy. Less humane, however, towards his own satraps than towards the ambassadors of his enemies, the Sultaun despatched his messengers with the bowstring to Prince Ipsilanti; but that nobleman, in whom energy of mind supplied the want of bodily strength, succeeded in throwing down the executioners after they had got hold of his person, and had the good fortune to escape into Russia.¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

58.

And war is
declared.Dec. 30,
1806.

¹ Hard. ix.
365. Bign.
vi. 184, 189.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 208,
211.

Though war was thus resolved on, the Porte was far from being in a condition at the moment to oppose any effectual resistance to the powerful army of General

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

59.

Rapid progress of the Russians in the principalities.

Dec. 27.

¹ Ann. Reg. 1806, 211.

60.

The Russians require the aid of a naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to.

² *Ante*, chap. xlv. § 81.

Michelson, which had entered the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Forty thousand Russian troops, amply provided with every necessary, were irresistible. Moldavia was speedily overrun; the victorious bands, following up their success, entered Wallachia; a tumultuary force which the Pasha of Roudchouck had raised to arrest their progress was defeated; and Bucharest, the capital of the latter province, and a city containing eighty thousand inhabitants, fell into their hands. Before the end of the year, and before war had been formally declared on either side, they were already masters of all the territory to the north of the Danube; and their outposts, preparing to cross that river, were in communication with Czerni George, the chief of Servia, who had revolted from the Grand Seignior, defeated his forces in several encounters, and was at this time engaged in the siege of the important fortress of Belgrade.¹

The rapidity and magnitude of these successes, however, was the occasion of no small disquietude to the court of St Petersburg. They had now felt the weight of the French troops on the Vistula; their arms had retired from doubtful and well-debated fields at Golymin and Pultusk; and they had become sensible of the imprudence of engaging at the same time in another contest, and dispersing on the banks of the Danube the troops so imperiously required for the defence of their own frontier. Already an order had been despatched to recall four divisions to support the extreme left of the army in Poland, whose arrival and operations under Essen, against Savary at Ostrolenka, have already been noticed.² But this was not sufficient; their diminished forces on the Danube might be exposed to serious danger from the efforts, and now fully aroused national spirit, of the Turks; and as the duration of the contest with France could not be foreseen, it was of the utmost moment to deprive the Emperor Napoleon of that power-

ful co-operation which he was likely to derive from the war so imprudently lighted up on the southern frontier of the empire. The naval forces of England appeared to be precisely calculated to effect this object; and as they were cruising at no great distance in the Ægean sea, it was hoped that a vigorous demonstration against Constantinople might at once terminate the contest in that quarter. Application was made to the British government for this purpose; and the cabinet of St James's, however unwilling, under the direction of Mr Fox's successors, to engage in any military enterprises in conjunction with the Continental powers, was not averse to the employment of its naval forces in support of the common cause. They felt the necessity of doing something, after the refusal of both subsidies and land forces to Russia, to convince that power of the sincerity of its desire with its appropriate weapons to maintain the contest. Instructions, therefore, were given to Sir John Duckworth, who at the close of the year was cruising off Ferrol with four ships of the line, to proceed forthwith to the mouth of the Dardanelles, where Admiral Louis was already stationed with three line-of-battle ships and four frigates; and his orders were to force the passage of these celebrated straits, and compel the Turks, by the threat of an immediate bombardment, into a relinquishment of the French and adoption of the Russian and English alliance.¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Bign. vi.
189, 190.
Jom. ii. 372.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 195.

The Hellespont or Dardanelles, which, from the days of Homer and the war of Troy to these times, has been the theatre of the most important operations in which the fates of Europe and Asia were concerned, is formed by the narrow strait through which the waters of the Black Sea discharge themselves from the lesser expanse of Marmora into the Mediterranean. Its breadth varies from one to three miles: but its course, which is very winding, amounts to nearly thirty; and the many projecting headlands which advance into the stream, afford the most

61.
Description
of the Dar-
danelles.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

favourable stations for the erection of batteries. Its banks are less precipitous and beautiful than those of the Bosphorus—which is the appellation bestowed on the still more bold and romantic channel which unites the Sea of Marmora to the Euxine—but they possess, both from historical association and natural variety, the highest interest; and few persons who have received even the rudiments of education can thread their devious way through the winding channel and smiling steepes, which resemble the shores of an inland lake rather than the boundary of two continents, without recurring in imagination to the exploits of Ajax and Achilles, whose tombs still stand at the entrance of the strait; the loves of Hero and Leander, yet fresh in the songs of the boatmen; the memorable contests of which it was the theatre during the Byzantine empire, the glowing picture by Gibbon of the Latin Crusade, the inimitable pictures by Lamartine of its romantic scenes, and the thrilling verses of Lord Byron on its classic shores.

62.
Ultimatum
of Great
Britain, and
declaration
of war by
Turkey.

The fortifications of these important straits, the real gates of Constantinople, had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The Castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, still stood in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage; but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside. The efforts of Sebastiani, seconded by the spirit of the Turks, whose religious enthusiasm was now fully awakened, had endeavoured in vain to attract the attention of the Divan to the danger which threatened them in this quarter. True to the Mussulman principle of foreseeing nothing, and judging only of the future by the past, they bent their whole attention to the war on the Danube, and despatched all their disposable forces to arrest the progress of the Servians and Czerni George, when a redoubtable enemy threatened them with destruc-

tion at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Duly informed of these circumstances, Mr Arbuthnot was no sooner apprised of the arrival of Sir John Duckworth off Tenedos, than he delivered the ultimatum of Great Britain, which was the immediate dismissal of M. Sebastiani, the accession of Turkey to the alliance of Russia and Great Britain, and the opening of the Dardanelles to the vessels of Russia. These offers were peremptorily declined, and their refusal accompanied by a significant hint from General Sebastiani, that the Berlin decree, recently received at the Turkish capital, required the immediate arrest of all British subjects in all the territories of the allies of France, and that *Turkey was one of these allies*. Deeming his stay at Constantinople no longer secure, Mr Arbuthnot, under colour of going to dine with Admiral Louis, who in the *Endymion* frigate lay off Seraglio Point, withdrew from Constantinople, having first recommended his family to the care of General Sebastiani. That general honourably discharged the trust, but he was too skilful not to turn to the best advantage so unlooked-for an occurrence in his favour, and war was immediately declared by the Divan against Great Britain.¹

Hitherto everything had seconded beyond his most sanguine expectations the efforts of the French ambassador, but he was unable to persuade the Turkish government to take the requisite measures of precaution against this new enemy who had arisen. In vain he urged them instantly to put in repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles; in vain he predicted an immediate formidable attack from the fleet of England. Nothing was done to give additional security to the strait, and the Divan, persuaded that the only serious danger lay on the side of the Danube, continued to send all their disposable troops in that direction. Meanwhile the squadrons of Sir John Duckworth and Admiral Louis having effected a junction off Tenedos, their united forces amounted to eight ships

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

Jan. 26.

Jan. 29.
1 Bign. vi.
191, 192.
Dum. xvii.
271, 273.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 195.63.
Sir John
Duckworth
resolves to
pass the
Dardanelles.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

Feb. 19.

¹ Dum. xvii.
275, 277.

Bign. vi.

194. Jom.

ii. 374. Ann.

Reg. 1807,
196.

of the line, two frigates, and two bomb-vessels ; but, the Ajax of seventy-four guns having unfortunately been destroyed by fire at this critical time, the squadron was reduced to seven line-of-battle ships. With these, however, the British admiral resolved to force the passage. Having taken his measures with much skill, he advanced with his ships in single file at moderate intervals, and with a fair wind, on the morning of the 19th February, entered the straits.¹

64.
The straits
are forced,
after much
resistance.

So completely were the Turks taken by surprise, that a feeble desultory fire alone was opened upon the ships as they passed the first batteries, to which the English did not deign to reply. But when they reached the Castles of Europe and Asia, where the straits are little more than a mile broad, a tremendous cannonade assailed them on both sides, and enormous balls, weighing seven and eight hundredweight, began to pass through the rigging. The British sailors, however, meanwhile were not idle ; deliberately aiming their guns, as the ships slowly and majestically moved through the narrow channel, they kept up an incessant discharge to the right and left, with such effect that the Turkish cannoneers, little accustomed to the rapid fire and accurate aim of modern times, and terrified at the crash of the shot on the battlements around them, took to flight. Following up his triumphant course, the English admiral attacked and burnt the line-of-battle ship bearing the flag of the Capitan Pasha, lying at anchor in the straits ; Sir Sidney Smith, the second in command, compelled four frigates to surrender, which were immediately after committed to the flames ; a fifth, after an obstinate resistance, shared the same fate ; and a brig, which with difficulty escaped from the conflagration, had scarcely announced the alarming tidings at Constantinople, when the British fleet, with all sails set, was seen proudly advancing, and cast anchor off the Isle of Princes, within three leagues of Seraglio Point.²

² Ann. Reg.
1807, 196.
Dum. xvii.
275, 278.
Bign. vi.
194, 195.
Jom. ii. 374.

No words can adequately paint the terror which prevailed in Constantinople, when the increasing sound of the approaching cannonade too surely announced that the defences of the straits had been forced ; and shortly after, the distant light of the conflagration gave token of the rapid destruction of the fleet. This was much increased when a message was received from Admiral Duckworth, half an hour after his arrival, which, after recapitulating all the instances of fidelity to the Turkish alliance which England had so long afforded, concluded by the declaration that if, in twenty-four hours, the demands of Great Britain were not acceded to, he would be reduced to the painful necessity of commencing hostilities. The capital was totally defenceless, not ten guns being mounted on the sea batteries ; and a furious crowd was already assembled in the streets, demanding the heads of the Reis Effendi and General Sebastiani, the authors of all the public calamities. The consternation was universal ; the danger, from having been never anticipated, was now felt with stunning force ; and the Divan, having been assembled in the first moments of alarm, sent an intimation to General Sebastiani that no defence remained to the capital ; that submission was a matter of necessity ; and that, as the people regarded him as the author of all their misfortunes, his life was no longer in safety, and he would do well instantly to leave the capital.¹ *

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

65.

The Divan
resolves on
submission,
as Constantinople was
defenceless.¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 196,
197. Dum.
xvii. 278,
279. Bign.
vi. 197, 198.

But his answer was worthy of the great and gallant nation which he represented. Receiving the messenger of the Sultaun in full dress, surrounded by all his suite, he immediately replied—"My personal danger cannot for an instant occupy my attention, when the maintenance of the French alliance and the independence of the Ottoman

66.
Intrepid
conduct of
Sebastiani.

* The author has been informed by Sir Stratford Canning, the well-known and able British diplomatist at Constantinople, that it is currently stated in the East that Sebastiani was at first disposed to submit, and that it was the Spanish ambassador's remonstrances which awakened him to the energetic conduct which has shed such a lustre around his name.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

empire are at stake. I will not quit Constantinople, and I confidently expect a new decision, more worthy of Suldaun Selim and the Turkish nation. Tell your powerful monarch, that he should not for a moment think of descending from the high rank where the glorious deeds of his ancestors have placed him, by surrendering to a few English vessels a city containing nine hundred thousand souls, and abundantly provided with magazines and ammunition. Your ramparts are not yet armed, but that may soon be done; you have weapons enough—use them with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to a part of the town—granted; but without the assistance of a land army, it could not take possession of the capital, even if you were to open your gates. You sustain every year the ravages of accidental conflagration, and the more serious calamities of the plague; and do you now scruple at incurring the risk of inferior losses in defence of your capital, your country, your holy religion?"¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
278, 280.
Bign. vi.
197, 198.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 196,
197.

67.
The Turks
negotiate to
gain time,
and complete their
preparations.

This noble reply produced a great effect upon the Divan; and it was resolved that, before submitting, they should at least try whether, by gaining time in parleying, they could not in some degree complete their preparations. Sebastiani accordingly dictated a note in answer to the communication from the English admiral, in which the Suldaun professed an anxious desire to re-establish amicable relations with the British government, and announced his appointment of Allett-Effendi for the purpose of conducting the negotiation. The unsuspecting English admiral, who, from the illness of Mr Arbuthnot, was intrusted with the negotiation, was no match for the wily French general in the arts of diplomacy, and fell into the snare. The British ultimatum was sent ashore the following morning, which consisted in the provisional cession of their fleet to England, the dismissal of Sebastiani, and the re-establishment of amicable relations with Russia and the British government. Half an hour only

Feb. 21.

was allowed to the Divan, after the receipt and translation of this note, to deliberate and reply. Had this vigorous resolution been acted upon, it must have led to immediate submission: for the batteries were not yet armed; the fleet, the arsenal, the Seraglio, and great part of the town, lay exposed to the fire of the English squadron; and during the terror produced by a bombardment, the greater part of the capital, which is chiefly built of wood, must have been reduced to ashes.¹

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 198,
199. Dum.
xvii. 280,
282. Bign.
vi. 198, 200.

Unfortunately, instead of doing this, Sir John Duckworth, impressed with the belief that the Sultaun was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, and that the desired objects might be obtained without the horrors of a conflagration, or an irreparable breach with the Ottoman empire, imprudently gave time, and suffered himself to be drawn into a negotiation. Day after day elapsed in the mere exchange of notes and diplomatic communications; and meanwhile the spirit of the Mussulmans, now raised to the highest pitch, was indefatigably employed in organising the means of defence. The direction of the whole was intrusted to General Sebastiani, for whom a magnificent tent was erected in the gardens of the Seraglio, and who communicated to the ardent multitude the organisation and arrangement which long warlike experience had given to the officers of Napoleon. Men and women, gray hairs, young hands, the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, were to be seen promiscuously labouring together at the fortifications. Forgetting, in the general transport, the time-worn lines of religious distinction, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs set the first example of cordial acquiescence in the orders of government. Selim himself repeatedly visited the works; his commands were obeyed by two hundred thousand men, animated by religious and patriotic ardour to the greatest degree; while the French engineers, who had been sent by Marmont to aid in the war with the Russians, communicated to the busy multitude the inestimable advan-

68.
Vast energy
displayed by
the Mussul-
mans in
their de-
fence.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Jom. ii.
375, 377.
Dum. xvii.
284, 286.
Bign. vi.
200, 204.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 198,
199.

69.
The English
renounce
the enter-
prise.

tages of scientific direction and experienced skill. Under such auspices, the defences of the harbour were speedily armed and strengthened; the naval arsenal furnished inexhaustible resources; in three days three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the batteries — at the end of a week their number was increased to a thousand; temporary parapets were everywhere formed with gabions and fascines, where regular defences were wanting; the tower of Leander was armed with heavy artillery; a hundred gunboats were drawn across the mouth of the Golden Horn; twelve line-of-battle ships within stood apparently ready for action; fire-ships were prepared, and numerous furnaces with red-hot shot kept constantly heated to carry into the British fleet the conflagration with which it menaced the Turkish capital.¹*

Although the English officers perceived, by means of their telescopes, the preparations which were going forward, and though the peril to the fleet was hourly increasing from the long continuance of a south-west wind, which rendered it impossible to pass the straits, yet nothing was done adequate to the emergency. The ships, indeed, were brought nearer to the Seraglio, and every effort made to bring the enemy, by negotiation, to an accommodation: but the pride of the Mussulmans, now fully aroused, would not have permitted the government to come to terms, even if they had been so inclined; and the influence of Sebastiani was successfully exerted to protract the conferences till the preparations were so far completed as to enable them to bid defiance to the enemy. The time when decisive success might have been attained had been allowed to pass away. Four days after the English fleet appeared off Constantinople, the coasts were so completely armed with artillery, as to render an attack eminently hazardous; in a week it was totally hopeless. The object

* The number of guns mounted on the batteries in six days was 917 pieces of cannon and 200 mortars—an instance of vigour and rapidity in preparing the means of defence perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world.—See HARD. xi. 436; *Pièces Just.*

of the expedition having failed, nothing remained but to provide for the safety of the fleet : but this was now no easy matter ; for, during the week lost in negotiation, the batteries of the Dardanelles had all been armed, and the Castles of Europe and Asia so strengthened as to render it an extremely hazardous matter to attempt the passage. To complete the difficulties of the English admiral, the wind, which generally blows at Constantinople from the north-east, continued, ever after his arrival, fixed in the south-west, so as to render it totally impossible for him to retrace his steps.¹

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

¹ Sir J. Duckworth's Despatch, Ann. Reg. 1807, 664. Jom. ii. 376. Dum. xvii. 281, 282.

At length on the 1st March, a breeze having sprung up from the Black Sea, all sails were spread, and the fleet re-entered the perilous straits. But it was not without difficulty, and with considerable hazard, that the passage was effected. A heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries ; the headlands on either side presented a continued line of smoke ; the roar of artillery was incessant ; and enormous stone balls, some of them weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, threatened at one stroke to sink the largest ships. One of these massy projectiles carried away the main-mast of the Windsor Castle, which bore the admiral's flag ; another penetrated the poop of the Standard, and killed and wounded sixty men. At length the fleet cleared the straits, and cast anchor off Tenedos, in such a situation as to blockade the Dardanelles, having sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men in this audacious expedition, which, though it proved unsuccessful from the errors attending its execution in the department of diplomacy, was both boldly conceived and ably executed, so far as the forcing the passage was concerned.² It produced a very great impression in Europe, by revealing the secret weakness of the Ottoman empire, and demonstrating how easily an adequate maritime force, by thus bursting through its defences, and aiming a stroke at once at the vitals of the state, could subdue the strength of Islamism, and compel the submission of a power before

70.
The British fleet repass the straits. March 1.

March 2.

² Ann. Reg. 1807, 200. Sir J. Duckworth's Despatch, ib. 664. Jom. ii. 376, 377. Dum. xvii. 281, 293. Bign. vi. 204, 207.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

71.
Blockade of
the Darda-
nelles.

which, in former times, all the monarchies of Europe had trembled.

After the departure of the English fleet, all amicable relations were, of course, suspended with the Turkish government; the preparations of the Sultaun to strengthen the batteries both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles continued with undiminished activity; and the influence of General Sebastiani with the Divan became unbounded. The ease, however, with which the British fleet had surmounted all the defences of Constantinople, and the imminent risk which he had run of being deprived, by one blow, of the powerful aid of Turkey, gave the utmost uneasiness to Napoleon; and he despatched, without delay, orders both to Marmont in Illyria, and Eugene in Italy, to forward instantly a number of able officers, among whom were Colonel Haxo of the engineers, and Colonel Foy of the artillery, to co-operate in the strengthening of the defences of Constantinople. Six hundred men were directed to be forthwith put at the disposal of the Grand Seignior, and authority given for the transmission of five thousand, with abundant supplies in money and ammunition, if required. These reinforcements, however, were not required; for though the English fleet was shortly after joined by the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, yet they had too recently experienced the dangers of the straits to venture a second time into them, more especially after their defences had been so materially strengthened, as they soon were, by the operations of the French engineers. Contenting themselves, therefore, with taking possession of Lemnos and Tenedos for the service of their fleet, they established a close blockade of the entrance to the straits from the Archipelago; and as a similar precaution was adopted at the mouth of the Bosphorus, the supply of the capital by water-carriage on both sides was interrupted, and before long a very great dearth of provisions was experienced.¹

¹ Dum. xvii.
292, 293.
Jom. ii. 376,
377. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
201.

The Turkish government made the utmost efforts to

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

72.

Naval ac-
tion off
Tenedos.

man their squadron, but this was no easy matter, as the blockade deprived them of all intercourse with the Greeks, who constituted almost exclusively the nautical portion of their population. At length, however, the scarcity became so great that serious commotions took place in the capital; and the government having, by extraordinary severity, forced an adequate number of hands on board the fleet, the Capitan Pasha ventured to leave the protection of the forts in the Dardanelles, and give battle to the Russian fleet. But the result was what might have been expected from a contest between an inexperienced body of men, for the most part unacquainted with naval affairs, and recently torn from civil occupations, and a squadron manned by seamen who yield to none in Europe in the resolution with which they stand to their guns.* Though the Turks fought with great gallantry, they could not withstand the superior skill and more rapid fire of their antagonists: four of their ships were early in the day drifted out of the line, and the unskilful crews were unable, or unwilling, to bring them again into fire; the remainder, after this great loss, were surrounded, and in great part destroyed. Four ships of the line were taken with the vice-admiral, three were burned, and the shattered remnant driven for shelter under the cannon of the Dardanelles. So overbearing did the pressure of the Russians at sea now become, that it threatened the utmost dangers to the Ottoman government; when the blockade of the capital was raised, and a temporary respite obtained by the treaty of Tilsit, which, as will immediately appear, established a short and fallacious truce between these irreconcilable enemies.¹

Not content with this attack on the Turkish capital, the British government at the same time effected a descent on the coasts of Egypt. Deeming the opportunity favourable for regaining possession of that important

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 201,
202. Dum.
xvii. 292,
293. Jom.
ii. 376, 379.

* "Lay your ship alongside a Frenchman," said Nelson, "but try to outmanœuvre a Russian or a Dane."

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

73.

Descent by
the British
on the coast
of Egypt.
Macleod de-
feated at El
Hammed.

March 6.

April 22.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 203,
204. Bign.
vi. 215, 217.74.
Evacuation
of Alexan-
dria.

country, which was still warmly coveted by Napoleon, and the cession of which into the feeble hands of the Mussulmans had been long a subject of regret, the British government resolved to send an expedition to the shores of the Nile, at the same time that it threatened with bombardment the Turkish capital. The land troops, under the command of General Mackenzie, set sail from Messina on the 6th of March, and landed near Rosetta on the 18th. Alexandria speedily capitulated; Damietta was also occupied without resistance; and General Fraser was detached with two thousand five hundred men to effect the reduction of Rosetta, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile, and the possession of which was deemed essential to the regular supply of Alexandria with provisions. This place, however, held out; and as immediate succour was expected from the Mamelukes, Colonel Macleod was stationed with seven hundred men at El Hammed, in order to facilitate their junction with the besieging force. This detachment was speedily surrounded by an overwhelming body of Turkish horse, and after a gallant resistance, which repelled the attacks of their numerous squadrons till the whole ammunition was exhausted, entirely cut off. The promised Mamelukes never made their appearance; and General Stewart, severely weakened by so great a loss, with difficulty made good his retreat, fighting all the way, to Alexandria, where he arrived with a thousand fewer men than he had set out.¹

The fortifications of that place, however, enabled the British to bid defiance to their desultory opponents; and it was soon found that the apprehensions of scarcity which had prompted this ill-fated expedition to Rosetta were entirely chimerical, as provisions speedily became more abundant than ever. But the British government, in which an important change at this time took place, became sensible of the impolicy of longer retaining this acquisition at a crisis when every nerve required to be

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

Sept. 23.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 203,
205. Bign.
vi. 215, 219.

exerted to protect their shores from the forces of Napoleon. It was with lively satisfaction, therefore, that they heard of the conclusion of a convention in autumn, by which it was stipulated that all the British prisoners in the hands of the Turks should be released, and Alexandria surrendered to the latter; in virtue of which arrangement the English troops set sail from the mouth of the Nile in the end of September, and were brought to Gibraltar, where they were stationed, ere long co-operating in covering the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from the Tagus, and ultimately taking a share in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns.¹

The public dissatisfaction arising from these repeated defeats was so strong, that it seriously shook the stability of the ministry, and produced a very general impression, even among that portion of the community who had hitherto supported them, that, however well qualified to direct the state during a period of profound peace, and when ample leisure was to be had for carrying into effect their projected reforms, they were not calculated for the existing crisis, in which these pacific ameliorations were of comparatively little consequence, and when what was imperatively called for was the capacity of warlike combination. But room was not afforded for this growing discontent to manifest itself in the usual way, so as to affect the fortunes of the administration, from another event at this time, which brought them into collision with the religious feelings of the sovereign, and ultimately led to their retirement from office.

It has been already mentioned that the general question of Catholic emancipation was brought forward in the session of 1804, and supported with all the weight and eloquence of the Whig party.* The ministerial leaders felt the necessity of making some effort, when in power, to redeem the pledges which they had so freely given when on the Opposition benches. Lord Grenville,

75.
Great discontent at these repeated defeats throughout Great Britain.

76.
Measures for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick.

* *Ante*, Chap. xxxix. § 16.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

March 5.

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 1, 5.77.
Arguments
in favour of
it by Lord
Howick.

in particular, who had formed part of the administration which resigned in 1801, in consequence of the declared repugnance of the sovereign to those concessions to the Catholics which Mr Pitt then deemed essential to the security of the country, considered himself called upon by every consideration, both of public policy and private honour, again to press them upon the legislature. In consequence of these impressions, Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey) moved, on the 5th of March, for leave to bring in a bill which should enable persons of every religious persuasion to serve in the army and navy, without any other condition but that of taking an oath specified in the bill, which was repugnant to no religious opinions. By the existing law, a Catholic in Great Britain could not rise to the rank even of a subaltern, in consequence of the necessity of officers of every grade taking the Test Oath; while in Ireland, under an act passed in the Irish parliament in 1793, persons of that religious persuasion were permitted to rise to any situation in the army, excepting commander-in-chief of the forces, master-general of the ordnance, or general of the staff.¹

“Was it prudent,” said Lord Howick, “when we were contending with so powerful an enemy, to prevent, in this manner, a large portion of the population of the country from concurring in the common defence? What can be more anomalous than that in one united empire so great a discrepancy should prevail, as that on one side of St George’s Channel a Catholic may rise to the highest rank in the army, but on the other he cannot hold even an ensign’s commission? It was declared in 1793, when this restriction was removed by the Irish parliament, by his Majesty’s ministers in both houses, that in two months they would grant a similar indulgence to persons of the Romish persuasion in Great Britain; but this had never yet been done, and this monstrous inconsistency continued to disgrace the laws of the United Kingdom.

It may fairly be admitted that the principle of this relaxation applies equally to dissenters of every description, and that it must lead to a general admission of persons of every religious persuasion to the army and navy; but where is the danger of such liberality? The proposed measure only enables the sovereign to appoint such persons to offices of high importance. It does not compel him to do so; their appointment would still depend on the executive government, which would naturally avoid any dangerous or improper exercise of its authority; and would, on the contrary, be enabled to take advantage, in the common defence, of the whole population of the country, without any of those restrictions which now, with a large proportion, damped the spirit or soured the affections.”¹

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 1, 7.

On the other hand, it was strongly contended by Mr Perceval,—“The objections to this measure, strong as they are, are not so insuperable as to the system of which it forms a part, which originates in a laxity of principle on matters of religion, which is daily increasing, and threatens in its ultimate results to involve all our institutions in destruction. If it is desirable to preserve anything in our ancient and venerable establishments, it is indispensable to make a stand at the outset against any innovations in so essential a particular. This measure is, in truth, a partial repeal of the Test Act; if passed, it must at no distant period lead to the total repeal of that act, and with it to the downfall of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. The advocates of the Catholics argue as if their measures were calculated to support toleration, whereas, in reality, and in their ultimate effects, they are calculated to destroy that great national blessing, by subverting the Protestant establishment, by which toleration has been always both professed and practised, and reinstating the Romish, by which it has been as uniformly repudiated. From the arguments that are advanced at the present day, one would be inclined to imagine that

78.

Arguments
against it by
Mr Perceval.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

there was no such thing as truth or falsehood in religion ; that all creeds were equally conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind ; and that, provided only the existing heats and dissensions on the subject could be allayed, it mattered not to what religious tenets either a government or a people inclined. True toleration is indeed an inestimable blessing, but it consists in permitting to every man the free exercise of his religion, not in putting into the hands of the professors of a hostile creed the means of overturning what they will never cease to regard as a pestilent heresy, and resuming from its present Protestant possessors the lost patrimony of St Peter in these islands.

79.
The alleged
tendency of
the measure.

“ In point of law, it is incorrect to say, that a Catholic who has obtained a commission in Ireland is liable to any penalties : the Mutiny Act authorises the King to require in any part of his dominions the services of every man in his army, and this is of itself a practical repeal of the disability affecting Catholics ; for no man can be compelled to do what would subject him to a penalty. The argument that all offices should be thrown open to persons of all religious persuasions, is inconsistent with the British constitution as settled in 1688, which is root and branch a Protestant establishment. If pushed to its legitimate length, it would throw open all offices, even the crown itself, to Catholic aspirants : what then becomes of the Act of Settlement, or the right of the house of Hanover to the throne ? If this is to be the policy of our country, there is but one thing to be done—to do everything to transfer the church lands in Ireland to the Catholics, re-establish the Catholic faith, and call over the Pretender to the throne of these realms. These are the great and dazzling objects which the Romish party have in view ; it was to exclude them that all the restrictions were imposed by our ancestors on the persons professing that faith ; it is to gain them that all these minor concessions are demanded by their adherents ; their advances are only

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

the more dangerous that they are gradual, unperceived, and veiled under the colour of philanthropy. The Catholics already enjoy everything which toleration can demand ; to ask more is to demand weapons to be used against ourselves. The consequences of a storm are little to be apprehended ; it is the gradual approaches which are really dangerous. If parliament goes on allowing this accumulation, *it will ultimately have that extorted from its weakness which its wisdom would be desirous to withhold.*"¹*

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 9, 11.

The second reading of this interesting bill was adjourned from time to time, without the nation being either alive to its importance, or aware of the quarter in which obstacles to its progress existed. But on the 24th March, it was suddenly announced in the newspapers that ministers had been dismissed ; and two nights after, Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, and Lord Howick in the House of Commons, gave a full statement of the circumstances which had led to so unlooked-for a change. The draft of the bill, as usual in all matters of importance, had been submitted to his Majesty for his consideration ; and it contained a recital of the Irish Act, which opened the army to Catholics for every grade,*with the exception of the offices of master-general of the ordnance, com-

80.

Repugnance
of the King
to the bill,
which is
withdrawn.
March 24.

* Subsequent events, more particularly the fierce agitation for repeal in 1843, after Catholic emancipation had been conceded, and the miserable attempt at rebellion in 1848, have rendered these early debates and predictions on the effects of concession to the Catholics in the highest degree curious and interesting. Without pronouncing any decided opinion on a subject on which the light of experience is only now beginning to shine upon the world, it is the duty of the historian to urge the discussions on this subject on the attentive consideration of every candid inquirer, either into political wisdom or historic truth. So far back as 1803, Lord Redesdale wrote to government from Dublin :—"The present rebellion is a *beginning only*, that I cannot doubt. All the actors have been puppets worked by persons behind the scenes. You must immediately arm us with a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. But you must do more ; you must renew the martial law, or pass some other bill to enable the military to act with greater promptitude if the Lord-lieutenant shall see fit. We have done all we can, but armed rebellion must be met by arms. It is as necessary to destroy the influence of the terror of the rebels over the people's minds, as to meet them in the field."—LORD REDESDALE to MR ADDINGTON, July 25, 1803. PELLEW'S *Sidmouth*, ii. 209.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

mander-in-chief of the forces, and general of the staff; and then provided that the services of the Catholics should be received without any restriction, and on the condition only of taking the oath of allegiance. On this bill being proposed, the King manifested considerable objections to it; but these were at length so far overcome by the representation that the measure was a necessary consequence of the acts of 1793 and the union, so far as Ireland was concerned, that ministers were authorised to bring in the bill, and communications were made to the heads of the Catholics in Ireland, that they were to be admitted to every situation in the army, without exception. The King, however, had laboured under some misapprehension as to the extent and tendency of the measure which was to be brought forward, and believed that it was not intended to enlarge the facilities of admission created by the act 1793 for Ireland, but only to make that act the general law of the empire; for no sooner was its import explained in the debate which occurred on the first reading in the House of Commons, of which an abstract has already been given, than he intimated to the government that he had invincible objections to the proposed change.*

81.
The King
requires a
written
pledge that
no further
concessions
should be
made to the
Catholics.
Change of
ministry.

After some ineffectual attempts at a compromise, ministers, finding the King resolute, determined to withdraw the bill altogether, and intimated this decision to his Majesty, accompanied, however, with the conditions, that they should not be precluded from stating their opinions on the general policy of the measure in parliament, and that they should be at liberty, from time to

* Lord Sidmouth stated in the House of Lords, "That he (Lord Sidmouth) had stated to his Majesty, that he had been induced to concur in the proposed measure, as a necessary consequence of the Irish Act of 1793; from the consideration of which, combined with the act of union, it appeared to him there was no alternative but either the repeal of the Irish Act, or the adoption of the measure. His Majesty then declared that he would not *consent to any new concession*, but that in consequence of the Irish Act, *and of it alone*, he would take the proposition of the cabinet into further consideration. The answer stated was, that "however painful his Majesty had found it to reconcile to his feelings, the removal of objections which might have the most distant reference to a question which had already been the subject of such frequent and distressing

time, to bring the matter again under his Majesty's consideration. The answer of the King, after expressing regret at the difference of opinion which had arisen, rejected these conditions as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the constitution, that the acts of government are to be held as those of the responsible ministers, and that the adoption or rejection of no measure is to be laid upon his Majesty ; and as not less at variance with the fundamental basis of the Act of Settlement, which is rested on the exclusion of Catholics from the highest office in the realm. His Majesty therefore required a written pledge from ministers that they would propose no further concessions to the Catholics. This pledge ministers, on their side, considered as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of a free constitution, which is, that the king can do no wrong, and that the responsibility of all public measures must rest with his advisers, and equally repugnant to that progressive change in human affairs which might at no distant period render a repetition of the proposal a matter of necessity. They therefore declined, though in the most respectful terms, to give the proposed pledge, and the consequence was, that the King, in gracious terms, sent them an intimation that their services were no longer required ; and on the same day the Duke of Portland, Lord Hawkesbury, and Mr Perceval, received the royal commands to form a new administration. The King was perfectly firm on this occasion : he himself said he regarded his crown at stake in the question at issue.¹*

¹ Lord Grenville's, Howick's, Hawkesbury's, and Mr Perceval's Speeches. Parl. Deb. ix. 247, 258, 261, 278.

discussion, he would not, under the circumstances so earnestly pressed, prevent his ministers from submitting to the consideration of parliament the propriety of inserting the proposed clauses in the Mutiny Bill." While, however, the King so far reluctantly conceded, he thought it necessary to declare that *he could not go one step further* : and he trusted this proof of his forbearance would secure him from being at a future period distressed by any further proposal connected with the question."—PELLEW'S *Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 455, 456.

* "The King considers the struggle as for his throne ; and he told me but yesterday, when I took the great seal, that he did so consider it, that he must be the Protestant king of a Protestant country, or no king. He is remarkably well, firm as a lion, placid, and quick beyond example in any moment of his

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

82.

Arguments
in parlia-
ment against
the King's
conduct.

Parliament, after this unexpected event, was adjourned till the 8th April, and on that day the new ministers took their seats.* The change of administration, of course, formed the first and most anxious subject of debate ; and the interest of the country was excited to the highest degree, by the arguments which were urged for and against that important and unwonted exercise of the royal prerogative. On the side of the former ministers, it was urged by Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Howick : —“The true question at issue is, whether or not it would have been constitutionally justifiable, or rather would not have been a high crime and misdemeanour, for any minister to have subscribed a written pledge that he would never in future bring a particular measure or set of measures under his Majesty's consideration. If any statesman could be found base enough to give such a pledge, he would deserve to lose his head, and the House would be guilty of a dereliction of its duty, if it did not impeach a minister who so far forgot his duty to the life. The late ministers are satisfied that the King, whose state of mind they were always doubting, has more sense and understanding than all the ministers put together : they leave him with a full conviction of that fact.”—LORD ELDON to Rev. Dr SWIRE, April 1, 1807 ; CAMPBELL'S *Lives of the Chancellors*, vii. 207.

* The new cabinet stood thus :—

CABINET.

Composition
of the new
cabinet.

Earl Camden, President of the Council.
Lord Eldon, Chancellor.
Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal.
Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury.
Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.
Earl Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade.
Lord Hawkesbury, Home Secretary.
Mr Canning, Foreign Secretary.
Lord Castlereagh, War and Colonial Secretary.
Mr Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duchy of Lancaster,
—See *Parl. Deb.* ix. 111.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

Mr Robert Dundas, President of the Board of Control.
Mr George Rose, President of the Board of Trade.
Sir James Pulteney, Secretary at War.
Sir Vicary Gibbs, Attorney-General.
Sir Thomas Plummer, Solicitor-General.
Duke of Richmond, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

country. This is a matter in which the interests of the crown were more at stake than even those of the people : for if the precedent is once to be allowed, that a minister is at liberty to surrender his own private judgment to the will of the reigning sovereign, it is impossible that the legal fiction, that the king can do no wrong, can any longer be maintained, and the great constitutional principle, that the acts of the king are those of his responsible advisers, will be at an end. Who could, in such a view, set bounds to the dangerous encroachments of unknown and irresponsible advisers upon the deliberations of government, or say how far the ostensible ministers might be thwarted and overruled by unknown and secret influence, which might totally stop the action of a constitutional government ? The danger of the measure which has been adopted is only rendered the greater by the announcement now openly made, that in this, the most important step perhaps taken in his whole reign, his Majesty had no advisers. The constitution recognises no such doctrine ; the advisers of the King throughout must be held to be those who have succeeded to his councils. There is no desire to bring the sovereign to the bar of the House of Commons ; it is the new ministers who are really the objects of deliberation. The late administration was dismissed because they refused to bind themselves by a specific pledge never to renew the subject of Catholic concession ; a new ministry have succeeded them ; they must be held therefore to have given that pledge ; and it is for the house to say, whether such a dereliction of public duty is not utterly at variance with every principle of constitutional freedom.”¹

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Eldon, Mr Perceval, and Mr Canning :—“ The question on which the imprudent zeal of the late administration has brought them into collision with the religious scruples and political wisdom of the sovereign is not one of trivial moment, in which the monarch may be expected to abide by the

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 327, 330,
338, 341.

83.
And in support of it by
Mr Perceval
and Mr Canning.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

judgment of his constitutional advisers. It lies, on the contrary, at the foot of the whole constitution ; it constitutes one of the foundations *non tangenda non movenda*, on which the entire fabric of our Protestant liberties has been reared. The present question regards the transference of the sword to Catholic hands ; the same question on which Charles I. erected his standard at Northampton—the intrusting the direction of the military force to a party necessarily and permanently inimical to our Protestant constitution, both in church and state. It is absurd to suppose this concession would do anything towards satisfying the Catholics—it would only lead them to make fresh demands, and empower them to urge them with additional weight ; and the consequence of the measure could be nothing else, in the end, but to bring Catholic bishops into the House of Lords. Was it surprising that the King paused on the threshold of such a question, striking, as it evidently did, at the root of the tenure by which his own family held their right to the throne ?

84.
The sovereign had been left in the dark as to the extent of the measure.

“ In demanding a pledge that such a proposal should not be renewed, he acted without any adviser, upon the unaided dictates of his own masculine understanding, aided by the conscientious scruples of his unsophisticated heart. All the talent of the cabinet could not blind him to the evident and inevitable, though possibly remote, consequences of such a fatal precedent as was now sought to be forced upon him. It is a palpable mistake to say he drew back in the later stages of the negotiation from what he had previously agreed to ; he first gave a reluctant consent to the extension of the Irish Act of 1793 to Great Britain, in the firm belief that this was all that was required of him ; so the proposed measure was explained to and understood by him ; and that he was not singular in this belief is proved by the fact, that the Irish Secretary had his doubts upon it, and that the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question

as to the second reading of the bill, said there was no particular reason for the Irish members being present on that occasion, as they were already acquainted with the measure. Three cabinet ministers, viz., the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Ellenborough, refused to concur in the measure, when they understood how far it was to be carried; the Chancellor was not even summoned to the council at which it was to be discussed, though he was in a peculiar manner the keeper of the King's conscience; and even the person who was commissioned to procure the King's consent to the measure did not understand the extent to which it was to be carried.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

"Having thus been misled, whether designedly or inadvertently it mattered not, in so vital a particular by his ministers, was it surprising that the King should have required from them a pledge that they would not again harass him on the same subject? Undoubtedly no minister should give a pledge to fetter the exercise of his own judgment on future occasions; but that was not here required; for if circumstances in future might render a renewal of the measure necessary, they might at once resign. The King regarded this measure as a violation of his coronation oath, as destructive to the Protestant church in Ireland, and as likely in its ultimate effects to endanger our whole Protestant constitution. Unquestionably it was to be regretted that on any occasion the private opinion of the sovereign should be brought forward apart from that of his constitutional advisers; but for this evil those must answer who, by forcing on a rash and unnecessary measure, compelled him to rely on his own judgment alone. And it is some consolation to reflect, that, in proportion as the sovereign has been made more constitutionally responsible in his own person, he must become better known to his people; and the soundness of judgment, promptness and vivacity of intellect, which have enabled him to bear up alone against the united

85.
Defence of
his conduct
in requiring
the pledge
from minis-
ters.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 314, 321,
342, 346.² Ibid. ix.
348.86.
Dissolution
of parlia-
ment, and
great major-
ity for the
new minis-
ters.

weight of the cabinet, have only evinced, in the more striking manner, how worthy he is to fill the throne which his family attained by the principle he has now so manfully defended.”¹ Upon a division, there appeared two hundred and fifty-eight for the new ministers, and two hundred and twenty-six for the old—leaving a majority of thirty-two for the existing government.²*

This majority, though sufficient to enable ministers to conduct the public business during the remainder of that session, was not adequate to carry on the government during the arduous crisis which awaited them in the administration of foreign affairs. They resolved, therefore, to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of parliament; and the event decisively proved that the King had not miscalculated the loyalty and religious feeling of the English people in this trying emergency. Parliament was prorogued on the 27th April, and soon after dissolved by royal proclamation. The utmost efforts were made by both parties on this occasion to augment their respective forces; to the usual heats and excitement of a general election were superadded the extraordinary passions arising from the recent dismissal of an administration from office, and consequent elevation of another in their stead. All the usual means of exciting popular enthusiasm were resorted to without scruple on both sides. The venality and corruption of the Tories, alleged to be so strikingly evinced in their recent elevation of Lord Melville, after the stain consequent on the tenth report of the commissioners, were the subject of loud declamation from the Whigs; the scandalous attempt to force the King’s con-

* In 1829, when the Catholic Relief Bill was introduced by Sir Robert Peel, Lord Eldon said in parliament—“If I had a voice that would resound to the remotest corner of the empire, I would re-echo the principle, that if ever a Roman Catholic is permitted to form part of the legislature of this country, or to hold any of the great offices of government, from that moment the *sun of Great Britain is set for ever*. (A laugh.) My opinions may be received with contempt and derision; opprobrium may be heaped upon their author; but they shall not be stifled; and whatever calamities may befall the nation, it shall be known that there was one Englishman who boldly strove to avert them.”

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

science, and induce a popish tyranny on the land, yet wet with the blood of the Protestant martyrs, was as vehemently re-echoed from the other. "No Peculation," "No Popery," were the war-cries of the respective parties; and amidst banners, shouts, and universal excitement, the people were called on to exercise the most important rights of free citizens. To the honour of the empire, however, this great contest was conducted without bloodshed or disorder in any quarter; and the result decisively proved that, in taking his stand upon the inviolate maintenance of the Protestant constitution, the King had a great majority of all classes throughout the empire on his side. Almost all the counties and chief cities of Great Britain returned members in the interest of the new ministry; defeat after defeat, in every quarter, told the Whigs how far they had miscalculated the spirit of the age; and on the first division in the ensuing parliament they were overthrown by a great majority in both houses—that in the Peers being ninety-seven, in the Commons no less than one hundred and ninety-five.^{1*}

June 26.
¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 238,
239.

Though this important step of the King in dismissing the ministry was adopted on his own private judgment, and from the strength of his native resolution alone, yet it had the effect of bringing into a prominent place in his councils a man of great capacity, who held for nearly twenty years afterwards the important situation of chancellor, and whose powerful mind communicated its impress to the policy of government during the most momentous period of British history. John Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, was born at Newcastle-on-Tyne, on 4th June 1751. He was the eighth son of William Scott, a respectable trader engaged in the coal business in that city: and his

87.
Biography
of Lord
Eldon.

* The numbers were—

In the Peers, for the Whigs,	67	In the Commons, for the Whigs,	155
... for the Tories,	164	... for the Tories,	350
Majority,	97	Majority,	195
—Ann. Reg. 1807, 238-239.			

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

¹ Twiss's
Life of Eldon, i. 5,
44.

88.
His rise at
the bar to
the office of
chancellor.

elder brother William, afterwards Lord Stowell, had been born on 17th September 1745, at Haworth, near the same town. Thus the same family had the singular good fortune of giving birth to the two greatest lawyers in their respective departments, and not the least remarkable men of their day. Their father not having been in affluent circumstances, they were sent to the Royal Grammar-school, a charitable establishment in Newcastle, to which the sons of burgesses in that town were entitled, free of cost. John Scott there met a boy of equally obscure parentage—Cuthbert Collingwood, afterwards Lord Collingwood, the worthy companion of Nelson and St Vincent in the brightest days of England's glory. From such humble origin did the future rulers and statesmen of England at that period take their rise!¹

William Scott, the elder brother, early evinced such extraordinary abilities, that, at the age of sixteen, his parents were induced to put him forward as a candidate for a scholarship at Oxford, for the diocese of Durham, which he obtained in 1761. This laid the foundation of the fortunes both of himself and his younger brother John, who at the age of sixteen followed him to that celebrated seat of learning in 1766. William Scott soon obtained a fellowship, and gave lectures, which were much admired, on public law. John Scott took his degree in 1772, made a runaway marriage in the same year, which imposed on him the necessity of exertion, and in 1774 and 1775 gave lectures on law as deputy for Robert Chambers, professor of law, for which he was glad to receive £60 a-year. In 1775 he was called to the bar; and although he experienced the usual amount of disappointment which almost invariably, in that profession, precedes eminence, yet such was the vigour of his mind, and the unconquerable perseverance of his character, that it soon became evident to his friends that opportunity only was wanting to make him rise to the highest eminence. The opportunity came earlier to him than it

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

does to many others with equal powers and anxiety to do well. After four years of severe labour and no progress, he fortunately obtained an opportunity of being heard in a question of disputed succession,* in which his learning ultimately prevailed with Lord Chancellor Thurlow, though the decision had been adverse in the court below. That case made his fortune. He was soon after taken into the great case of the Clitheroe election, before a committee of the House of Commons, and, from the admirable appearance he made there, rapidly rose to the head of his profession. His secret for doing so was energetically expressed by himself in a few words, "To live like a hermit, and work like a horse,"—a rule which will probably insure success, even to ordinary abilities, in other professions besides the bar. In 1783 he received a silk gown from the coalition administration, and in the same year was elected member of parliament for Weobly. In 1788 he was appointed solicitor-general, and knighted. In 1793 he was elevated to the rank of attorney-general, and in that capacity conducted the memorable treason trials of Hardy and Horne Tooke in the succeeding year. Finally, in 1801, on the resignation of Lord Loughborough, he was appointed Lord Chancellor by the title of Lord Eldon.¹

¹ Twiss's
Life of El-
don, i. 45,
364.

Lord Eldon enjoyed a larger share of the confidence of George III. and the great majority of the royal family, than any other minister after the death of Mr Pitt; and his views influenced in a material degree the conduct of that monarch on many important occasions, and on none more than in the stand he made against the Catholic claims in 1806. Similarity of character, identity of principles, was the cause of this strong prepossession and daily increasing influence. Lord Eldon was in the cabinet what the king was on the throne. Both were thoroughly English in their ideas and character. They had the virtues equally with the failings, the excellencies and the

89.
His charac-
ter as a
lawyer and
statesman.

* *Ackroyd v. Smithson*; BROWN'S *Chancery Cases*, i. 505.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

defects of that temperament. Moral courage, fearless determination in council, was the grand characteristic of both. Neither had very extensive information out of the circle of their professional habits, (if such a word can fitly be applied to a sovereign,) but both had a large share of that strong good sense, practical sagacity, and clear perception, which so often, in the real business of life, obtain the mastery both of knowledge, genius, and accomplishments. "Church and King" was Eldon's motto, and adherence to the constitution in all points his ruling principle. He was the last of the sturdy old patriots of former and more quiescent days, and stands forth in history as the "ultimus Romanorum"—the latest relic of a race which, by their firmness and resolution, created the British empire. As a lawyer, his learning was unbounded, his understanding sound, his memory prodigious; and although the strength of his conscientious feelings in deciding cases in the court of last resort often led to distressing delays, yet his judgments, when they were pronounced, were almost always right, and have attained a weight which belongs to none others in Westminster Hall.

90.
Character
of the Whig
ministry,
and effects
of their fall.

On reviewing the external measures of the Whig administration, it is impossible to deny that their removal from office at that period was a fortunate event for the British empire in its ultimate results, and proved eminently favourable to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Notwithstanding all their talent—and they had a splendid array of it in their ranks,—notwithstanding all their philanthropy—and their domestic measures were generally dictated by its spirit;—they could not at that period have long maintained the confidence of the English people; and their unfortunate shipwreck on the Catholic question only accelerated a catastrophe already prepared by many concurrent causes. External disaster, the reproaches of our allies, the unbroken progress of our enemies, must ere long have occasioned their fall. The

time was not suited, the national temper not then adapted, for those domestic reforms on which the wishes of their partisans had long been set, and which in pacific times were calculated to have excited so powerful a popular feeling in their favour. The active and ruling portion of the nation had grown up to manhood during the war with France; the perils, the glories, the necessities of that struggle were universally felt; the military spirit had spread, with the general arming of the people, to a degree hitherto unparalleled in the British islands. Vigour in the prosecution of the contest was then indispensably necessary to obtain general support; capacity for warlike combination the one thing needful for lasting popularity. In these particulars the Whig ministry, notwithstanding all their talents, were eminently deficient; and the part they had taken throughout the contest disqualified them from conducting it to a successful issue. They had so uniformly opposed the war with France, that they were by no means equally impressed, as the nation was, either with its dangers or its inevitable character: they had so strenuously on every occasion deprecated the system of coalitions, that they could hardly, in consistency with their former principles, take a suitable part in that great confederacy by which alone its overgrown strength could be reduced. Their system of warfare, accordingly, was in every respect adverse to that which the nation then desired,—founded upon a secession from all alliances, when the people passionately desired to share in the dangers and glories of a Continental struggle; calculated upon a defensive system for a long course of years, when the now aroused spirit of the empire deemed it practicable, by a vigorous and concentrated effort, to bring the contest at once to a successful termination.

The foreign disasters, which attended their military and naval enterprises in all parts of the world, profoundly affected the British people, more impatient than any in Europe both of the expense of warlike preparation, and

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

of defeat in warlike adventure. The capitulation at Buenos Ayres, the flight from Constantinople, the catastrophe in Egypt, succeeding one another in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly that they occurred on the theatres of our greatest triumphs by land and sea, or blasted hopes the most extravagant of commercial advantage. And yet it is now abundantly evident that defeat on the shores of the La Plata and the banks of the Nile was more to be desired than victory; and that no calamity could have been so great as the successful issue of these expeditions. They were conceived in the most inconsiderate manner, and aimed at objects which, if gained, must have paralysed the strength of the empire. At the moment when the armies of Napoleon were crossing the Thuringian forests, ten thousand English soldiers embarked for South America: when the scales of war hung even on the fields of Poland, five thousand men were sent to certain destruction amidst the cavalry of Egypt. Their united force, if thrown into the scale at Eylau, might have driven the French Emperor to a disastrous retreat across the Rhine, and induced, seven years before they occurred, the glories of Leipsic and Waterloo. What could be more impolitic than, after Russia had given such decisive proof of its extraordinary resolution and devotion to the cause of Europe, in February 1807, to send out a miserable little expedition to Alexandria in March following, too large for piracy, too small for conquest, and the success of which could have no other effect but that of riveting the hostility of Turkey to Russia and its allies, and thereby securing to Napoleon the inestimable advantage of a powerful diversion on the side of the Danube? What more impolitic than, when the finances of that great power were exhausted by the extraordinary expenses of the contest, to refuse to the Emperor not only a subsidy, but even the British guarantee to a loan which he was desirous of contracting in the British dominions, unless accompanied by the

cession of customhouse duties in Russia in security?—dealing thus with the greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was perilling his very crown in what was our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief.

CHAP.
XLV.
1807.

The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for contracting the closest alliance with the Russian government—for the instant advance of loans to any amount, and the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoleon had drawn him into a situation full of peril. For the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle; and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitation of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and, by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French Emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals to his repeated and most earnest applications for assistance, and saw the land force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the hazardous conflict in which he was now exclusively engaged?*

92.
And their
glaring ne-
glect of the
Russian
war.

* "In the foreign office," said Mr Canning, when minister of foreign

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

93.

The Dardanelles expedition is an exception to the general inexperience of their foreign policy.

To these general censures on the foreign policy of England at this juncture, an exception must be made in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was ably conceived and vigorously entered upon. The stroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart of her adversary; the fire of Duckworth's broadsides was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylau; if successful, they would have added forty thousand men to the Russian standards. This object was so important that it completely vindicates the expedition; the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the disposal of the British admiral was not such as to have rendered victory a matter of certainty. As it was, however, it was ade-

Repeated and ineffectual applications which Alexander had made for aid during the Polish war.

affairs in 1807, "are to be found not one but twenty letters from the Marquis of Douglas, ambassador at St Petersburg, intimating, in the strongest terms, that unless effectual aid was sent to the Emperor of Russia, he would abandon the contest." Ample proof of this exists in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid before parliament. On 28th November 1806, the Marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, from St Petersburg—"General Budberg lately told me that his imperial majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coast of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his imperial majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in England." On 18th December 1806, he again wrote—"At court this morning his imperial majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expedience of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On 2d January 1807—"I have again heard the *strongest complaints* that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January 14th—"I must not conceal from your lordships that the silence of his majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." On January 26th—"Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February 4th—"During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February 15th—"I cannot sufficiently express the *extreme anxiety* felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain, to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances, and urgent calls for aid, the British government did nothing; they declined to guarantee the loan of six millions, which was indispensable to the equipment

quate to the object; and this bold and well-conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sebastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British admiral, who, however gallant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expeditions, and the severe mortification which their failure occasioned

of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On January 13th, Lord Howick wrote—"In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his majesty feels it to be his duty to *preserve as much as possible* the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in history an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony; "husbanding," as Mr Canning afterwards said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of the military then lying idle in the British islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of *eighty thousand men* in the British islands. Her military force, Jan. 1807, was as follows:—

REGULARS.	MILITIA.	VOLUNTEERS.
Cavalry at home, 20,041	In Great Britain, 53,810	Infantry, 254,544
Infantry ditto, 61,447	In Ireland, 24,180	Cavalry, 25,342
		Artillery, 9,420
Total ditto, 81,488	77,990	289,306
Infantry abroad, 93,114		
Cavalry ditto, 6,274		
Total, 180,876		
Total in arms in British isles—of whom 81,488 were regulars,		448,784

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1809, England had above seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.—See *Parl. Paper*, July 18, 1807; *Parl. Deb.* ix. 111; *Appendix*.

CHAP.
XLV.

1807.

94.
These fail-
ures were
ultimately
beneficial.

to the British people, had a favourable effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric characters of his maritime expeditions; but they were important in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowed by the grandeur and extent of his Continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and Continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources against the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disasters and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic, as well as unworthy of its resources, for so great a nation to waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue: the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired, and that general longing after military renown was felt which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular war, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND AND PEACE OF TILSIT.

APRIL—JULY, 1807.

THE change of ministry in England was attended with an immediate alteration in the policy pursued by that power with respect to Continental affairs. The men who now succeeded to the direction of its foreign relations had been educated in the school of Mr Pitt, and had early imbibed the ardent feelings of hostility with which he was animated towards the French Revolution. They were fully alive to the insatiable spirit of foreign aggrandisement to which the passions springing from its convulsions had led. Mr Canning and Lord Castlereagh were strongly impressed with the disastrous effects which had resulted from the economical system of their predecessors, and the ill-judged parsimony which had led them to starve the war at the decisive moment, and hold back at a time when, by a vigorous application of their resources, it might at once have been brought to a triumphant conclusion. No sooner, therefore, were they in possession of the reins of power than they hastened to supply the defect, and take measures for bringing the might of England to bear on the contest in a manner worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown. An immediate advance of £100,000 was made to the King of Prussia; arms and military stores were furnished for the use of the troops to the amount of £200,000;¹ and nego-

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

1.
Negotia-
tions and
treaties be-
tween the
Allies for
the vigorous
prosecution
of the war.

April 2.

¹ Lucches. ii.
297. Hard.
ix. 297, 298.
Parl. Deb.
x. 103, 104.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

2.
Austria
strives to
mediate be-
tween the
contending
powers.
April 3.
Treaty be-
tween Prus-
sia and Rus-
sia at Bar-
tenstein.

April 25.

tiations were set on foot for concluding, with the cabinets of St Petersburg, Berlin, and Stockholm, conventions for concerted operations and a vigorous prosecution of the war.

In April, the cabinet of Vienna interposed its good offices to effect an adjustment of the differences of the Allied powers; but Mr Canning, while he accepted the offer of a mediation, did so under the express condition of its being communicated to the other belligerent powers, and of their accession to its conditions. But as they had already concluded engagements for the active prosecution of the contest, the proposed negotiations never took place; and England, under the guidance of its new administration, instead of entering into terms with France, reverted, in the most decided manner, to Mr Pitt's system of uncompromising hostility to its ambition. A treaty was signed at Bartenstein, in East Prussia, in the end of the same month, between Russia and Prussia, for the future prosecution of the war. By this convention it was stipulated that neither of the contracting parties should make peace without the concurrence of the other; that the Confederation of the Rhine, which had proved so fatal to the liberties of Germany, should be dissolved, and a new confederacy, for the protection of its interests, formed, under the auspices of its natural protectors, Austria and Prussia; that the latter power should recover the dominions which it had held in September 1805, and that Austria should be requested to accede to this treaty in order to regain its possessions in the Tyrol and the Venetian provinces, and to extend its frontier to the Mincio. Finally, Great Britain was formally invited to unite with the contracting powers, by furnishing succours in arms, ammunition, and money to them, and by the debarkation of a strong auxiliary force at the mouth of the Elbe, to co-operate with the Swedes in the rear of the enemy, while Austria should menace his communications, and the combined Russian and Prussian armies should attack him in front.¹

¹ Lucches. ii.
297, 300.
Parl. Deb.
x. 103, 104.
Hard. ix.
401, 402.
Bign. vi.
234. Mar-
tens, viii.
603, 604.

To this convention Sweden had already given its adhesion by the signature of a treaty, six days before, for the employment of an auxiliary force of twelve thousand men in Pomerania; and England hastened to unite itself to the confederacy. By a convention signed at London on the 17th June, England gave in its accession to the treaty of Bartenstein, and engaged to support the Swedish force in Pomerania by a corps of twenty thousand British soldiers, to act against the rear and left flank of the French army; while, by a relative agreement on the 23d, the Swedish auxiliary force in British pay was to be raised to eighteen thousand men, and the provisions of the fundamental treaty of alliance in April 1805, were again declared in force against the common enemy. Shortly after, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and Prussia, by which a subsidy of a million sterling was promised to the latter power for the campaign of 1807; and a secret article stipulated for succours yet more considerable, if necessary, to carry into full effect the purposes of the convention of Bartenstein. Thus, by the return of England to the principles of Mr Pitt's foreign policy, were the provisions of the great confederacy of 1805 again revived on the part of the northern powers; and to Great Britain it is not the least honourable part of these transactions, as Mr Canning justly observed, that the treaty with Prussia was signed when that power was almost entirely bereft of its possessions, and agreed to by Frederick-William in the only large town that remained to him of his once extensive dominions.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

3.

To which
England
and Sweden
accede.
June 17.

June 23.

¹ Schoell, ix. 141. Lucches. ii. 302, 303. Bignon. vi. 234. Dum. xviii. 216, 217. Hard. ix. 402, 405. Parl. Deb. ix. 974, and x. 102, 103. Martens, viii. 603.

But it was all in vain: the succours of England came too late to counterbalance the disasters which had been incurred; the change of system was too tardy to assuage the irritation which had been produced. By withholding these succours at an earlier period, the former ministry had not only seriously weakened the strength of the Russian forces, by preventing the arming of the numerous militia

4.

But too late
to prevent
their irritation
of Russia.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

corps which were crowding to the Imperial standards, but left the seeds of intense dissatisfaction in the breast of the Czar, who, not aware of the total change of policy which the accession of the Whig ministry had produced in the cabinet of St James's, and the complete revolution in that policy which had resulted from their dismissal, was actuated by the strongest resentment against the British government, and loudly complained that he was deserted by the ancient ally of Russia at the very moment when, for its interests even more than his own, he was risking his empire in a mortal struggle with the French Emperor.* Such was the state of destitution to which the ill-judged parsimony of the late administration had reduced the British arsenals, and such the effect of their total dismissal of transports from the royal service, that it was found impossible by their successors to fit out

* These angry feelings are very clearly evinced in General Budberg's answer to Lord Leveson Gower's (the British ambassador at St Petersburg) remonstrance on the conclusion at Tilsit of a separate peace by Russia with France. "The firmness and perseverance with which his majesty, during eight months, maintained and defended a cause common to all sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles. Never would his imperial majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he has hitherto pursued, if he had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his allies. But having, from the separation of Austria and England, found himself reduced to his own resources, having to combat with his own means the immense military forces which France had at her disposal, he was authorised in believing that, in continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he might ultimately come to compromise the fate of his own empire. The conduct of the British government in later times has been of a kind completely to justify the determination which his majesty has now taken. The diversion on the Continent which England so long promised, has not to this day taken place; and even if, as the latest advices from London show, the British government has at length resolved on sending ten thousand men to Pomerania, that succour is noways proportioned either to the hopes we were authorised to entertain, or the importance of the object to which these troops were destined. Pecuniary succours might, in some degree, have compensated the want of English troops; but not only did the British government decline facilitating the loan the imperial court had intended to negotiate in London, but when it did at length resolve upon making some advances, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the Allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expenses of Prussia. In fine, the use which, instead of co-operating in the common cause, the British government, during this period, has made of its forces in South America and in Egypt, the latter of which was not even communicated to the imperial cabinet, and was entirely at variance with its interests, at a time when, by giving them

an expedition for the shores of the Baltic for several months after their accession to office; and, in consequence, the formidable armament under Lord Cathcart, which afterwards achieved the conquest of Copenhagen, and might have appeared with decisive effect on the shores of the Elbe or the Vistula at the opening of the campaign, was not able to leave the shores of Britain till the end of July—a fortnight after the treaty of Tilsit had been signed, and the subjugation of the Continent, to all appearance, irrevocably effected.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Parl. Deb.
ix. 1035,
1036. Hard.
ix. 425.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 23,
23.

While the Allies were thus drawing closer the bonds which united their confederacy, and England, rousing from its unworthy slumber, was preparing to resume its place at the head of the alliance, Napoleon on his side was not idle, and from his camp at Finkenstein carried on an active negotiation with all the powers in Europe.

5.
Negotia-
tions of
Napoleon
during the
same period.
Auxiliary
forces ob-
tained under
Romana
from Spain.

a different destination, the necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the Danube might have been prevented, and the disposable force on the Vistula proportionally increased, sufficiently demonstrates that the Emperor of Russia was virtually released from his engagements, and had no course left but to attend to the security of his own dominions." It is impossible to dispute the justice of these observations.—*Note, GENERAL BUDBERG to LORD LEYCESON GOWER, Tilsit, 30th June 1807; Parl. Deb. v. 111, 112.*

* "When the present ministers came into office," said Mr Canning, then foreign minister, on July 31, 1807, "they found the transport department totally dismantled. This originated in the economical system of Lord H. Petty; but it was a false parsimony, evidently calculated, at no distant period, to render necessary a profuse expenditure. The mandate of dismissal came from the treasury, and was applicable to all transports but those necessary to maintain the communication with Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey. The saving produced by this order did not amount to more than £4000 a-month, and it dispersed 60,000 tons of shipping which was left to the late ministry by their predecessors. Ministers thus, in the beginning of April last, had not a transport at their disposal; and from the active state of trade at the same time, it required several months before they could be collected. If they had existed, a military force would in that very month have been sent out, and twenty thousand British troops would have turned the scale at Friedland. This ill-judged economy was the more criminal, that, by having a fleet of transports constantly at command, and threatening various points, 20,000 men could easily paralyse three times that force on the part of the enemy. The Whigs had apparently parted with this transport force for no other purpose but that of registering their abandonment of the Continent." The facts here alleged, Mr Windham, on the part of the late government, did not deny, alleging only "the absurdity of sending British forces to the Continent; which required no reply."—A curious argument from so able a man, when it is recollected that the nation was on the verge of Wellington's career.—See *Parl. Deb. ix. 1035-1038.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

In his addresses to the French senate, calling out the additional conscription of eighty thousand men, which has been already mentioned, he publicly held out the olive branch ; the surest proof of the magnitude of the disaster sustained at Eylau, and the critical situation in which he felt himself placed, with Austria hanging in dubious strength in his rear on one side, and Great Britain preparing to organise a formidable force on the other. "Our policy is fixed," said he: "we have offered to England peace before the fourth coalition ; we repeat the offer ; we are ready to conclude a treaty with Russia on the terms which her ambassador subscribed at Paris : we are prepared to restore its eight millions of inhabitants, and its capital, conquered by our arms, to Prussia." There was nothing said now about making the Prussian nobility so poor that they should have to beg their bread ; nor of the Queen, like another Helen, having lighted the fires of another Troy. But amidst these tardy and extorted expressions of moderation, the Emperor had nothing less at his heart than to come to an accommodation ; and his indefatigable activity was incessantly engaged in strengthening his hands by fresh alliances, and collecting from all quarters additional troops to overwhelm his enemies. The imprudent and premature proclamation has been already mentioned,* by which the Prince of the Peace announced, on the eve of the battle of Jena, his preparations to combat an enemy which no one could doubt was France. Napoleon dissembled for a while his resentment, but resolved to make this hostile demonstration the ground for demanding fresh supplies from Spain ; and accordingly great numbers of the Prussian prisoners were sent into the Peninsula to be fed and clothed at the expense of the court of Madrid, while an auxiliary force was peremptorily demanded from that power to co-operate in the contest in the north of Europe. Trembling for its existence, the Spanish government had

* *Ante*, Chap. XLIII. § 19.

no alternative but submission; and accordingly sixteen thousand of the best troops of the monarchy, under a leader destined to future celebrity, the MARQUIS DE ROMANA, crossed the Pyrenees early in March, and arrived on the banks of the Elbe in the middle of May. Thus was the double object gained of obtaining an important auxiliary force for the Grand Army, and of securing, as hostages for the fidelity of the court of Madrid, the flower of its troops in a remote situation, entirely at the mercy of his forces.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Bign. vi.
239, 242.

Sweden was another power which Napoleon was not without hopes, notwithstanding the hostile disposition of its sovereign, of detaching, through dread of Russia, from the coalition. Immediately after the battle of Eylau, he began to take measures to excite the court of Stockholm against the alliance.* "Should Swedish blood," said he, in the bulletin on the 23d April, "flow for the defence of the Ottoman empire, or its ruin? should it be shed to establish the freedom of the seas, or to subvert it? What has Sweden to fear from France? Nothing. What from Russia? Everything. A peace, or even a truce with Sweden, would accomplish the dearest wish of his Majesty's heart, who has always beheld with pain the hostilities in which he was engaged with a nation generous and brave, linked alike by its historic recollections and geographical position to the alliance with France." In pursuance of instructions framed on these principles, Mortier inclined with the bulk of his forces towards Colberg, to prosecute the siege of that town, leaving only

6.
Operations
in Pome-
rania, and
views of
Napoleon
regarding
Sweden.

Atlas,
Plate 89.

* In furtherance of this design, early in March he explained to Marshal Mortier, who was intrusted with the prosecution of the war in Pomerania, that the real object of hostilities in that quarter was not to take Stralsund, nor inflict any serious injury on Sweden, but to observe Hamburg and Berlin, and defend the mouths of the Oder. "I regret much what has already happened," said he, "and most of all that the fine suburbs of Stralsund have been burned. It is not our interest to inflict injury on Sweden, but to protect that power from it. Hasten to propose an armistice to the governor of Stralsund, or even a suspension of arms, in order to lighten the sufferings of a war which I regard as criminal, because it is contrary to the real interests of that monarchy." — 72d Bulletin, *Camp. en Saxe et Pologne*, iv. 243-246.

March 5.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

April 3.

General Grandjean with a weak division before Stralsund. Informed of that circumstance, General Essen, the governor of the fortress, conceived hopes of capturing or destroying the presumptuous commander who maintained a sort of blockade with a force inferior to that which was assembled within its walls. Early in April, accordingly, he issued from the fortress, and attacked the French with such superior numbers, that they were compelled to retire, first to Anclam, where they sustained a severe defeat, and ultimately to Stettin, with the loss of above two thousand men. No sooner did he hear of this check, than Mortier assembled the bulk of his troops, about fourteen thousand strong, under the cannon of that fortress, and prepared for a serious attack upon the enemy. The Swedes, though nearly equal in number, were not prepared for a conflict with forces so formidable, and retired to Stralsund with the loss of above a thousand prisoners, and three hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was General Arnfeldt, the most uncompromising enemy of France in their councils.¹

¹Dum. xviii.
108, 117.
Bign. vi.
244, 245.

7.
Armistice
between the
Swedes and
French.

April 18.

After this repulse, Mortier renewed his secret proposals for a separate accommodation to the Swedish generals; and on this occasion he found them more inclined to enter into his views. The Swedish government at this period was actuated by a strong feeling of irritation towards Great Britain for the long delay which had occurred, under the administration of the Whigs, in the remittance of the stipulated subsidies; and its generals at Stralsund were ignorant of the steps which were in progress, since the change of ministry in England, to remedy the defect. Deeming themselves, therefore, deserted by their natural allies, and left alone to sustain a contest in which they had only a subordinate interest, they lent a willing ear to Mortier's proposals, and concluded an armistice, by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease between the two armies—that the islands of Usedom and Wollin should be occupied by the French troops—the lines of the Peene

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

and the Trebel separate the two armies — no succours, direct or indirect, should be forwarded through the Swedish lines either to Dantzic or Colberg — and no debarkation of troops hostile to France take place at Stralsund.* The armistice was not to be broken without ten days' previous notice, which period was, by a supplementary convention on the 29th April, extended to a month. No sooner was this last agreement signed, than Mortier in person resumed the blockade of Colberg, while a large part of his forces was despatched to aid Lefebvre in the operations against Dantzic, and took an important part in the siege of that fortress, and the brief but decisive campaign which immediately ensued. The conditions of the new treaty between England and Sweden, signed at London on the 17th June, came too late to remedy these serious evils. And thus, while the previous ill-timed defection of the cabinet of London from the great confederacy for the deliverance of Europe, had sown the seeds of irreconcilable enmity in the breast of the Emperor Alexander, it entirely paralysed the valuable array in the rear of Napoleon, which, if thrown into the scale at the decisive moment, and with the support of a powerful British auxiliary force,¹ could hardly have failed to have had the

¹Dum. xviii.
118, 121.
Bign. vi.
245, 246.
Jom. ii.
388, 392.

* In the letter of Napoleon, which Mortier despatched to Essen on that occasion, he said, — "I have nothing more at heart than to re-establish peace with Sweden. Political passion may have divided us; but state interest, which ought to rule the determinations of sovereigns, should reunite our policy. Sweden cannot be ignorant that, in the present contest, she is as much interested in the success of our arms as France itself. She will speedily feel the consequence of Russian aggrandisement. Is it for the destruction of the empire of Constantinople that the Swedes are fighting? Sweden is not less interested than France in the diminution of the enormous maritime power of England. Accustomed by the traditions of our fathers to regard each other as friends, our bonds are drawn closer together by the partition of Poland and the dangers of the Ottoman empire; our political interests are the same; why, then, are we at variance?" And in the event of the Swedish general acceding to these propositions, the instructions of Mortier were—"instantly to send to Dantzic and Thorn all the regiments of foot and horse which can be spared; to resume without delay the siege of Colberg, and at the same time to hold himself in readiness to start with the whole blockading force, at a moment's warning, either for the Vistula or the Elbe."—JOMINI, 389, 391.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

8.

Sweden
again re-
verts to the
alliance.

most important effects, both upon the movements of Austria and the general issue of the campaign.

In justice to the Swedish monarch, however, who, though eccentric and rash, was animated with the highest and most romantic principles of honour, it must be noticed, that no sooner was he informed of the change of policy on the part of the cabinet of London, consequent on the accession of the new administration, and even before the conclusion of the treaty of 17th June, by which efficacious succours were at length promised on the part of Great Britain, than he manifested the firm resolution to abide by the confederacy, and even pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons as the condition on which alone peace appeared practicable to Europe, or a curb could be imposed on the ambition of France. Early in June he wrote to the King of Prussia with these views, and soon after refused to ratify the convention of 29th April for the extension of the period allowed for the denouncing the armistice with France, in a conversation with Marshal Brune, successor to Mortier, so curious and characteristic as to deserve a place in general history.*

9.
Formation
of an army
of reserve
on the Elbe.

Not content with thus drawing to the northern contest the troops of the monarchy of Charles V., and neutralising the whole forces of Sweden and the important *point d'appui* for British co-operation in his rear, Napoleon at the same time directed the formation of a new and respectable army on the banks of the Elbe. The change of ministry in England had led him to expect a much more vigorous prosecution of the war by that power ;

* "Nothing," said he, in his letter of 2d June to the King of Prussia, "would gratify me more than to be able to contribute with you to the establishment of general order and the independence of Europe ; but to attain that end, I think a public declaration should be made in favour of the legitimate cause of the Bourbons, by openly espousing their interest, which is plainly that of all established governments. My opinion on this point is fixed and unalterable, as well as on the events which are passing before our eyes." And two days afterwards, the following conversation passed between the King of Sweden and Marshal Brune : — "Do you forget, Marshal, that you have a lawful sovereign, though he is now in misfortune !" — "I know that he exists," replied the

the descent of a large body of English troops in the north of Germany was known to be in contemplation; and with his advanced and critical position in Poland, the preservation of his long line of communication with France was an object of vital importance. To counteract any such attempt as might threaten it, two French divisions, under Boudet and Molitor, were summoned from Italy; and, united with Romana's corps of Spaniards and the Dutch troops with which Louis Buonaparte had effected the reduction of the fortresses of Hanover, formed an army of observation on the Elbe, which it was hoped would be sufficient at once to avert any danger in that quarter, overawe Hamburg and Berlin, and keep up the important communications of the Grand Army with the banks of the Rhine.¹

¹ *Jom. ii.*
393, 394.

With a view still further to strengthen himself in the formidable contest which he foresaw was approaching, Napoleon, from his headquarters at Finkenstein, opened negotiations both with Turkey and Persia, in the hope of rousing these irreconcilable enemies of the Muscovite empire to powerful diversions in his favour on the Danube and the Caucasus. Early in March, magnificent embassies were received by the Emperor at Warsaw from the Sublime Porte and the King of Persia. A treaty, offensive and defensive, was speedily concluded between the courts of Paris and Teheran, by which mutual aid and succour was stipulated by the two contracting parties; and the better to consolidate their relations, and turn to useful account the military resources of the Persian monarchy, it was agreed that a Persian lega-

10.
Negotia-
tions with
Turkey and
Persia by
Napoleon.

May 7.

Marshal.—“He is exiled,” rejoined the King; “he is unfortunate; his rights are sacred; he desires only to see Frenchmen around that standard.”—“Where is that standard?”—“You will find it wherever mine is raised.”—“Your Majesty then regards the Pretender as your brother?”—“The French should know their duties without waiting till I set them an example.”—“Will your Majesty then consent to the notification of ten days before breaking the armistice?”—“Yes.”—“But if a month should be secretly agreed on?”—“You know me little, if you deem me capable of such a deception.”—See *HARD. ix.* 411, 412; and *DUMAS, xix.* 139.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

tion should reside at Paris; and General Gardanne, accompanied by a body of skilful engineers, set out for the distant capital of Teheran. Napoleon received the Turkish ambassador, who represented a power whose forces might more immediately affect the issue of the combat, with the utmost distinction, and lavished on him the most flattering expressions of regard. In a public audience given to that functionary at Warsaw on the 28th May, he said, "that his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Suldaun Selim should ever be to him." Memorable words! and highly characteristic of the Emperor, when his total desertion of that potentate two months afterwards, by the treaty of Tilsit, is taken into consideration. In pursuance, however, of his design, at that time at least sincerely conceived, of engaging Turkey and Persia in active hostilities with Russia, he wrote to the minister of marine :—"The Emperor of Persia has requested four thousand men, ten thousand muskets, and fifty pieces of cannon—when can they be embarked, and from whence? They would form a rallying point, give consistency to eighty thousand horse, and would force the Russians to a considerable diversion. Send me without delay a memoir on the best means of fitting out an expedition to Persia." At the same time he conceived the idea of maritime operations in the Black Sea, in conjunction with the Ottoman fleet; and in a long letter to the minister of marine enumerated all the naval forces at his disposal and on the stocks, in order to impress him with the facility with which a powerful squadron might be sent to the Bosphorus, in order to co-operate in an attack upon Sebastopol.¹

¹ Corr. Nav. de Napoleon, ii. 117. Bour. vii. 281, 282. Ann. Reg. 1807. Bign. vi. 246, 251.

11. Preparations for aiding these powers by land.

Still more extensive operations were in contemplation with land forces. Orders were sent to Marmont to prepare for the transmission of twenty-five thousand men across the northern provinces of Turkey to the Danube; and a formal application was made at Constantinople for liberty to march them through Bosnia, Macedonia, and

Bulgaria. In these great designs, especially the mission of General Gardanne to the court of Teheran, more important objects than even a diversion to the war in Poland, vital as it was to his interests, were in the contemplation of the Emperor. The appearance of the ambassadors of Turkey and Persia at his headquarters, when five hundred leagues from Paris, on the road to Asia, had strongly excited his imagination; his early visions of Oriental conquest were revived, and the project was already far advanced to maturity, of striking, through Persia, a mortal stroke at England in her Indian possessions.

These extensive projects, however, which the rapid succession of events on the Vistula prevented from being carried into execution, were wellnigh interrupted by a precipitate and ill-timed step on the part of the governor of the Ionian Islands, Cæsar Berthier. The consent of the Divan had just been given to the march of the French troops across the northern provinces of the empire, when intelligence was received that the towns of Parga, Previso, and Butrin, on the coast of the Adriatic, though then in the possession of the Turks, had been summoned in the most peremptory manner by that officer as dependencies of the Venetian States, out of which the modern republic of the Seven Islands had been framed, with the threat to employ force if they were not immediately surrendered. This intelligence excited the utmost alarm at Constantinople. The Turks recollected the perfidious attack which, under the mask of friendship, the French had made on their valuable possessions in Egypt, and anticipated a similar seizure of their European dominions from the force for which entrance was sought on the footing of forwarding succours to the Danube. Napoleon, though this step was taken in pursuance of orders emanating from himself, expressed the utmost dissatisfaction at their literal execution at so untimely a crisis; the governor was recalled, and the utmost protestations of friendship for the Sultaun

12.
Jealousy
excited in
the Divan
by the sum-
moning of
Parga.

May 29.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Bign. vi.
248, 250.

13.
Measures to
organise the
military
strength of
Poland.

March 12.

April 6.

May 16.

May 27.

were made. But the evil was done, and was irreparable : Turkish honesty had conceived serious suspicions of French fidelity; the passage of the troops was refused, and the foundation laid of that well-founded distrust which, confirmed by Napoleon's desertion of their interests in the treaty of Tilsit, subsequently led to the conclusion of a separate peace by the Osmanlis with Russia in 1812, and the horrors of the Beresina to the Grand Army.¹

A nearer and more efficacious ally was presented to Napoleon in the Polish provinces. The continuance of the war in their neighbourhood, the sight of the Russian prisoners, the certainty of the advance of the French troops, and the exaggerated reports everywhere diffused of their successes, had, notwithstanding the measured reserve of his language, excited the utmost enthusiasm for the French Emperor in the gallant inhabitants of that ill-fated monarchy. Of this disposition, so far as it could be done without embroiling him with Austria, he resolved to take advantage. His policy towards that country uniformly had been, to derive the utmost aid from the military spirit of its subjects which could be obtained, without openly proclaiming its independence, and thereby irrevocably embroiling him with the partitioning powers. In addition to the Polish forces organised under former decrees, and which now amounted to above twenty thousand men, he took into his pay a regiment of light horse raised by Prince John Sulkowski; subsequently decreed the formation of a Polish-Italian legion, and the incorporation of one of their regiments of hussars with his Guards; and authorised the provisional government at Warsaw to dispose of royal domains in Polish Prussia to the extent of eighteen millions of francs, and Prussian stock to the extent of six millions. His cautious policy, however, shortly after appeared in a decree, by which the commissary-general at Warsaw was enjoined to limit his requisitions to the territory described by the original

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

decree establishing his powers, which confined them to Prussian Poland. By these means, though he avoided giving any direct encouragement to rebellion in the Russian and Austrian provinces of the partitioned territory, he succeeded in generally diffusing an enthusiastic spirit, which, before the campaign opened, had brought above thirty thousand gallant recruits to his standards. This disposition was strongly increased by two decrees June 4. which appeared early in June, on the eve of the resumption of hostilities,—by the first of which Prince Poniatowski was reinstated in a starosty, or government, of which he had been dispossessed by the Prussian cabinet; while, by the second, the provisional government at Warsaw was directed to set apart twenty millions of francs (£800,000) as a fund to recompense those who should distinguish themselves in the approaching campaign.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
252, 253.

The headquarters of Napoleon, in the first instance, had been fixed at Osterode, on the margin of one of the lakes which form the feeders of the Drewenz; but, on the representations of the learned and humane Larrey, that that situation was low and unhealthy for the troops, he moved to Finkenstein, where all the important negotiations which ensued during the cessation of active hostilities were conducted. The Guard were disposed around the Emperor's residence; and not only that select corps, but the whole army, were lodged in a more comfortable manner than could have been anticipated in that severe climate. After a sharp conflict in the end of February, the important fortified post of Braunsberg, at the entrance of the river Passarge into the Frische-Haff, was wrested from the Prussians by Bernadotte, and the *tête-de-pont* there established secured all the left of the army from the incursions of the enemy. On the left bank of that river no less than four corps of the army were cantoned, while all the points of passage over it were occupied in such strength as to render any attempt at a surprise

14.
Winter
quarters of
the French
army.
—
Atlas,
Plate 44.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

impossible. Secure behind this protecting screen, the French army constructed comfortable huts for their winter quarters, and all the admirable arrangements of the camp at Boulogne were again put in force amidst the severity of a Polish winter. The streets, in which they were disposed, resembled in regularity and cleanliness those of a metropolis. Constant exercises, rural labours, warlike games, and reviews, both confirmed the health and diverted the minds of the soldiers; while the inexhaustible agricultural riches of Old Prussia kept even the enormous multitude, which was concentrated within a space of twenty leagues, amply supplied with provisions. Immense convoys constantly defiling on all the roads from the Rhine, Silesia, and the Elbe, provided all that was necessary for warlike operations; while the numerous conscripts, both from France and the allied states, and the great numbers of wounded and sick who on the return of spring were discharged from the hospitals, both swelled the ranks and reassured the minds of the soldiers. The magnitude of the requisitions by which these ample supplies were obtained, and the inflexible severity with which they were levied from the conquered states, were indeed spreading the seeds of inextinguishable animosity in his rear. But the effects of that feeling were remote and contingent, the present benefits certain and immediate; and the Russians had too much reason to feel their importance in the numbers and incomparable discipline of the troops by whom they were assailed upon the opening of the campaign. The marauders, still above fifty thousand in number, whom the excessive severity of the preceding campaign had caused to leave their colours, in an especial manner fixed the attention of the Emperor, the more especially as they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, and caused unbounded exasperation, by the magnitude and rapacity of their exactions. To repress this enormous evil, he employed at first the whole Polish gendarmerie, and ultimately that of the Imperial

CHAP.
XLIV.

1807.

Guard, as the only one whose uniform commanded general respect. By their exertions the number of these stragglers was greatly diminished; but the evil could never be entirely eradicated while the war lasted, and was at length suppressed only during the tranquillity which followed the peace of Tilsit. The comforts of the common soldiers were tolerably provided for by the incessant efforts of the Emperor, but the labours of the officers were overwhelming; and Napoleon with reason compared the warfare in which he had been engaged during the last winter, to that waged by the legions with the barbarians who overthrew the Roman empire.¹*

¹ Dum. xviii.
75, 85, 206,
207; and
xix. 436,
442. Wil-
son, 118.
Thiers, vii.
408, 417.

The Russian army was far from being equally well situated, and the resources at its disposal were by no means commensurate to those which were in possession of the French Emperor. The bulk of the Allied army was cantoned between the Sense and the Alle, around Heilsberg, where a formidable intrenched camp had been constructed. The only contest of any moment which took place while the army occupied this position, was in the beginning of March at Guttstadt, which was attacked and carried by Marshal Ney, with the magazines which it contained; but the French troops having imprudently advanced into the plain beyond that town, several regiments were surrounded by the Cossacks, pierced through, and broken; so that both parties were glad to resume their quarters without boasting of any considerable

15.
Winter
quarters of
the Rus-
sians. Com-
bat of Gutt-
stadt.
March 3.

* "Les officiers d'état-major ne se sont pas déshabillés depuis deux mois, et quelques-uns depuis quatre; j'ai moi-même été quinze jours sans ôter mes bottes. Nous sommes au milieu de la neige et de la boue, sans vin, sans eau-de-vie, sans pain, mangeant des pommes de terre et de la viande, faisant de longues marches et contre-marches, sans aucune espèce de douceurs, et nous battant ordinairement à la baïonnette et sous la mitraille, les blessés obligés de se retirer en traîneau, en plein air, pendant cinquante lieues. Après avoir détruit la monarchie Prussienne, nous nous battons contre le reste de la Prusse, contre les Russes, les Calmouks, les Cosaques, et les peuplades du Nord, qui envahirent jadis l'empire Romain. Nous faisons la guerre dans toute son énergie et son horreur. Au milieu de ces grandes fatigues, tout le monde a été plus ou moins malade: pour moi je ne me suis jamais trouvé plus fort, et j'ai engraisé."—*Napoleon to King Joseph: Osterode, 1st March 1807. THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, vii. 417.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

March 28.

advantage. Headquarters were at Bartenstein, and the advanced posts approached to those of Marshal Ney, on the right bank of the Passarge. Their cantonments, with the great commercial city of Königsberg in their rear, were very comfortable, and the army was daily receiving important accessions of strength from the sick and wounded who were leaving the hospitals. Thirty thousand fresh troops also, including the Grand-duke Constantine, with the remainder of the Guard, and several batteries of light artillery, joined the army while they lay in their winter quarters ; and in the end of March the Emperor Alexander left St Petersburg and arrived at Bartenstein, where the King of Prussia had already taken up his headquarters, and where the imperial and royal courts were established. But although the Russian and Prussian governments both made the utmost efforts to recruit their forces and bring up supplies from their rear, yet the succour which they were enabled to draw from their exhausted provinces was very different from what Napoleon extracted from the opulent German states which he held in subjection; and the additions to the respective forces which the cessation of hostilities secured, were in consequence widely different. Now was seen how immense was the advantage which the French Emperor had gained by having overrun and turned to his own account the richest part of Europe ; as well as the magnitude of the error which the British government had committed, in refusing to the northern powers, now reduced to their own resources, and with nine-tenths of Prussia in the hands of the enemy, the supplies by which alone they could be expected to maintain the contest.¹ *

¹Dum. xviii.
86, 91, 203,
207. Wil-
son, 122,
133.

* While occupying these cantonments, a truce in hostilities, as usual in such cases, took place between the advanced posts of the two armies, and this led to an incident equally characteristic of the gallantry and honourable feelings of both. The Russian and French outposts being stationed on the opposite banks of a river, some firing, contrary to the usual custom, took place, and a French officer advancing, reproached the Russians with the discharge, and a Russian officer approaching him, requested him to stop the firing of his people, in

During the pause in military operations which took place for the three succeeding months, the active mind of Napoleon resumed the projects which he had formed for the internal amelioration of his immense empire. Early in March he wrote to the minister of the interior as to the expedience of granting a loan, without interest, to the mercantile classes who were labouring under distress, on the footing of advancing one half of the value of the goods they could give security over ; and he announced his design of establishing a great bank in connexion with the state for the purpose of lending sums to manufacturers or merchants in difficulties, on the security of their unsold property. The utmost pains were at the same time taken to neutralise the effect of the gloomy reports sent to Paris from the army as to the losses and disasters of the campaign ; and Napoleon wrote to the minister of police that they were all exaggerations or falsehoods, and that the position of France was never more prosperous.* But although he made these representations to his ministers, Napoleon was not the less aware himself of the imminence of the danger. Orders were given to put all the fortresses on the Rhine in a posture of defence, and "*train battalions*," as he called them—that is, battalions of waggoners—were organised in Paris, and forwarded to the army, which it was calculated they would reach in two months. Nor were diplomatic efforts overlooked.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.
16.
Great designs of Napoleon at this time for the interior of his empire.
March 7.

order that, if necessary, they might determine by single combat who was most courageous. The officer assented, and was in the act of commanding his men to cease firing, when a ball pierced him to the heart. The Russian officer instantly rushed forward, and cried out to the French soldiers—"My life shall make reparation for this accident—let three marksmen fire at me as I stand here ;" and turning to his own soldiers, ordered them "to cease firing upon the enemy, whatever might be his fate, unless they attempted to cross the river." Already a Frenchman had levelled his piece, when the subaltern next in command struck it down with his sword, and, running to the Russian, took him by the hand, declaring that no man worthy of the name of Frenchman would be the executioner of so brave a man. His soldiers felt the justice of the sentiment, and confirmed the feeling by a general acclamation.—See WILSON, 120. With truth did Montesquieu say, that honour was, under a monarchical government, the prevailing feeling of mankind.

* "Mes officiers, disait-il, savent ce qui se passe dans mon armée, comme les

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

April 14.

March 17.
May 7.
April 19.
1 Bign. vi.
257, 264.

Orders were sent to the French ambassadors at the courts of Madrid and Constantinople, to use their endeavours to obtain the removal of certain restrictions which existed on French manufactures, and which, in the mortal commercial struggle between France and England, it might be of importance to have recalled. The bridge recently built in front of the Champ-de-Mars received the name of Jena—an appellation destined to bring that beautiful structure to the verge of destruction in future times; a statue was ordered to be erected to d'Alembert, in the hall of the Institute; the prize formerly promised to the ablest treatise on galvanism was directed to be paid to the author who had deserved it; the important and difficult subject of the liberty of the press occupied his serious thoughts, and engrossed much of his correspondence with the minister of the interior.¹*

His projects for political improvements were still more oisifs qui se promènent dans le jardin des Tuileries, savent ce qui se délibère dans le cabinet. D'ailleurs, l'exagération plaît à l'esprit humain. Les peintures rembrunies qu'on vous a tracées de notre situation ont pour auteurs des bavards de Paris, qui sont des têtes à tableaux. Jamais la position de la France n'a été ni plus grande ni plus belle. Quant à Eylau, j'ai dit et redit que le bulletin avait exagéré la perte; et qu'est-ce que deux ou trois mille hommes tués dans une grande bataille? Quand je ramènerai mon armée en France et sur le Rhin, on verra qu'il n'en manque pas beaucoup à l'appel."—*Napoleon to Fouché: 13th April 1807. THIERS' Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 420.

* "An effective mode of encouraging literature," said Napoleon, "would be to establish a journal, of which the criticism is enlightened, actuated by good intentions, and free of that coarse brutality which characterises the existing newspapers, and is so contrary to the true interests of the nation. Journals now never criticise with the intention of repressing mediocrity, guiding inexperience, or encouraging rising merit; all their endeavour is to wither, to destroy. I am not insensible to the danger, that in avoiding one rock you may strike upon another. It may doubtless happen, that if they dare not criticise, they may fall into the still greater abuse of indiscriminate panegyric; and that the authors of those books with which the world is inundated, seeing themselves praised in journals which all are obliged to read, should believe themselves heaven-born geniuses, and, by the facility of their triumphs, encourage still more despicable imitation. Articles should be selected for the journals where reasoning is mingled with eloquence; where praise for deserved merit is tempered with censure for faults. Merit, however inconsiderable, should be sought for and rewarded. A young man who has written an ode worthy of praise, and which has attracted the notice of the minister, has already emerged from obscurity; the public is fixed; it is his part to do the rest."—*Napoleon to the Minister of the Interior: 19th April 1807. BIGNON*, vi. 262, 264.

important. The project for establishing a university for literary and political information was discussed ;* a prize of twelve thousand francs (£480) was announced for the best treatise on the means of curing the croup, which at that period was committing very serious ravages on the infants of France, and of which the child of the Queen of Holland had recently died ; a daily correspondence was carried on with the minister of finance, and long calculations, often erroneous, but always intended to support an ingenious opinion, were transmitted to test the accuracy and stimulate the activity of the functionaries in that important department.† In that department the great improvement of keeping accounts by double entry was adopted from the example of commerce, first by the recommendation of the Emperor, and, after its advantages had been fully demonstrated by experience, formally enforced by a decree of the government. Nor, amidst weightier cares,

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

17.
And for
political im-
provements.

June 4.

March 24.

Jan. 8,
1808.

* "You should occupy yourself with the project of establishing a university for literature, understanding by that word, not merely the belles-lettres, but history and geography. It should consist of at least thirty chairs, so linked together as to exhibit a living picture of instruction and direction, where every one who wishes to study a particular age should know at once whom to consult, what books, monuments, or chronicles to examine ; where every one who wishes to travel should know where to receive positive instructions, both as to the government, literature, and physical productions of the country which he is about to visit. It is a lamentable truth, that in this great country a young man who wishes to study, or is desirous of signalling himself in any department, is obliged for long to grope in the dark, and literally lose years in fruitless researches before he discovers the true repositories of the information for which he seeks. It is a lamentable fact, that in this great country we have no depot for the preservation of knowledge, on the situation, government, and present state of different portions of the globe ; but the student must have recourse either to the office of foreign affairs, where the collections are far from complete, or to the office of the minister of marine, where he will with difficulty find any one who knows anything of what is asked. I desire such institutions ; they have long formed the subject of my meditation, because in the course of my various labours I have repeatedly experienced their want."—*Napoleon to the Minister of the Interior: 19th April 1807. BIGNON, vi. 267, 269.*

* "The good order which you have established in the affairs of the treasury, and the emancipation which you have effected of its operations from the control of bankers, is an advantage of the most important kind, which will eminently redound to the benefit of our commerce and manufactures."—*Napoleon to the Minister of Finance: Osterode, 24th March 1807.* In truth, however, what the Emperor here called the emancipation of the treasury from the bankers, arose not so much from the regulations of the minister of that

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

were the fine arts neglected. The designs for the Temple of Glory, ordered by the decree of 9th November from Posen, were submitted to the Emperor's consideration, and that one selected which has since been realised in the beautiful peristyle of the Madeleine; while all the departments of France were ordered to be searched for quarries of granite and marble capable of furnishing materials of durability and elegance for its interior decorations, worthy of a monument designed for immortal duration.¹*

¹ Bign. vi.
277, 278.

18.

Finance of
France during
this year.

The official exposition of the finances of France during this year exhibited the most flattering prospect in the accounts published; but the picture was entirely fallacious, so far as the total expenditure was concerned, because a large portion of the supplies were drawn by war contributions from foreign states, and more than half the army was quartered for all its expenses on the vanquished territories. The revenue of the empire as presented in the budget, amounted to 683,057,933 francs, or £27,318,000, and its expenditure to 777,850,000 francs, or £31,106,000.² But the Emperor did not reveal to the public what was nevertheless true, that the contributions levied on the countries lying between the Rhine and the

² Gaeta, i.
305.

department, as from the extraneous sources from whence the chief supplies for the army were now derived, and which rendered the anticipation of revenue by discounting long-dated treasury bills at the bank of France unnecessary. He admitted this himself in the same letter—"I am now discharging the arrears of the army from the beginning of October 1806, to the end of February 1807; we shall see hereafter how this will be arranged with the treasury: *in the mean time, the payment comes from Prussia*, and that will put us greatly at ease." The pay thus extracted from the conquered states amounted to the enormous sum of 3,300,000 francs, or £132,000 a-month, supposing 150,000 men only so maintained, which for these five months alone was no less than 16,500,000 francs, or £660,000 sterling.—See BIGNON, iv. 274, 276.

* "After having attentively considered," said Napoleon, "the different plans submitted to my examination, I have not felt the smallest doubt on that which I should adopt. That of M. Vignon alone fulfils my wishes. It is a temple which I desire, and not a church. What could you erect as a church which could keep its ground against the Pantheon, Notre-Dame, or, above all, St Peter's at Rome? Everything in the temple should be in a chaste, severe, and durable style; it should be fitted for solemnities at all times, at all hours; the imperial throne should be a curule chair of marble, seats of marble for the persons invited, an amphitheatre of marble for the performers. No furniture

Napoleon
fixes on a
design for the
Madeleine
at Paris.

Vistula, between the 14th October 1806, when the war commenced, and the 14th June 1807, when it terminated, amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of 604,227,922 francs, or £24,220,000; that above a million annually was extracted from the kingdom of Italy;¹ that the arrears paid up by Austria for the great war contribution of 1805 were double that sum; that the war subsidies extracted from Spain and Portugal, in virtue of the treaty of St Ildefonso, were above £3,500,000 yearly; finally, that the Grand Army, two hundred thousand strong, had, since it broke up from the heights of Boulogne, in September 1805, been exclusively fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of the German states.² Napoleon made it an invariable rule, when application was made to him for money for any other purpose but those of beneficence, to say he had got none—a system which had the effect of habituating his lieutenants to extracting all the supplies they required out of the country they occupied—the thing of all others which he most ardently desired.* The revenues of France, therefore, did not furnish more than half the total sum required by the expensive and gigantic military establishment of the Emperor; while its

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Daru's
Report.
Dum. xix.
464. Pièces
Just.

² Jom. ii.
437.

should be admitted but cushions for the seats; all should be of granite, of marble, and of iron. With this view, searches should be made in all the provinces for quarries of marble and granite. They will be useful, not merely for this monument, but for others, which I have it in view to construct at future times, and which by their nature will require thirty, forty, or fifty years for their construction. Not more than 3,000,000 of francs (£120,000) should be required, the temples of Athens having not cost much more than the half of that sum; fifteen millions have been absorbed, I know not how, in the Pantheon, but I should not object to an expenditure of five or six millions for the construction of a temple worthy of the first city of the world."—*Napoleon to the Minister of the Interior: Finkenstein, 18th April 1807. BIGNON, vi. 270, 272.* It was from this determination of the Emperor that the present exquisite structure of the Madeleine took its rise; but his real design in the formation, on so durable and gigantic a scale, of this noble monument, was, as already mentioned, still more extensive than the honour of the Grand Army; and he in secret intended it as an expiatory monument to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution.—See *Ante*, Chap. XLIV. § 17, note; and LAS CASES, i. 370, 371.

* THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, viii. 633.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

inhabitants received almost the whole benefit from its expenditure—a state of things which at once explains the necessity under which he lay of continually advancing to fresh conquests; the extraordinary attachment which the French so long felt to his government; the vast internal prosperity with which it was attended, and the grinding misery, as well as the inextinguishable hatred, with which it soon came to be regarded in foreign states.*

19.
Meeting of
the Grand
Sanhedrim
of the Jews
at Paris.
March 9.

Early in March, a grand convocation of the Jews assembled in Paris, in pursuance of the commands of Napoleon, issued in the July preceding. Seventy-one doctors and chiefs of that ancient nation attended this great assembly—the first meeting of the kind which had occurred since the dispersion of the Israelites on the

* The receipts and expenditure of France, as exhibited in the budget of the Minister of Finance for this year, were as follows:—

		<i>Receipts.</i>	
Receipts and expenditure of the year.	Direct taxes,	311,840,685 francs, or	£12,500,000
	Register and crown lands,	172,227,000	... 6,900,000
	Customs,	90,115,728	... 3,600,000
	Lottery,	12,233,837	... 480,000
	Post-Office,	9,968,134	... 400,000
	Excise,	75,808,358	... 3,032,000
	Salt and tobacco, . . .	6,900,000	... 276,000
	Salt mines of government,	3,230,000	... 130,000
		682,323,740	... £27,318,000
		<i>Expenditure.</i>	
	Public debt,	105,959,000 francs, or	£4,240,000
	Civil list,	28,000,000	... 1,120,000
	Public justice,	22,042,000	... 880,000
	Foreign ministers, . . .	10,379,000	... 420,000
	Interior, do. . . .	54,902,000	... 2,200,000
	Finance, do. . . .	25,624,000	... 1,025,000
	Public treasury,	8,571,000	... 343,000
	War,	195,895,000	... 7,850,000
	Ordnance,	147,654,000	... 5,900,000
	Marine,	117,307,000	... 4,700,000
	Public worship,	12,342,000	... 490,000
	General police,	708,000	... 28,000
	Roads and bridges, . . .	38,215,000	... 1,500,000
	Incidental charges, . . .	10,252,000	... 410,000
		777,850,000	... £31,106,000

But as the Grand Army, 200,000 strong, was solely maintained, paid, and

capture of Jerusalem. For seventeen hundred years the children of Israel had sojourned as strangers in foreign realms; reviled, oppressed, persecuted, without a capital, without a government, without a home; far from the tombs of their forefathers, banished from the land of their ancestors; but preserving unimpaired, amidst all their calamities, their traditions, their usages, their faith; exhibiting in every nation of the earth a lasting miracle to attest the verity of the Christian prophecies. On this occasion the great Sanhedrim, or assembly, published the result of their deliberations in a variety of statutes and declarations, calculated to remove from the Israelites a portion of that odium under which they had so long laboured in all the nations of Christendom; and Napoleon, in return, took them under his protection, and, under certain modifications, admitted them to the privileges of his empire.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ D'Abr. ix.
218. Bign.
vi. 269, 270.

This first approach to a reunion and settlement of the

equipped at the expense of Germany, this table exhibited a most fallacious view of the real expenditure and receipts of Napoleon during the year. Without mentioning lesser contributions, the following table exhibits the enormous sums which, by public or private plunder—for it deserves no better name—he was enabled, during the same period, to extract from the tributary or conquered states, and their application to the expenses of the war or otherwise:—

Foreign Receipts.

War contribution levied on Germany		
from October 1806 to July 1807,	604,227,922 francs, or	£24,200,000
Tribute from Italy,	30,000,000	... 1,200,000
— from Spain,	72,000,000	... 2,880,000
— from Portugal,	16,000,000	... 640,000
War contributions from Austria, arrears		
of 1805,	50,000,000	... 2,000,000
	772,227,922	... £30,920,000

Expenditure.

Cost of the Grand Army from October		
1806 to July 1807,	228,944,363 francs, or	£9,160,000
Leaving of plunder levied to be applied		
to the internal service of France in		
this or succeeding years,	543,282,559	... 21,760,000
	772,226,922	... £30,920,000

—DARU'S *Report of the Finances of 1806*; DUMAS, xix. 464, 465; BIGNON, vii. 279, 280; GAETA, i. 305.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

20.
Reflections
on this
event.

Jews, impossible under any other circumstances but the rule of so great a conqueror as Napoleon, is very remarkable. The immediate cause of it, doubtless, was the desire of the Emperor to secure the support of so numerous and opulent a body as the Jews of Old Prussia, Poland, and the southern provinces of Russia, which was of great importance in the contest in which he was engaged ; but it is impossible not to see in its result a step in the development of Christian prophecy. And thus, from the mysterious manner in which the wisdom of Providence makes the wickedness and passions of men to work out its great designs for the government of human affairs, did the French Revolution, which, nursed in infidelity and crime, set out with the abolition of Christian worship, and the open denial of God by a whole nation, in its secondary results lead to the first great step which had occurred in modern Europe to the reassembling of the Jews, so early foretold by our Saviour. And it will appear in the sequel that in its ultimate effects it is destined, to all human appearance, by the irresistible strength which it has given to the British navy, and the vast impulse which it has communicated to the Russian army, to lead to the wresting of Jerusalem from the hands of the infidels, and the spread of the Christian faith alike over the forests of the New and the deserts of the Old World.

21.
Napoleon's
efforts to
feed his
troops.
Sieges in
Silesia dur-
ing the in-
terval of
hostilities.

The two grand armies, in their respective positions on the Passarge and the Alle, remained for nearly four months after the sanguinary fight at Eylau in a state of tranquillity, interrupted only by skirmishes at the outposts, followed by no material results, and too inconsiderable to deserve the attention of the general historian. Both parties were actively engaged in measures to repair the wide chasms which that conflict had occasioned in their ranks, and preparing for the coming struggle which was to decide the great contest for the empire of Europe. Napoleon, during this respite from active operations, was

indefatigable in his endeavours to provide for the vast multitude which was assembled round his standards. He soon had three hundred thousand rations of biscuit at Warsaw; but he ordered fifty thousand additional to be forwarded daily to Osterode from that capital, and two thousand pints of brandy. "The fate of Europe," said he, "now depends on procuring subsistence. To beat the Russians, if I have bread enough, is mere child's play. Biscuit and brandy are all I require : they will defeat all the efforts of our enemies." * But in addition to these preparations for the use of the troops under his immediate command, Napoleon felt too strongly the imminent risk which he had run of total ruin by a defeat on the frontiers of Russia, before the fortresses in his rear were all subdued, to incur it a second time—until his right flank was secured by the reduction of the remainder of the powerful chain of strongholds in Silesia, which still hoisted the Prussian colours, and his left by the surrender of the great fortified emporium of Dantzic. To these two objects accordingly his attention was directed during the cessation of active hostilities in the front of the Grand Army; and his operations in these quarters were not only great in themselves, but had the most important effect upon the future fortunes of the campaign.¹

¹ *Jom. ii.*
399. *Dum.*
xviii. 86,
87. *Thiers,*
vii. 442,
443.

Schweidnitz and Neisse were invested about the same

* "J'ai 300,000 rations de biscuit à Varsovie. Il faut huit jours pour venir de Varsovie à Osterode; faites des miracles, mais qu'on m'en expédie par jour 50,000 rations. Tâchez aussi de me faire expédier par jour 2000 pintes d'eau-de-vie. Aujourd'hui le sort de l'Europe et les plus grands calculs dépendent des subsistances. Battre les Russes, si j'ai du pain, est un enfantillage. J'ai des millions, je ne me refuse pas d'en donner. Tout ce que vous ferez sera bien fait, mais il faut qu'au reçu de cette lettre on m'expédie 50,000 rations de biscuit et 2000 pintes. C'est l'affaire de 80 voitures par jour en les payant au poids de l'or. Si le patriotisme des Polonais ne peut pas faire cet effort, ils ne sont pas bons à grand'chose. L'importance de ce dont je vous charge là est plus considérable que toutes les négociations du monde. Donnez de l'argent; j'approuve tout ce que vous ferez. Du biscuit et de l'eau-de-vie, c'est tout ce qu'il nous faut. Ces 300,000 rations de biscuit et ces 18,000 ou 20,000 pintes d'eau-de-vie qui peuvent nous arriver dans quelques jours, voilà ce qui déjouera les combinaisons de toutes les puissances."—*Napoleon to Talleyrand: March 12, 1807. Thiers, Consulat et l'Empire, vii. 412, 413.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

22.

Fall of
Schweid-
nitz.

Atlas,
Plate 39.
Feb. 17.

time, in the end of January; but serious operations were not attempted against the latter fortress, which was the chief stronghold of the province, till the former was reduced. The siege of Schweidnitz accordingly was carried on with great activity, and with such success, that it capitulated, after a feeble resistance, in the middle of February. This reduction of the capital of Silesia was of the highest importance, not merely as putting at the disposal of Napoleon a powerful fortress, commanding a rich territory, but giving him a supply of extensive stores in ammunition and artillery, which were forthwith forwarded to Dantzic and Neisse, and proved of the utmost service in the sieges of both these towns. The resources of the province, now almost entirely in the hands of Vandamme, were turned to the very best account by that indefatigable and rapacious commander. Heavy requisitions for horses, provisions, and forage, followed each other in rapid succession; besides grievous contributions in money, which were so considerable, and levied with such severity on that opulent province, that before the end of March 1,500,000 francs (£60,000) were regularly transmitted *once a-week* to the headquarters of Napoleon, and this plentiful supply continued undiminished till the end of the war.¹

¹ Martens,
Sup. 417.
Dum. xviii.
98, 99. Jom.
ii. 399.

23.
Of Neisse.

No sooner was the besieging force before Neisse strengthened by the artillery and reinforcements which were forwarded from Schweidnitz, than the operations of the French for its reduction were conducted with more activity. This fortress, originally situated exclusively on the right bank of the river which bears the same name, was extended by Frederick the Great to the left bank, where the principal arsenals and military establishments were placed. The works surrounding the whole were extensive, though in some places not entirely armed or clothed with masonry; but a garrison of six thousand men, great part of which occupied an intrenched camp without the fortress, promised to present a formidable

resistance. Finding, however, that the trenches had been opened, and that the place was hard pressed, an attempt to relieve it was made by General Kleist with four thousand men, drawn from the garrison of Glatz. Their efforts, which took place on the night of the 20th, April 20. were combined with a vigorous sortie from the walls of the place ; but though the attack at first was attended with some success, it was finally defeated by the opportune arrival of Jerome Buonaparte with a powerful reinforcement, who had received intelligence of the projected operation, and came up in time to render it totally abortive. The defeated troops took refuge in Glatz, after sustaining a loss of seven hundred men. Immediately after, the bombardment was resumed with fresh vigour ; the town was repeatedly set on fire in many different places ; the outwork of the Blockhausen was carried by assault : already the rampart was beginning to be shaken by the breaching batteries ; and the explosion of one June 1. of their magazines spread consternation through the garrison ; when the governor offered to capitulate on the same conditions as the other fortresses of Prussia. This offer was agreed to ; and on the 6th June, this great stronghold, with three hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, two hundred thousand pounds of powder, a garrison still above five thousand strong, but entirely destitute of provisions, fell into the hands of the enemy.¹

¹Dum. xviii.
100, 105.
Jom. ii. 399.

Glatz alone remained to complete the reduction of the province, and it did not long survive its unfortunate companions. Prince Jerome commanded the attacking force ; and though the garrison was numerous, it was so much discouraged by the bad success of the besieged in all the other fortresses of the province, that it made but a feeble resistance. The intrenched camp, which communicated with the town, having been attacked and carried, this last stronghold of Silesia capitulated on the 14th June, the very day on which the battle of Friedland was fought. Thus were all the fortresses of this province, so long the

24.
And of
Glatz.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹Dum. xviii.
105, 106.
Jom. ii. 399.

25.
Siege of
Dantzic.
Description
of that for-
tress.

—
Atlas,
Plate 44.

bulwark of Prussia, reduced by a force hardly equal to the united strength of their garrisons ; and Vandamme, with a corps not exceeding twenty-five thousand men, had the glory of wresting from the enemy six first-rate fortified towns, containing above twelve hundred pieces of cannon. The defence which they made did little credit to the Prussian arms, as not one of them had resolution enough to stand an assault, and almost all lowered their colours while the rampart was still unbreached.¹

The siege of Dantzic was an operation of more difficulty, and of much more immediate influence upon the fate of the campaign. Napoleon felt the imminent danger which he would have run if Benningsen's army, during the irruption which preceded the battle of Eylau, had succeeded in throwing a powerful reinforcement into that fortress. Thirty thousand men, resting on its formidable ramparts, and amply supplied with every necessary from the sea, would have paralysed all the movements of the Grand Army. This important city, formerly one of the most flourishing of the Hanse Towns, had fallen to the lot of Prussia on occasion of the last partition of Poland in 1794 ; and though it had much declined in wealth and population since the disastrous era when it lost its independence, yet it was still a place of great importance and strength. Its situation at the mouth of the Vistula gave it a monopoly of all the commerce of Poland ; it served as the great emporium of the noble wheat crops, which in every age have constituted almost exclusively the wealth of that kingdom, and imported, in return, the wines, fruits, dress, and other luxuries which contributed to the splendour of its haughty nobles, and the rude garments which clothed the limbs of its unhappy peasantry. The river Moltaw, a branch of the Vistula, traverses the whole extent of the city, and serves as a canal for the transport of its bulk in merchandise, while its waters fill the wet ditches, and contribute much to the strength of the place.²

²Dum. xviii.
124, 125.
Jom. ii. 307.

Previous to the war the fortifications had been much neglected, as its remote situation seemed to afford little likelihood of its being destined to undergo a siege; but after the battle of Jena, General Manstein, the governor, had laboured indefatigably to put the works in a good posture of defence; and such had been the success of his efforts, that they were in March all armed and in a condition to undergo a siege. It was surrounded in all places by a rampart, wet ditch, and strong palisades, in most by formidable outworks; the fort of Weichselmünde, in its vicinity, commanding the opening of the Vistula into the sea, required a separate siege for itself, and was connected with the town, from which it was distant four miles, by a chain of fortified posts. But the principal defence of the place consisted in the marshy nature of the ground in its vicinity, which could be traversed only on a few dikes or chaussées, and the power which the besieged had, by the command of the sluices of the Vistula—the waters of which, from their communication with the Baltic, where there are scarcely any tides, are almost always at the same level—of inundating the country for several miles in breadth round two-thirds of the circumference of the walls. Beyond this marshy circle rose a series of sandy hills like a great exterior mound of defence, batteries on which commanded any part of the city, and from which in former times all the principal attacks on Dantzic had been directed. They were now covered with outworks, which presented a serious obstacle to the progress of the besiegers. The works of the place were not formed of scarps in masonry, but of steep slopes with enormous palisades, each fifteen inches in diameter, at their feet; and at all the inner angles of the works, blockhouses of wood had been constructed, of such strength as almost to bid defiance to cannon-balls or bombs. The fortress was amply stored with ammunition, and provisions both for the garrison and citizens for a twelvemonth.¹ The garrison consisted of twelve thousand

¹Dum. xviii.
124, 126,
141. Join.
ii. 397. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
23. Thiers,
vii. 495,
496.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

27.
First opera-
tions of the
besieging
force.

Prussians and six thousand Russians, under the command of Field-marshal Kalkreuth, a veteran whose intrepid character was a sufficient guarantee for a gallant defence.

To form the besieging force, Napoleon had drawn together a large body of Italians, Saxons, Hessians, troops of Baden, with a division of Polish levies, and two divisions of French—in all twenty-seven thousand men. The most inefficient part of this motley group was employed in the blockade of Colberg and Graudenz; and the flower of the troops, consisting of the French divisions, a Saxon brigade, and the Baden and Polish hussars, amounting to about twenty thousand men, was destined to the more arduous undertaking of the siege of Dantzic. The artillery was commanded by the gallant General Lariboissière; the engineers were under the able directions of General Chasseloup; Marshal Lannes, with the grenadiers of the Guard, formerly under Oudinot, who was confined by sickness, formed in the rear of the Grand Army the covering force; and he was in communication with Massena, who had superseded Saváry in the command of the corps which had combated at Ostrolenka, and was reinforced by the warlike Bavarian grenadiers of Wrede. Thus, while twenty thousand men were assembled for the siege, thirty thousand, under the most experienced marshals of France, were stationed so as to protect the operations against any incursions of the enemy.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
396, 397.
Dum. xviii.
126, 129.
Ann. Reg.
1807, 23.

28.
Capture of
the isle of
Nehrung.

So early as the middle of February, the advanced posts of the besiegers had begun to invest the place, and, on the 22d of that month, a sanguinary conflict ensued between the Polish hussars, who composed their vanguard, and a body of fifteen hundred Prussians, at Dirschau, which terminated, after a severe loss on both sides, in the retreat of the latter under the cannon of the ramparts. After this check, General Manstein no longer endeavoured to maintain himself on the outside of the walls; and as the French troops successively came up, the investment of the fortress was completed. The first serious conflict took

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

March 18.

place on the island or peninsula of Nehrung, the well-known tongue of land which separates the waters of the salt lake, called the Frische-haff, and of the Vistula, from the Baltic sea. It is twelve leagues in length, but seldom more than a mile or two in breadth, composed of sand-hills thrown up by the meeting of the river with the ocean, in one part of which the waves have broken in and overflowed the level space in its rear, which now forms the Frische-haff. As it communicates with Dantzic, which stands on the other side of the Vistula, opposite its western extremity, the approaches to the town on that side could not be effected until it was cleared of the enemy. Sensible of its value, the besieged had spared no pains to strengthen themselves on this important neck of land; and the besiegers were equally resolute to dislodge them from it, and thereby complete the investment of the fortress. Early in the morning of the 20th March, a French detachment crossed the Frische-haff in boats, and surprised the Prussian posts on the opposite shore; fresh troops were ferried over in rapid succession, and the besiegers, before evening, established themselves in such force in the island, that though Kal-kreuth despatched a body of four thousand men out of the place to reinforce his posts in that quarter, they were unable to dislodge the enemy. On the contrary, they not only kept their ground, but, progressively advancing two days afterwards, entirely cleared the peninsula of the Prussians, and completed the investment of the town on that side. By this success the communication of Dantzic with the land was entirely cut off; but the besieged, by means of the island of Holm and fort of Weichselmünde, with the intrenched camp of Neufahrwasser, which commands the entrance of the Vistula into the Baltic, had still the means of receiving succour by sea.¹

March 20.

March 22.

¹Dum. xviii.
133, 141.
Bign. vi.
284, 285.
Wilson,
129.

After full deliberation among the French engineers, it was determined to commence the siege by an attack on the fort of Hagelsberg, which stands on an eminence

29.
Progress of
the siege.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

April 2.

April 16.

April 23.

April 26.

May 2.

May 5.

May 6.
 'Dum. xviii.
 146, 169.
 Bign. vi.
 285, 286.
 Wilson,
 129, 130.

without the ramparts on the western side of the town, which was the only one entirely free from inundation. The first parallel having been completed, a heavy fire was opened on the works in that quarter on the night of the 1st of April, though at the distance of eight hundred toises. A fortnight after, the second parallel was also finished, notwithstanding several vigorous sorties from the garrison; and by the 23d, amidst snow and sleet, the batteries were all armed and ready to play on the ramparts at the distance only of sixty toises. On the following night, a tremendous fire was opened from fifty-six pieces of heavy cannon and twelve mortars, which, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the garrison, soon acquired a marked superiority over the batteries of the besieged. For a week together this cannonade continued, without intermission, night and day; a brave sortie was unable to arrest it more than a few hours; but although the city was already on fire in several places, and the artillery on the ramparts in part dismounted, yet, as the exterior works were faced with earth, not masonry, little progress was made in injuring them, and no practicable breach had been as yet effected. Finding themselves foiled in this species of attack, the French engineers had recourse to the more certain, but tedious method of approach by sap; the besieged countermined with indefatigable perseverance, but notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the mines of the French were pushed to within eighteen yards of the salient angle of the outermost works of Hagelsberg. — At the same time a separate expedition against the island of Holm, which formed the western extremity of the peninsula of Nehrung, from whence it was separated only by one of the arms of the Vistula, proved successful: the garrison, consisting of five hundred men with fifteen pieces of cannon, were made prisoners, and the city was by that means deprived of all the succour which it had hitherto obtained by the mouths of that river.¹ *

* A remarkable incident occurred on this occasion, highly characteristic of

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

30.

Attempt of
the Allies
to raise the
siege.

May 7.

May 14.

Invested now on all sides, with its garrison weakened by the casualties of the siege, and the enemy's mines ready to blow its outworks on the side assailed into the air, Dantzic could not be expected to hold out for any length of time. Not deeming himself in sufficient strength to attempt the raising of the siege by a direct attack upon the enemy's cantonments on the Passarge, Benningsen, with the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander, had resolved to attempt the relief of the fortress by a combined attack by land and sea from the peninsula of Nehrung and the mouths of the Vistula. The preparations made with this view were of the most formidable kind, and had wellnigh been crowned with success. General Kamenskoi, with five thousand men, was embarked at Pillau, under convoy of a Swedish and an English man-of-war, and landed at Neufahrwasser, the fortified port at the mouth of the Vistula, distant four miles from Dantzic; while two thousand Prussians were to co-operate in the attack, by advancing along the peninsula of Nehrung, and the Grand Army was to be disquieted and hindered from sending succours by a feigned attack on Marshal Ney's corps. At the same time General Touchkoff, who had succeeded Essen in the command of the troops on the Narew and the Bug, was to engage the attention of Massena's corps in that quarter. All these operations took place, and, but for an accidental circumstance, would, to all appearance, have proved successful. The proposed feints were made with the desired effects on the side of Guttstadt and the Narew; but unfortunately the delay of the Swedish man-of-war, which had twelve hundred

the heroic spirit with which both parties were animated. A chasseur of the 12th regiment of French light infantry, named Fortunas, transported by the ardour of the attack, fell in the dark into the midst of a Russian detachment, and in a few minutes that detachment itself was surprised by the company to which the French soldier belonged. The Russian officers exclaimed, "Do not fire, we are French!" and threatened the chasseur with instant death if he betrayed them. "Fire instantly!" exclaimed the brave Fortunas, "they are Russians!" and fell pierced by the balls of his comrades.—DUMAS, xviii. 169.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Wilson,
131, 132.
Dum. xviii.
173, 180.

men on board, rendered it impossible for Kamenskoi to commence his attack before the 15th instant. In the meanwhile Napoleon, who had received intelligence of what was in preparation, and was fully aware of the imminent danger to which Lefebvre was exposed, had time to draw a large body of troops from Lannes' covering corps by the bridge of Marienwerder to the scene of danger.¹

31.
Which
proves un-
successful.

This great reinforcement, comprising among other troops the grenadiers of the Guard under Oudinot, turned the scale, which at that period quivered on the beam. Early on the morning of the 15th, Kamenskoi marched out of the trenches of Neufahrwasser, and, after defiling over the bridge of the Vistula into the peninsula of Nehrung, advanced with the utmost intrepidity to the attack of the strong fortifications which the enemy had erected to bar their advance among the hills and copse-woods of that sandy peninsula. The first onset was irresistible. The intrenchments were carried in the most gallant style, and all their cannon taken: success appeared certain, as the defeated Saxons and Poles were flying in great disorder out of the woods into the sandy hills which lay between them and the town of Dantzic, when the victors were suddenly assailed in flank, when disordered by success, by Marshal Lannes, at the head of Oudinot's formidable grenadiers of the Guard. Unable to resist so vehement an onset, the Russians were in their turn driven back, and lost the intrenchments; but rallying again with admirable discipline, they renewed the assault and regained the works. Again they were expelled with great slaughter. A third time, stimulated by desperation, they returned to the charge, and routed the French grenadiers with such vigour, that Oudinot had a horse shot under him, and fell upon Marshal Lannes, and both these valiant chiefs thereafter combated on foot in the midst of their faithful grenadiers. But fresh reinforcements from the left bank were every moment received by the enemy:

Kalkreuth, confining himself to a heavy cannonade, had made no sortie to aid this gallant effort to cut through the lines; and to complete Kamenskoi's misfortune, he received intelligence, during the action, that the Prussian corps of two thousand men, which was advancing along the Nehrung to co-operate in the attack, had been assailed by superior forces at Kahlberg, and routed with the loss of six hundred men and two pieces of cannon. Finding the undertaking, in these circumstances, hopeless, the brave Russian, at eight at night, ordered his heroic troops to retire, and they regained the shelter of the cannon of Weichselmünde without being pursued, but after sustaining a loss of seventeen hundred soldiers; while the French had to lament nearly as great a number of brave men who had fallen in this desperate conflict.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Wilson,
131, 133.
Bign. vi.
285, 287.
Dum. xviii.
173, 183.

No other serious effort was made by the Allies for the relief of Dantzic. The besieged had provisions enough, but it was well known that their ammunition was almost exhausted, and that, without a speedy supply of that indispensable article, the place must ere long capitulate. An English brig of twenty-two guns, under Captain Strachey, with one hundred and fifty barrels of powder on board, made a brave attempt to force its way up the river, though the Vistula is a rapid stream, not more in general than sixty yards broad, and the passage was both defended by numerous batteries and a boom thrown across the channel. She made her way up the river for a considerable way, with surprising success; but at length a cannon-shot having struck the rudder, and her rigging being almost entirely cut to pieces by the French fire, she was forced to surrender. Meanwhile the operations against the Hagelsberg were continued without intermission. The springing of several mines, though not attended with all the damage which was expected by the besiegers, had the effect of ruining and laying open the outworks, and preparations were already made for blowing the counterscarp into the ditch. In vain a sortie from the

32.
Growing
difficulties
of the be-
sieged, and
fall of the
place.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

May 21.

May 24.

May 27.

ramparts was made, and at first attended with some success, to destroy these threatening advanced works of the enemy; the besieged were at length driven back, and on the next day the arrival of Marshal Mortier with a large part of his corps from the neighbourhood of Stralsund and Colberg, nearly doubled the effective strength of the enemy. Kalkreuth, however, was still unsubdued, and the most vigorous preparations had been made on the breaches of the ramparts to repel the assault which was hourly expected, when a summons from Lefebvre offered him honourable terms of capitulation. The situation of the brave veteran left him no alternative; though his courage was unsubdued, his ammunition was exhausted, and nothing remained but submission. The terms of capitulation were without difficulty arranged; the garrison was permitted to retire with their arms and the honours of war, on condition of not serving against France or its allies for a year, or till regularly exchanged; and on the 27th this great fortress, containing nine hundred pieces of cannon, but hardly any ammunition, was taken possession of by the French troops. The garrison, now reduced to seven thousand men, was marched through the peninsula of Nehrung to Königsberg. No less than 2700 had perished during the siege, and 3400 been wounded. Eight hundred had been made prisoners, and 4300 deserted. These figures are sufficient to demonstrate the gallant nature of the defence, and how worthy the governor, Kalkreuth, was of the school of the Great Frederick, in which he had been brought up. After the fall of the place, Kamenskoi, unable to render any assistance, set sail from Fort Weichselmünde with his own division, and its original garrison and a few invalids only remained on the 26th to open its gates to the enemy.¹

¹Dum. xviii.
180, 181.
Bign. vi.
287, 289.
Wilson,
134, 135.
Martens,
Sup. iv. 420.
Thiers, vii.
543.

While this desperate struggle was going on round Dantzic, the Russians were making the utmost efforts to reinforce their principal army; but the time which they had was not sufficient to bring up from its immense extent

the distant resources of their empire, and though men were in abundance in the nearer provinces, both money and arms were wanting to equip them for the field. In the end of March and beginning of April, however, reinforcements to a considerable amount arrived on the Alle, among which the most important were the superb corps of the Guards under the Grand-duke Constantine, consisting of thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons, full twenty thousand men, the flower of the Imperial army. A powerful reserve, drawn from the depots in the interior of the empire, of thirty thousand men, was also advancing under Prince Labanoff; but it was so far in the rear that it could not arrive at the scene of action before the end of June, and was therefore not to be relied on for the early operations of the campaign. The whole army which Benningsen had at his command, on the resumption of hostilities, was only one hundred and twenty thousand men, including in that force the detached corps of eighteen thousand Prussians and Russians in front of Königsberg under Lestocq, and the left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy, which was fifteen thousand strong;* so that the force to be trusted to for the immediate shock on the Alle or the Passarge was scarcely ninety thousand. These were, however, all veterans inured to war, and animated in the highest degree both by their recent success at Eylau, and by the presence of their beloved Emperor,¹

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

33.

Reinforcements which arrived to the Russian army. Its strength and positions.

¹Dum. xviii. App. Table, iii. and pp. 220, 221. Jom. ii. 400. Wilson, 135, 136.

* The Russian army, when the campaign opened, was as follows:—

Centre under Benningsen on the Alle, at Arensdorf, Neuhoß,	
Bergfried, and Bevern,	88,000
Right wing under Lestocq, near Königsberg and at Pillau,	18,000
Left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy,	15,000

—See DUMAS, xviii. 220, 221; and WILSON, 136.

121,000

The militia, which the patriotic ardour of the Russians led them to raise, were unable to march from want of arms and ammunition, which the ill-timed parsimony of England withheld. One hundred and sixty thousand muskets, sent out in haste by the British government after the change of ministry, arrived at Königsberg in the end of June, after the contest had been terminated in the field of Friedland, and escaped seizure by the French only by not being landed.—HARD. iv. 417.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.
34.
Strength
and posi-
tion of the
French
army.

who, since the end of March, had been at the headquarters of the army.

By incredible exertions Napoleon had succeeded in assembling a much greater force. Notwithstanding the immense losses of his bloody winter campaign in Poland, such had been the vigour of his measures for recruiting his army, and such the efficacy of the combined influence of terror, coercion, military ardour, and patriotic spirit, which he had contrived to bring to bear upon the warlike population of France, Germany, and Poland, that a greater host than had ever yet been witnessed together in modern Europe was now assembled round his eagles. Exclusive of the army of observation on the Elbe, and the garrisons and blockading corps in his rear, no less than a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, and thirty-five thousand horse, were ready for immediate action on the Passarge and the Narew.* Immense efforts had been made by the Emperor to augment, by every possible means, his cavalry, an arm on which he always so much relied in war. His orders were to raise this force with the Grand Army to eighty thousand men. For this

* The composition and distribution of this force, previous to the resumption of hostilities, was as follows :—

	Present. Infantry.	Present. Cavalry.	Stationed at
First corps, Bernadotte,	23,547	3,744	Braunsberg and Spanden.
Fourth do. Soult,	30,199	1,366	Liebstadt and Alkin.
Sixth do. Ney,	15,883	1,117	Guttstadt and the right of the Passarge.
Third do. Davoust,	28,445	1,125	Osterode and Allenstein.
Imperial Guard, Bessières,	7,819	1,808	Finkenstein.
Reserve cavalry, Murat,		21,428	Passarge and Lower Vistula.
Reserve corps, Lannes,	15,090	250	Marienburg.
Eighth corps, Mortier,	14,000	1,000	Lower Vistula.
Second corps, Massena,	17,580	2,604	Narew.
	152,063	34,442	

Exclusive of officers, which made the force at least 155,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry. The corps of Lefebvre, after the capture of Dantzic, was broken up and divided between those of Lannes and Mortier and the garrison of the place; another was in Dalmatia, under Marmont; the ninth in Silesia, under Vandamme. Augereau's corps was divided among the others after its terrific losses in the battle of Eylau.—DUMAS, xviii. 222, 223; *Pièces Just.* No. 3; and JOMINI, ii. 403.

purpose, besides the horses which he had seized in Prussia and the north of Germany, and those taken in battle, he bought, during the cessation of hostilities, seventeen thousand horses in Germany, and twelve thousand in France, all of which were, without a moment's delay, hurried off to the Vistula. In addition to this, the fortifications of Praga, Modlin, and Sierock, had been put in the best possible state of defence, and even the cantonments on the Passarge strengthened with *têtes-de-pont* and stout palisades. Nor was it merely from its nominal strength that this immense force was formidable; its discipline and equipment had attained the very highest perfection. The requisitions enforced by the terrors of military execution, had extorted from Germany all the supplies of which it stood in need. The cavalry were remounted, the artillery waggons and carriages repaired and in the best condition; the reserve parks and pontoon trains fully supplied; the return of spring had restored numbers of the veterans to their ranks—the never-failing conscription filled up the chasms produced by Pultusk and Eylau; while the recent successes in Silesia and at Dantzic had revived in the warlike multitude that confidence in themselves and in their renowned leader which the disasters of the winter campaign had much impaired, but which has ever been found, even more than numbers or skill, to contribute to military success. Nor were the rear and the communications forgotten; on the contrary, it was in them that the provident care and enormous resources of the Emperor shone most conspicuous. Marshal Brune had an army of eighty thousand men in the north of Germany, composed of fifteen thousand Dutch, a like number of Spaniards, sixteen thousand Würtembergers, sixteen thousand French of Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, and the reserve contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine—in all, nearly four hundred thousand men were collected between the Rhine and the Niemen. But of this immense force, only one hundred and sixty thousand could

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹Dum. xviii.
220, 221.
Wilson,
136. Jom.
ii. 401. Bign.
vi. 294.
Thiers, vii.
476, 553,
557.

35.
Defensive
measures of
the Rus-
sians.

be relied on for the actual shock of war on the Passarge. Such is the dilapidation of armies occasioned by distant offensive war! Such as it was, however, it was much greater than Alexander could collect to resist it. Vast as the resources of Russia undoubtedly are when time has been afforded to collect into one focus its unwieldy strength, it was now fairly overmatched by the banded strength of western Europe on its own frontier; and though the Czar might possibly have combated on equal terms with Napoleon on the Wolga or the Dniester, he was inadequate to the encounter on the Alle or the Narew.¹

The Emperor Alexander had arrived at the headquarters of his army on the 28th March, and resided since that time with the King of Prussia at Bartenstein, a little in the rear of the cantonments of the soldiers. There they had, for two months, carried on a sort of negotiation with the French Emperor by means of confidential agents; but this show of pacific overtures, which were only intended on either side to give time and propitiate Austria, by seeming to listen to her offers of mediation, was abandoned in the middle of May, and both parties prepared to determine the contest by the sword. To compensate for his inferiority of force, and provide a point of support for his troops, even in the first line, Benningsen had, with great care, constructed a formidable intrenched camp, composed of six great works regularly fortified, and sixteen lunettes or armed ravelins, astride on the opposite banks of the river Alle. Thither he proposed to retire, in the event of the enemy bringing an overwhelming force to bear against his columns; but he did not conceive himself sufficiently strong until the reinforcements under Prince Labanoff arrived, to commence any serious offensive movement against the French army, and in consequence allowed the siege of Dantzic, as already mentioned, to be brought to a successful issue, without any other demonstration for its relief than the

cannonade against Ney's corps, intended as a diversion in favour of Kamenskoï's attack. The army, though so much inferior in numerical strength to the French, was animated with the best spirit, and the great magazines and harbour of Königsberg supplied it with every necessary. But the situation of that city, without fortifications, and with its back to the Curische-haff, from whence retreat was impossible, rendered it a situation extremely ill adapted, as the event proved, for the security of the stores on which the operations of the army depended.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Jom. ii.
401, 402.
Wilson,
136, 137.
Dum. xviii.
211, 217.

36.
Designs of
the Russians
on Ney's
corps.

After the fall of Dantzic, and when the French army was reinforced by full thirty thousand men from the covering and besieging force, Napoleon drew his troops from their cantonments into camps, which were strengthened with palisades to guard against surprise, and he had a grand review of his reserve cavalry in the plains of Elbing. They presented a most magnificent spectacle. Eighteen thousand horsemen, admirably mounted and perfectly disciplined, there obeyed, with parade precision, the orders of Murat. Accustomed as Napoleon was to military spectacles, his eyes were almost dazzled by the splendour of this; and he wrote an hour after to his ministers, that he could not but feel proud of the sight he had just witnessed. Meanwhile Benningsen was seduced, by the exposed situation of Marshal Ney's corps at Guttstadt, midway between the two armies, to hazard an attack on that insulated body. He had been stationed there by Napoleon expressly in order to serve as a bait to draw the Russian generals into that perilous encounter; and, as the event proved, with perfect success. Early in June all the corps of their army were put in motion, in order to envelop the French marshal. For this purpose, Benningsen proposed to make a feint of forcing the passage of the Passarge at the two points of Spanden and Lomitten, and at the same time assail Ney in his advanced position at Guttstadt, in front and both flanks—the front by Altkirch,

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

1 Jom. ii.
403. Wil-
son, 136.
Dum. xviii.
231. Thiers,
vii. 558, 564.

37.
Feigned
attacks on
the bridges
of the Pas-
sarge, and
real attack
on Marshal
Ney.
June 5.

and the flanks by Wolfsdorf and Guttstadt. If, by these means, the corps which he commanded could be destroyed, it was intended on the following day to renew the attack on the bridges in good earnest, and fall with the whole centre of the Russian army on the corps of Soult, cantoned behind the Passarge, and at such a distance from that of Davoust, as to afford some ground for hope that it, too, might be seriously injured before the remainder of the French troops could advance to its relief. Should this daring attack fail, it was always in their power to retire to the fortified central position of Heilsberg, and there endeavour to arrest the enemy, as Kray had done with Moreau at Ulm, till the great reinforcements, under Labanoff, should enable them to resume the offensive.¹

Early on the morning of the 5th June, the whole Russian army was put in motion for the execution of this well-conceived enterprise. The feigned attacks, intended to distract the enemy's attention on the two fortified bridges of Spanden and Lomitten, took place at the prescribed time, and perfectly answered the object in view. The Prussians at the former point, and the Russians at the latter, pressed the enemy so severely, and with forces so considerable, that they supposed the forcing of the bridges was really intended, and in consequence, when the enemy drew off in the evening, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded, from each of these places, represented their retreat as evidence of a repulse. Bernadotte, who commanded at Spanden, and had collected his whole corps to defend that important passage, was wounded by a musket-ball on the head, during the heat of the action, and was replaced in command by General Dupont. Meanwhile the real attack was directed against Ney's corps in its advanced position at Guttstadt on the Alle, full seven miles to the right of the Passarge, and so completely in the midst of the Russian army, now that their advanced columns were assailing the bridges over

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹Dum. xviii.
230, 238.
Jom. ii. 403,
404. Wil-
son, 136.
Thiers, vii.
571.

that river, that its capture appeared inevitable. In effect, the marshal was taken so completely by surprise, that if Benningsen had pressed the retiring columns with anything like the vigour which Napoleon would have exerted on a similar occasion, they must inevitably have been destroyed. He had thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horse against Ney, who could not muster half that force.¹

But, unfortunately, orders had been issued for the different corps to delay the onset till they were in a condition to render assistance to each other; and as some were impeded in the march by unforeseen accidents, the serious attack on Guttstadt did not take place till two o'clock in the afternoon. It was then carried by assault, and four hundred prisoners, with considerable magazines and several guns, were taken; but after having thus made themselves masters of his headquarters, the Russians, though more than double in number to the enemy, exerted so little activity in following up their success, that Ney, who displayed on this trying occasion all his wonted skill and firmness, was enabled to effect his retreat, with comparatively little loss, to Ankendorf, where he passed the night. On the following morning he resumed his march, though pressed on all sides by greatly superior forces. It was only by prodigies of discipline and valour, however, that his retreat was effected. Surrounded and repeatedly charged by the immense masses of the enemy's horse, his troops retired over a level plain in echelons of squares, each delivering its fire, opening out and retiring on either side of the square in rear, which stood firm and performed a similar evolution, while the entire formation of the first was again effected. In this way they retired for several miles with parade precision, repeatedly charged, but never broken. In the course of the retreat, he boldly imposed on the enemy, when their forces were divided by a lake, by a bold and well-conceived advance, which gave time for his artillery and horse

38.

Its success
at first, and
final failure.

June 6.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Wilson,
136, 137.
Dum. xviii.
230, 246.
Jom. ii. 403,
405. Thiers,
vii. 565.

39.
Napoleon
concentrates
his army,
and the Rus-
sians fall
back.

June 7.

to defile over the bridge in his rear; and at length passed the Passarge at Deppen, with the loss, in the whole of his retreat, of only a thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number made prisoners. On arriving at the heights of Deppen, as the rearguard of Ney was defiling over, the Russians had the mortification of discovering that the bridge was not only altogether unprotected by a *tête-de-pont*, but completely commanded by the heights on which they stood on the right bank; so that, if they had exerted ordinary vigour in the attack of the preceding day, the negligence of Napoleon had given them the means of totally destroying the exposed corps of his gallant lieutenant.¹

This sudden though unfortunate attack on the centre of his position, very much disconcerted the Emperor Napoleon, the more especially as he received intelligence, the same day, of the passage of the Alle at Bergfried by Platoff at the head of his Cossacks, and the surprise of five hundred men, who were made prisoners,* and also of a regiment of Cossacks having swam the Passarge, and cut to pieces an escort of cavalry, and captured some artillery and baggage. He instantly commenced the concentration of his army. The corps of Ney, which, although it had escaped from so serious a danger, was seriously weakened and much disorganised, was united to that of Lannes, which had suffered no loss; the Guard and reserve cavalry under Murat were commanded to assemble and support him with the utmost expedition; Mortier was ordered up by forced marches by Mohrunen; the

* The French officer in command owed his life to the fortunate incident of his giving the Russian commander the freemasons' sign when seizing his hand just as a lance was about to pierce his breast.—WILSON, 138. In reviewing Sir Robert Wilson's work, the *Edinburgh Review* says, this is an anecdote so incredible, that no amount of testimony could make them believe it; but this only shows the critic's ignorance. The same fortunate presence of mind, in making use of the freemasons' sign, saved the life of a gallant officer, the author's father-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler, during the American war, who, by giving one of the enemy's officers the freemasons' grip, when he lay on the ground with a bayonet at his breast, succeeded in interesting the generous American in his behalf, and thus escaped death.

corps of Bernadotte, which, since his wound, was intrusted to the direction of Victor, was directed to concentrate itself for the protection of Elbing; and Soult, who had assembled his corps at Liebstadt, was enjoined to force the passage of the Passarge at Wolfsdorf, in order to threaten the communications of the enemy with their intrenched camp at Heilsberg; while Davoust connected himself by the right with Ney, and formed an imposing mass behind the Passarge, against which, it was hoped, all the efforts of the enemy would be shattered. But these great preparations were suitable rather to the confidence which Napoleon felt in himself than that with which his adversaries were inspired. Having failed in his original and well-conceived project of cutting off the corps of Marshal Ney in its advanced position close to his cantonments, Benningsen had no intention of hazarding his army by commencing offensive operations against a force so greatly superior, with a few bridges over the Alle for his only retreat in case of disaster. On the morning of the 8th, the increasing forces which the enemy displayed at Deppen, and the vivacity of their cannonade at that point, prognosticated some decisive movement; and about noon the loud shouts of the soldiers announced the arrival of Napoleon in-person. Soon after, General Havoiski, with a body of Cossacks, part of the army opposed to Soult, surprised three regiments of horse, the advanced-guard of Soult's corps, which had obeyed its orders and crossed the river at Wolfsdorf, and made three hundred prisoners, besides killing a still greater number. But these partial successes were insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, whose masses, now rapidly arriving on its banks, gave them a decided superiority; and Benningsen resolved to fall back to the intrenched camp at Heilsberg, while Bagrathion covered the retreat on the left with five thousand foot and two thousand horse, and Platoff with three thousand Cossacks on the right.¹

June 8.

¹ Wilson,
138, 139.
Jom. ii. 405.
Dum. xviii.
248, 258.

The retreat, however, which was now commenced, was

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

40.

The Russians, pursued by the French, fall back to Heilsberg, June 9.

far more hazardous than that which Ney had just effected with such skill; for it was to be made in presence of Napoleon and a hundred thousand men. No sooner had the Russian carriages begun to defile to the rear, than the French crossed the Passarge in great strength at all points; the Guards and cavalry, and the main body, with the Emperor at their head, at Deppen, Soult at Elditten, and Davoust at Haorsenberg. Their immense masses converged from all these different points towards Guttstadt and Altkirch, whither the Russian army had retired in one compact body, following the direct road to their intrenchments at Heilsberg. The great bulk of the army was so far advanced as to be beyond the reach of danger; but the rearguard, under Bagrathion and Platoff, was exposed to the most imminent hazard, especially when, towards evening, it became necessary to halt and arrest the enemy, in order to give time for the numerous carriages and guns in their rear to defile over the Alle by the four bridges by which alone Heilsberg could be reached. Bagrathion, however, took post at Glottau, and sent forth the cavalry of the Imperial Guard and Cossacks into the plain to check the advance of his pursuers. The French infantry instantly halted and formed squares; while twelve thousand of Murat's dragoons rushed upon the rearguard at full speed, threatening to annihilate them by their thundering charge. Such, however, was the steadiness and intrepidity of the Russian horse, that they successfully combated against the fearful odds by which they were assailed. Several brilliant charges took place without any decisive result on either side. But not one square of the retreating rearguard was broken, not one squadron dispersed; and after a sanguinary conflict, Bagrathion, having gained time for the whole artillery and carriages in his rear to defile over the bridge, withdrew to the other side of the Alle, abandoning Guttstadt, with no greater loss in killed and wounded than he had inflicted upon the enemy—a

rare example of intrepidity and skill in such trying circumstances, even more remarkable than the retreat of Marshal Ney two days before, as his own force was much less, and the pursuing host incomparably greater. At the same time, Platoff, on his side, also gained the river, and crossed the bridges in safety, having, in order to give an example of coolness to his men, dismounted from his horse, and, with the tranquillity of parade exercise, withdrawn his forces in small bodies, with large intervals between them, which so effectually imposed upon the enemy, that he sustained no serious molestation in his retreat.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 171.
Wilson,
140, 143.
Dum. xviii.
258, 264.
Jom. ii. 405.

Having thus succeeded in throwing the river Alle between themselves and the French army, and broken down all the bridges over that river, the Russians were enabled, without further molestation, to withdraw all their troops by the right bank of the river into the intrenched camp at Heilsberg, where they stood firm under the cover of most formidable fieldworks. Napoleon had now one of two courses to follow. In his front was the great fortified camp of the enemy, by storming which he might hope to terminate the war in a single bloody battle; a little to his left was the city of Königsberg, containing the whole magazines and reserve stores of their army. The most obvious course would have been to have executed a general movement with the right in front, passing Heilsberg, so as to establish the French lines between that place and Bischofstein, with the right extending towards Bartenstein, and the left reaching to Guttstadt; repeating thereby the circuitous sweep round the enemy's position, which his great numerical superiority gave him the means of so easily effecting, and which had proved so fatal to the Austrians at Ulm, and the Prussians at Jena. The second was to advance with the main body of the army along the left bank of the Alle, straight against their intrenchments at Heilsberg, and in the event of their proving so strong as to defy open force, threatening

41.
Different
plans of
operation
which pre-
sented them-
selves to
Napoleon.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

to turn them by the advance of fifty thousand men on the left towards Eylau, so as to menace the communications of the enemy with his magazines at Königsberg. The first plan offered the most decisive results, as the Russian army, if cut off from its own frontier, by being turned on the right, would have been exposed to total destruction in the event of being thrown, after a defeat, upon Königsberg and the *cul-de-sac* of the Curische-hoff. But the second was most easy of immediate execution, from its avoiding the difficult and intricate country into which an advance upon Bischofstein would have led the army; and, notwithstanding the obvious risk to which his left wing would be exposed by advancing between a superior mass of the enemy and the sea, Napoleon flattered himself that he would so engage his attention in front as to prevent him from taking advantage of the chances thus offered in his favour.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1807, 171.
Jom. ii. 408.
Dum. xviii.
263, 264.

42.
Advance
upon Heils-
berg.
June 10.

On the 10th June, accordingly, preparations were made for a front attack upon the intrenched camp of Heilsberg, while Davoust and Mortier moved forward on the French left to turn its right flank, and menace the enemy's communication with Königsberg. For this purpose, the cavalry of Murat led the advance down the left bank of the Alle against the Russian intrenchments, which were about ten miles distant, and he was immediately followed by the corps of Soult, Lannes, Ney, and the infantry of the Guard. Bagrathion, who was retiring down the right bank, upon finding that the French were moving along the left, crossed the river in order to retard their advance as much as possible. As long as he was pursuing his way through the broken ground, he was able to keep the enemy tolerably at bay: but when he was obliged to evacuate that favourable cover, and enter upon the open plain, which extended on both sides of the Alle to Heilsberg, his task of covering the retreat became much more difficult. In vain the Russian horse, by repeated charges, strove to retard the advance of their indefatigable pur-

suers ; in vain the infantry retired by echelon in alternate lines, to sustain by continued fire their retrograde movements. The French cavalry and horse-artillery incessantly pressed on : by degrees the losses of the Russians became more severe, and they at length began to fall into confusion. At this critical moment, the opportune arrival of fifteen squadrons of Prussian cavalry, with a troop of horse-artillery, which Benningsen sent to their succour, gave great relief ; and these brave troops, by their gallant bearing, enabled Bagrathion to maintain the fight, though with serious loss, till six at night, when the whole Allied army had got within its lines. Then, on the word being given, the Russian and Prussian cavalry withdrew by their flanks, exposing to view within half cannon-shot the formidable intrenchments, bristling with bayonets, and armed in this part with one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery. Instantly a fire of grape of extraordinary severity was opened upon the enemy, which speedily swept off all the squadrons who could not escape from its fury ; and though Murat brought up several batteries of cannon, and swarms of tirailleurs occupied every thicket, and kept up an incessant rattle along the whole front of the lines, yet they produced no impression, and the superiority of the Russian fire was very apparent.¹

¹ Wilson,
144, 146.
Jom. ii. 409.
Dum. xviii.
264, 266,
272.

The position of Heilsberg, however, was too important for Napoleon to relinquish the prospect of making himself master of it by main force without a struggle. Situated on a cluster of heights on both banks of the Alle, of which the town covered a part, it commanded the three roads of Wormditt, Mehlsack, and Landsberg, which intersected each other within the intrenched camp, and in this way blocked up the access to Eylau and Königsberg. As long as the Russians held this important position, and at the same time maintained the course of the Lower Passarge towards Braunsberg, their lines might be considered unassailable. But from the moment

43.
Description
of the position
and intrenched
camp of
Heilsberg.

Atlas,
Plate 45.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

that they were driven from the latter ground, and the enemy's columns began to interpose between the intrenched camp and the sea, threatening Eylau and Friedland, its advantages were at an end, because it was cut off from its own communication with the very depots which it was designed to protect. Its weakest side was that on the left bank of the Alle, which was connected with the redoubts on the other side by four bridges. Nearly eighty thousand men were here assembled, under the cover of above five hundred pieces of cannon, in nine divisions, of which seven under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the left bank of the river, and two, under Prince Gortchakoff, the right bank ; while Kamen-skoi was stationed in the redoubts which covered the front of the position on the left bank.¹

1 Wilson,
145, 146.
Dum. xviii.
266, 268.
Bign. vi.
298.

44.
Battle of
Heilsberg.

Napoleon having collected forty pieces of artillery, under the command of General Dulauloy, on his left, pushed them forward, and, by the vivacity of their fire, in some degree weakened that of the enemy to which they were opposed. The divisions of St-Cyr, Legrand, and St-Hilaire, part of Soult's corps, with Murat's cavalry, advanced about seven in the evening, by the villages of Lawden, Langwiese, and Bewernicken, to the attack of the enemy's redoubts on the left bank of the river. These brave men had no sooner quitted the cover of the ravine which for some time sheltered them from the enemy's fire, than they rushed forward with such vigour, that in the first onset they carried the principal redoubt of the Russians in that quarter, with all the guns which it contained ; while St-Hilaire, with his division, penetrated between that intrenchment and the neighbouring works. The moment was critical, and the least wavering would have exposed the Russians to total ruin ; for a line of redoubts, broken in upon at one point, is wellnigh lost. But Benningsen was at the head of men who were equal to any emergency. General Warneck, who commanded part of the Russian reserve, instantly ordered

the regiment of Kalouga to charge: the animating hurras of his men demonstrated that he had not calculated in vain on their intrepidity at that trying crisis. On they rushed with fixed bayonets; the two regiments which had captured the redoubt were totally destroyed, and their eagles taken. Following up their success, the Russians burst out into the plain between the wood and the redoubts, and forced Soult's divisions to give ground. With the steadiness of discipline, however, the latter retired in hollow squares by echelon, all of which vomited forth an incessant rolling fire upon their pursuers; the approach of night gave these moving citadels the appearance of being encircled with flame, while the intrenchments resembled a line of volcanoes in vehement eruption. At length, however, the retreat of Legrand and St-Cyr obliged St-Hilaire, who had penetrated to the very foot of the redoubts, and had borne without flinching their terrible discharge of grape, also to retire. Savary, with two regiments of the Guard and twelve guns, came up to cover his retreat: he, in his turn, however, was surrounded. The French at all points retired to the cover of the woods, and narrowly escaped being made prisoners by the Allied cavalry; and at length, also grievously shattered, the victorious Russians were again withdrawn into their intrenchments.^{1*}

¹ Wilson,
145, 146.
Dum. xviii.
272, 277.
Bign. vi.
299. Savary,
iii. 53.

* "I had on this occasion," says Savary, "an exceedingly warm altercation with the Grand-duke of Berg, (Murat,) who sent to me, in the very thickest of the action, orders to move forward and attack. I bade the officer who brought the order go to the devil, asking, at the same time, if he did not see how we were engaged. That prince, who would have commanded everywhere, wished that I should cease firing, at the hottest period of the fight, to march forward: he would not see, that if I had done so, I should infallibly have been destroyed before reaching the enemy. For a quarter of an hour I exchanged grape with the enemy—nothing enabled me to keep my ground but the rapidity of my fire. The coming on of night was most fortunate. While every one slumbered, the Emperor sent for me. He was content with my charge, but scolded me for having failed in the support of Murat. When defending myself, I had the boldness to say he was a fool, who would some day cause us to lose a great battle; and that it would be better for us if he was less brave and had more common sense. The Emperor bade me be silent, saying, I was in a passion, but did not think the less of what I had said. Next day he was in a very bad humour; our wounded were as numerous as in a pitched battle."—SAVARY, iii.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

45.

Fresh attack
by Lannes,
which also
proves un-
successful.

The vehement cannonade which had so long illuminated the heavens now ceased, and the cries of the wounded, in the plain at the foot of the intrenchments, began to be heard above the declining roar of the musketry. At eleven at night, however, a deserter came into the Russian lines, and announced that a fresh attack was preparing. Suitable arrangements were accordingly made; and hardly were they completed, when dark masses of the enemy were seen, by the uncertain twilight of a midsummer night, to issue from the woods, and advance with a swift pace across the bloody plain which separated them from the redoubts. Instantly the batteries opened on the moving masses: they staggered under the discharge, but still pressed on, without returning a shot. But when they arrived within reach of the musketry, the fire became so vehement that the heads of the columns were entirely swept away, and the remainder driven back in great disorder, after sustaining a frightful loss. At length, at midnight, after twelve hours' incessant fighting, in the retreat and round the intrenchments, the firing entirely ceased, and nothing was heard in the narrow space which separated the two armies but the groans of the wounded, who, anticipating a renewal of the combat in the morning, and tortured by pain, implored removal, relief, or even death itself, to put a period to their sufferings.^{1*}

¹ Wilson,
146, 147.
Dum. xviii.
276, 278.
Bign. vi.
299. Sav.
iii. 53, 54.

54.—“He was particularly angry at the cavalry, saying they had done nothing he had ordered.”—WILSON, 149.

* The bad success of the attack on Heilsberg gave rise to a furious altercation between Lannes and Murat, and an explosion of the former, who was subject to ungovernable fits of passion, even with the Emperor himself. It is thus narrated, with dramatic power, by the Duchess of Abrantès: — “‘Your brother-in-law is a mountebank, sire; a tight-rope dancer, with his white dancing plume.’ — ‘Come, now, you are joking!’ answered Napoleon in good humour: ‘is he not brave!’ — ‘And who is not so in France? We point with the finger at a coward. Soult and I have done our duty: we refuse to allow the honour of the day to your brother-in-law — to his Serene and Imperial Highness Prince Murat! Truly these titles make one shrug his shoulders! The mania of royalty has seized him also; and it is to tack his mantle to your own that you wish to rob us of our glory. You have only to speak: we have enough remaining

Violent explosion of
Lannes and
Napoleon in
consequence.

Heavy rain fell in the early part of the night, which, though it severely distressed the soldiers who were unhurt in their bivouacs, assuaged the thirst and diminished the sufferings of the host of wounded of both armies who lay mingled together on the plain. With the first dawn of day the Russians again stood to their arms, expecting every moment to be attacked; but the morning passed over without any movement on the part of the enemy. As the light broke, the French were descried on the skirts of the wood in order of battle: but, more even than by their well-appointed battalions and squadrons, the eyes of all were riveted on a spectacle inconceivably frightful between their lines and the redoubts. This space, about a quarter of a mile broad and above a mile in length, presented a sheet of naked human bodies—the greater part dead, but some showing by their motions that they preserved consciousness or implored relief. Six thousand corpses were there lying together as close as they had stood in their ranks, stript during the night of every rag of garment by the cupidity of the camp-followers of either army, ghastly pale, or purple with the blood which was still oozing from their wounds. How inured soever to the horrors of a campaign, the soldiers of both armies, even while they loathed it, felt their eyes fascinated by this harrowing spectacle, which exhibited war, stripped of all its pomp,¹ in its native bar-

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

46.
Frightful
appearance
of the slain
after the
battle.¹ Wilson,
147. Sav.
iii. 54.

— we will willingly give it to him,' — 'Yes!' exclaimed Napoleon, no longer able to contain himself; 'I will bestow or take away glory as I please: for hear ye! it is I ALONE who give you both glory and success.'—On this Lannes became pale with rage; and with a voice quivering with passion he exclaimed, 'Yes! yes! because you have marched up to the ankles in gore on this bloody field, you think yourself a great man; and your fine emplumed brother-in-law crows on his own dunghill. I will have no more of this. And this fine victory of yours—a great triumph truly!—twelve thousand corpses lying on the plain to keep the field for *your* honour, where you can only trace the French uniform by fractures and mutilation: and yet to deny to *me*—to me, Lannes—my due share in the honours of the day!'—D'ABRANTÈS, ix. 369, 372. The lively duchess, with her usual inaccuracy in military details, recounts this scene as relating to the battle of Eylau; but that is impossible, as Lannes was not in that battle at all, but sick in the rear.—*Vide Ante*, Chap. XLIV. § 64.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

barity ; and, by common consent, the interval of hostilities was employed in burying the dead, and removing the shivering wounded to the rear of the armies.

47.
Napoleon
turns the
flank of the
enemy, and
compels
them to
evacuate
Heilsberg.

Atlas,
Plate 44.

June 11.

Napoleon was extremely disconcerted by this repulse, and vented his ill-humour in violent sallies of passion against his generals. The butchery had been worse than useless—it had been hurtful. The Russians still held, in unshaken strength, their intrenchments ; twelve thousand French had fallen around their redoubts, without having gained, at the close of the day, the mastery of one of them ; the ditches were filled with their dead bodies, but no part of them had been crossed. Eight thousand Russians, also, were killed or wounded ; and this loss, though less than that of their opponents, from their having fought in part under cover, was equally great in proportion to the relative strength of their army. The French Emperor, however, had felt too severely the strength of the enemy's position to venture upon a renewal of the attack, and therefore he resolved to compel the Russians to evacuate it by manœuvring on their flank. For this purpose, he took advantage of the arrival of Marshal Davoust's corps to push it forward at noon on the Landsberg road toward Eylau and Königsberg. This movement alarmed Benningsen, who, though not apprehensive of being forced in his intrenched position, was extremely afraid of being cut off from his supplies at Königsberg, on which the army depended for its daily subsistence ; and at the same time, an order of Napoleon to Victor was intercepted, which contained commands to attack Lestocq and the right wing of the Allies at all points, and push on for Königsberg. Seeing the movement of the enemy to turn his right flank and threaten his magazines now clearly pronounced, the Russian general gave orders to retreat. The intrenched camp was evacuated at nightfall, and the army marched all the night of the 11th,¹ and established themselves, at break of day, in a position in front of Bartenstein, head-

¹ Wilson,
149, 151.
Dum. xviii.
279, 283.
Jom. ii. 409.

quarters being transferred to that town. Though great part of this operation was performed after daybreak on the 12th, in sight of the enemy, yet such was the feeling produced by the battle of Heilsberg, that they made no attempt whatever to molest the retreat.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

No sooner was this retrograde movement perceived by the French Emperor, on the morning of the 12th, than he detached Murat's dragoons to follow upon the traces of the enemy ; and he himself, moving forward his whole army, established his headquarters in the evening on the field of Preussisch-Eylau. It was no longer a shivering scene of ice and snow : green fields were to be seen on all sides ; clear and placid lakes gave variety and animation to the landscape ; woods, resplendent with the early green of summer, fringed the rising grounds ; and numerous white villages, with handsome spires, rose above their summit, attesting the industry and prosperity of the inhabitants under the paternal government of Old Prussia. The French soldiers could hardly recognise, in the gay and smiling objects around them, the frightful scene of devastation and blood which was imprinted in such sombre colours in their recollection by the events of which it had been the theatre in the preceding winter. Meanwhile General Lestocq resolved to break up from Braunsberg and the Lower Passarge, and retire by the margin of the Frische-haff towards Königsberg—a measure which had become indispensable to prevent his being entirely cut off from his communication with the main army, and thrown back without resource on the margin of the sea. Kamenskoi was also directed by Benningsen to march upon Königsberg ; but on arriving at Mühlhausen, on the road to that city, he found that place already occupied by the advanced guard of Davoust, and only reached the object of his destination by making a very long circuit. During the night of the 12th, the Russians resumed their march through Schippenbeil, and on the following morning they had reached the banks of the Alle. On arriving

48.
Movements
of the two
armies be-
fore the
battle of
Friedland.

June 12.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

June 13.

there, however, Benningsen received information that the French had, by the rapidity of their movements, and by following the chord of the arc which led to Königsberg, while his own troops were traversing the circumference, anticipated him in his march upon that city, and were already so far advanced on the road that they could not be overtaken. Murat and Davoust were in full advance from Eylau to Königsberg: Soult was marching on the same point by Kreutzburg: Victor, who had crossed the Passarge at Spanden, was moving on Eylau; Napoleon himself, at the head of the corps of Lannes, Ney, and Mortier, was approaching to FRIEDLAND by Domnau, at which latter place the Imperial Guard was already arrived. A glance at the map must be sufficient to show that, by these different movements, not only was the bulk of the French army interposed between the Russian general and Königsberg, where all his magazines were placed, but Napoleon was in a situation, by a rapid advance upon Wehlau, to threaten his line of retreat to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances, no time was to be lost; and, though the troops were dreadfully fatigued, orders were given to continue the march all day, and by great exertions the army reached Friedland, where headquarters were established in the evening.¹

49.
Description
of the field
of Fried-
land.

Atlas,
Plate 46.

Friedland, which has acquired immortal celebrity by the memorable battle of which it was the theatre, is a considerable town situated on the left bank of the river Alle, which there flows in a northern direction towards the Baltic sea. It is situated between the river and a large artificial lake or fish-pond, which lies to the north, and has been formed by damming up a rivulet called the Mill Stream, which flows from the high grounds to the westward near Posthenen into the Alle, and falls into it at right angles. The windings of the Alle serve as a natural wet ditch round Friedland on the south and east; the artificial lake protects it on the north: in a military point of view, therefore, it is only accessible on the

¹ Wilson,
150, 152.
Dum. xviii.
280, 287.
Jom. ii. 410,
411. Sav. iii.
54, 55. Bign.
vi. 299, 300.

western side, where it is approached by the road from Eylau, which the French were pursuing, and from which side also set out the roads to Königsberg to the north, and Wehlau and Tilsit on the northwest. In that direction there is a large open space dotted with villages and cultivated ground, neither hill nor plain, but an undulating surface, intersected only along its whole extent by the ravine formed by the Mill Stream, which is very deep, with rugged sides, and in many places, from the reflux of the waters, scarcely fordable. At the distance of two miles from Friedland as a centre, the cultivated plain to the westward is bounded by a semicircle of woods, which fringe the higher grounds, and form the horizon when looking in that direction from the town. The banks of the Alle on the eastward are very steep; and though there are three bridges over that river, two of which were formed by the Russians with pontoons at the town itself, in other quarters it could be passed only at a few fords, which were unknown to the Allies till late in the evening, and at that period, from the recent heavy rains, were scarcely practicable.¹

¹ Wilson, 152, 153.
Dum. xix.
6. Rel. de la Camp. par un Témoin Oculaire, 74.

50.
Benningsen resolves to attack Lannes' corps. Situation of that corps.

In the night of the 13th, Benningsen received information that the corps of Lannes, which had suffered so severely at Heilsberg, was lying at Posthenen, a village about three miles from Friedland on the road to Königsberg. The exposed situation of that corps, which formed the vanguard of the French army, and the well-known losses which it had sustained at Heilsberg, inspired the Russian general with the hope that, by a sudden attack, it might be destroyed before the main body of Napoleon's forces could advance to its relief. This resolution was taken at two in the morning of the 14th; orders were immediately despatched, and at four the Russian vanguard was already defiling over the bridge at Friedland. The opportunity was tempting, and to all appearance the corps of Lannes was placed in a situation of great danger. It consisted now of only twelve thousand infantry and

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

three thousand horse; and though the corps of Mortier, Ney, and Victor, with great part of the cavalry of Murat, might be shortly expected to arrive at the scene of action, yet some hours must elapse before the foremost of these powerful auxiliaries could be relied on, and in the meanwhile this detached body was exposed to the shock of above fifty thousand veteran troops, who, by proper exertion, might be directed against it. Here, in short, as at Marengo, the French army was to be attacked when on a line of march in echelon, by the concentrated masses of the enemy, who fell first on the leading corps.* But there was this essential distinction between its position on these two memorable days, that on the former occasion the army was stationary or retreating, so that the distant corps could not arrive till late on the field of battle, whereas here it was advancing: and consequently, unless decisive success were gained in the outset, the assailants would have the whole hostile body upon their hands. In case too of defeat, they could retreat only by the bridges of the Alle, which were wholly inadequate to afford an issue to so large a force.¹

¹ Wilson,
152, 153.
Jom. ii. 411,
412. Bign.
vi. 312, 313.
Dum. xix.
3, 9.

* The following account of the French army which combated at Friedland is from a holograph note in Napoleon's handwriting:—

PRESENT IN ARMS.

Imperial Guard,	7,500
Lannes' corps,	15,900
Ney's do.,	14,000
Mortier's do.,	10,000
Bernadotte's corps, commanded by Victor,	22,000
Cavalry,	11,500
Total at Friedland,					80,900

DETACHED.

Davoust,	28,000
Sault,	27,000
Murat—cavalry,	10,000
Total,					65,000
Total,					145,900

No sooner were the advanced posts of the Russians descried by the videttes of Lannes' corps, than a sharp fire of musketry began, which was soon increased to a heavy cannonade as the dark masses of infantry and cavalry were seen swiftly advancing through the early dawn of the summer morning. The French tirailleurs fell back, skirmishing, however, sharply as they retired: the alarm was speedily communicated to the rear, and the whole corps stood to arms. A single Russian division had at first been passed over; but the enemy's troops were so constantly fed from the rear, and the resistance opposed was so considerable, that Benningsen soon found himself under the necessity of passing over another to its support. Three pontoon bridges were constructed to facilitate the passage; and by degrees, as the increasing masses of the enemy showed that other corps had arrived to the support of Lannes, the whole army was brought across. Thus was the Russian general, who at first contemplated only a partial operation, insensibly drawn into a general action; and that, too, in the most disadvantageous of all possible situations—with a superior force of the enemy in front, and a deep river traversed only by a few bridges in his rear.¹

The corps of Mortier arrived to the support of Lannes in a short time after the firing commenced, and both corps withdrew to the heights stretching from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, about three miles to the westward of the river Alle. Deeming these the only forces with which he had to contend, and considering himself adequate to their destruction, Benningsen drew up his whole forces as they successively arrived on the field from the bridges, in the narrow plain, backed by Friedland and the Alle, facing towards the westward, about half a mile in front of that town. The Mill Stream, flowing in a perpendicular direction to his line, nearly cut it in two equal parts; the right wing extended from the rivulet to the Alle, through the wood of Domnau; the left, which was less

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

51.

He crosses
the Alle, and
attacks the
French mar-
shal.¹ Wilson,
152, 153.
Dum. xix.
7, 10. Jom.
ii. 412, 413.

52.

Disposition
and arrange-
ment of the
Russian
army.
June 14

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

considerable in length, stretched in a southerly direction also to the Alle, across the wood of Sortlack, and barring the roads of Eylau, Bartenstein, and Schippenbeil, nearly at the point where they intersected each other. The whole army was drawn up in two lines facing to the west, the first and third battalions of each regiment, in battle array, composing the first line; the second battalion, in close columns behind the intervals between them, forming the second. Thus the Russians stood on the arc of the segment of a circle formed by the river Alle in their rear. Only one division remained on the right bank. Gortchakoff commanded the right wing, Bagrathion the left; Ouvaroff and Gallitzin the cavalry of the right, Kollagriboff the horse on the left. After taking into view the losses in the preceding actions, and the large detachment, under Kamenskoï, to the right to the support of Lestocq, the whole force of the Russians, on both sides of the river, did not exceed fifty-five thousand men, of whom about ten thousand were cavalry. They were all brave and experienced soldiers, but exhausted by fatigue and want of sustenance for several days. Every man in the array was entirely exposed to fire, and every movement distinctly seen, while the enemy were for the most part concealed or sheltered by the woods and rising grounds which fringed the plain to the westward, and bounded the horizon on that side.¹

¹ Wilson,
153, 155.
Dum. xix.
9, 11. Jom.
ii. 411, 413.

53.
No decisive
success is
gained on
either side
before the
arrival of
the other
French
corps.

Even with this comparatively inconsiderable force, however, the Russian general might, at least in the earlier part of the day, have gained considerable, perhaps decisive success, against the corps of Lannes and Mortier, which alone had come up to the field of battle, had he acted at once with the vigour and decision which the opportunity afforded, and the critical circumstances in which he was placed imperatively required. But, unfortunately, he was so prepossessed with the idea that he had no other antagonist to expect than the two corps

CHAP.

XLVI.

1807.

actually on the spot, that the precious hours, big with the fate of Europe, were allowed to elapse without any decided movement being attempted. Lannes gradually fell back from his ground in front of Friedland, as the successive divisions of the enemy crossed the bridges, and established themselves on the left bank of the river; skilfully availing himself, however, of every advantage which the inequalities of the ground afforded to retard the advance of the enemy, and covering his movements with a cloud of light troops, whose incessant fire concealed the real amount of his force. A severe action took place on the French left, where a body of thirty squadrons tried to turn the Russian position in front of Heinrichsdorf, and at first with some success; but the advance of some fresh regiments compelled the assailants to give ground in that quarter. Soon after a column of three thousand men advanced straight against Friedland. They were permitted to approach close to the Russian cannon without a single shot being fired, when suddenly the whole opened with grape, and with such effect, that in a few minutes a thousand men were struck down, the column was routed, and an eagle taken. Encouraged by this success, the Russians advanced their left wing, and drove back the French right with such vigour, that it was thought they were retiring altogether towards Eylau. But this success was of short duration: fresh reinforcements arrived to the enemy; the lost ground was regained; and a tremendous cannonade along the whole line announced that the other corps were arriving, and that a general battle was at hand.¹

¹ Dum. xix.
12, 14. Jom.
ii. 412. Wilson, 154,
156.

Napoleon was at Domnau, ten miles distant, when the first sound of distant cannon was heard. He immediately mounted on horseback, and rode rapidly forward to the front, where the increasing cannonade and the quick rattle of musketry announced that a serious conflict was already in progress, despatching, at the same time, orders

54.
Preparatory
dispositions
and forces of
Napoleon.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

for the corps in the rear to hasten their march. About one o'clock in the afternoon he arrived on the heights behind Heinrichsdorf, which overlooked the field of battle, and immediately sent out the officers of his staff in different directions to observe the motions of the enemy. Savary speedily returned with information that the march of troops over the bridge of Friedland was incessant; that none were retracing their steps; that three additional bridges had been constructed to facilitate the passage; and that the masses in front were every minute increasing and extending themselves. " 'Tis well!" replied the Emperor: "I am already prepared; I have gained an hour upon them, and, since they wish it, I will give them another. This is the anniversary of Marengo: the battle could not be fought on a more propitious day." Orders were despatched for all the corps of infantry, as they came up, to concentrate themselves in the immense woods behind Heinrichsdorf, on the skirts of which Marshal Lannes was combating; the artillery alone was placed on the great roads leading from Eylau and Domnau; the cavalry in the large apertures which had been cut for the purposes of agriculture in these extensive forests. The firm countenance and dense masses of the enemy, who appeared even more numerous than they really were, as seen from the heights of Heinrichsdorf, at first made the Emperor doubtful whether he should not postpone the attack till the following day, when the remainder of the cavalry of Murat and the corps of Davoust might be expected to join from the direction of Königsberg.¹* But the successive arrival of the

¹ Wilson,
155, 156.
Sav. iii. 56,
57. Dum.
xix. 10, 17.

* Accordingly, at one o'clock, he wrote to that general from the field:—"The enemy is in battle array in front of Friedland, with all his army. At first he appeared desirous of moving on by Stocken on Königsberg; but now he appears only desirous of receiving battle on the ground he has chosen. I hope that by this time you have entered Königsberg: and as the corps of Soult is sufficient for the protection of that city, you will without doubt retrace your steps as rapidly as possible with the remainder of the cavalry and Davoust's corps towards Friedland. It is the more necessary that you should

corps of Ney and Victor,* with the infantry and cavalry of the Guard, and part of Murat's dragoons, at two and three o'clock, joined to the obvious and flagrant disadvantages of the enemy's position, induced him not to lose a moment in bringing matters to a decisive issue.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Orders were accordingly despatched for all the troops to prepare for action in an hour. Meanwhile the soldiers were ordered to sit down and rest themselves; while the most minute inspection took place in the ranks to see that the firelocks were in good condition, and the cart-ridge-boxes amply supplied. The order of battle was soon fixed. Ney occupied the right, from the wood of Sortlack to Posthenen, directly in front of Friedland: Lannes stood in the centre, between Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf: Mortier was on the left, occupying Heinrichsdorf and the road to Königsberg. In the second line Victor's corps was stationed immediately behind Ney: the Imperial Guard, with a numerous brigade of fusileers, under the orders of Savary; and the cavalry, under Grouchy, Latour Maubourg, and Nansouty, behind the centre and left. The whole army was directed to advance in echelon, with the right in front and the left slightly thrown back; thus Ney would be first engaged; and the artillery received orders to redouble their fire along the whole line as soon as the heads of his columns were seen emerging from the woods. By four o'clock seventy thousand infantry and ten thousand horse were assembled, in the highest spirits and the finest state of discipline and equipment; while Benningsen, who, from seeing the formidable accumulation of forces in his front,¹ and the losses he had sustained,

55.
Order of
battle taken
up by the
French.

¹ Sav. iii.
56, 58. Wil-
son, 155,
156. Jom.
ii. 413, 415.
Dum. xix.
10, 17. Bign.
vi. 301, 302.

do so, as very possibly the affair may be protracted till to-morrow. Use your utmost efforts, therefore, to arrive here by one o'clock in the morning. If I perceive in the outset of the action that the enemy is in such strength as to render the result doubtful, it is possible that I may engage only in a cannonade to-day, and await your arrival before commencing serious operations."—JOMINT, ii. 414.

* Formerly commanded by Bernadotte, who had been wounded at Spanden.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

had deemed it necessary to detach six thousand men to his rear to secure the bridge of Wehlau over the Pregel, had not more than forty thousand foot and eight thousand horse to oppose their attack.

56.
Battle of
Friedland.
Splendid
attack by
Ney's corps.

June 14.

The cessation of any serious attack for some hours after noon, led the Russian general, who had long since abandoned his original project of surprising Lannes, and was desirous only of maintaining his ground till the approach of night gave him the means of regaining, without molestation, the right bank of the Alle, to indulge a hope that nothing further would be undertaken during that day; but he was soon painfully undeceived. At five o'clock, on a signal given by a discharge of twenty pieces of cannon from the French centre, the whole army stood to their arms, and immediately the heads of Marshal Ney's column were seen emerging from the woods behind Posthenen, and rapidly advancing straight upon Friedland. On all sides the enemy's forces at once were seen; from the steeples of Friedland, through the interstices of the trees, or in the openings of the forest, they were descried in masses of enormous power and depth. From the plain, the horizon appeared to be bounded by a deep girdle of glittering steel. At one glance the most inexperienced could see the imminence and magnitude of the danger; for no preparations to cover the retreat over the Alle had been made, and the enemy's force appeared at least double that of the Russians. But there was no time for consultation or defensive measures. On came Ney's column with the fury of a tempest, driving before them, like foam before the waves, the Russian chasseurs of the Guard and several regiments of cavalry and Cossacks who were placed in advance, and had endeavoured to check their progress. Some regiments of militia, stationed on the low grounds near the Alle, also broke and fled towards the bridges, spreading confusion and alarm through the whole rear of the army. At the same time Victor's corps, placed

at first in the second line, advanced to the ground originally occupied by Ney; and its artillery, consisting of forty pieces, under the command of General Senarmont, pushed on four hundred paces further, and from a rising ground thundered over the whole Russian line, so as effectually to prevent any succours being sent to the distressed left. That portion of their army was now everywhere shaken; the loud shouts of Ney's column were heard along the whole line; their advanced guards were close to Friedland, and, encouraged by this rapid and splendid success, they were already preparing to storm the town and complete the ruin of the enemy by gaining possession of the bridges in his rear.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Sav. iii.
58, 69. Dum.
xix. 17, 19.
Wilson,
159, 160.
Jom. ii. 417,
418. Bign.
vi. 303, 304.

At this instant the Russian Imperial Guard, which was placed in reserve behind the artificial lake to the north of Friedland, was ordered to advance. Immediately these noble troops rushed forward with fixed bayonets, not in compact order, yet with such vigour, that the leading divisions of Ney's corps, assailed in front and flank, were pierced through, trodden down, and driven back with prodigious slaughter. Such was the change produced by this vehement onset, that the day seemed all but regained; the French were repulsed to a considerable distance, and the Russian left wing in its turn became the assailants. Then it was that the six thousand men detached in the forenoon to Wehlau might have changed the destinies of Europe. But the Russian Guards, being unsupported by any further reserve, could not singly maintain the contest for a length of time, with the overwhelming odds which were speedily directed against them. As they hurried on in pursuit of Ney, they came upon the reserve under Victor, which had advanced to his support; and one of his divisions, under Dupont, charged them so opportunely in flank, while disordered by the vehemence of their pursuit, that they were in their turn repulsed to the edge of the town. Encouraged by this change of fortune, Ney's soldiers now returned to the charge. Dupont's division,

57.
Gallant
charge of
the Russian
Guard.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Saalf.
Gesch. der
Krieg von
Nap. i.
644-7. Wil-
son, 159,
160. Sav.
iii. 58, 59.
Jom. ii. 418.
Dum. xix.
19, 21.
Thiers. vii.
612.

58.
Progress of
the action
on the cen-
tre and right
of the Rus-
sians.

emulating the deeds of its old comrades in the camp of Boulogne, pressed on in hot pursuit; Senarmont's terrific battery advanced, playing without intermission on the crowded ranks of the retiring Russians; and soon the confusion and press in Friedland appeared so great, that the leading French divisions were tempted to hazard an assault. After an obstinate resistance, the streets were forced; some of the principal buildings in the town took fire; in the first moments of consternation the fugitives applied the torch to the bridges over the river—in a few minutes they were wrapped in flames, and the volumes of smoke which rolled over the whole field of battle, spread a dismal feeling through the breasts of the soldiers.^{1*}

While this decisive success was gaining on the left, the centre and right of the Russians kept their ground with undaunted firmness under a dreadful cannonade, which told with fatal effect on the dense masses which, from the limited extent of the ground, were there accumulated between the front and the river. They had even gained considerable success; for some French battalions, having broken their array in crossing the deep ravine of the Mill Stream, with which they were unacquainted, were charged before they could re-form by the Russian cavalry, and cut to pieces. But when the retreat of the left wing and the Guards had uncovered their flank, the infantry in the centre were exposed to the most serious danger, and must have given way, had not the Russian cavalry galloped forward at full speed and charged the corps who threatened them, who were the left of Oudinot's grenadiers, now forming part of Lannes' corps, with such vigour that they were in a few minutes trampled under foot and destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the infantry of the centre also moved forward, and threw in so destructive a flanking

* As Napoleon, in the rear, eagerly watched these triumphant movements, a shell whirled over his head at the height of the top of the soldiers' bayonets, and a soldier instinctively cowered his head. "If that bomb had been destined for you," said he, smiling, "it would have found you, were you buried a hundred feet below the earth."—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 612.

fire, as effectually covered the retreat of their horse ; but at this moment the flames of Friedland and the bridges were seen to arise, and the vast clouds of black smoke which darkened the atmosphere told too plainly that their retreat was cut off, and that success was hopeless. Then indeed their hopes fell, and despair took possession of every heart. Still, however, their courage was unshaken : uniting the fronts of battalions, closing the ranks of the soldiers, they presented, in circumstances which seemed wellnigh desperate, an unbroken front to the enemy. In vain the artillery, approaching to half cannon-shot distance, ploughed through their dense array—in vain the French infantry threw in a destructive fire with ceaseless vigour—in vain the grenadiers of their Guard charged repeatedly with the shouts and confidence of victory ; not one square was broken—not one gun was taken. Slowly and in solid order they retired, leisurely retracing their steps towards the river, keeping up an incessant rolling fire from the rear, which faced the enemy, and charging with the bayonet whenever hard pressed by their pursuers.*

Whoever witnessed the conduct of that devoted host during these trying hours, must have felt that Russia, if adequately directed, was destined in the end to take the lead in the deliverance of Europe.¹

¹ Wilson,
160, 161.
Sav. iii. 59.
Jom. ii. 418,
419. Dum.
xix. 20, 21.
Saalf. i. 645.

Benningesen, meanwhile, without losing his presence of mind in the general wreck, did all that prudence could suggest to repair the consequences of the error into which

* "But yet, though thick the shafts as snow,
Though charging knights like whirlwinds go,
Though billmen ply the ghastly blow,
Unbroken was the ring ;

* * * *

Each stepping where his comrade stood,
The instant that he fell.
No thought was there of dastard flight ;
Link'd in the serried phalanx tight,
Groom fought like noble, squire like knight,
As fearlessly and well ;
Till utter darkness closed her wing
O'er their thin host and wounded king.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

59.

Benning-
sen's mea-
sures to
secure a
retreat.

he had been drawn in the earlier part of the day. His first care was to discover a ford for the cannon, as Friedland was in the hands of the enemy, and the bridges were no longer passable by friend or foe. Happily some peasants pointed out one, where the great park of artillery might be got across. It was at once withdrawn, with the exception of a few pieces which fell into the enemy's hands, while the firm countenance of the infantry warded off the assault of his impetuous columns; but the water came up to the horses' middles, and what remained of the ammunition was utterly spoiled. A hundred guns were immediately after the passage planted on the right bank to retard the enemy; but so closely were the columns on the opposite sides intermingled, that it was dangerous to fire lest the balls should fall in the Russian lines. Meanwhile two of their divisions, impatient of the slow progress at the ford, and unable to endure any longer the incessant showers of musketry and grape, threw themselves, sword in hand, into Friedland, and endeavoured to open a passage with fixed bayonets to the bridges. A desperate struggle ensued with the troops of Ney and Victor in the streets; but the despair of the Russians prevailed over the enthusiasm of the French, and they made their way through the burning houses to the water's edge. There, however, they found the bridges destroyed; and these brave men, after having so heroically cut their way through

Then skill'd *Napoleon's* sage commands
Led back from strife his shatter'd bands;
And from the charge they drew,
As mountain-waves from wasted lands
Sweep back to ocean blue.
Then did their loss his foemen know;
Their chiefs, their lords, their mightiest low,
They melted from the field as snow,
When streams are swoln and south winds blow,
Dissolves in silent dew.
Alles echoes heard the ceaseless plash,
While many a broken band
Disorder'd through her current dash,
To gain the *Russian* land."

Marmion, Canto vi.

the hostile ranks, found themselves stopped by an impassable barrier, while the increasing masses of the enemy now enclosed them, amidst fire and darkness, on every side. Still, however, no one thought, even in circumstances all but desperate, of surrender; with heroic courage they fought their way back, though with prodigious slaughter, to the ford, and during the darkness of the night plunged into the stream. The water was breast-high, and many, missing the fords, were drowned; several guns were abandoned, from the impossibility of dragging them through the press; but such was the unconquerable valour of the rearguard to the very last, that not one battalion capitulated, and, with the exception of five thousand wounded, few prisoners fell into the enemy's hands.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Saalf. i.
647-8. Wilson, 159,
161. Jom.
ii. 419, 421.
Dum. xix.
19, 23. Sav.
iii. 59. Bign.
vi. 304, 305.

Such was the disastrous battle of Friedland, which at one blow dissolved the great confederacy which the genius and foresight of Mr Pitt had formed for the coercion of Napoleon's ambition, and left Great Britain alone to maintain the contest with nearly the whole forces of the Continent arrayed under his banners. Grievously, then, was felt the want of British aid, and woful were the consequences of the ill-timed parsimony which had withheld all subsidies from Russia during this desperate struggle. Thirty thousand of the militia, whom even a small loan would have clothed and armed, might have averted the catastrophe; twenty thousand British auxiliaries would have converted it into a glorious victory, and thrown Napoleon back upon the Vistula and the Elbe. The losses of the Russians, though nothing like what they had experienced in the decisive overthrow of Austerlitz, were

60.
Immense
results of
the battle.

* In describing this battle, Lord Hutchinson, who witnessed it, stated, in his official despatches to the British government:—"I want words sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which alone would have rendered their success undoubted, if courage alone could secure victory; but whatever may be the event, the officers and men of the Russian army have done their duty in the noblest manner, and are justly entitled to the praise and admiration of every person who was witness of their conduct."—LORD HUTCHINSON'S *Despatch*, June 15, 1807; SIR ROBERT WILSON, 162.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Wilson,
163. Dum.
xix. 21, 23.
Jom. ii. 420,
421. 79th
Bull. Camp.
de Saxe, iv.
334. Sav.
iii. 59, 60.

still very severe. Seventeen thousand men had fallen, either killed or wounded, and five thousand of the latter had been made prisoners; but of those unhurt not more than five hundred had become captives; no colours were taken, and only seventeen guns remained in the enemy's power. The French had lost ten thousand men, and two eagles wrested from them in fair combat. Nothing can illustrate more clearly the desperate resistance made by the Russians than the small number of guns taken, under circumstances when, with less steady troops, the whole artillery would have been abandoned.^{1*}

61.
The Rus-
sians retreat
without
molestation
to Allen-
burg and
Wehlau.
June 15.

Atlas,
Plate 44.

June 16.

During the evening, the extreme right of the Russians and part of the cavalry retired by the left bank of the Alle, and crossed without molestation at the bridge of Allenburg. Thither, on the morning after the battle, the remainder of the army retired by the other bank, without being at all harassed on the march; indeed, it is a remarkable and unaccountable circumstance, that though fifteen thousand French horse were in the field, they were little engaged in the action after Napoleon arrived on the spot, nor once let loose in the pursuit.† On the day following they reached Wehlau, where the Alle and the Pregel unite in the midst of a marshy plain, traversed by a single chaussée. By that defile, not only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but the immense baggage and ammunition-train, which had evacuated Königsberg, had to pass. Although no serious attack was made, yet such was the confusion produced by the enormous accumulation of cannon and chariots on a single chaussée, and

* The French say in the bulletins, that they took eighty pieces of cannon; that the Russians had 18,000 killed, and that they lost on their own side only 500 killed and 3000 wounded. Berthier estimated the real loss at Tilsit to Sir R. Wilson at more than 8000; and that officer makes the Russian loss only 12,000 men. The latter estimate, however, is obviously too low, as the peace which immediately followed demonstrated; the account of the French loss in the bulletin was, as usual, from a third to a fourth of its real amount.—79 *Bulletin, Camp. de Saxe*, iv. 334; and WILSON, 163.

† "The Russians had on their right twenty-two squadrons of cavalry, who covered their retreat; we had more than forty, with which we should have charged them, but, by a fatality without example, these forty squadrons received

such the apprehensions inspired by the evident dangers which would ensue if the rearguard were attacked, that, on a few muskets being accidentally discharged, a general panic took place, and horse, foot, and cannon rushed tumultuously together to the bridge, and the strongest, throwing down and trampling under foot the weaker, broke through and spread in the wildest disorder into the town. Such was the uproar and consternation which ensued, that it was with the utmost difficulty that order could be restored by the personal efforts of Sir Robert Wilson and a few Russian officers who happened to be on the spot; and it inspired these gallant chiefs with the melancholy conviction, that if Napoleon had followed up his success with his wonted vigour, the Russian host would have been utterly annihilated.* But on this occasion, as on many others in the memorable campaign of 1812, it was apparent that the vigour of the Emperor in following up his victories was by no means equal either to what it had been in the German or Italian wars, or to the successes which he claimed at the moment—a circumstance for which his panegyrists find it impossible to offer any explanation, but which, in truth, is susceptible of a very easy solution, when the desperate nature of the resistance opposed to him in these northern latitudes, and the consequent magnitude of his losses, is taken into consideration.¹

¹ Wilson,
164, 165.
Dum. xix.
34, 35.

The catastrophe at Friedland, and subsequent retreat of the Allies behind the Pregel, rendered the city of Königsberg, which was situated considerably in advance,

no orders, and never so much as mounted their horses; they remained during all the battle on foot behind our left. On seeing that, I lamented the Grand-duke of Berg had not been there: if he had, these forty squadrons would certainly have been employed, and not a Russian would have escaped.”—SAVARY, iii. 60.

* “Et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset,
Ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.”

In the first alarm, the Cossacks crowded down to the right bank of the Alle, and swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side and discharged a *volley of arrows* with considerable effect at the enemy.—WILSON, 163, 165.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

62.

Capture of
Königsberg.
June 16.

near the mouth of that river, no longer tenable. General Lestocq had, with his wonted ability, conducted the retreat of his little army with very trifling loss, till he was joined on the 12th, in front of Königsberg, by the corps of Kamenskoi. Even their united forces, however, not more than twenty-four thousand strong, could hardly hope to save that town without the assistance of the main army, when they were attacked by the corps of Soult and Davoust, and the greater part of the cavalry under Murat, amounting to full fifty thousand men, of whom about twelve thousand were horse, in the finest condition. Notwithstanding this overwhelming odds, however, the Prussian general made the attempt, and by the firm countenance which he assumed, and the devoted heroism of his rearguard in the retreat from the lower Passarge, succeeded in so far retarding the enemy as to gain time for the evacuation of almost all the magazines and stores in the city, even by the narrow and crowded defile of Wehlau. But this great object was not gained without sustaining a considerable loss. A

June 14., battalion was surrounded and made prisoners, which had been left to defend the passage of the Frisching; and on

June 15. the following day a column of twelve hundred men, which was enveloped by St-Cyr's division and Murat's cavalry, was, after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender. Weakened by these losses, Lestocq, however, still maintained his ground in Königsberg, repeatedly repulsed the attempts to storm it which were made by the Brandenburg gate, and remained there all the day, putting the mouldering fortifications in a respectable posture of defence, and pressing the evacuation of the magazines. But on the following morning, having

June 16. received accounts of the battle of Friedland, he ordered the garrison to be under arms, under pretence of making a sally; and when evening approached, the whole took the direction of Labiau, leaving General Sutterheim with two battalions of light infantry to man

the walls. He also evacuated the place at midnight, and on the following day the magistrates sent the keys of the city to Marshal Soult. Three thousand sick or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy; but such was the activity of General Lestocq, and the skill with which Sutterheim conducted his measures, that no magazines or stores of any importance were taken, and the rearguard, though frequently molested, effected their retreat without any serious loss to Wehlau, where they joined the main army as it was defiling over the bridge.^{1*}

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Wilson,
167, 169.
Dum. xix.
33, 36.

Meanwhile Napoleon, after his usual custom, rode on the following morning over the field of battle. It presented a ghastly spectacle, second only to the terrific plain of Eylau in circumstances of horror. Then might be seen evident proofs of the stern and unconquerable valour with which the Russians had combated. The position of the squares of infantry could be distinctly traced by the dead bodies of the men, which, lying on their backs facing outwards, still preserved their regular array; the station of the cavalry was seen by the multitude of horses, which lay dead as they had stood in squadrons on the field. In the pursuit, however, he exerted none of his usual vigour, and threw away, in the prosecution of a minor object, the fairest opportunity he had ever enjoyed of destroying the Rus-

63.
Measures of
Napoleon,
and retreat
of the Rus-
sians to the
Niemen.
—
Atlas,
Plate 39.

* Napoleon, with his usual mendacious policy, gave out, in his 79th bulletin, that he had taken in Königsberg, not only twenty thousand prisoners and immense public magazines, but 160,000 stand of British arms! It appeared a happy stroke to make the Parisians believe that the tardy succours of Great Britain had arrived just in time to arm the French troops. "This assertion," Sir R. Wilson justly observes, "is a falsehood of the most extravagant character, and which finds no parallel but in the catalogue of their own compositions." In truth, the British arms escaped by a circumstance more discreditable to England than the falsehood which Napoleon asserted—they had not yet arrived. The cannon, ammunition, and arms for Prussia were sent by Lord Hutchinson, after the armistice, to a Swedish port; those for Russia were landed at Riga, and delivered to the Russian troops.—*Parl. Returns*, 1807; *Parl. Hist.* ix. App.; and Wilson, 167. The falsehood in regard to the stores taken at Königsberg appeared in the bulletin giving the details of the battle of Friedland, dated Wehlau, June 17, the very day on which that town was taken by the French troops. He there said:—"Marshal Soult has entered Königsberg, where we found many hundred thousand quintals of wheat, more than twenty thousand

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

June 18.

June 19.

¹ Wilson,
168, 170.
Dum. xix.
35, 40. Bign.
vi. 508, 509.

sian army. Intent only on cutting the enemy off from Königsberg, and securing to himself that noble prize of victory, he totally neglected to follow up with sufficient rapidity his success on the right bank of the Alle, and suffered the disorganised and shattered Russian army to retire without molestation through the narrow defile that traversed the marshes of Wehlau and over the single bridge of the Pregel, when a little additional vigour in the pursuit would at least have compelled them to abandon, at the entrance of these passes, the greater part of their baggage and artillery. On the evening of the 18th, the Allied army, which had united at Wehlau with the troops under Kamenskoi and Lestocq, falling back from Königsberg, reached TILSIT on the Niemen, and early on the following morning the mighty array began to defile over the bridge. For forty hours successively the passage continued without intermission; horse, foot, cannon, baggage-waggons, store-chariots, succeeding each other in endless array; it seemed as if the East was swallowing up the warlike brood which had so long contended with the west for the mastery of Europe. Still, though a hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, were hardly a day's march in the rear, no attempt was made by Napoleon to molest their passage.¹ A few cannon-shots alone were exchanged

Russians and Prussians wounded, and all the military stores which England had sent out; among the rest, 160,000 muskets, still on shipboard." This fabrication was made at Wehlau on the 17th, which is thirty miles from Königsberg, before it *was possible* that anything further than the bare capture of the city could have been heard of by the French Emperor. The falsehood in the first bulletin, which corresponded to his wishes rather than the reality, was so gross that it could not be repeated in the succeeding one, dated Tilsit, 19th June, which, after recapitulating the successes of Soult and the fall of Königsberg, said:—"In fine, the result of all these affairs has been, that four or five thousand prisoners, and fifteen pieces of cannon, have fallen into our hands. Two hundred Russian vessels, and great stores of subsistence, wine, and spirits, have been found in Königsberg." Yet so little do the French writers attend to accuracy in their detail, that the enormous falsehood in the first bulletin, even when abandoned in the second, has been adopted by all their historians, even Jomini and Dumas, whose accuracy is in general so praiseworthy.—See DUMAS, xiv. 33; and JOMINI, ii. 422; and 79th and 80th *Bullet. Camp. de Saxe*, iv. 338, 342; and BRENON, vi. 308; and NOBVIS, iii. 27.

between the Cossacks and the horse-artillery of Murat, which, on the morning of the 20th, approached the town of Tilsit, which was shortly after evacuated by Bagrathion with the Russian rearguard, who withdrew without molestation across the river and burned the bridge.

In truth, hostilities were no longer either required or expedient. Disheartened by the defeat which he had experienced; chagrined at the refusal of succours either in men or money from England; irritated at the timid policy of Austria, when the fairest opportunity that ever yet had occurred was presented for her decisive interposition; foiled in the objects for which he had originally begun the war, and deserted by those for whose advantage, more than his own, it had been undertaken, the Emperor Alexander had taken his resolution. He deemed it unnecessary and improper to risk the independence of Russia in a quarrel not directly affecting its interests, and from which the parties immediately concerned had withdrawn. On the 18th, therefore, General Benningsen wrote a letter to Prince Bagrathion, desiring him to make known to the French generals the Emperor's desire for an armistice. This was accordingly communicated to Murat on the forenoon of the following day, and orders were transmitted for hostilities to cease at all points. Thus was this mighty conflagration, which originally commenced on the banks of the Danube, finally stifled on the shores of the Niemen.^{1*}

64.
The Emperor Alexander proposes an armistice.

June 19.

¹ Wilson,
170, 171.
Dum. xix.
42, 44.

These proposals on the part of the Russian Emperor gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon. It had ever been his policy to offer peace to his enemies during the

* During this desperate struggle on the Passarge, a conflict of some importance, but overlooked amidst the shock of such mighty hosts, took place on the banks of the Narew. Tolstoy had there gained some successes over Massena, and, in particular, made himself master of the intrenched camp of Borken; but the French having attacked it some days after with increased forces, it again fell into their hands, and the Russians, following the retreat of their principal army, had retired from Ostrolenka towards Ticoizin, when the armistice of Tilsit put a period to their operations.—DUMAS, xix. 41, 43.

June 11.
June 15.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

65.

Reasons
which made
Napoleon
rejoice at
this step.

first tumult and consternation of defeat ; and more than once, by such well-timed advances, he had extricated himself from situations of the utmost peril. To be anticipated in this manner in his desires, and have the public demonstration afforded of the reality of his victory by the enemy proposing an armistice, was a circumstance of all others the most gratifying, which raised him at once to the highest point of glory. He was not ignorant that here, as at Leoben and Austerlitz, a further continuance of the contest might be attended with very serious dangers. England, it is true, had hitherto, in an unaccountable manner, kept herself aloof from the struggle ; but a change had taken place in her councils : a close alliance had been contracted with Prussia ; powerful succours in arms and ammunition were on their way, and the greatest military expedition she had ever sent forth was preparing to hoist the flag of a national war on the banks of the Elbe. The dubious policy of Austria rendered it more than probable that, in such an event, she would throw off the mask ; and that eighty thousand armed mediators might suddenly make their appearance under the walls of Dresden, and totally intercept the communications of the Grand Army with France. Russia, it was true, was defeated—the army of Benningsen was little more than half its former amount ; but thirty thousand men were advancing, under Prince Labanoff, to repair its losses ; and if its frontiers were invaded, and a national resistance aroused, there were four hundred thousand militia enrolled, who would speedily fill the ranks of the regular army. Napoleon indeed could collect, notwithstanding the losses of the short campaign, a hundred and fifty thousand men on the Niemen ; but even this mighty host appeared hardly adequate to the task of subduing an empire whose dominions on this side of the Ural Mountains equalled all the rest of Europe put together. How were the conquered provinces to be kept in subjection ; the taken fortresses to be garrisoned ; the immense lines of communication to be kept up, when the war

was to *commence* at the distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Rhine, and the Scythian monarch, if resolute on preserving his independence, might retreat a thousand miles further without coming to the verge of his European dominions ? ¹*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Hard. ix.
426.

Nor were the considerations less powerful which induced Alexander to desire an accommodation. By engaging in the war on this desperate principle, indeed, and drawing the enemy into the heart of his dominions, he had every chance of defeating the invasion of this second Darius into the deserts of Scythia ; but this could only be done by great sacrifices, and at the hazard of throwing back for a long period the internal improvement of his rising dominions. For what object were these sacrifices to be made ? For the preservation of Prussia ? She was already crushed, and a few inconsiderable forts, with the town of Graudenz, were all that remained to Frederick-William of the dominions of his illustrious ancestors. For the safety of England ? She was sufficiently protected by her invincible fleets ; and the interest she had evinced in the struggle had not been such as to render it imperative on the Czar, either in honour or policy, to continue the contest on her account.† For the sake of the balance of

66.
Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation.

* The following regular forces, exclusive of 400,000 militia, were still at the command of the Russian government :—

Remains of the army which fought at Friedland,	28,000
Kamenskoï's corps,	9,000
Reinforcements which joined at Tilsit, or on the march,	9,000
Half of Labanoff's corps, at Olita,	15,000
Prussians retired with Lestocq,	18,000
Tolstoy's corps on the Narew,	18,000
On march from Wilna,	15,000

Total regulars, 112,000

—WILSON, 176.

† The secret motives which induced the Emperor Alexander to conclude the treaty of Tilsit, were the refusal by Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey) to guarantee the Russian subsidies, and that too in a manner peculiarly painful to the feelings of the Emperor—a refusal the more inexplicable, as that minister was the very person who had, after the catastrophe of Jena, warmly solicited the Czar to fly to the succour of Prussia ; the delay in the arrival of the troops promised by England in the island of Rugen ; the tardiness of the new administration in furnishing the promised supplies in money, arms, and ammunition

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

power? That was an object, however important, which could not be brought about by the unaided efforts of a single empire; and if Austria, whose interests were more immediately concerned in its preservation, was not inclined to draw the sword in the conflict, it did not appear that Russia, whose independence had never yet been seriously threatened, was called upon to continue it unaided, for its restoration. Now was an opportunity when the war might be terminated, if not with advantage, at least without dishonour. In the fields of Pultusk, Eylau, and Heilsberg, the Russians had sufficiently vindicated their title to military glory; and objects of immediate importance were to be gained nearer home, both on the Danube and the Neva, amply sufficient to indemnify the empire for a temporary withdrawal from the general theatre of European strife.¹

¹ Boutourlin, Camp. de 1812, i. 21, 22. Hard. ix. Lucches. i. 322, 323.

67.
Conclusion
of an armis-
tice.

When such were the dispositions on both sides, there was little difficulty in coming to an understanding. France had nothing to demand of Russia except that she should close her ports against England; Russia nothing to ask of France but that she would withdraw her armies from Poland, and permit the Emperor to pursue his long-cherished projects of conquest in Turkey. The map of Europe lay before them, out of which these two mighty potentates might carve at pleasure ample indemnities for themselves, or acquisitions for their allies. No difficulty, in consequence, was experienced in settling the terms of the armistice. The Niemen separated the two armies; the headquarters of Napoleon were fixed at Tilsit, on the left bank of the river; those of Alexander at Piktupohen, a mile distant on the right bank.² A friendly intercourse was immediately established between

² Bign. vi. 308, 312. Dum. xix. 44, 50.

—circumstances which had strongly irritated him against the English government; the refusal of Austria to accede to the convention of Bartenstein, or take any part in the contest; as well as the exhaustion of his own finances, the penury of arms and ammunition, the famishing state of the troops, and the risk of total overthrow to which they were exposed.—HARDENBERG, ix. 425; and LUCCHESINI, i. 322, 323.

the officers and men of the two armies—they had felt each other's valour too strongly not to be inspired with sentiments of mutual respect ; while Napoleon, in eloquent terms, addressed his soldiers on this glorious termination of their labours in one of those proclamations which made Europe thrill from side to side.*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.
June 22.

An armistice having been thus concluded, it was agreed that the two Emperors should meet to arrange, in a private conference, the destinies of the Continent. It took place, accordingly, on the 25th, under circumstances eminently calculated to impress the imagination of mankind. By the direction of the French general of engineers, Lariboissière, a raft of great dimensions was constructed on the river Niemen—the *raft of Tilsit*, which will be recollected as long as the cage of Bajazet or the phalanx of Alexander. It was moored in the centre of the stream, and on its surface stood a wooden apartment, surmounted by the eagles of France and Russia, framed with all the possible magnificence which the time and circumstances would admit. This was destined for the reception of the Emperors alone ; at a little distance was stationed another raft, richly but less sumptuously adorned, for their respective suites. The shore on either side was covered with the Imperial Guard of the two monarchs, drawn up in triple lines, in the same firm and imposing array in which they had stood on the fields of Eylau and Friedland. At one o'clock precisely, amidst the thunder of artillery, each Emperor stepped into a boat on his own side of the river, accompanied by a few of his principal officers : Napoleon was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt ; Alexander by the Grand-duke Constantine, General Benningsen,¹

68.
Interview
on the raft
at Tilsit.

June 25.

¹ Savary, iii.
76. Bign.
vi. 315.
Dum. xix.
53, 54.

* "Soldiers !—On the 5th June we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army ; the enemy misunderstood the cause of our inactivity. He has learned, when it was too late, that our slumber was that of the lion ; he now repents having forgotten it. In the days of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in the ever memorable field of Friedland, in a ten days' campaign in short, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, 7 standards, killed or wounded 60,000 Russians, wrested

Napoleon's
proclamation
thereon to
his troops.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Prince Labanoff, General Ouvaroff, and Count Lieven. The numerous and splendid suite of each monarch followed in another boat immediately after.

69.
First words
of Napoleon
and Alex-
ander.

The bark of Napoleon, rowed by the marines of his Guard, advanced with greater rapidity than that of Alexander. He arrived first at the raft, entered the apartment, and himself opened the door on the opposite side to receive the Czar, while the shouts of the soldiers on either shore drowned even the roar of the artillery. In a few seconds Alexander arrived, and was received by the conqueror at the door on his own side. Their meeting was friendly, and the very first words which the Russian Emperor uttered revealed both the lacerated feelings occasioned by the conduct of the government of Great Britain during the war, his deep penetration, and clear conception of the ruling passion of Napoleon—"I hate the English," said he, "as much as you do, and am ready to second you in all your enterprises against them." "In that case," replied Napoleon, "everything will be easily arranged, and peace is already made." The interview lasted two hours, during which Napoleon exercised all the ascendant which his extraordinary talents and fortune, as well as singular powers of fascination gave him; while the Russian Emperor gave proof of the tact and finesse, as well as diplomatic ability, with which his nation is gifted beyond any other in Europe.¹ Before they parted, the out-

¹ Savary, iii.
76, 77. Bign.
vi. 315, 316.
Dum. xix.
53, 55.

from the enemy's army all its magazines and hospitals, the fortress of Königsberg, with three hundred vessels which it contained, loaded with munitions of war of all sorts, and especially 160,000 muskets sent by England to arm our enemies. From the shores of the Vistula we have arrived on those of the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of my coronation; you have this year worthily commemorated that of Marengo, which terminated the war of the second coalition. Frenchmen, you are worthy of yourselves, *and of me*. You will return to your country covered with laurels, after having gained a peace which will be its own guarantee. It is time that our country should live in repose, sheltered from the malignant influence of England. My recompenses to you shall testify the large measure of my gratitude, and the whole extent of the love which I bear you." Already was to be seen, not merely in Napoleon's thoughts, but in his words, a return to the celebrated maxim of Louis XIV., "*L'état—c'est moi.*"—BIGNON, vi. 311, 312.

lines of the treaty were arranged between them: it was not difficult to come to an understanding—the world afforded ample room for the aggrandisement of both.*

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

On the day following, a second interview took place at the same town, at which the King of Prussia was present: the first had been arranged, and the preliminary terms agreed to, without any concert with that unhappy prince. He was no longer in a situation to stipulate any conditions. Bereft of his dominions, driven up into a corner of his territories, destitute of everything, he had no alternative but submission to the stern law of the conqueror.† As it was now evident that an accommodation was about to take place, arrangements were made for conducting it with more convenience to the exalted personages concerned. Part of the town of Tilsit was declared neutral, and allotted to the accommodation of the Emperor of Russia and his suite; thither he repaired on the afternoon of the same day, and was received with all imaginable courtesy by Napoleon himself, upon landing on the left bank of the river from his boat. Amidst discharges of artillery, and the acclamations of a vast multitude of spectators, whom the extraordinary spectacle had collected together, did these two sovereigns, whose hostility had so lately dyed the fields of Poland with blood, ride side by side to the quarters prepared for the Czar, through a triple line of the French Imperial Guard.

70.
Commence-
ment of the
negotiations
at Tilsit.
June 26.

* Savary, who had been nominated governor of Königsberg, received orders, when the French army first approached the Niemen, to get a pontoon train, which had been left in the arsenal of that city, ready for immediate operation. Next day, however, he received the following significant note from Talleyrand:—"Be in no hurry with your pontoons: what would we gain by passing the Niemen? what is there to be acquired beyond that river? The Emperor must *abandon his ideas in regard to Poland*; that nation is fit for nothing; disorder alone is to be organised among its inhabitants. *We have another far more important matter to settle*; here is a fair opportunity of terminating the present dispute; we must not let it escape." Already the Spanish invasion had entered into the calculations of the rulers of Europe on the Niemen.—SAVARY, iii. 76.

† At this period he wrote to the King of Sweden—"Immediately after the armistice, my imperial ally concluded peace on his own account alone. Abandoned in this manner, and left without support on

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

The attention of Napoleon descended to the most minute particulars. The furniture in the Emperor of Russia's rooms was all sent from the French headquarters; a sumptuous train of cooks and other attendants was in readiness to make him forget the luxuries of St Petersburg; even his couch was prepared in a camp-bed of the French Emperor's, which he had made use of in his campaigns. The King of Prussia also arrived, two days after, in Tilsit, with his beautiful and unfortunate queen, and the ministers on both sides—Talleyrand on the part of France, Prince Kourakin on that of Russia, and Marshal Kalkreuth on that of Prussia. But they were of little service, for such was the extraordinary length to which the intimacy of the two Emperors had gone, that not only did they invariably dine and pass the evening together, but almost all the morning conferences, during which the destinies of the world were arranged, were conducted by themselves in person.¹

¹ Savary, iii, 77, 78. Bign. vi. 316, 317. Dum. xix. 55.

71.
Napoleon's
interview
with the
Queen of
Prussia.

“Had the Queen of Prussia arrived earlier at our conferences,” says Napoleon, “it might have had much influence on the result of the negotiations; but happily she did not make her appearance till all was settled, and I was in a situation to decide everything in twenty-four hours. As soon as she arrived I went to pay her a visit; she was very beautiful, but somewhat past the first flower of youth. She received me in despair, exclaiming, ‘Justice! Justice!’ and throwing herself back with loud lamentations. I at length prevailed on her to take a seat, but she continued, nevertheless, her pathetic entreaties. ‘Prussia,’ said she, ‘was blinded in regard to her power; she ventured to enter the lists with a hero, oppose herself to the destinies of France, neglect its fortunate friendship! she has been well punished for her folly. The glory of the

the great theatre of war, I found myself forced, how painful soever to my feelings, to do the same, and to sign a peace, though its conditions were to the last degree hard and overwhelming.”—SCHÖELL, viii. 410; and LUOGHESINI, i. 328.

Great Frederick, the halo his name spread round our arms, had inflated the heart of Prussia—they have caused her ruin.” Magdeburg, in an especial manner, was the object of her entreaties; and when Napoleon, before dinner, presented her with a beautiful rose, she at first refused it, but immediately after took it with a smile, adding at the same time, “Yes! but at least with Magdeburg.” — “I must observe to your majesty,” replied the Emperor, “that it is I who give, and you only who must receive.” Napoleon had the talents of Cæsar, but not the chivalry of Henry IV. “After all,” said he, “a fine woman and gallantry are not to be weighed against affairs of state.” He had frequently, during the repast, found himself hard pressed by the talent and grace of the Queen, and he resolved to cut the matter short. When she had retired, he sent for Talleyrand and Prince Kourakin, arranged the few remaining points of difference, and signed the treaty. The Queen was violently affected next day, when she learned that all was concluded; she refused to see the Emperor, and loudly protested she had been deceived by him — an assertion which he positively denies, and which his intellectual character, inaccessible to gallantry or female influence, though very warm so far as sense was concerned, rendered highly improbable. At length she was prevailed on by Alexander to be again present at dinner; and when Napoleon conducted her down stairs, after it was over, she stopped in the middle, pressed his hand as he bade her farewell, and said, “Is it possible that, after having had the good fortune to be so near to the Hero of the Age, he has not left me the satisfaction of being able to assure him that he has attached me to him for life?” “Madame,” replied the Emperor, “I lament if it is so; it is the effect of my evil destiny.” They separated, never again to meet in this world.¹

“The Queen of Prussia,” said Napoleon, “unquestionably possessed talents, great information, and singular

¹ Las Cas.
iv. 224,
228.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

72.

Napoleon's
character of
the Queen
of Prussia.

acquaintance with affairs ; she was the real sovereign for fifteen years. In truth, in spite of my address and utmost efforts, she constantly led the conversation, returned at pleasure to her subject, and directed it as she chose ; but still with so much tact and delicacy that it was impossible to take offence. And in truth it must be confessed, that the objects at stake were of infinite importance ; the time short and precious. One of the high contracting parties frequently repeated to me, that I should forgive everything or nothing at all ; but I answered that I had done everything in my power to put things in such a train. The King of Prussia requested an interview that very day to take leave ; I put it off for twenty-four hours, at the secret solicitation of Alexander : he never forgave me that postponement. I discovered in all our conversations that the violation of the territory of Anspach, during the advance to Ulm, had been the original cause of his irritation. In all our subsequent interviews, how great soever may have been the interests of the moment, he abandoned them without hesitation, to prove to me that I had really broken in upon his dominions, on that occasion. He was wrong ; but still I must allow his indignation was that of an honest man.”¹*

¹ Las Cas.
iv. 228,
230.

73.

Convivial-
ities between
the Russian
and French
officers.

The Russians at Tilsit did not consider themselves as vanquished ; on the contrary, they felt, after all their misfortunes, much of the exultation of victory. Proud of having so long arrested the progress of the conqueror of the world, glorying even in the amount of their losses and the chasms in the ranks, which told the desperate

* “Almost every day at Tilsit the two Emperors and the King of Prussia rode out together ; but this mark of confidence led to no good result. The Prussians could not conceal how much they suffered at seeing it ; Napoleon rode in the middle between the two sovereigns, but the King could hardly keep pace with the two Emperors, or deemed himself *de trop* in their *tête-à-tête*, and generally fell behind. When we returned, the two Emperors dismounted in a moment ; but they had generally to wait till the King came up, which caused them to be frequently wet, to the great annoyance of the spectators, as the weather was rainy at the time. That incident was the more annoying, as Alexander's manners are full of grace, and fully on a level with the highest elegance which the

strife in which they had been engaged, they mingled with their recent enemies with feelings unlacerated by the humiliations of defeat. It was obvious that peace was equally necessary to both Emperors; it was soon whispered that it was to be concluded on terms eminently favourable to the Russian empire. The utmost cordiality, in consequence, soon prevailed between the officers and soldiers of the two armies; fêtes and repasts were interchanged in rapid succession, given by the warriors so recently hostile to each other. In these entertainments the officers of the two Imperial Guards, and in particular Prince Murat and the Grand-duke Constantine, were peculiarly cordial and complimentary to each other. On one of these occasions, to such a length did the effusions of mutual respect and regard proceed, that the officers of the two Guards, amidst the fumes of wine and the enthusiasm of the moment, mutually exchanged their uniforms; French hearts beat under the decorations won amidst the snows of Eylau, and Russian bosoms warmed beneath the orders bestowed on the field of Austerlitz. Last and most singular effect of civilised life and military discipline, to strengthen at once the fierceness of national passions and the bonds by which they are to be restrained, and join in fraternal brotherhood one day those hands which, on another, had been dyed by mutual slaughter, or lifted up in relentless hostility against each other!¹

¹ Bign. vi.
317, 318.

In the course of their rides together, the two Emperors had frequent opportunities of observing the flower of their respective armies. Napoleon afterwards acknowledged that he had never seen anything which impressed him so

saloons of Paris can exhibit. He was sometimes fatigued with his companion, whose chagrin was so evident that it damped our satisfaction. We broke up in consequence our dinner parties at an early hour, under pretence of business at home; but Alexander and I remained behind to take tea together, and generally prolonged the conversation till past midnight."—LAS CASES, iv. 228, 230. Everything conspires to indicate, that at this period the Emperor Alexander was completely dazzled by the grandeur and fascination of Napoleon, and that, under the influence of these feelings, he entirely forgot the interests and misfortunes of his ally.—SAVARY, iv. 92, note.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

74.

Napoleon's
admiration
of the Rus-
sian Impe-
rial Guard.

much as the appearance of one of the regiments of the Russian Guard. Albeit noways an admirer of the rigid formality of German tactics, and trusting rather to the effect of proclamations on the spirits of his troops than the influence of discipline on their movements, he was inexpressibly struck with the military aspect of its soldiers, and could not avoid the conclusion, that an army thus constituted would be the first in the world, if, to the firmness and precision which it had already attained, it should come to unite the fire and enthusiasm of the French. The docility with which they submitted to the orders they received, whatever they were, struck him as particularly admirable. "My soldiers," said he, "are as brave as it is possible to be, but they are too much addicted to reasoning on their position. If they had the impassible firmness and docility of the Russians, the world would be too small for their exploits. The French soldiers are too much attached to their country to play the part of the Macedonians."¹

¹ Jom. ii.
423, 424.

75.

Treaty of
Tilsit. Its
leading
provisions.
Creation of
the Grand-
duchy of
Warsaw,
and king-
dom of
Westpha-
lia.
July 7
and 9.

After a fortnight of conference, the treaty of Tilsit, which had been agreed on as to its leading articles in the first four days after the armistice, was formally signed and published to the world. The first treaty between France and Russia was signed on the 7th; the second between France and Prussia, on the 9th of July. By the first, the Emperor Napoleon, as a mark of his regard for the *Emperor of Russia*, agreed to restore to the King of Prussia, Silesia and nearly all his German dominions on the right bank of the Elbe, with the fortresses on the Oder and in Pomerania. The provinces which, prior to the first partition in 1772, formed part of the kingdom of Poland, and had since been annexed to Prussia, were detached from that monarchy and erected into a separate principality, to be called the GRAND-DUCHY OF WARSAW, and bestowed on the King of Saxony, with the exception of the province of Bialystock, containing two hundred thousand souls, which was ceded to *Russia*, which thus

participated, in the hour of misfortune, in a share, small indeed, but still a share, of the spoils of its ally. Dantzic, with a limited portion of territory around it, was declared a free and independent city, under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, which was in effect declaring it, what it immediately after became, a frontier town of France. A right to a free military road was granted to the King of Saxony across the Prussian states, to connect his German with his Polish dominions; the navigation of the Vistula was declared free to Prussia, Saxony, and Dantzic; the Dukes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were reinstated in their dominions, but under the condition that their harbours should all be occupied by French troops, so as to prevent the introduction of English merchandise: the mediation of the Emperor of Russia was accepted with a view to the arrangement of a general peace; the Kings of Naples and Holland, with the Confederation of the Rhine, were recognised by the Emperor of Russia: a new kingdom, to be called the KINGDOM OF WESTPHALIA, was erected in favour of Jerome Buonaparte, the Emperor's brother, composed of the whole provinces ceded by Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, which was also recognised by the Emperor. Hostilities were to cease between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to be evacuated by the Russian troops, but not occupied by those of the Suldaun till the ratification of a general peace; the Emperor of Russia accepted the mediation of Napoleon for the conclusion of his differences with Turkey; the Emperors of Russia and France mutually guaranteed their respective dominions, and agreed to establish commercial relations with each other on the footing allowed the most favoured nations.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Art. 9.

Art. 6.

Art. 7.

Art. 3.

Art. 12.

Art. 13.

Art. 19.

Art. 20.

Art. 21.

Art. 22.

Art. 23.

Art. 25.

¹ Mart. viii.

637. Dum.

xix. 58, 64.

By the second treaty, concluded two days after, between France and Prussia, the King of Prussia recognised the Kings of Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and concluded peace with the

76.
Treaty with
Prussia.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Art. 9
and 10.

Art. 12.

Art. 13.

Art. 14.

Art. 15.

Art. 18.

Art. 28.

¹ Mart. viii.
661. Dum.
xix. 64, 71.

sovereigns of those several states, as well as with the Emperor of France. He ceded to the kings or princes who should be designated by the Emperor Napoleon all the dominions which at the commencement of the war he possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, and engaged to offer no opposition to any arrangement in regard to them which his Imperial Majesty might choose to adopt. The King of Prussia ceded, in addition, to the King of Saxony, the circle of Gotha in Lower Lusatia: he renounced all right to his acquisitions made in Poland subsequent to 1st January 1772, and to the city and surrounding territory of Dantzic; and consented to their erection into a separate duchy in favour of the King of Saxony, as well as to the military road, through his dominions to connect the Polish with the German possessions of that sovereign. He agreed to the extension of the frontiers of Russian Poland, by the cession of the province of Bialystock; consented, till the conclusion of a general maritime peace, to close his harbours without exception to the ships and commerce of Great Britain; and concurred in a separate convention, having for its object the restoration of the strongholds of Prussia at certain fixed periods, and the sums to be paid for their civil and military evacuation.¹

77.

Immense
losses of
Prussia by
this treaty.

The losses of Prussia by this treaty were enormous. Between the states forming part of her possessions ceded to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and those acquired by the kingdom of Westphalia, she lost 4,236,048 inhabitants, or nearly half of her dominions, for those retained contained only 5,034,504 souls. But, overwhelming as the losses were, they constituted but a small part of the calamities which fell on the ill-fated monarchy by this disastrous peace. The fortresses left her, whether in Silesia or on the Oder, remained in the hands of France, nominally as a security for payment of the war contributions which were to be levied on the impoverished inhabitants, but really to overawe its government, and

paralyse its military resources.* A garrison of twenty thousand French soldiers was cantoned in Dantzic—a frontier station of immense importance, alike as hermetically closing the mouths of the Vistula, giving the French authorities the entire command of the commerce of Poland, and affording an advanced post which, in the event of future hostilities, would be highly serviceable in a war with Russia. The newly established kingdoms of Westphalia and Saxony, with the military road through Prussia, terminating in the grand-duchy of Warsaw, gave the French Emperor the undisputed control of northern Germany; in effect, brought up the French frontier to the Niemen, and enabled him to commence any future war with the same advantage from that distant river as he had done the present from the banks of the Rhine. At the same time enormous contributions, amounting to the stupendous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of *six hundred millions of francs*, or twenty-four millions sterling, were imposed on the countries which had been the seat of war between the Rhine and the Niemen; a sum equal to at least fifty millions sterling in Great Britain, when the difference in

* Losses of Prussia in territory and population.

On the east of the Elbe:—

	Souls.		Souls.
Circle of Cothbus, . . .	33,500	Over, . . .	362,039
Of Western Prussia, . .	262,286	Halberstadt, . . .	148,230
Southern Prussia, Old		Hildesheim, . . .	130,069
Poland, . . .	1,282,189	Ecclesfeld and Erfurth, .	164,690
New Eastern Prussia, .	904,518	Maiden and Revensberg, .	159,776
	2,482,493	Paderborn, Munster, Leugen,	
		and Tecklemburg, . .	268,542
		La Marche, Essen, Elten,	
		and Wreden, . . .	162,101
<i>On the west of the Elbe:—</i>		East Friesland, . . .	119,803
Circle of Old Munich and		Baireuth, . . .	238,305
Prignitz, . . .	112,000		
Duchy of Magdeburg, .	250,039		
	362,039	West of Elbe, . . .	1,753,555
		East of Elbe, . . .	2,482,493
		Total, . . .	4,236,048

—See BIGNON, vi. 335; and HARDENBERG, ix. 487.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Hard. ix.
490, 491.

the value of money at that time, and the wealth of the two states, is taken into consideration. This grievous exaction completely paralysed the strength of Prussia, and rendered her for the next five years totally incapable of extricating herself from that iron net in which she was enveloped by the continued occupation of her fortresses by the French troops.^{1*}

78.
Secret treaty
for the par-
tition of
Turkey.

Important as the changes introduced by these public treaties of Tilsit were to the political interests of Europe, they were far inferior in daring and magnitude to the provisions of the secret conventions concluded at the same place between the French Emperor and the Russian Autocrat. These two mighty potentates, who so lately had been actuated by the strongest hostility to each other, deeming themselves invincible when they had united their arms together, had conceived, beyond all question, the project of dividing the world between them.

* This war contribution on the north of Germany was so prodigious a burden, and in its first effects was so instrumental in increasing the power of France, and in its ultimate results in occasioning its overthrow, that the particulars of it are here given, taken from the authentic records of Count Daru, the chief commissioner intrusted by Napoleon with its collection, as one of the most instructive and curious monuments of the Revolutionary wars.

War contributions imposed since
the 15th October 1806, and levied

before the 1st Jan. 1808, .	474,352,650 francs, or	£19,000,000
Remaining still to recover, .	39,391,759	... 1,600,000
Contributions levied in kind, .	90,483,511	... 3,600,000
	604,227,920	... £24,200,000

—See *Daru's Report to Napoleon, 1st Jan. 1808*: DUM. xix. 462, 465, *Pièces Just.*

In the Prussian estimate, the amount is stated considerably higher—even in so far as it was levied on the Prussian states alone. It stands thus:—

War contributions in specie, .	220,000,000 francs, or	£8,800,000
Maintenance of the fortresses, .	40,000,000	... 1,600,000
Contributions in kind, without counting the billeting of soldiers, .	346,800,000	... 13,870,000
Miscellaneous losses, .	8,000,000	... 320,000
Losses sustained in the local taxes, .	75,000,000	... 3,000,000
Ditto in the general revenue, .	50,000,000	... 2,000,000
	739,800,000	... £29,590,000

—See SCHÖELL, vi. 518.

When it is recollected that the whole revenues of Prussia were only about

To Russia was assigned, with hardly any limitations, the empire of the East; France acquired absolute sway in all the kingdoms of the West: both united in cordial hostility against the maritime power of Great Britain. Turkey, in consequence, was abandoned almost without reserve to the Russian autocrat. To the cession of Constantinople alone Napoleon never would agree; and rivalry for the possession of that matchless capital, itself worth an empire, was one of the principal causes which afterwards led him into the desperate chances of the Moscow campaign. The clause on this subject was in the following terms:—"In like manner, if, in consequence of the changes which have recently taken place in the government of Constantinople, the Porte shall decline the intervention of France; or in case, having accepted it, the negotiations shall not have led to a satisfactory adjustment in the space of three months, France will make common cause with Russia against the Ottoman Porte, and the two high contracting parties will unite their *efforts to wrest from the vexatious and oppressive government of the Turks all its provinces in Europe—Roumelia and Constantinople alone excepted.*"¹*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Art. 8.
Secret
treaty.¹ Thiers, viii.
450, note.
Bign. vi.
339, 340.
Hard. ix.
430.

£6,000,000; that money at that period was at least of twice the value there that it was in England; and that the monarchy was already exhausted by the immense efforts made for the campaign of 1806, either of these estimates must appear amongst the most enormous instances of military exaction on record in history. It is the same thing as if *three hundred millions sterling* were at this moment to be levied, by the terrors of military execution, in a year and a half in Great Britain.

In addition to all this, Napoleon and his generals, with disgraceful rapacity, carried off from the different palaces in Prussia no less than 127 paintings, most of them by first-rate masters, and 238 marbles or statues, besides all the manuscripts, curiosities, and antiquities they could lay their hands on. The movables thus carried away, contrary to the laws of war, were worth above £300,000. They were all reclaimed and got back by the Prussians on the capture of Paris in 1815.—See the *Official List* in SCHOELL, vi. 261, 289.

* "L'on était convenu à Tilsit que la puissance Ottomane devait être rejetée en Asie, ne conservant en Europe que la ville de Constantinople et la Romélie.—L'on en avait alors tiré cette conséquence, que l'Empereur des Français acquerrait l'Albanie, la Morée, et l'île de Candie. L'on avait dès lors adjugé la Valachie, la Moldavie, à la Russie, donnant à cet empire le Danube pour limite, ce qui comprend la Bessarabie, qui en effet est une lisière au bord de la mer, et que communément on considère comme faisant partie de la Moldavie; si l'on ajoute à cette

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

79.
Secret articles regarding England and all neutral fleets.

Art. 4.

The abandonment of all Turkey, with the exception of its capital and the small adjacent provinces, to the ambition of its hereditary and inveterate enemies, called for a similar concession to the leading objects of French ambition. This was provided for in the articles regarding the prosecution of the war against England, and the cession of the Spanish peninsula to the French Emperor. In regard to the first object, it was stipulated, that in case the proffered mediation of France to adjust the differences with the cabinet of St James's should not be accepted, Russia should make common cause with France against England, with all its forces, by sea and land; or, "if, having accepted it, peace was not concluded by the 1st November, on terms stipulating that the flags of every power should enjoy a perfect and entire equality on every sea, and that all the conquests made of French possessions since 1805 should be restored—in that case also, Russia shall demand a categorical answer by the 1st December, and the Russian ambassador shall receive a conditional order to quit London." In the event of the English government not having made a satisfactory answer to the Russian requisition, "France and Russia shall jointly *summon the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon, to close their harbours against English vessels, recall their ambassadors from London, and declare war against Great Britain.*" Hanover was to be restored to England in exchange for the whole colonies she had conquered during the war; Spain was to be compelled to remain in the alliance against Great Britain; and the Emperor of France engaged to do nothing tending to augment the power of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, or which might lead to the re-establishment of the Polish monarchy.¹ *

Art. 5.

¹ Bign. vi.
336. Hard.
ix. 431.
Jom. ii. 434,
435.

Art. 7.

part la Bulgarie, l'Empereur est pret à concourir à l'expédition de l'Inde.—Note, M. Romanzoff à Napoleon, approuvée de vive voix par l'Empereur Alexandre à M. de Caulaincourt, l'ambassadeur Français à St Petersburg. Février 1808.
—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, viii. 449, 450.

* These secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which are of such moment,

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

80.

Secret
agreement
between
the Em-
perors re-
garding
Spain and
Italy.

This was the whole extent to which the formal secret treaty of Tilsit went; but, extensive as the changes which it contemplated were, they yet yielded in magnitude to those which were also agreed on, in a convention still more secret, between the two Emperors. "A thunderbolt from heaven," said Napoleon to Alexander, "has just disengaged me from the Porte. My ally and friend Sultaun Selim, has been cast down from his throne, and is in irons. I thought we could have made something of the Turks, but I see I was mistaken. We must be done with their empire, and take care that its spoils do not go to augment the power of England. Portugal and Sweden may perhaps hold out; let us understand each other in regard to them, as well as Turkey. Take you Finland as a compensation for the expense of the war. The King of Sweden is no doubt your brother-in-law and ally, but that is only an additional reason why he should conform to your policy. Sweden may be an ally, or connected by marriage at the moment, but it is geographically your enemy. Petersburg is too near Finland. It won't do to let your Russian beauties hear the sound of Swedish cannon. If the Turks resist, we must divide their dominions—and how? You may keep, besides Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia and Bulgaria, to the foot of the Balkan. France should have the maritime provinces, such as Albania, Thessaly, the Morea, and Candia. The consent of Austria will easily be obtained, by giving her Bosnia and Servia." These ambitious projects ere long were reduced into secret, but formal articles. By this treaty, which may literally be called a spoliating agreement, the shares which the two imperial robbers were to have respectively in the partition of Europe were chalked out. The mouths of the

both as illustrating the general character of Napoleon's policy, and as affording an unanswerable vindication of the Copenhagen expedition, have been literally transcribed from Bignon's work. As that author was not only for long the French ambassador at Berlin, but was also nominated by Napoleon in his testament as the author to whom was committed, with a legacy of 100,000 francs,

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

- Art. 1.
Arts. 2
and 3.
Art. 4.
Art. 5.

Cattaro, which had been ostensibly at least the original cause of the rupture, were ceded by Russia to France, as well as the seven Ionian Islands. Joseph Buonaparte was to be secured in the possession of Sicily, as well as of Naples; Ferdinand IV., the reigning King of Sicily, was to receive an indemnity in the isle of Candia, or some other part of the Turkish empire: the dominions of the Pope were to be ceded to France, as well as Malta and Egypt; *the sovereigns of the houses of Bourbon and Braganza, in the Spanish peninsula, were to be replaced by princes of the family of Napoleon*; and when the final partition of the Ottoman empire took place, *Wallachia, Moldavia, Servia, and Bulgaria, were to be allotted to Russia*; while *Greece, Macedonia, Dalmatia, and all the sea-coasts of the Adriatic*, were to be enjoyed by France, which engaged in return to throw no obstacles in the way of the acquisition of Finland by the Russian Emperor.* And the consent of Austria was

the task of writing a history of his diplomacy, which he has executed with great ability, it is impossible to quote them from a more unexceptionable authority; and he himself says he has given them "textuellement." They are not yet to be found in any diplomatic collection, but their authenticity is fully established by M. Thiers.—*See Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, viii. 450.

Decisive evidence of these projects of spoliation which exists both on the testimony of the French and Russian Emperors.

* As the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are given on the authority of M. Bignon and M. Thiers, as chosen partisans of Napoleon, and therefore valuable unwilling witnesses, it is proper to mention that Bignon does not admit the express signature of a convention regarding the dethroning of the Spanish and Portuguese sovereigns, and the partition of the Turkish empire, but says that "these projects were merely sketched out in the private conferences of the two Emperors, but without being actually reduced to writing,"—while the author of Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs, whose accuracy and extent of secret information are in general equally remarkable, asserts that they were embodied in an express treaty.—*See BIGN. vi. 345, and HARD. ix. 433.* It is of little importance whether they were or were not embodied in a formal convention, since there was no doubt that they were verbally agreed on between the two Emperors. We have the authority of the Emperor Alexander that Napoleon said to him at Tilsit—"I lay no stress on the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by your troops; you may protect them if you desire. It is impossible any longer to endure the presence of the Turks in Europe; you are at liberty to chase them into Asia; but observe only, I rely upon it that Constantinople is not to fall into the hands of any European power."—*HARD. ix. 432.* Napoleon, in conversation with Escoiquiz at Bayonne, in the following year, said, "The Emperor Alexander, to whom I revealed at Tilsit my designs against Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would throw no obstacle in the way."—*Escoiq.* This coincides with

to be purchased by the cession of Servia and Bosnia, as her share of the plunder. Alexander wished to go further, and repeatedly pressed on Napoleon the acceptance by Napoleon of the whole maritime provinces of Turkey, including Egypt and Candia, provided Roumelia and Constantinople were ceded to Russia; but the French Emperor never could be brought to yield the Queen of the East to his new apparently beloved, but secretly dreaded ally.¹

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

¹ Thiers, vii.
648, 649,
653. Bign.
v. 347, 348.
Hard. ix.
431, 432.

Napoleon was not long of taking steps to pave the way for the acquisition of his share of the Ottoman dominions. On the day after the secret treaty with Russia was signed, he despatched a letter to the King of Naples, informing him of the cession of Corfu to France, and directing him to assemble, in the most secret manner, four thousand men at Otranto and Tarentum, to take possession of that island, and of the mouths of the Cattaro.² On the same day he enjoined Eugene, Viceroy of

81.
Measures of
Napoleon to
secure his
anticipated
Turkish
acquisitions.

² Nap. to
Murat,
Tilsit, 8th
July.

what Savary affirms, who says,—“The Emperor Alexander frequently repeated to me, when I was afterwards ambassador at St Petersburg, that Napoleon had said to him that he was under no engagements with the new Sultaun, and that the changes which had supervened in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to each other. I saw at once that this point had formed the subject of their secret conference at Tilsit; and I could not avoid the conviction that a mutual communication of their projects had taken place, because I could not believe that we would have abandoned the Turks without receiving some compensation in some other quarter. I have strong reasons for believing that the Spanish question was brought under discussion at Tilsit. The Emperor Napoleon had that affair strongly at heart, and nothing could be more natural than that he should frankly communicate it to the Czar—the more especially as he had on his side a project of aggrandisement, in the way of which, without previous concert, France might be disposed to throw obstacles. I was the more confirmed in this opinion by observing the conduct and language of the Emperor Alexander when the Spanish war broke out.”—SAVARY, iii. 98, 99. And Napoleon said at St Helena—“All the Emperor Alexander's thoughts are directed to the conquest of Turkey. We have had many discussions about it, and at first I was pleased with his proposals, because I thought it would benefit the world to drive those brutes the Turks out of Europe. But when I reflected upon the consequences of this step, and saw what a tremendous weight of power it would give to Russia, on account of the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who would naturally join the Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted to get Constantinople, which I would not allow, as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that France would gain Egypt, Syria, and the islands, which would have been nothing in comparison with what Russia would have obtained.”—

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Nap. to
Eugene,
8th July.

July 9.

² Nap. to
Count Guil-
leminot,
9th July.

Italy, to send a force of six thousand men into Dalmatia,¹ while Marshal Marmont, who commanded in that province, was directed, instead of attacking the Montenegrins, as he was preparing to do, to do everything in his power to make these mountaineers receive willingly the French government, beneath which they would soon be placed; and at the same time to transmit minute information as to the resources, population, and revenue of Bosnia, Thrace, Albania, Macedonia, and Greece, and what direction two European armies should follow—entering that country, one by the Cattaro, the other from Corfu.* At the same time Count Guilleminot was despatched from Tilsit on a double mission; the first, open and ostensible, to General Michelson's army on the Danube—the other, secret, to General Sebastiani at Constantinople; in the course of which he was to acquire all the information he could on the subject of the population, riches, and geographical position of the country through which he passed.² Finally, to General Sebastiani himself he fully explained the whole design, which was, as stated in his letters, that as no European power would be permitted to possess Constantinople and the Hellespont, the first thing to be done was “to draw a line from Burgas, on the Black Sea, to the Gulf of Enos in the Archipelago—and all to the eastward of that line, including Adrianople, was to remain to Turkey; Russia was to obtain *Moldavia, Wallachia, and all Bul-*

O'MEARA, i. 382. “Was there,” says Bignon, “any express treaty assigning to each Emperor his share of the Turkish dominions? No; that there *was an agreement on that subject between the two Emperors* is beyond a doubt; but no formal treaty.” We shall find numberless proofs of this in the sequel of this work in the language used by the Emperor Alexander, and the actions of Napoleon. They had even gone so far as to assign a portion also to the Emperor Francis,—“Something,” in Alexander's words, “to Austria, to soothe her vanity rather than satisfy her ambition.”—BIGNON, vi. 343.

* To Marmont, Napoleon wrote, on July 8, from Tilsit:—“Set to work as vigorously as possible to obtain, by officers whom you shall send forward with that view, or in any other way, and address directly to the Emperor, in order that he may know by confidential officers, both geographically and civilly, all the information you can acquire regarding Bosnia, Macedonia, Thrace, Albania, &c.:—what is the amount of their population, what resources in clothing, pro-

garia, as far as the left bank of the Hebrus; Servia was to be allotted to Austria; and *Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, the Peloponnesus, Attica, and Thessaly*, to France."

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

Sebastiani at the same time received orders to prepare, and transmit without delay to the French Emperor, a memorial, containing exact details, to define the geographical boundaries of the acquisitions of the three powers interested in the partition.¹

¹ Bign. vi.
334, 345.
Dum. xix.
337, 344,
which contains
Pièces
Just.

While Napoleon and Alexander were thus adjusting their differences at Tilsit, by the spoliation of all the weaker powers in Europe, partitioning Turkey, and providing for the dethronement of the sovereigns in the Spanish peninsula, the chains were drawn yet more closely round unhappy Prussia. In the treaty with that power, it had been provided that a subsidiary military convention should be concluded regarding the time of the evacuation of the fortresses by the French troops, and the sums of money to be paid for their ransom. Nominally, it was arranged that they should be evacuated by the 1st October, with the exception of Stettin, which was still to be garrisoned by French troops. But as it was expressly declared, as a *sine quâ non*, that the whole contributions imposed should be paid up before the evacuation commenced, that the King of Prussia should levy no revenue in his dominions till these exactions were fully satisfied, and that the Prussians, meanwhile, should feed, clothe, and lodge all the French troops

82.
Convention
regarding
the payment
of the
French
contribu-
tions on
Prussia.

Art. 2
and 3.

Art. 4.

Art. 5.

visions, or money those provinces would furnish to any European power which might possess them; in fine, what revenue could be drawn from them at the moment of their occupation, for the principles of their occupation are at present without any proper settlement. In a second memoir, state, in a military point of view, if two European armies should enter these provinces at once, the one by Cattaro and Dalmatia into Bosnia, the other by Corfu, what force would be required for each to insure success; what species of arms would be most advantageous; how could the artillery be transported; could horses for its transport be found in the country; could recruits be raised there; what would be the most favourable times for military operations. All these reports should be transmitted by confidential persons on whom you have perfect reliance. Keep on good terms with the Pasha of Bosnia; but, nevertheless, gradually let your relations with him become more cold and reserved than formerly." *Napoleon to Marmont: Tilsit, July 8, 1807.*—DUMAS, xix. 341, 342.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

Note, chap.
xlv. § 77.

Nov. 10, and
Dec. 10.

¹ Daru's
Report.
Dum. xix.
85, and
Hard ix.
453, 454.

83.
Noble pro-
clamation by
the King of
Prussia to
his lost pro-
vinces.

² Scott's
Nap. v.
411, 412.

within their bounds, the French Emperor had in reality the means of retaining possession of them as long as he chose, which he accordingly did. In addition to the enormous war contributions already mentioned, of which 513,744,000 francs, or £20,500,000, fell on Prussia alone, further and most burdensome commissions were forced on the same unhappy state in the end of the year, in virtue of which Count Daru, the French collector-general, demanded 154,000,000 francs, or £6,160,000 more from its now wasted and wretched provinces — an exaction so monstrous, and so utterly disproportioned to its scanty revenue, which did not, after its grievous losses, exceed £3,000,000 sterling, that it never was or could be fully discharged. And this gave the French a pretence for continuing the occupation of the fortresses, and wringing contributions from the country till five years afterwards, when the Moscow campaign commenced.¹

Bereft by this disastrous treaty of half his dominions, nothing remained to the King of Prussia but submission; and he won the hearts of all the really generous in Europe by the resignation and heroism with which he bore so extraordinary a reverse of fortune. In a dignified proclamation, which he addressed to the inhabitants of his lost provinces upon liberating them from their allegiance to the Prussian throne, he observed—"Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns! My arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my forces have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundary of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice and sign a peace, no choice remained to me but to follow his example. That peace imposed on me the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocal ties of love and duty, the fruit of ages of labour, have been broken asunder. All my efforts, and they have been most strenuous, have proved in vain. Fate ordains it. A father is compelled to depart from his children."² I hereby release you from your alle-

giance to me and my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereigns. Be to them what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever sever the remembrance of you from my heart."

Vast as had been the conquests, unbounded the triumphs of France, during the campaign, the consumption of life to the victors had been, if possible, more than proportionate; and it was already apparent that war, conducted on this gigantic scale, was attended with such a sacrifice of human beings as, for any lengthened time, would be insupportable. The fearful and ominous call of eighty thousand conscripts, *thrice repeated* during the short period of eight months, had already told the French people at what cost of their best and bravest they followed the car of victory; and the official details which have since come to light, show that even the enormous levy of two hundred and forty thousand men, in that short period, was not disproportioned to the expenditure of the campaign. Authentic documents prove that the number of sick and wounded who were received into the French hospitals during the campaign,* from the banks of the Saale to those of the Niemen, amounted to the stupendous

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

84.
Enormous
losses sus-
tained by the
French during
the
campaign.

* The following are the details of this enormous catalogue of human suffering:—

In hospital of the army on 1st October 1806,	403
Admitted till 30th June 1807,	421,416
Total treated in the hospital,	421,819
Of whom died there,	31,916
Dismissed cured,	370,473
Sent back to France,	11,455
Remained in hospital on 17th October 1808,	7,957
	421,819

The average stay of each patient in the hospital was 29 days. The proportions of maladies out of 200 was as follows:—

Fevers,	105
Wounded,	47
Venereal,	31
Various,	17

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

number of FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND ; of whom, at an average, not more than a ninth were prisoners taken from the Allies ! If such were the losses to the victors, it may readily be believed that those of the vanquished were still greater ; and putting both together, it may fairly be concluded that, from the 1st October 1806 to the 30th June 1807—that is, during a period of nine months—a million of human beings were consigned to military hospitals, of whom at least a hundred thousand perished, independent of those slain in battle, who were nearly as many more ! The mind finds it impossible to apprehend such enormous calamities ; like the calculated distances of the sun or the fixed stars, they elude the grasp of the most vivid imagination ; but even in the bewildering impression which they produce, they tend to show how boundless was the suffering then occasioned by human ambition ; how awful the judgment of the Almighty then executed upon the earth !¹

¹ Daru's
Report to
Napoleon,
in Dum.
xix. 486.
Pièces Just.

Nor is it difficult to discern what were the national sins which were thus visited with so terrible a punishment. Fourteen years before, Austria, Russia, and Prussia had

and the other diseases incident to a campaign is, than the actual number killed or wounded in the field. Applying these proportions to the total number of 420,000, we shall have the whole numbers nearly as follows :—

Fevers,	.	.	.	210,000
Wounded,	.	.	.	100,000
Venereal,	.	.	.	62,000
Miscellaneous,	.	.	.	48,000

420,000

The immense number of wounded being at least *five times* what the bulletins admitted, demonstrates, if an additional proof were wanting, the total falsehood in the estimate of losses by which these reports were invariably distinguished. The great number of venereal patients is very curious, and highly characteristic of the French soldiers.—*Daru's Report to Napoleon* : DUMAS, xix. 486, 487.

It appears from Savary's report of the number of sick and wounded in the great hospital at Königsberg, of which city he received the command after the battle of Friedland, that at the end of June 1807 they amounted to the immense number of 27,376. Preparations were made for the reception of 57,000 ; but the sudden conclusion of the peace at Tilsit rendered them in a great degree unnecessary. Nevertheless, the whole hospitals of the army were again overflowing in spring 1808, in every part of the north of Germany.—SAVARY, iii. 66, 69.

united their armies to partition Poland, and Suwarroff had entered Warsaw while yet reeking with patriot blood. In the prosecution of this guilty object, they neglected the volcano which was bursting forth in the west of Europe; they starved the war on the Rhine to feed that on the Vistula, and opened the gates of Germany to French ambition, in order to master the bulwarks of Sarmatia for themselves. Prussia, in particular, first drew off from the European alliance; and after the great barrier of frontier fortresses had been broken through in 1793, and revolutionary France stood, as Napoleon admits, "on the verge of ruin," allowed her to restore her tottering fortunes, and for ten long years stood by in dubious and selfish neutrality, anxious only to secure or increase her ill-gotten gains. And what was the result? Poland became the great theatre of punishment to the partitioning powers; her blood-stained fields beheld the writhing and the anguish of her spoilers. Pierced to the heart by hostile armies, driven up to a corner of her territory, within sight almost of the Sarmatian wilds, Austria saw her expiring efforts for independence overthrown on the field of Austerlitz. Reft of her dominions, bound in chains for the insult of the conqueror, with the iron driven into her soul, Prussia beheld her last hopes expire on the shores of the Vistula.

Banished almost from Europe, conquered in war, sullied in fame, Russia was compelled to sue for peace on the banks of the Niemen, the frontier of her Lithuanian spoils. The measure of her retribution was not yet complete; the grand-duchy of Warsaw was to become the outwork of France against Muscovy; the tide of war was to roll on to Red Russia; the sacred towers of Smolensko were to be shaken by Polish battalions; the sack of Praga was to be expiated by the flames of Moscow. That Providence superintends the progress of human affairs; that the retributions of justice apply to political societies as well as to single men; and that

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

85.
Memorable
retribution
for the par-
tition of
Poland on
Austria and
Prussia.86.
And on
Russia.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

nations, which have no immortality, are destined to undergo the punishment of their flagrant iniquities in this world, was long ago announced in thunders from Mount Sinai, and may be read on every subsequent page of civilised history. But it is often in the third and fourth generation that the retribution descends; and in the complicated thread of intervening events, it is sometimes difficult to trace the connexion which we know exists between the guilty deeds and the deserved suffering. In the present instance, however, the connexion was immediate and palpable; the actors in the iniquitous spoliation were themselves the sufferers by its effects: it was the partition of Poland which opened the gates of Europe to France; it was the partitioning powers that sank beneath the car of Napoleon's ambition.

87.
Terrible
retribution
that was ap-
proaching to
France.

And was France, then, the instrument of these terrible dispensations, herself to escape the punishment of her sins? Was she, stained with the blood of the righteous, wrapt in the flames of the church, marked with the sign of the miscreant, to be the besom of destruction to others, and to bask only in the sunshine of glory herself? No! the dread hour of her retribution was steadily approaching; swift as was the march of her triumphant host, swifter still was the advance of the calamities which were to presage her fall. Already to the discerning eye was visible the handwriting on the wall which foretold her doom. At Tilsit she reached the highest point of her ascendant; every subsequent change was a step nearer to her ruin. True, the Continent had sunk beneath her arms; true, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had successively fallen in the conflict; true, she had advanced her eagles to the Niemen, and from the rock of Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea, no voice dared to breathe a whisper against her authority: still the seeds of destruction were implanted in her bosom. Her feet were of base and perishable clay. The resources of the empire were wasting away in the pursuit of the lurid phantoms which its people wor-

shipped ; its strength was melting under the incessant drains which the career of victory demanded ; a hundred and fifty thousand men were annually sacrificed to the Moloch of its ambition. They saw it not—they felt it not : joyfully its youth “descended to the harvest of death.” “They REPENTED NOT of their sins, to give glory to the Lord.”¹ But the effect was not the less certain, that the operation of the circumstances producing it was not perceived ; and among the many concurring causes which at this period were preparing the fall of the French empire, a prominent place must be assigned to that very treaty of Tilsit, which apparently carried its fortunes to their highest elevation.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Rev. xvi.
8, 9.

In this treaty were to be discerned no marks of great political capacity on the part of the conqueror ; in the harshness and perfidy with which it was accompanied, the foundation was laid for the most powerful future allies to the vanquished. The formation of the kingdom of Westphalia, and the grand-duchy of Warsaw, with three or four millions of souls, each connected only by a military road across the impoverished and indignant remaining dominions of Frederick-William, could not be supposed to add, in any considerable degree, to the strength of the French empire. The indignities offered to Prussia, the slights shown to her beautiful and high-spirited queen, the enormous contributions imposed on her inhabitants, the relentless rigour with which they were levied, the forcible retention of her fortresses, the tearing away of half her dominions, were injuries that could never be forgiven. Her people, in consequence, imbibed the most unbounded horror at French oppression ; and though the fire did not burst forth for some years in open conflagration, it smouldered incessantly in all ranks, from the throne to the cottage, till at length its force became irresistible. This entire alienation of Prussia was one of the greatest errors ever committed by Napoleon in the course of his eventful career, and this is

88.
Evil consequences of the treaty of Tilsit in the end to Napoleon.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

admitted even by his warmest panegyrists. "Frederick-William," says Thiers, "who had a horror of war, and was dragged with so much reluctance into the coalition of 1813, when Napoleon, half conquered, appeared an easy prey, would never have deserted France but for this severity; and Napoleon, having only Russia and Austria to combat, would not have been overwhelmed."*

89.
Useless
allies which
Napoleon
made to
himself by
this treaty.

And what allies did Napoleon rear up on the Vistula by the arrangement of Tilsit, to prove a counterpoise to the deadly hostility of Prussia thus gathering strength in his rear? None equal to the enemies whom he created. Saxony, indeed, was made a faithful friend, and proved herself such in the hour of disaster, as well as the day of triumph. But the hopes of the Poles were cruelly blighted, and that confidence in the restoration of their empire by his assistance, which might have rendered their warlike bands so powerful an ally on the shores of the Vistula, for ever destroyed.† Instead of seeing their nationality revive, the ancient line of their princes restored, and their lost provinces again reunited under one sceptre, they beheld only a fragment of their former empire wrested from Prussia, and handed over, too weak to defend itself, to the foreign government of the house of Saxony. The close alliance of Russia, and still more, the extraordinary intimacy which had sprung up between the two Emperors, precluded all hope that the vast provinces of Lithuania would ever again be restored to the domination of the Jagellons or the Sobieskis. The restoration of Poland thus seemed further removed than ever, in consequence of the successful efforts which a

* THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 638.

† "The treaty of Tilsit," says Oginski, "spread consternation through all the Polish provinces. Numbers in Lithuania and Volhynia had left their homes to join the army raised under the auspices of Napoleon, and knew that their safety was compromised. Those who waited only for his passage of the Niemen to declare themselves, were disappointed. Universally, the treaty was regarded as the tomb of all the hopes which had been entertained of the restoration of the ancient monarchy; and from that moment, the confidence of all the Poles in the good intentions of the Emperor Napoleon was irrevocably weakened."—OGINSKI, *Mem. sur la Pologne*, ii. 345.

portion of its inhabitants had made for their liberation: they appeared to have now as much to fear from the triumphs of the French as of the Russian arms. Thus the treaty of Tilsit irrevocably alienated Prussia, and at the same time extinguished the rising ardour of Poland; and while it broke down the strength of all the intervening states, and presaged a future desperate strife between the despots of the East and West on the banks of the Niemen, it laid no foundation in the affections of mankind for the moral support by which its dangers were to be encountered.

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

But if the treaty of Tilsit involved serious errors in policy, so far as Poland and Prussia were concerned, much more was it worthy of reprehension when the provisions for the immediate partition of Turkey are taken into consideration. Six months had not elapsed since he had written to Marmont "to spare no protestations or assistance to Turkey, since she was the faithful ally of the French empire." Seven months had not elapsed since he had publicly declared at Posen, "that the full and complete independence of the Ottoman empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor, as it is indispensable to the security of France and Italy: he would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence:"¹ *one month* had not elapsed since he had said to the Turkish ambassador, in a public audience at Finkenstein, "*that his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultaun Selim should ever be to him.*"² In consequence of these protestations, Turkey had thrown itself into the breach; she had braved the whole hostility of Russia, and defied the thunders of England when her fleets were anchored off the Seraglio Point. And what return did Napoleon make to these faithful allies for the exemplary fidelity with which they had stood by his fortunes when they were shaking in every quarter, and

90.
Disgraceful
perfidy of
Napoleon
towards the
Turks.

Jan. 2.

¹ *Ante*, c.
xliv. § 14.

On 28th
May.

² *Ante*, c.
xlv. § 10.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

91.
Whom he
surrenders
to the spolia-
tion of
Russia.

Europe, after the battle of Eylau, was ready to start up in fearful hostility in his rear?

The return he made was to sign a convention with Alexander for the partition of all their European dominions; and, not content with assuring the Czar that he was at perfect liberty to chase the Ottomans into Asia, provided only he did not lay violent hands on Constantinople, he stipulated for the largest share of the spoils, including *Thrace, Albania, Dalmatia, Epirus, and Greece, for himself*; while the consent of Austria was to be purchased by the acquisition of Servia! A more iniquitous and shameless instance of treachery is not to be found even in the dark annals of Italian perfidy: and it is sufficient to demonstrate, what so many other circumstances conspire to indicate, that this great man was as regardless of the sanctity of treaties as he was of the duty of veracity; that vows were made by him only to be broken, and oaths intended to be kept only till it was expedient to violate them; and that in prosperous, equally as adverse fortune, no reliance could be placed upon his feelings of gratitude or sense of obligation, if a present interest was to be served by forgetting them.

92.
No defence
can be made
for it in
consequence
of the revolu-
tion at Con-
stanti-
nople.

The excuse set up for this monstrous tergiversation by the French writers, viz. that a few weeks before the battle of Friedland an insurrection of the janizaries had taken place at Constantinople, and the ruling powers there had been overturned by open violence, is totally insufficient. The deposition of one sultaun—no unusual occurrence in oriental dynasties—had made no change whatever in the amicable disposition of the Divan towards France, or their inveterate hostility to the ancient and hereditary rivals of the Mahommedan faith: on the contrary, the party of the janizaries which had now gained the ascendant, was precisely the one which had ever been inclined to prosecute hostilities with Russia with the most fanatical fervour. It ill became France to hold out a revolution in the Seraglio as a ground for considering

all the existing obligations with Turkey as annulled, when her own changes of government since the Revolution had been so frequent, that Talleyrand had already sworn allegiance to *ten* in succession. And, in truth, this violation of public faith was as short-sighted as it was dishonourable. The secret articles soon came to the knowledge of the British government—they were communicated by their ambassador to the Divan, and produced an impression which was never forgotten. Honest and sincere, without foresight as without deceit, the Turks are as incapable of betraying an ally as they are of forgetting an act of treachery committed against themselves. The time will come in this history, when the moment of retribution arrives, when Napoleon, hard pressed by the storms of winter and the arms of Russia, is to feel the bitterness of an ally's desertion, and when the perfidy of Tilsit is to be awfully avenged on the shores of the Beresina.*

Towards the other powers of Europe the conduct of the two imperial despots was alike at variance with every principle of fidelity to their allies, or moderation towards their weaker neighbours. France abandoned Finland to Russia, and Alexander felt no scruples at accepting the project of rounding his territories in the neighbourhood of St Petersburg by wresting that important province

93.
Mutual projects of the Emperors for the spoliation of the other European powers.

* The perfidious conduct of Napoleon towards Turkey has been almost overlooked by the liberal writers of Europe, in the vehemence of their indignation at him for not re-establishing the kingdom of Poland. Without doubt, if that great act of injustice could have been repaired by his victorious arm, and a compact, powerful empire of sixteen millions of souls re-established on the banks of the Vistula, it would have been alike grateful to every lover of freedom, and important as forming a barrier against Muscovite aggrandisement in Europe. But was it possible to construct such an empire, to form such a barrier, out of the disjointed elements of Polish anarchy? That is the point for consideration; and if it was not, then the French Emperor would have thrown away all the advantages of victory, if, for a visionary and impracticable scheme of this description, he had incurred the lasting and indelible animosity of the partitioning powers. With the aid of two hundred thousand brave men, indeed, which Poland could with ease have sent into the field, he might, for a season, have withstood the united armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but could he rely on their tumultuary assemblies sustaining the steady and durable

CHAP.
XLVI.
1807.

from his faithful ally the King of Sweden, and even went the length of advancing his western frontier, by sharing in the spoils of his unhappy brother-in-arms the King of Prussia; while Russia surrendered Italy to France, and engaged to wink at the appropriation of the Papal States by Napoleon, who had resolved upon seizing them, in return for the condescension of the head of the church in recently travelling to Paris to place the imperial crown on his head. The rulers of the Continent drew an imaginary line across Europe, and mutually gave each other *carte blanche* in regard to spoliations, however unjustifiable, committed on their own side of the division. Napoleon surrendered half the European territories of Turkey to Alexander, and appropriated the other half to himself; while Alexander engaged to throw no obstacles in the way of the dethronement of the sovereigns of the Spanish peninsula, to make way for the elevation of princes of the Buonaparte family. Both appear to have conceived that, in thus suddenly closing their deadly strife, and turning their irresistible arms against the secondary states in their vicinity, they would gain important present objects, and mutually find room for the exercise of their future ambition, without encroaching on each other: forgetting that the desires of the human heart are insatiable; that, the more powerful empires

efforts requisite for permanent success? What made Poland originally fall a victim to the coalesced powers, once little more than provinces of its mighty dominion? "The insane ambition," as John Sobieski said, "of a plebeian noblesse;" the jealousy of a hundred thousand electors incapable alike of governing themselves or of permitting the steady national government of others. Was this fatal element of discord eradicated from the Polish heart? Is it yet cradicated? Was it possible, by re-establishing Poland in 1807, to have done anything but, as Talleyrand well expressed it, "organised anarchy?" These are the considerations which then presented, and still present, an invincible obstacle to a measure in other points of view recommended by so many considerations of justice and expedience. It is evident that the passions of the people, their insane desire for democratic equality, were so powerful, that, if re-established in its full original extent, Poland would speedily have again fallen under the dominion of its former conquerors: the same causes which formerly proved fatal to its independence would, without doubt, again have had the same effect.

become, the more ardently do they pant after universal dominion; and that the same causes which arrayed Rome against Carthage in ancient, and brought Tamerlane and Bajazet into fierce collision in modern times, could not fail to become more powerful in their operation from the mutual aggrandisement which their gigantic empires received. "Nec mundus," said Alexander the Great, "duobus solibus regi potest, nec duo summa regna, salvo statu terrarum, potest habere."¹*

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

¹ Quint.
Curtius, l.
iv. c. 11.

The great and ruling principle which actuated Napoleon in the negotiations at Tilsit, was the desire to combine all Europe into a cordial union against Britain.† For this end he was willing to forego, or postpone, his rivalry with Russia; to permit her to emerge, apparently crowned with the laurels of victory, from defeat, and derive greater advantages from the rout of Friedland than she had reaped even from the triumph of Pultowa or the sack of Ismael. All these sources of aggrandisement to his great Continental rival were to Napoleon as nothing, provided only they led to the overthrow of the maritime power of England. That accomplished, he anticipated little comparative difficulty even with the colossal strength of the Scythian monarch. In yielding to his seductions, Alexander appears to have been impressed with a belief that he was the man of destiny,

94.
Napoleon's
leading ob-
ject in the
treaty was
the hum-
bling of
Great
Britain.

* "Neither can the world," said Alexander the Great, "be ruled by two suns, nor contain two empires of the greatest magnitude, without destroying the peace of nations."—QUINTUS CURTIUS, iv. c. 11.

† "It cannot admit of a doubt," says Bignon, "that in the treaty of Tilsit, as in all the actions of his life, it was the desire to force England to conclude peace, that was the sole, the only principle of Napoleon's actions. A prolonged state of war with Russia, or even the conclusion of a treaty which would only have put a period to the bloodshed, would not have satisfied him. It was necessary, not merely that he should have an enemy the less—he required an ally the more. Russia, it is true, had ceased to combat his army, but he required that she should enlist herself on his side; that she should enter into the strife with England, if not with arms, at least by joining in the Continental blockade, which was to aim a deadly thrust at her power. All his lures held out to Alexander were calculated for that end: it is as referring to that object that all the minor arrangements to which he consented are to be regarded."—BIGNON, vi. 351, 352.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

95.

England
could not
complain
of its con-
ditions.

and that, in continuing the combat, he was striving against fate.*

Nor had England any great cause of complaint against him for violating his engagements to her, whatever Sweden or Turkey might have for the ambitious projects entertained at their expense. The cabinet of St James's had themselves receded from the spirit as well as the letter of the confederacy; the subsidies promised by Mr Pitt had disappeared; the cabinet of St Petersburg had been drawn into the contest for the interest of Germany and England, and both had withdrawn or been overthrown, leaving Russia alone to maintain it. So circumstanced, Great Britain had no reason to be surprised if Alexander took the first opportunity to extricate himself from a struggle in which the parties chiefly interested no longer appeared to take any share; nor could she complain if she was left alone to continue a contest which she seemed desirous of reducing to a mere maritime quarrel. Deeply did England and Austria subsequently suffer from this infatuated and ill-timed desertion of the confederacy at the very moment when the scales hung nearly even, and their aid might have been thrown in with decisive effect upon the balance. They might have stood in firm and impregnable array beside the veterans of Russia on the Vistula or the Elbe; they were left to maintain singly the contest on the Danube and the Tagus. They might have shared in the glories of Pultusk and Eylau, and converted the rout of Friedland into the triumph of Leipsic; and they expiated their neglect in the carnage of Wagram and the blood of Talavera.

But though the timidity of Austria, when her forces were capable of interfering with decisive effect on the theatre of European contest, and the supineness of England, when she had only to appear in adequate force to

* "Sire," said one of the Russian counsellors to Alexander at Tilsit, "I take the liberty of reminding you of the fate of your father, as the consequence of French alliance."—"Oh God!" replied the Emperor, "I know it; I see it; but how can I withstand the destiny which directs me?"—SAVARY, iii. 92.

conquer, were the causes to which alone we are to ascribe the long subsequent continuance, multiplied disasters, and unbounded ultimate bloodshed of the war ; yet for the development of the great moral lesson to France and mankind, and the illustration of the glories of patriotic resistance, it was fortunate that, by protracting it, opportunity was afforded for the memorable occurrences of its later years. But for that circumstance, the annals of the world would have lost the strife in the Tyrol, the patriotism of Aspern, the siege of Saragossa, the battle-fields of Spain. Peace would have been concluded with France as an ordinary power ; she would have retained the Rhine for her boundary, and Paris would have remained the depository of revolutionary plunder : the Moscow campaign would not have avenged the blood of the innocent, nor the capture of their capital entered like iron into the soul of the vanquished. The last act of the mighty drama had not yet arrived : it was the design of Providence that it should terminate in yet deeper tragedy, and present a more awful spectacle of the Divine judgments to mankind. England would have saved three hundred millions of her debt, but she would have lost Vitoria and Waterloo : her standards would not have waved in the Pass of Roncesvalles, nor her soldiers entered in triumph the gates of Paris : she would have shared with Russia, in a very unequal proportion, the lustre of the contest ; and to barbaric force, not freeborn bravery, future ages would have awarded the glory of having struck down the Conqueror of the World.

CHAP.
XLVI.

1807.

96.

It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the war was prolonged.

CHAPTER XLVII.

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

CHAP.
XLVII.1.
Comparison
of the Ro-
man Empire
and British
India.

VAST and interesting as are the events which have now been traced, springing out of the wars of the French Revolution, they are yet outdone by the spectacle which, at the same period, the oriental world exhibited. The BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA forms, beyond all question, the most dazzling object in that age of wonders—perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon in the history of the species. Antiquity may be searched in vain for a parallel to its lustre. During the plenitude of its power, the Roman empire never contained above a hundred and twenty millions of inhabitants, and they were congregated round the shores of the Mediterranean, with a great inland sea to form their interior line of communication, and an army of four hundred thousand men to secure the submission of its multifarious inhabitants. Magnificent causeways, emanating from Rome, the centre of authority, reached the furthest extremities of its dominions; the legions not only conquered but humanised mankind; and the proconsuls, whether they journeyed from the Forum to the wall of Antoninus and the solitudes of Caledonia, or to the shores of the Euphrates and the sands of Parthia, to the cataracts of the Nile, the banks of the Danube, or the mountains of Atlas, travelled along the great roads with which these indomitable pioneers of civilisation had penetrated the wilds of nature. Their immense dominions

were the result of three centuries of conquest ; and the genius of Scipio, Cæsar, and Severus, not less than the civic virtues of Regulus, Cato, and Cicero, were required to extend and cement the mighty fabric.

CHAP.
XLVII.

But in the Eastern world, an empire hardly less extensive or populous, embracing as great a variety of people, and rich in as many millions and provinces, has been conquered by the British arms in less than eighty years, at the distance of above fourteen thousand miles from the ruling state. That vast region, the fabled scene of opulence and grandeur since the dawn of civilisation, from which the arms of Alexander rolled back, which the ferocity of Timour imperfectly vanquished, and the banners of Nadir Shah traversed only to destroy, has been permanently subdued and moulded into a regular province by a company of British merchants, originally settled as obscure traffickers on the shores of Hindostan ; who have been dragged to their present perilous height of power by incessant attempts at their destruction on the part of the native princes ; whose rise was contemporaneous with numerous and desperate struggles of the British nation with its European rivals, and who never had a fourth part of the disposable national strength at their command. For such a body, in such times, and with such forces, to have acquired so immense a dominion, is one of those prodigies of civilisation with which the history of the last half century so abounds ; with which we are too familiar to be able fully to appreciate the wonder ; and which must be viewed by mankind, simplified by distance, and gilded by the colours of history, before its due proportions can be understood.

2.
Wonderful
circum-
stances
attending
the British
dominion
in India.

The British empire in India—extending now, with few interruptions, and those only of tributary or allied states, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains—comprehends by far the richest and most important part of southern Asia ; is in extent nearly four times the area of France, and six times that of Great Britain and

3.
Its extent,
population,
revenue,
and military
strength.

Atlas,
Plate 47.

CHAP.
XLVII.

Ireland;* contains nearly a hundred millions of inhabitants within its own limits, and forty more in the tributary and protected states,† and yields a revenue of about twenty millions sterling.‡ The land forces rose in the year 1826, when two bloody wars were to be maintained at the same time, to the enormous amount of 260,000 native troops, including 45,000 cavalry and 1000 pieces of artillery, besides 31,000 native English; and even under the reduced peace establishment of subsequent times, they still amount to 194,000, of whom 30,000 are British soldiers. This immense force, all in the very highest state of discipline and equipment, is raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a compulsory conscription ever being resorted to; and so popular is the

* The Company's territories consist of 512,873 square miles; including the protected states, they embrace 1,123,800 square miles.—*Parl. Return*, 1831; and MARTIN, ix. 2, *duodecimo edition*. Europe contains, to the westward of the Ural mountains, 3,500,000 square miles.—See MALTE BRUN, i. 4. France, 156,000 square miles.—*Ibid.* viii. 273.

† Population and superficies of India:—

	Square miles.	Population.
Bengal, Lower provinces, . . .	153,802	37,500,000
— Upper provinces, . . .	66,510	32,200,000
— Cessions from Berar, . . .	85,700	3,200,000
<hr/>		
Total, Bengal, . . .	306,012	72,900,000
Madras, . . .	141,923	13,500,000
Bombay, . . .	64,938	6,800,000
<hr/>		
Total, British possessions, . . .	512,873	93,200,000
Allied states, . . .	614,610	43,022,700
Runjeet Singh, . . .	60,000	3,500,000
Scinde, . . .	100,000	1,000,000
<hr/>		
	1,287,483	140,722,700

—See *Commons' Report on Indian Affairs*, October 11, 1831; and ELPHINSTONE'S *History of India*, i. 5.

‡ The revenue in 1833 was £18,677,952; that for fifteen years ending 1829, £309,151,920, or about £20,650,000 per annum. The charges in India are £17,533,132, leaving at present a surplus of £1,094,820. The public debt has stood since 1792 as follows:—

1792, . . .	£9,142,720
1809, . . .	30,812,441
1814, . . .	30,919,620
1829, . . .	47,255,374
1833, . . .	44,800,000

—See *Parl. Papers*, May 1833; and MARTIN, ix. 113.

British service, and so unbounded the general confidence both in the Company's stability and its fidelity to its engagements, that the only difficulty the authorities experience is to select the most deserving from the numerous competitors who are desirous of being enrolled under its banners. If public danger threatened, or the Russian eagles approached the Indus, this force might be instantly raised by the same means to a million of armed men.¹

¹ Martin, 90.

When the British power was threatened with a double attack, and the Rajah of Bhurtpore raised the standard of revolt at the time that the bulk of their forces were entangled in the jungles of the Irrawaddy, or dying under the fevers of Arracan, no vacillation or weakness appeared in the British councils. With the right hand they humbled what the Orientals styled the giant strength of Ava, while with the left they crushed the rising power of the northern rajahs; and while a larger force than combated in Portugal under Wellington was pursuing the career of conquest in the Burmese empire, and advancing the British standard almost to the minarets of Ummerapoora, a greater host than the native British who conquered at Waterloo assembled as if by enchantment around the walls of Bhurtpore, and, at the distance of fourteen hundred miles from Calcutta, and sixteen thousand from the British isles, carried the last and hitherto impregnable stronghold of Hindoo independence.* In recent times, the strength of the empire has been still more severely tried—it carried its standards at once into Affghanistan and China; withstood a disaster almost unparalleled in Eastern countries; and in one day re-

4.
Dreadful
dangers it
has sur-
mounted.

* Lord Combermere besieged Bhurtpore, in 1825, with 36,000 red-coats and 180 pieces of cannon; the force employed in the Burmese empire, at the same time, was in all 55,000 strong.—MARTIN, viii. 36; and *Ann. Reg.* 1825. The British and King's German Legion at Waterloo were 18,481 infantry, 7834 cavalry, 3493 artillery; the Hanoverians and Brunswickers about 17,000; the Belgians, 20,000.—See *Adjutant-General's Report*, 6th Nov. 1816; *Battle of Waterloo by a near Observer*, ii. 138.

ceived intelligence of the capture of Cabul in the centre of Asia. and the dictating of peace to the Celestial Empire under the walls of Nankin. The greatness of Napoleon flits as a brilliant vision across our recollection ; the power of Russia stands forth a present object of terror to our senses ; but Russia never invaded Persia or Turkey, albeit adjoining her own frontiers, with forces equal to those which England has arrayed in the plains of Hindostan :* and the host which followed Napoleon to Austerlitz and Friedland was inferior to that with which Lord Hastings made war on the Mahratta states.†

Imagination itself can scarcely do justice to the varied and magnificent scenery of Hindostan. From the snowy summits of the Himalaya to the green slopes of Cape Comorin, from the steep ghauts of Malabar to the sandy shores of Coromandel, it exhibits a succession of the most noble or beautiful features ; at times stupendous mountain ranges, their sides clothed with lofty forests, their peaks reposing in icy stillness ; at others, vast plains rivalling the Delta of Egypt in richness, and, like it, submerged yearly by the fertilising waters of the Ganges ; here lofty ghauts running parallel, at a short distance from the shores of the ocean, to the edge of its waters, and marking the line of demarcation between the low rich or sandy plains on the sea-side, and the elevated table-land, several thousand feet above the sea-level in the interior ; there, rugged hills or thick forests teeming with the rich pro-

5.
Physical
description
of the In-
dian penin-
sula.

* In the war of 1823, which terminated in the crossing of the Balkan, and capture of Adrianople, the Russians could never collect 40,000 men in a single field. In the Persian war of 1824-5, they never had 10,000 men together in one army to the south of the Caucasus. In 1772 and 1800, the English besieged Seringapatam with 35,000 men and 104 pieces of cannon ; in 1814 Lord Hastings sent 30,000 men against the Goorkhas on the first range of the Himalaya mountains.—MARTIN, viii. 33, 51.

† In 1817, Lord Hastings made war against the Mahratta confederacy with 81,000 regular infantry, and 33,000 cavalry, in all the armies under his orders—the greatest body of men, if their composition and qualities are considered, ever assembled under one commander on the plains of Hindostan. The French who fought at Austerlitz were 90,000 of all arms—at Friedland 80,000.—*Ante*, Chap. XL. § 120 ; and Chap. XLVI. § 55 ; and MARTIN, viii. 35.

ductions of a southern sun. The natural boundaries of India are the Himalaya range and mountains of Cabul and Candahar on the north; the splendid and rapid stream of the Indus, seventeen hundred miles in length, of which seven hundred and sixty are navigable, flowing impetuously from their perennial snows, on the north-west; the deep and stagnant Irrawaddy, fourteen hundred miles in length, fed by the eastern extremity of the chain, and winding its way to the Bay of Bengal through the rank luxuriance of tropical vegetation, on the north-east; and the encircling ocean on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, on the south. Nature everywhere appears in this highly favoured region in her most imposing array: the Himalaya mountains, surmounting even the Andes in elevation; the Indus, all but rivalling the river of the Amazons in magnitude; the plain of Bengal, surpassing Mesopotamia itself in fertility—form some of the features of a country which, from the earliest times, has been the seat of civilisation, and the fabled abode of opulence and magnificence. The noble expanse of Bengal, the Lombardy of Asia, has been thus described by a master whose accuracy of detail is only exceeded by his powers of description:—"No part of India possessed such natural advantages both for agriculture and commerce. The Ganges, rushing through a hundred channels to the sea, has formed a vast plain of rich mould, which, even under the tropical sky, rivals the verdure of an English April. The rice-fields yield an increase which is unknown elsewhere. Spices, sugar, vegetable oils, are produced with marvellous exuberance. The rivers afford an inexhaustible supply of fish. The desolate islands along the sea-coast, overgrown by noxious vegetation, and swarming with deer and tigers, supply the cultivated districts with abundance of salt. The great stream which fertilises its soil is, at the same time, the chief highway of Eastern commerce. On its banks, and on those of its tributary waters, are the wealthiest marts, the most splendid capitals, and the

most sacred shrines of India. The tyranny of man had for ages struggled against the overflowing bounty of nature. In spite of the Mussulman despot, and of the Mahratta freebooter, Bengal was known through the East as the garden of Eden, as the rich kingdom. Its population multiplied exceedingly. Distant provinces were nourished from the overflowing of its granaries; and the noble ladies of London and Paris were clothed in the delicate produce of its worm. The races by whom this rich tract was peopled, enervated by a soft climate, and accustomed to peaceful avocations, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which the Asiatics generally bear to the bold and energetic children of Europe. The Castilians have a proverb, that in Valencia the earth is water, and the men women; and the description is at least equally applicable to the vast plain of the lower Ganges. Whatever the Bengalee does he does languidly. His favourite pursuits are sedentary. He shrinks from bold exertion; and though voluble in dispute, and singularly pertinacious in the war of chicane, he seldom engages in a personal conflict, and scarcely ever enlists as a soldier. There never, perhaps, existed a people so thoroughly fitted by nature and habit for a foreign yoke."¹*

¹ Malte Brun, iii. 5, 11. Martin, viii. 91, 92. Macaulay's Essays, iii. 141, 142.

6.
Its veget-
able and
animal pro-
ductions.

All the productions of the globe are to be found, and for the most part flourish to perfection, in the varied climates and soils of the splendid Indian peninsula. The forests, the fruits, the crops of Europe, are recognised by the delighted traveller in the Himalaya mountains, where the prodigy is exhibited of valleys tolerably peopled, and bearing crops, at the height of sixteen or seventeen thousand feet above the sea, or considerably above the summit of Mont Blanc, or the Great Glochner. On the side of these stupendous mountain ranges, nature appears on an extraordinary scale of magnificence; huge pinnacles of bare rock shoot up into the azure firmament, and forests overspread their sides, in which scarlet rhododendrons

* MACAULAY'S *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, iii. 141, 142.

sixty feet in height are surmounted by trees two hundred feet in elevation. The peach, the apricot, the nectarine, even apples, pears, and strawberries, refresh the European, to whom they recall, in a distant land and amidst oriental luxuries, the images and enjoyments of his youth. The forests of the plains of Hindostan exhibit a richness of foliage and luxuriance of vegetation of which not a conception can be formed by those who judge of nature only by the robe she wears in northern climates. Poetry can alone describe their charms :—

—“ Behold us now
Beneath the bamboo's archèd bough ;
Where, gemming oft that sacred gloom,
Glows the geranium's scarlet bloom,
And winds our path through many a bower
Of fragrant tree and giant flower.
The ceiba's crimson pomp displayed
O'er the broad plantain's humbler shade,
And dusk anana's prickly spade,
While o'er the brake, so wild and fair,
The betel waves his crest in air ;
With pendant train, and rushing wings,
Aloft the gorgeous peacock springs ;
And he, the bird of hundred dyes,
Whose plumes the dames of Ava prize—
So rich a shade, so green a sod,
Our English fairies never trod.”*

Wheat, barley, and oats, with noble forests of teak and oak, flourish on the cool slopes of the mountains ; while at their feet the vast plain of Bengal is covered to an incalculable extent with double crops, yearly, of rice, or with thickets of bamboo canes, fed by the fertilising floods which, at times to the breadth of a hundred miles, exhibit a sea of water interspersed only with tufts of wood, solitary palms, hamlets, and pagodas. Indigo grows in luxuriance in many districts, and forms a staple article of commerce to the country. Sugar thrives as well as in the West Indies, and promises to fill up the deficiency in the productions of the globe occasioned by the disastrous emancipation of the slaves in the western tropical regions. Grapes, melons,

* HEBER, *Evening Walk in Bengal*.

CHAP.
XLVII.

pine-apples, figs, dates, mangoes, are everywhere found in profusion, with many other fruits still more luscious, peculiar to the eastern hemisphere. The elephant, at once the strongest, the most sagacious, and the most docile of animals; the camel, the ship of the desert; the horse, the companion and fellow-soldier of man—alike flourish in a country where the tiger and the rhinoceros rule the wilds of nature. Even the flowers and birds partake of the splendid character of creation; the roses of Cashmere and Delhi yield their highly prized perfume to the world: the red blossoms of the ixora and mussonda, and innumerable other tropical plants, diffuse a blaze of beauty through the woods; the scarlet plumage of the flamingo, the varied hues of the parrot, rival the colours of the setting sun. But the woods are silent, or resound only with the harsh scream of birds, or the fearful cry of beasts of prey; no troops of feathered songsters fill the air with their melodious voices, nor welcome in the breath of spring with the voice of gladness and the notes of love.¹

¹Hamilton's
Account of
Hindustan,
i. 24, 72.
Malte Brun,
iii. 32, 33.
Martin, viii.
153, 157.

7.
Extraordi-
nary diplo-
maticability
with which
India has
been gov-
erned.

In the transactions of Europe, the historian has too good reason frequently to lament the indecision and want of foresight with which both diplomatic negotiations and military operations have been conducted by the English cabinet; and he is, perhaps, driven to the conclusion that greatness has rather been forced on the state by the energy and virtues of its inhabitants, than conferred upon the people by the wisdom or ability of the government. But in the East, the reverse has from the outset been the case. If the intelligence, vigour, and bravery of the middle and working classes of England, who sent forth their sons to push their fortunes in the plains of Hindostan, have furnished an inexhaustible supply of talent and resolution to conduct their enterprises, the foresight and capacity of the Indian government have almost invariably brought these qualities to bear upon the public service in the most efficient manner. Perhaps there is

not to be found in the history of any country, so remarkable a succession of able statesmen and warriors as in India have reared the mighty fabric of British greatness. The cool daring, invincible intrepidity, and military genius of LORD CLIVE, laid the foundation of the structure; the quick sagacity, prompt determination, and high moral courage of WARREN HASTINGS rescued it more than once from ruin: but it was the enlarged views, statesmanlike wisdom, and energetic conduct of MARQUIS WELLESLEY, which completed the superstructure, and left to succeeding governors a force which nothing could resist, a moral ascendancy which nothing could counterbalance. MARQUIS HASTINGS has since, with equal ability, followed out the same enlightened principles; crushed the united confederacy of the Mahrattas and Pindarees, vanquished the hill strength of the Goorkhas, and left to his successors a matchless empire, stretching from the Himalaya snows to Cape Comorin, and from the frontiers of China to the banks of the Indus, united under one rule, obeying one government, and actuated by one common sense of experienced obligation.

Mr Burke has said that if the English were to be expelled from India, they would leave no better traces of their dominion than the hyena or the tiger. Even at the period when this celebrated expression was used, it savoured more of the fire of the orator than the judgment of the statesman; but had that great man survived to these times, he would have gratefully retracted the sarcasm, and admitted that, of all the marvels attending the British sway in the East, the most wonderful is the extraordinary blessings which it has conferred upon the inhabitants. Facts more eloquent than words, statistics more irresistible than arguments, place this important point beyond the possibility of a doubt. While under its native princes, the state of capital in India was so insecure that twelve per cent was the common, and thirty-six per cent no unusual rate of interest: under the British

8.
Immense
advantages
of the British
government to the
Indian people.

CHAP.
XLVII.

rule, the interest of the public debt has, for the first time in eastern history, been lowered to five per cent; and at that reduced rate, the capitalists of Arabia and Armenia daily transmit their surplus funds for investment in the Company's stock, as the most secure one in the East. Of the public debt of £47,000,000, a large proportion is due to native or Asiatic capitalists; and such is the unbounded confidence in the good faith and probity of the government, that bales stamped with their signet circulate unopened, like coined money, through the vast empire of China. So complete has been the protection, so ample the security enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British provinces, compared with what obtains under their native rajahs, that the people from every part of India flock, as Bishop Heber has observed, to the three Presidencies: and the extension of the Company's empire, in whatever direction, is immediately followed by a vast concourse of population, and increase of industry, by the settlers from the adjoining native dominions.¹

¹ Sinclair's Account of India, 13, 27. Heber's India, iii. 274. Life, i. 98, 211; ii. 74, 114.

9.
Great diminution of crime under the British rule.

Brilliant as has been the career of England in the European world during the last half century, there are several circumstances in its internal situation which cannot be contemplated without painful feelings. Among these, the constant and uninterrupted increase of crime through all the vicissitudes of peace and war, unchecked by penal vigilance, undiminished by intellectual cultivation, is one of the most alarming. But under the British empire in the East, a very different and much more satisfactory progress has taken place. Rapid as has been the *growth* of crime in the European dominions of England during the last half century, its *decrease* in her eastern possessions has been still more striking; and the steady powerful rule of a central government has done as much for the inhabitants of Hindostan, as the vices consequent on a corrupted manufacturing population have undone for the people of Great Britain.* From the

* See Appendix, Note A.

returns of commitments and crime in many different provinces of India for the last thirty years, it distinctly appears that crime has, during that period, diminished one half, in many places sunk to a sixth, in the East ; while it has in the same time more than quadrupled in the British islands, and in Ireland multiplied ninefold.* Nor is it difficult to perceive to what cause this remarkable difference is owing. Robbery and plunder, the crimes of violence, were those chiefly prevalent in India, growing out of the lawless habits which ages of misrule had diffused through a large portion of the population. These savage and dangerous crimes have been everywhere severely repressed, in some districts totally extirpated, by the strong and steady arm of the English government. The long-established hordes of robbers have been in most places dissolved ; the Pindarees, who so long spread ruin and desolation through central India, rooted out : the gangs of Dacoits and Looties, who levied a frightful tax on honest industry, transported or broken up. But if this unwonted feeling of security against hostile spoliation is so generally perceptible even in the provinces which have enjoyed the benefit of English protection for the longest period, what must it be to those which have been lately rescued from a state of anarchy, misery, and bloodshed, unparalleled in the modern history of the world ?¹

"Nothing," says an intelligent observer, in 1829, "can be more gratifying to an Englishman than to travel through the central and western provinces, so long the theatre of merciless and oppressive war, and to witness the wonderful change which has everywhere been wrought. Every village in that part of the country was closely surrounded by fortifications, and no man ventured to go to the labours of the plough or the loom without being armed with his sword and shield. Now the forts are useless, and are slowly crumbling into ruin ; substantial

¹ Statistical Tables in Martin's India, ix. 322, 329.

10.
Great change effected in the aspect of the country in the central and western provinces.

* See Appendix, Note B.

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Sinclair's India, 8, 9. Heber's India, iii. 336; and Life, 314.

11.
Rapid progress of wealth, population, and comfort, over all India.

houses begin for the first time to be built in the *open plain*; cultivation is extended over the distant and undefended fields; the useless encumbrance of defensive armour is laid aside; and the peasant may fearlessly venture to enjoy the wealth and comforts which his industry and labour enable him to acquire. In short, the course of events within the last fifteen years has done more than the whole preceding century, to improve the condition of the middle and lower classes through the whole of India; to give them a taste for the comforts and conveniences of life, and to relieve their industry from the paralysis under which a long continuance of internal dissension had caused it to sink. Englishmen, who have so long been blessed with internal tranquillity, and to whom the idea of an invasion presents only a vague and indistinct notion of confusion, bloodshed, and rapine, can hardly conceive the rapturous delight which animates the Hindoo peasant, who has had from time immemorial a wretched experience of these frightful realities, or the gratitude he feels to those who protect him from them, who enable him to reap his harvest in security, defend his home from profanation, and his property from the never-ending extortion of the powerful.”¹

The progress, accordingly, of wealth, comfort, and population during the last twenty years, especially in central India, has been rapid in a most extraordinary degree; and even that short period of firm pacific administration has gone far to obliterate the deep furrows which the devastating wars and interminable oppression of former times had produced. Old neglected tanks have been cleared out, their banks restored, and themselves been again filled with vivifying floods; roads repaired or struck out anew in the most important lines of communication; harbours excavated, bridges erected, aqueducts constructed, with all the advantages of European skill; irrigation spread over the thirsty plains, and cultivation extended far into the open country, at a distance from any villages, the

centres, in former times, of all the operations of human labour.* Villages, almost beyond the power of enumeration, have risen up from their ruins in every part of the country; the ryots around them are to be seen cheerfully cutting into the jungle, and chasing the leopard and the tiger from their hereditary haunts;† an entirely new feature in Indian society has arisen—a *middle class*—which is gradually approximating to the yeomanry of the Western World; and the never-failing symptoms of a prosperous population have generally appeared—a great increase in the numbers of the people, co-existent with a marked elevation in their standard of comfort and individual prosperity.^{1‡}

¹ Heber, iii. 252. Mart. ix. 336, 352. Sinclair, 29. Malcolm's Central India, App.

12. Increased taste for British manufactures over India.

The effect of this progressive elevation in the situation of the middle, and improvement in the circumstances of the lower orders, has already been strongly and beneficially felt in the extended commercial intercourse between India and the British islands. The growing taste for British manufactures of almost every kind, as well as the increased capability of the working-classes to purchase them, in every part of Hindostan, has been remarked by Bishop Heber; and the same gratifying change has, since his time, been noticed by not less competent observers. The gradual rise of the more opulent of the working into a middle class, has spread a taste among them for luxuries and conveniences to which their fathers, during the many ages of previous native oppression, were strangers. The calicoes and long cloths of Manchester and Paisley have now obtained as undisputed possession of the markets of

* The public works undertaken and carried through by the British government in India, especially in the formation of roads, bridges, aqueducts, canals, harbours, tanks, &c., almost exceed belief; and though less pompously set forth in official reports, equal those which have shed such an imperishable lustre over the reign of Napoleon in Europe. An enumeration of them will be found in the *Parl. Papers* in 1833, and an abstract in MARTIN, ix. 344, 349. The roads constructed under Lord W. Bentinck's administration alone, in 1831, extended to 1784 miles, and 10,000 persons were employed on them.—MARTIN, ix. 349.

† See Appendix, Note C.

‡ See Appendix, Note D.

CHAP.
XLVII.

the East, as the hardwares of Sheffield, Birmingham, and Leeds; and the abundance and cheapness of British manufactures have diffused a taste for these articles among classes who formerly never had a wish beyond the mere necessities of life. While the industry of Indian artisans was, in former times, exclusively directed to fabricate only the coarsest articles for the poorer, and the most costly luxuries for the richer classes, the rapid increase of the consumption of a superior sort of fabric, (still much below the Cashmere shawls and brocades of the rich,) unknown till within these twenty years in any part of Hindostan, marks the slow but gradual growth, under British protection, of an intermediate class in society, superior to the naked ryot, but inferior to the pampered zemindar: while, by one of those changes which bespeak the revolutions of ages, and measure the difference in the progress of different quarters of the globe, the cotton of India, transported to the British shores, and manufactured by the refinements of European machinery, is sent back to the East, and, by its greater cheapness, has opened to a class, who never before could enjoy them, the comforts of the original produce of Hindostan.^{1*}

¹ Sinclair, 29, 30. Heber, iii. 284. Martin, ix. 353, 355.

13. Vast police force established throughout Bengal, and its admirable effects.

The extraordinary diminution of crime, especially of a violent kind, in all parts of the Indian peninsula of late years, and the progressive amelioration of the people, is in a great measure to be ascribed to the extensive and powerful police force which is very generally established. The discipline and organisation of this civil body is admirable; and such is its extent, that in the provinces of Bengal and Bahar it numbers one hundred and sixty thousand men in its ranks. In most villages there are two or three, in many, ten or twelve of this protective force permanently established. Europeans may feel astonished at the magnitude of this establishment; but experience has completely demonstrated that it is highly

* See Appendix, Note E.

useful, and indeed indispensable, amidst the habits of lawless violence to which ages of license and rapine have inured the inhabitants of India. The rapid diminution of crimes of violence in Bengal, under the operation of this preventive system, proves that a remedy has been discovered and applied to the prevailing causes of evil in those regions. Would that human wisdom could devise an equally effectual preservative against the passion for illicit gain, sensual indulgence, and habitual intoxication, which are now, like a gangrene, overspreading the face of society in the British islands! ¹

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Martin,
ix. 94, 96.
Auber,
553.

Taxation in India is for the most part direct; that is, it consists of the rents of lands belonging in property to the government, and which, from time immemorial, have been devoted to the maintenance of the supreme authority. Of the nineteen millions which at present constitute the general revenue of India, nearly eleven millions are drawn in this manner from the produce of the government lands. The principle on which this immense revenue is derived from the soil, has no analogy to the European land-tax, which is a burden superinduced upon the owner of the rent; it is, on the contrary, the rent itself. The modes in which this tax is levied over India are three: either a perpetual settlement with, or fixed rent constantly payable by, the proprietors of land; or a temporary settlement with the heads of villages or townships; or a definite settlement with each individual occupant of the ground. These different modes of taxation are all founded on one principle, which is universally admitted and acknowledged in every part of Hindostan; viz., that government, as the paramount owner of the soil, has right to a certain portion of the gross produce of every foot of cultivated land, which may be commuted generally or partially, by permanent or partial settlements, with classes of men or separate individuals, but never can be wholly alienated by any ruler to the prejudice of his successors. Government, therefore, in India, is

14.
Principles
of Indian
taxation.

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Com. Report, 1832, 2, 29. Martin, ix. 116. Heber, iii. 275.

15.
Management of land. The Zemindar System.

at once the ruling power and the universal landlord in the state; and hence the general and omnipotent influence which its severity or justice has upon the prosperity and wellbeing of the people, and the immediate effect of the British sway—by whose agents the collection of rent has been fixed, upon comparatively equitable principles—upon the welfare of the humbler classes.¹

When the East India Company came into possession of the Bengal provinces, they found the land revenue everywhere collected by the intervention of officers under the Mahomedan government, who had charge of districts or provinces under the title of *zemindars*. These officers were paid by a per-centage on the sums which they collected: the utmost irregularity and abuse generally existed; military force was constantly resorted to, to enforce the collection; and some of them held their offices for life only, others transmitting them, by hereditary succession, to their descendants. Misled by the analogy of European institutions, or desirous of laying the foundation for their establishment in the East, Marquis Cornwallis, in 1793, conceived and carried into effect the idea of transforming the zemindars into landed proprietors, by conferring upon them and their descendants an indefeasible right to the territories over which their powers extended, so long as they continued to pay regularly the fixed land-tax to government. The propriety of this change was very much doubted at the time, and gave rise to a long and interesting controversy; but it was, nevertheless, carried into execution, and now forms the basis on which the taxation of two hundred thousand square miles of the Bengal territory, a district more than twice the size of Great Britain, is founded. Though framed on the principles of benevolence and moderation, it has, however, like almost all similar institutions borrowed from the analogy of other nations, and a different state of society, proved altogether ineffective for the principal object in view. The zemindars could not, by the mere regulation

of the Company, be converted from Asiatic to European habits: instead of acquiring the interests and views of hereditary landholders, they continued to act with the characteristic improvidence of Eastern rulers. To squeeze the last farthing, by any means, how unjust soever, from the ryots, and squander it in extravagance or luxury upon themselves or their families, was the general practice: numbers were ruined and dispossessed by the Company, who exacted the quit-rent with unrelenting and injudicious rigour; and thus no step was made towards the formation of a landed aristocracy, while no alleviation was experienced in the burdens of the poor.¹

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Parl. Pap.
1831, 3115,
et seq. 1832,
p. 21.

The evil, in effect, became so great, that it has in some degree worked out, like all other excessive ills, its own cure. The zemindar system has come in the end to benefit a class of landed proprietors, though not the one which Lord Cornwallis originally intended. From the general ruin which overtook these powerful officers, and the terror everywhere inspired by the rigorous exactions of the Company, the price of estates fell so low, that at last it became a prudent matter of speculation to buy land, and look to its returns for the interest of the price. A different and more provident class has thus, to a considerable extent, been introduced into the management of estates; and, as the land-rent which they are required to pay continues fixed, they have the strongest possible inducement to increase by good management the surplus which may accrue to themselves and their families. But, unfortunately, they have not learned in the East to look so far into the future as to see that this is to be most effectually done by equitable and just dealings towards the cultivators. The burdens imposed on the ryots are still generally exorbitant, often ruinous; and the benefits of the British government are felt by that numerous and important class rather by the cessation of war and depredation, than in any practical diminution of the duties legally exigible from them by their landlords.²

16.
Its practical
operation.

² Heber, iii.
273, 275.
Mart. ix.
118, 119.
Parl. Pap.
Com. 1831,
3115, et seq.
1832, p. 21.

CHAP.
XLVII.17.
The Ryot-
war system.

Impressed with these evils, a different system was adopted by Sir Thomas Munro, late governor of Madras, in his administration of some of the newly acquired provinces of that presidency. The principle acted on by that able ruler, of whom Mr Canning justly said, that "Asia did not possess a braver warrior, nor Europe a more enlightened statesman," was to consider the ryot, according to the true oriental principle, as the real proprietor; to dispense altogether with the zemindar or intermediate collector; and to levy the government duties, fixed for ever in amount, directly from the cultivator or landholder, whatever was the size of his possession. It is evident that this system is calculated to be much more beneficial than the zemindar one to the cultivators of the soil; because they are thereby brought directly into contact with government, and participate at once, without the intervention of any middle-man, in the benefit of a fixed quit-rent only being exacted from the land. It has, accordingly, found many and able supporters, and in some districts has been found in practice to be attended with the most admirable effects.* But when so powerful a party as government is brought into immediate contact with the cultivators, in a matter of such vital importance as the rent of land, it is indispensable to the success of the system that its demands should be moderate, and enforced with justice and consideration; and, unfortunately, this can hardly be generally expected in an empire of such immense extent as that of Hindostan, in which the supreme authority is situated at such a distance from the theatre of its fiscal operations, and the judge is

* See in particular, a most interesting account of a settlement on these principles in MALCOLM'S *India*, 526, 528. It is also much more beneficial to government, as is proved by the fact that, in 1827, the land-tax per head was,—

	Per head.	Population per square mile.
In Bengal, . . .	22 pence.	244
In Madras, . . .	52 ...	77
In Bombay, . . .	60 ...	76

—*Parl. Papers*, quoted in MARTIN, ix. 123.

often the principal collector of the revenue within the district over which he presides. The land-tax is usually taken at twelve shillings in the pound of the net produce of the soil—an enormous exaction, rendered still more burdensome by the rigour with which it is collected. The project of bringing the cultivator at once into contact with government, so equitable in theory, has often proved most fallacious in practice; for such is the subdivision of farms in most parts of India, that the immediate collection of the land-revenue by the government collector was soon found to be out of the question. He is obliged to delegate his duties, like a great landed proprietor in Ireland, to a host of subordinate agents, over whose operations or oppression he is little able to keep any effectual control; the treasury officers too often come to esteem a subordinate functionary in proportion to the regularity and amount of his remittances, rather than any other quality: the expenses of collection rise enormously with the multiplication of inferior agents; and the ryot has often little reason to congratulate himself on the exchange of a British collector for a native zemindar.¹

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Sinclair,
33, 36. Parl.
Pap. Com.
3156, 4577,
4579. Mart.
ix. 122, 123.

A third system of land-rents is the *Village* system. This prevails chiefly in the upper districts of India, and is the prevalent institution over the greater part of the East. To it, probably, more than any other cause, the preservation of its population and industry, amidst the endless devastations of wars, is to be ascribed. Each village forms a little community or republic in itself, possessing a certain district of surrounding territory, and paying a certain fixed rent for the whole to government. As long as this is regularly paid, the public authorities have no title to interfere in the internal concerns of the community: they elect their own *mocuddims*, or head men, who levy the proportions of the quit-rent from each individual, settle disputes, and allocate to each profession or individual the share of the general produce of the public territory which is to belong to it or him. As the

18.
The Village
system.

CHAP.
XLVII.

community is justly desirous of avoiding any pretext for the interference of the state collectors in its internal concerns, they make good the quota of every defaulter from the funds of his neighbours, so as to exhibit no defalcation in the general return to government. The only point in which the interference of the national authorities is required, is in fixing the limits of the village territories in a question with each other, which is done with great care by surveyors, in presence of the competing parties and their witnesses, and a great concourse of the neighbouring inhabitants. In times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves, drive their cattle within their walls, and often contrive, by the payment of a certain contribution, to avoid the evils of actual pillage, even by the most considerable armies. These villages are, indeed, frequently burned or destroyed by hostile forces, the little community dispersed, and its lands thrown back to a state of nature ; but when better times return, and the means of peaceable occupation are again recovered, the remnant reassemble with their children in their paternal inheritance. A generation may pass away, but the succeeding generation returns: the sons take the place of their fathers ; the same trades and occupations are filled by the descendants of those who formerly filled them : the same division of lands takes place ; the very houses are rebuilt on the site of those which had been destroyed ; and, emerging from the storm, the community revives, "another and the same." ¹

¹ Commons' Committee, 1832, p. 29. Lords 398, 399, 405, 529. Mart. ix. 120, 121.

19.
Admirable effect of the Village system in all ages.

It is in these village municipalities that the real secret of the durability of society in the East is to be found. If we contemplate the desolating invasions to which, from the earliest times, the Asiatic monarchies have been exposed from their proximity to the regions of central Asia; if we reflect on the wide-spread devastation consequent on the twelve dreadful irruptions of the Tartars into Hindostan ; and recollect that society, in the intervals of these terrific scourges, has invariably been sub-

jected to the varied but never-ending oppression of different rulers, who seemed to have no other idea of government but to extract as large contributions as possible from the people—it seems surprising how the human race did not become extinct under such a succession of calamities. But amidst those multiplied evils, the village system has provided an unheeded, but enduring and effectual refuge for mankind. Invasion may succeed invasion, horde after horde may sweep over the country — dynasty may overturn dynasty, revolution be followed by revolution; but the wide-spread foundations of rural society are unchanged. The social families bend, but break not, beneath the storm; industry revives in its ancient seats, and in its pristine form, under whatever government ultimately prevails; and the dominant power, intent only on fresh objects of plunder or aggrandisement, rolls past these unheeded fountains of industry and population. The Hindoos, the Patans, the Moguls, the Mahrattas, the Sikhs, and the English, have all been masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same. Abuses and oppression, without doubt, may prevail in this as in all other human institutions; but its extensive establishment and long duration in the East, prove that it has been found capable by experience of affording tolerable security to the labouring classes; and perhaps by no other means, in the absence of those effective bulwarks of freedom which the intelligence, hereditary succession, and free spirit of Europe create, is the inestimable blessing of protection to humble industry to be so generally and effectually obtained. The whole upper and western provinces of Bengal, the greater part of the Bombay territories, the ceded districts on the Nerbuddah, and the province of Tanjore, comprising about 260,000 square miles, are assessed according to this system.¹

¹ Com. Rep.
1831, 3119,
3123, 3129,
3130. Mart.
ix. 120, 122.

The concentration in the hands of government of so large a proportion of the surplus produce of the earth, as is effected by the great land-tax of India, is undoubtedly

CHAP.
XLVII.

20.
Effects of
this large
land revenue
on the gene-
ral system
of taxation.

prejudicial to society, in so far as it prevents the growth of that important class, so well known in European civilisation—a body of hereditary independent landed proprietors. But it is attended by this important advantage, that it renders the other imposts of the state extremely trifling. Of the total revenue of £19,500,000, more than a half is derived from the land revenue; and of the indirect taxes, nearly two-thirds are laid on the single articles of salt and opium.* When we reflect on the numerous taxes which are levied on almost every article of consumption in Great Britain, this must appear no small recommendation of the eastern system, in which so large a portion of the public revenue is derived from what is in reality the rent of land. It is obviously the same advantage to a nation to have a considerable portion of its revenue derived from crown-lands, as it is to have its ecclesiastical or charitable institutions supported by separate property of their own. In either case, the cost of these expensive establishments, essential to the protection, religious instruction, or relief of the people, is laid upon their own funds, instead of being imposed as a burden upon the earnings of the other classes of the community. It is, perhaps, the most remarkable instance of political blindness on record, that the republican party, both in France and England, should so long have endeavoured, and in the former country successfully, to destroy the property both of the church and the corporations holding funds devoted to the purposes of charity and education; that is, to terminate the payment of these necessary establishments by their own funds, and throw their maintenance as a tax on the wages of labour. And, without going the length of the opinion, that the oriental system is preferable to that of the landed proprietors of modern Europe, with the stability which they confer upon society, it may safely be asserted, that the receipt of a considerable portion of the public revenue from landed

* See Appendix, Note F.

property, vested in government or public bodies, is an invaluable feature in political institutions, and the very last which a real patriot would seek to subvert.

CHAP.
XLVII.

Religious difference, and the exclusive possession of power by persons of one ecclesiastical establishment, political party, or dominant race, have been found to be the great obstacles to the pacification of the kingdoms of modern Europe ; and in the centre of her power, England has found it impossible to conciliate the affections or overcome the antipathy of the Roman Catholic inhabitants of Ireland. But, in her eastern empire, political exclusion far more rigid, religious distinctions far more irreconcilable, have, under the able and judicious management of the Company, proved no obstacle to the consolidation of a vast and peaceable dominion. In India, notwithstanding the long period that some districts have been in British possession, and the universal peace which has so long reigned, save on the frontier, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains, the natives are still ineligible to offices of trust, both in the civil and military departments. In religion, the principle of separation is still more rigid. Hindostan has, in different ages, been overrun, not merely by conquerors of different races, agreeing only in their ferocity to the vanquished, but by hosts of totally distinct and irreconcilable religious creeds. The mild and pacific followers of Bramah have in different ages been obliged to bow the neck to the fierce idolators of Cabul, the rigid followers of Siva, the savage pagans of Tartary, the impetuous fire-worshippers of Persia, the triumphant followers of Mahomet, the disciplined battalions of Christ. These different and hostile religions have imprinted their traces deeply and indelibly on the Hindoo population ; and of the hundred and forty millions who now inhabit the vast peninsula to the south of the Himalaya mountains, a considerable proportion still follow the faith of the dominant races from which they severally sprang.

21.
Complete
system of
toleration
established
in India.

CHAP.
XLVII.

22.
Vast varieties of religious belief found in India.

Fifteen millions of Mussulmans, haughty in manners, indolent in character, voluptuous in disposition, even now recall the era when the followers of Mahomet issued from their burning deserts, with the sword in one hand and the Koran in the other, to win, through the blood of conquest, a path to the houris of paradise. Sixty millions of pacific Hindoos on the banks of the Ganges still continue the worship of Bramah and Vishnu, which has endured unchanged for four thousand years. Fifteen millions of hardy freebooters, in the upper provinces, follow a mixed creed, in which the tenets of Islamism and the doctrines of the Hindoo faith are strangely compounded together. Heathens and cannibals are found in great numbers in the hilly regions of the north-eastern frontier; a numerous fragment of Parsees or fire-worshippers, scattered through various parts of India, still preserve, untainted by foreign usage, the pure tenets, charitable practices, and elevating worship of Zoroaster. Jews are to be seen in many places, whose Old Testament, coming down no further than the Babylonian captivity, indicates that they had strayed to the East after that memorable event; while a small number of Christians have preserved inviolate, through eighteen hundred years, the fundamental principles of the Gospel, and traces are to be found, in some remote quarters, of the lost tribes of the children of Israel.¹

¹ Mart. ix. 207, 233. Sinclair, 40, 48, 49.

23.
Effect of this religious division in facilitating the government of the country.

At first sight it would be natural to conclude, that this extraordinary combination of different religions in one community would produce an insurmountable difficulty in conducting the government, and that the strength of a united empire could never be obtained with such various and discordant materials. The reverse, however, is so much the case, that it is owing to this, more perhaps than any other cause, that the subjection of so great a body of natives to the government of a handful of Europeans is to be ascribed. The Indian population is divided into so great a number of different faiths, that no one is predo-

minant, or can claim an undisputed pre-eminence over the others ; and political power has so long been dis severed from religious belief, that it no longer constitutes a bond of union by which any formidable coalition can be held together. Not only are there to be found Hindoos of every province, tribe, and dialect, in the ranks of the British native army, but the worshippers of Siva, the adorers of Vishnu, a multitude of Mahomedans, both of the Soonee and Shiah sects, Protestant and Catholic half-castes, and even Jews and Ghebirs. By this intermixture, unparalleled in history, the chances of any considerable combination, either for the purposes of military revolt or political hostility, have been considerably reduced. Although all classes live together on terms of mutual forbearance, this amazing diversity of religious sentiment in no way interferes with military subordination. No sooner are their professional duties at an end, than the distinctions of religion and caste return with undiminished influence. When the regimental parade is dismissed, the soldiers break into separate knots ; the gradation of caste is restored, the distinctions of faith return. The Sudra sergeant makes his *salaam* to the Brahmin or the Rajpoot private ; the Mussulman avoids the Christian, the Shiah the Soonee, the Hindoo all ; and an almost impassable barrier of mutual distrust and jealousy obstructs all amalgamation of opinion, or unity of action, even upon those national objects which separately interest the whole body. Thus the heterogeneous and discordant mass is kept in a state of complete subordination by the only power among them which possesses the inestimable advantage of unity of action ; and the British government, strong in its established probity, and the good faith with which it observes its engagements both towards its subjects and its enemies, is enabled to maintain an undisputed dominion over its innumerable and diversified subjects.¹

¹ Sinclair, 48, 49. Mal-
colm, Cen-
tral India,
i. 42, 47.

It is a common opinion in Great Britain—where the

CHAP.
XLVII.

24.

Vast variety
of national
character in
India.

real nature of our Eastern dominions is unknown to an extent which, *a priori*, would appear incredible—that the whole of India is inhabited by a race of meek and inoffensive Hindoos, who willingly bow the neck to every invader who chooses to oppress them, and are incapable, alike from their character, climate, and ignorance, of opposing any effectual resistance to a European invader. The slightest acquaintance, not merely with Indian but with Asiatic history, must be sufficient to demonstrate the unfounded nature of this opinion. In no part of the world, perhaps, has foreign conquest implanted its traces in more indelible features on the original population; in none is variety of present character and qualities so conspicuous. So far from the inhabitants of India being all of one description, alike timid and inoffensive, there is within its limits to be found a greater intermixture of races than in any part of the world, and as large a proportion of hardy valour and desperate daring as in any people recorded in history. Bishop Heber justly observes, that there is as great a disparity between the inhabitants of Guzerat, Bengal, the Doab, and the Deccan, as between any four nations of Europe; and that the inhabitants of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and of the Deccan, are as different from each other as the French and Portuguese from the Greeks, Germans, or Poles. Independent of the varieties of the proper Indian race, which are innumerable, there are to be found in the peninsula of Hindostan at least *thirty* distinct nations, speaking different languages, and almost entirely unknown to each other. The Mahrattas are as much strangers to the people of Bengal as to the Europeans; the inhabitants of the Carnatic are foreign to both; the Sikhs have scarcely any resemblance to the Mahrattas; and even the fifteen millions of Mahommedans have no common bond but their religion, and exhibit the descendants of adventurers from all the nations of Asia, who crowded to the standards of the Prophet.¹

¹ Heber's India, iii. 262. Crawford's Eastern Archipelago, i. 47, 54.

If we penetrate into more distant possessions, the varieties of human character are still more remarkable. The inhabitants of the swamps of Arracan, or the meadows of the Irrawaddy, are as distinct from the highlanders of Nepaul as the rice-growers of the Ganges are from the horsemen of Mysore, or the Pindarees of Malwa. It was in the plains of Bengal alone that the British force met with the genuine Hindoo race, and there victory was of comparatively easy acquisition. But as foreign aggression, or the necessities of their situation, forced them into more distant warfare, they were brought into collision with nations as fierce, and forces as formidable, as any that are arrayed under the banners of Western Europe. The desperate defence of Saragossa, the obstinate valour of Aspern, the enthusiastic gallantry of the Tyrol, have all their parallels in the annals of Indian warfare; and the heroism with which Napoleon and his redoubtable followers resisted and overcame these varied forms of hostility, was not greater than that with which the British soldiers, and their worthy native allies, have combated on the plateau of Mysore, the hills of Nepaul, the plains of Hindostan, the mountains of Affghanistan, or the intricacies of the Punjaub. The harassing hostility and terrible sweep of the Cossacks were fully equalled by the squadrons of Hyder and the Pindaree hordes; the free-born valour of the Tyrolese was rivalled by the heroic resistance of the Goorkhas; the storm of Badajos, the devotion of Saragossa, have their parallels in the defence of Bhurt-pore and the conquest of Seringapatam; the decision and skill which converted the perils of Assaye into a decisive victory, were not outdone by the most illustrious deeds of the immortal Napoleon. And the conqueror of the French legions at Albuera had yet a ruder conflict to sustain on the banks of the Sutlej, with the desperate valour of the Sikhs.¹

CHAP.
XLVII.

25.

And various
military
qualities of
the inhabi-
tants.

¹ Mart. ix.
267, 279.
Heber's In-
dia, iii. 262.
Crawford's
Eastern
Archipela-
go, i. 47, 54.

Climate and physical circumstances, in addition to

CHAP.
XLVII.

26.
Difference
of character
owing to
physical
causes.

original difference of race, have exercised their wonted influence on the character of the Indian population. In the flat hot regions of Bengal, on the shores of the Ganges, and amidst the meanderings of its tributary streams, is to be found a timid, gentle, pacific race : educated, but prone to superstition ; servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors ; obsequious, yet treacherous ; skilled in the arts of Eastern adulation, but mild and inoffensive in their intercourse with each other. In the elevated regions of the peninsula, on the other hand,—on the high table-land of Mysore, in the wild hills of Almorah, on the lofty mountains of Nepaul, the inhabitants are brave, daring, and impetuous ; glowing with ardour, chivalrous to women, courteous to strangers, glorying in deeds of heroism, faithful in friendship, vehement in hatred. With these elevated qualities are mingled, however, others which belong to the same national character : a fierce and revengeful temper, a disposition uncultivated and impatient of discipline ; habits prone to violence, and nursed in crime by ages of uncontrolled licentiousness. It is in these nations—among the proud Rajpoots, the roving Mahrattas, the daring Affghans, the heroic Sikhs—that the restraints of regular government are with most difficulty introduced, and its blessings most sensibly felt by the inhabitants : but it is amongst them also that the military spirit is most prevalent, and the British government has found at once its most faithful and intrepid native defenders, and most desperate and formidable foreign enemies.¹

¹ Malte
Brun, iii.
280, 299.
Mart. ix.
278, 279.

27.
Origin and
composition
of the sepooy
force.

Among all the prodigies attending the British dominion in India, none, perhaps, is so extraordinary as the rise, progress, and fidelity of the SEPOY FORCE. It was in Bombay that these invaluable auxiliaries were originally organised, and the first mention of them in history is when a corps of one hundred natives from Bombay, and four hundred from Tellicherry, assisted the army at Madras in 1747. From these humble beginnings has

arisen the present magnificent native army of India, which at one period embraced nearly three hundred thousand men, and even now, on a reduced peace establishment, numbers a hundred and seventy thousand. Their ranks have from the first been filled indiscriminately with recruits of all nations and religious persuasions ; and Mahommedans, Hindoos, Parsees, Jews, and Christians, are to be found blended among them, without the distinction of race having ever interfered with the unity of action, or the difference of religion ever shaken fidelity to duty. The whole have throughout been raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a conscription or forced levy having ever been found necessary ; and great as the present army is, it could be quadrupled in a few months, if the circumstances of the Indian government required such an augmentation of force. The facility with which vast armies can be raised in the East, when compared to the violent measures by which it has been found necessary in Europe to accomplish the same object, appears at first sight surprising. But it ceases to be so, when the effects of the distinction of castes, and the relative situation of the sepoy soldiers and the other classes of the community, are taken into consideration.¹

¹ Orme's Hindostan, i. 72. Martin, ix. 64, 65.

The military form a distinct caste in all the Hindoo communities ; and from father to son deeds of arms are handed down, as the only object of honourable ambition, —the true incitement to glorious exploit. The Rajpoot of Bengal is born a soldier. The mother recounts acts of heroism to her infant ; from earliest youth he is habituated to the use and exercise of arms. Even when still a child, the future warrior is accustomed to handle the spear and dagger, and to look without fear on the implements of death. If his father tills the ground, the sword and shield are placed near the furrow, and moved as his labour advances. The frame of youth is constantly strengthened by martial exercises ; he is habitually tem-

28.
Causes of the facility with which it has been raised.

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Sir John Malcolm in Quart. Rev. xviii. 414, 415. Orme's Hindostan, i. 72, 104. Mart. ix. 64, 65. Sinclair, 46.

29.
Elevated rank and situation of these sepoy troops.

perate in his diet ; of a generous though warm disposition ; and, if well treated, zealous, faithful, and obedient. It was from this military caste that the chief Indian armies were first recruited, and they still form the strength of the native infantry. In process of time, however, as our empire has extended into more distant regions, the military qualities of its varied inhabitants have been called into action ; and the desultory activity of the Mahratta horse, not less than the firm intrepidity of the Mysore cavalry, and the chivalrous valour of the Affghaun gunners, have contributed to the formation of our mighty dominions.¹

Unlike the soldiers of Europe, the sepoy is an object of envy to his less fortunate compatriots. His profession gives him the precedency, not less in general estimation than in that of his caste, over persons engaged in civil occupations ; and his pay is so considerable as to raise him, both in station and enjoyments, far above his brethren whom he has left behind in his native village. Each private sepoy is attended by two servants : in the field there are, at an average, nine followers to every two fighting men—a system which gives to a hundred thousand men, in a campaign, nearly five hundred thousand attendants, and goes far to explain both the prodigious hosts recorded in history, as commanded by Xerxes and Darius, and the facility with which they were routed by a comparatively small body of Greeks, all real soldiers. Such a mode of carrying on war augments enormously the difficulty of providing subsistence for so prodigious a multitude as attends every considerable army,* and obstructs to a most distressing degree the difficulty of

* When General Harris advanced against Seringapatam in 1799, his army was composed of 35,000 fighting men and 120,000 attendants ; and when Marquis Hastings took the field, in 1817, against the Mahrattas, his whole regular forces, amounting to 110,000 men, were swelled by above 500,000 camp-followers ; among whom, chiefly of the lower grades in society, and persons habituated to the humblest fare, the cholera made the most fearful ravages.—MALTE BRUN, iii. 328.

rapid movements in the field. The Romans understood war well, when they named baggage "*impedimenta*." But it renders it comparatively an easy matter to raise a military force. When the pay given to a private soldier is so considerable as to admit of his keeping two servants in the camp, and a still greater number in the field, no want of recruits will ever be experienced. The real difficulty is to find resources adequate to the support of a large army at that elevated standard. When Cromwell gave half-a-crown a-day to every dragoon, he readily got recruits for the Parliamentary armies.¹

CHAP.
XLVII.

¹ Malte
Brun, iii.
328. Martin,
ix. 79, 80.

The Indian infantry can hardly be said to be equal, even when led by British officers, to that of England; and, when left to the direction of their own leaders, they evince the general inferiority of the Asiatic race to the European. In ordinary engagements, too, they are not to be relied on, if they are not either led or supported by native English battalions, and have an adequate proportion of English officers. But it is only in trying situations that this difference is conspicuous, and, for the ordinary duties of a campaign, no troops in the world are superior to the sepoys. In many of the most essential duties of a soldier—sobriety during duty, patience under privation, docility in learning, hardihood in undergoing fatigue, steady enduring valour, and fidelity to their colours under every temptation to swerve from them—the Indian auxiliaries might serve as a model to every service in Europe. Nay, examples are numerous, in which, emulous of the fame of their British comrades, they have performed deeds of daring worthy of being placed beside the most exalted of European glory; and instances are not wanting where they have unhesitatingly faced dangers before which even English troops had recoiled.* The native

^{30.}
General
character
of the In-
dian army.

* At the first siege of Bhurtpore, in 1805, the 12th regiment of native Bengal infantry was associated with the 75th and 76th British infantry, whose deeds of valour they had emulated in the battle of Laswaree. The British were first led to the assault, and gallantly mounted the breach; but they were driven back with dreadful slaughter; and such was the panic inspired

CHAP.
XLVII.

cavalry is of more recent introduction than the infantry, but it is not less admirable in many of the most valuable qualities. The men are fearless riders, indefatigable in the service of light troops, sober and vigilant; they take exemplary care of their horses, many of which are of the best Persian and Arabian breeds, and in the sword-exercise or single combat are superior to almost any of the cavaliers of Europe. Nor is the artillery inferior to any in the world, either in the perfection of the material, the condition of the horses, or the coolness, precision, and bravery of the gunners. The immense host is entirely under the direction of British officers, nearly five thousand of whom are employed in this important service; but the non-commissioned officers and subalterns always were natives, and the avenue to more elevated promotion is now opened to the most deserving of their number.¹* In the shock of a regular charge alone, the native horse is

¹ Martin, ix. 83. Williams's Indian army, 32, 68. Quart. Rev. xviii. 414, 415.

by the disaster, that, when they were ordered a second time to advance, the soldiers refused to follow their officers or leave the trenches. The second battalion of the 12th native regiment was then ordered to advance; they did so with resolute steps, though well aware of the desperate nature of the service on which they were sent, and cheered as they passed the English troops, who lay sheltered in the trenches. Such was the heroic valour of their onset, that they overcame all opposition, and planted their colours, in sight of the whole army, on the summit of the breach. This work, unfortunately, was cut off by a deep ditch from the body of the fortress, and, finding it impossible to pass that barrier, Lord Lake was reluctantly obliged to order a retreat. It was with great difficulty, however, that the brave sepoys could be prevailed on to retire from the perilous post of honour which they had won, and not till they had sustained a loss of three hundred and sixty men, being half their total number when they went into action. The British regiment, stung with shame, now implored to be allowed to return to the assault, which was granted; but, notwithstanding their desperate valour, it was still unsuccessful.—See MARTIN, viii. 30-31, and ix. 69-70. The author has frequently heard this anecdote from his late lamented brother-in-law, Colonel Gerard, adjutant-general of the Bengal army, who was present on the occasion—an officer to whose talents, zeal, and bravery, the wonders of Lord Lake's campaign are, in a considerable degree, to be ascribed.

* The British officers in the Indian army amount to 4487; the Indian to 3416; but the latter cannot rise to a higher rank than that of ensign or cornet. The total British troops in India amount at present to 30,915 sabres and bayonets, of whom 19,540 are composed of the Queen's regiments, the remainder being English in the service of the East India Company; but the expense of the whole is defrayed by the Indian government.—MARTIN, ix. 73, 79-81.

still inferior to the British—a peculiarity which has distinguished the cavalry of the Eastern and Western Worlds in every age, from the days of Cyrus to those of the Crusades.

CHAP.
XLVII.

Volumes might be filled with the anecdotes which have occurred within the last eighty years, illustrative of the steady courage and incorruptible fidelity of the sepoy troops. They first rose to eminence in the wars of Lord Clive, Lawrence, Smith, and Coote, in the middle of the last century; and the number of Europeans who were then engaged in Indian warfare was so inconsiderable, that almost the whole glory of their marvellous victories is in reality due to the sepoys. The hardships which were undergone, at this period, by all the soldiers, both native and European, from the defective state, or rather total want of a commissariat, were excessive; but although the British power was then only in its infancy, and little promised future stability to its empire, nothing could shake the fidelity of the Indian troops. On one occasion, when the provisions of Clive's garrison of Arcot were very low, and a surrender, in consequence, appeared unavoidable, the Hindoo soldiers entreated their commander to allow them to boil their rice, the only food left for the whole garrison. "Your English soldiers," said they, "can eat from our hands, though we cannot from theirs: we will allow them as their share every grain of the rice, and subsist ourselves by drinking the water in which it has been boiled." In the year 1780, 1781, and 1782, the whole army suffered hardships almost unparalleled; there was hardly a corps whose pay was not twenty months in arrear, and their families, under the pressure of a dreadful famine, were expiring on all sides: nevertheless their fidelity never gave way under this extreme trial, and they repaid with gratitude and attachment, the consideration, to them unwonted, with which they were treated by their European officers.¹ The campaigns of Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Clive, in which they bore so prominent a part, still

31.
Touching
anecdotes of
the fidelity
of the sepoy
troops.

¹ Sir John
Malcolm, in
Quart. Rev.
xviii. 389,
396.

CHAP.
XLVII.

form an object of well-founded pride to the sepoys of Madras ; and when a regiment comes into garrison, they lead their children into the great room of the Exchange of that capital, to point out the portraits of the chiefs who first led their fathers to victory.

32.
Their fidelity
to the
English
under every
trial.

Towards the close of the war with Tippoo, in 1782, General Mathews, with his whole troops, almost entirely native, were made prisoners. The Sultaun, sensible of the advantages he might derive from the services of so large a body of disciplined men in his ranks, made every effort to induce the English sepoys to enter his army, but in vain. He then tried severity, and subjected them for long to the most rigorous confinement and unhealthy employments ; but nothing could shake their fidelity ; and at the peace of 1783, fifteen hundred of these brave men marched a distance of five hundred miles to Madras, to embark and rejoin the army to which they belonged, at Bombay. During the march, the utmost pains were taken by Tippoo's guards to keep the Hindoo privates separate from their European officers, in the hope that their fidelity might yet sink under the hardships to which they were exposed ; but in vain. Not only did they all remain true to their colours, but they swam the tanks and rivers by which they were separated from the officers during the night, bringing them all they could save from their little pittance ; "for we," they said, "can live on anything, but you require beef and mutton." A battalion of the Bombay 12th regiment mutinied in 1764, on account of some promises made to the soldiers having, as they said, been broken. A severe example was thought necessary, and twenty-eight of the most guilty were sentenced to be blown from the mouth of a cannon.¹* As

¹ Malcolm, in Quarterly Rev. xviii. 389, 405. Williams's Indian Army, 271, 304.

* "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who was an eye-witness of this remarkable scene, "there was not a dry eye among the marines who executed the sentence, though they had long been accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been in the execution-party which shot Admiral Byng in 1757. The corps to which they belonged subsequently distinguished itself greatly both at Laswaree and the first siege of Bhurtpore."—WILLIAMS'S *Indian Army*, 247 ; and *Ante*, Chap. XLVII. § 30, note.

they were on the point of being executed, three grenadiers who happened to be among them, stepped forward and claimed the honour of being blown away from the right guns: "they had always fought on the right," they said, "and they hoped they should be allowed to die at that post of honour."

CHAP.
XLVII.

During the advance of Lord Lake's army to Delhi and Agra in 1804, the hardships and privations which the troops of all sorts endured were such, as almost to break down the spirit of the British officers; but the Hindoo privates never showed the least symptoms of faintness or despondence, saying, "Keep up your spirits, sir; we will bring you in safety to Agra." When in square, and sustaining charges of the enemy's horse, it more than once happened, when a musket was fired by a young soldier, that a veteran struck him with the but-end of his firelock, exclaiming: "Are you mad, to destroy our discipline, and make us like the rabble that are attacking us?" Nor was the same steady courage and devoted fidelity wanting, on still more trying occasions, when the national or religious prejudices of the native soldier were brought still more violently in collision with their military duties. At the mutiny of Vellore, which shook the Indian empire to its foundation, and was brought on by an absurd interference with the religious feelings of the troops, the sabres of the native dragoons were dyed as deep as those of the British in the blood of their unhappy countrymen; and on occasion of a recent tumult at Bareilly, the capital of Rohilkund, occasioned by the introduction of a necessary but unpopular police-tax—a revolt which commanded the sympathy of the whole neighbouring population—a battalion of the 27th native infantry, with four hundred Rohilla horse recently embodied, were all that could be brought against the insurgents, who were above twelve thousand strong. The mutineers continued to resist till two thousand were slain;¹ and, although many of the assailants were their relations and neighbours, and the

33.
And admirable courage.

¹ Martin, ix. 66, 72. Williams's Indian Army, 272, 304. Malcolm, in Quart. Rev. xviii. 389, 415.

CHAP.
XLVII.

priests of the insurgents advanced and invoked them to join their natural friends, only one man was found wanting to his duty, and he was immediately put to death by his comrades, who throughout maintained the most unshaken fidelity and courage.

34.
Which is
owing to the
fidelity of
the English
government
to its en-
gagements.

The secret of this extraordinary fidelity of the native troops, under every temptation, to a foreign power professing a different religion, and known only by its successive overthrow of all the native potentates, is to be found in the wise and magnanimous policy with which the East India Company, through every vicissitude of fortune, have made good their engagements, and in the inviolable fidelity with which they have rewarded the services of the troops engaged in their ranks. From the earliest times the Indian princes have known no other way of paying their troops than by quartering them on some of the hereditary or conquered provinces of their dominions; where, though military license was allowed every latitude in the exaction of their pay or provisions, the soldiers experienced great difficulty, and were subject to a most vexatious uncertainty, in the recovery of their dues. When, therefore, instead of this harassing and oppressive system, the Indian sepoys found that they received their daily pay as regularly as English soldiers; that their wants were all provided for by a vigilant and honest government; that no subaltern fraud or chicanery was permitted to intercept the just rewards of their valour; and that, after a certain number of years' service, they were permitted to retire on ample allowances, or a grant of land, which formed a little patrimony to themselves and their descendants*—they were struck with astonishment,

* "I have beheld," says Sir John Malcolm, "with more patriotic pride than has ever been excited in my mind by any other act of British policy in India, a tract of country more than a hundred miles in length upon the banks of the Ganges—which had a few years before been a complete jungle, abandoned for ages to tigers and robbers—covered with cultivated fields and villages, the latter of which were filled with old soldiers and their families, in a manner which showed their deep gratitude and attachment for the comfort and happiness they enjoyed. When we consider the immeasurable quantity

and conceived the most unbounded confidence in a power which had thus for the first time set them the example of an upright and beneficent administration. Power in India is, even more than elsewhere in the world, founded on opinion; and the belief which gradually spread universally that the East India Company would, with perfect regularity and good faith, discharge all its engagements, formed a magnet of attraction which in the end drew almost all the strength and military virtue of the peninsula to its standards. When minutely examined, it will be found that it was neither the military discipline, nor the scientific acquisitions, nor the political talents of the British which has given them the empire of India, for all these were matched in the ranks of their enemies, recruited and directed as they were by French officers; but, far more than all these, their HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, which filled them with confidence in each other, and inspired the same reliance in the native powers;—qualities which, though often overreached in the outset by cunning and perfidy, generally prove more than a match for them in the end, and are destined ultimately to give to the Anglo-Saxon race the dominion of half the globe.¹

¹ Malcolm's Evidence before parliament, quoted in Martin, ix. 35, 72, 74, 80. Sinclair, 47, 49.

The order and regularity which prevail both in the maintenance of the Indian army, and the administration of its provinces, have produced the greater impression on the natives of the East, from the contrast which they afford to the hideous scenes of devastation and massacre with which, from the earliest times, conquest had been invariably attended in the plains of Hindostan. Throughout the whole period of the Mahommedan ascendancy in the south of India, the same enormities—the never-failing

^{35.} Contrast of the Company's rule to the devastating Mahommedan sway which preceded it.

of waste land in the dominions of the Company, it appears extraordinary that this plan has not been adopted, in every part of British India, upon a more liberal and enlarged scale. The native soldiers of Bengal are almost all cultivators, and a reward of this nature was peculiarly calculated to attach them. The accomplishment of this object would add in an incalculable degree to the ties which we have upon the fidelity of those by whom our dominion in India is likely to be preserved or lost."—MALCOLM'S *British India*, 1st Edit. 526, 528.

CHAP.
XLVII.

accompaniments of their presence and power—have occurred as in the northern provinces. The annals of this period give a succession of examples of the same unprovoked and devastating warfare; the same struggles for power among the nobles; the same unbridled lust of conquest in the government; the same perfidy, treason, and assassination in the transactions of courts; the same massacres, oppression, and suffering inflicted on the people. Examples have occurred of sixty, eighty, or a hundred thousand persons of all ages and sexes being put to death in a single day; great cities, and even capitals, were at once destroyed and delivered over tenantless to the alligator and the tiger; the treasures of the native princes were invariably filled with the plunder of their defenceless subjects. The system of Mahommedan exaction, at first under the name of contribution, latterly under that of revenue, being everywhere the same, with the power of rapacious armies to enforce it, the fate of the unhappy people was stamped with permanent wretchedness. Dreadful as were the devastations of war and conquest, they were as nothing compared to the lasting evils of military exaction and cupidity. There was no security whatever either for persons or property: the latter was always considered as the fair object of seizure wherever it was known to exist; and the mass of the people were subject to a state of poverty from which there was no escape—of violence and oppression, against which there was no redress.¹

¹ Rickard's India, i. 223, 234. Orme, b. i. c. 4. Malte Brun, iii. 310, 312.

36.
Unbounded devastations of their former wars.

Wars between the native or Mahommedan princes were perpetual, and their devastation extended not merely to the troops or armed men engaged, but to the whole population. Weeping mothers, smiling infants at the breast, were alike doomed to destruction; the march of troops might be tracked by hillocks of bodies and pyramids of human heads, burning villages, and desolated capitals. Under the Mahratta chiefs, who rose upon the decline of the Tartar dynasty, the same boundless rapacity con-

tinued, aggravated by the establishment of above twenty petty chiefs, each of whom exercised the right of making war on his own account. The work of devastation was perpetual: massacres, conquests, conflagrations, make up the history of India for the last eight hundred years. So universal had this oppression been, and so deeply rooted had its effects become in the habits of the people, that the display of wealth was universally avoided as the certain forerunner of additional exaction. Property was invariably either buried or invested in diamonds, which admitted of easy concealment: of the vast and fertile plains of India not more than a fourth part was cultivated.* The population was hardly a fifth of what, under a more beneficent government, it might become; while the long-continued drain of the precious metals to the East, so well-known to politicians of every age, indicated as clearly the precarious tenure of property which rendered concealment indispensable, as the recent and unparalleled occurrence of the *importation* of gold and silver from India demonstrates the arrival of the era for the first time in Eastern history, when the necessity for hoarding has ceased, and, under British protection, the natural desire for enjoyment can find an unrestrained vent among the natives of Hindostan.¹

To complete the almost fabulous wonders of this Oriental dominion, it only requires to be added, that it has been achieved by a mercantile company in an island of the Atlantic, possessing no territorial force at home: who merely took into their temporary pay, while in India, such part of the English troops as could be spared from

¹ Rickard's India, i. 223, 224. Orme, b, i. c. 4. Martin, ix. 75, 86. Malte Brun, iii. 310, 314.

* Hindostan, from the Himalaya mountains to Cape Comorin, contains 512,873 square miles; including the protected states, 1,280,000. The population of the former is 93,000,000, being at the rate of about 190 to the square mile. This, under the tropical sun, and with the rich alluvial soil of a large part of India, capable, in general, of bearing two crops in the year, must be considered a very scanty population. France contains 32,000,000 of inhabitants, and 156,000 square miles—or 214 to the square mile; England, 13,500,000, and 38,500 square miles—or 330 to the square mile; Flanders, 3,762,000, and 7400 square miles—or 507 to the square mile. Even in Bengal, the garden of

CHAP.
XLVII.

37.

Wonderful
nature of
this empire,
won by so
small a force,
and amidst
so many
difficulties
at home.

the contests of European ambition; and who never had, at any period, thirty thousand British soldiers in their service, while their civil and military servants did not amount to six thousand. The number of persons under their auspices who proceed yearly to India, is never six hundred, and the total number of white inhabitants who reside among the hundred and forty millions of the sable population, is hardly eighty thousand! So enormous, indeed, is the disproportion between the British rulers and their native subjects, that what the Hindoos say is literally true, that if every one of the followers of Bramah were to throw a handful of earth on the Europeans, they would be buried alive in the midst of their conquests. It augments our astonishment at the wisdom and beneficence of the Indian government, that these marvellous dominions have been gained, and these lasting benefits conferred upon their subjects, during a period checkered by the most desperate wars; when the very existence of the English authority was frequently at stake, and the whole energies of government were necessarily directed, in the first instance, to the preservation of their own national independence. During the growth of this astonishing prosperity in the Indian provinces, the peninsula has been the seat of almost unceasing warfare. It has witnessed the dreadful invasion of Hyder Ali; the two terrible wars with Tippoo Sultaun; the alternations of fortune, from the horrors of the Black Hole at Calcutta to the storming of Seringapatam; the long and bloody Mahratta wars; the Pindaree conflict; the Goorkha campaigns; the capture of Bhurtpore; the murderous

Hindustan, out of 202,650 square miles, only 89,250 are actually under cultivation. The produce of the soil there varies from forty to a hundred fold; on an average, about sixty-fold, at least four times that of the richest portion of Europe—which would, of course, maintain four times the number of persons on a square mile that can find subsistence in these northern climates.—MOREAU, *Statist. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 107-112; MALTE BRUN, vi. 84; and *Stat. Journal*, i. 195. In the Madras presidency, the population is only 107 to the square mile; in the Bombay, 114; in Singapore and Malacca, 92; in Ceylon, 50; over the whole of India, 144.—MOREAU, ii. 113.

warfare in the Burmese empire; the awful disaster of the Coord-Cabul Pass, the desperate chances of the Sikh invasion. During the seventy years of its recent and unexampled rise, twelve long and bloody wars have been maintained; the military strength of eighty millions of men, headed and directed by French officers, has been broken, and greatness insensibly forced upon the East India Company, in the perpetual struggle to maintain its existence. The Indian government has been but for a short time in the possession of its vast empire: thirty years only have elapsed since the Mahratta confederacy was finally broken; its efforts for a long period have been directed rather to the acquisition or defence of its territories than to their improvement; and yet, during this anxious and agitated period, the progress of the sable multitude who are embraced in its rule has been unexampled in wealth, tranquillity, and public felicity.¹

¹ Martin, ix.
73, 77. Sinclair, 27.

It was a maxim with the Romans, from which they never deviated, not to undertake two great wars at the same period; but rather to submit even to insults and losses for a time, than bring a second formidable enemy on their hands. Strongly as this principle is recommended, both by its intrinsic wisdom, and the example of that renowned people, it is not always capable of being carried into execution; and the British were frequently compelled in Hindostan, by the pressure of native confederacies, to sustain the most formidable foreign conflicts, at a time when the resources of the monarchy were all required to sustain the fortunes of the state in the contests of European ambition. At the same time that the East India Company, with their brave and faithful sepoys, were successfully combating the immense and disciplined hordes of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, the vast American colonies of England, directly ruled by parliament, were severed from the empire without any considerable external aid, by the mere force of internal discontent. The dissatisfaction of Canada has more than once led to

38.
Wars in which the empire was involved during the growth of the Indian power.

CHAP.
XLVII.

alarming collisions between the central government and the native French population; and the West India islands have been restrained only by the inherent weakness of a slave colony from breaking off all connexion with the parent state. The first rise of our Indian empire was contemporaneous with the energetic administration of Chatham, and the glories of the Seven Years' War: the moral courage and decided conduct of Hastings saved it from destruction, at the very moment when the weakness and corruption of Lord North's administration occasioned the loss of the American colonies: the contest with the Mysore princes occurred at the same time as that with Revolutionary France, and "Citizen Tippoo" was not the least esteemed ally both of the Directory and the Consular government: while the able and vigorous administration of Marquis Wellesley took place when Napoleon was commencing his immortal career in Europe; and Great Britain stretched forth her mighty arms into the eastern hemisphere, and struck down the formidable confederacy of the Mahratta princes, at the very time when she was engaged in a desperate contest for her existence with the conqueror of continental Europe.

39.
What were
the causes of
this success?
Was conquest forced
upon the
British by
necessity,
or adopted
from inclination?

It is an interesting object of inquiry—what was the form of government and system of foreign administration under which these astonishing triumphs were achieved by England in the eastern hemisphere? Were these triumphs, as the Continental writers and the enemies of the East India Company assert, the result of a continual system of aggression on their part, like the wars of the Romans in ancient, or the conquests of Napoleon or of Russia in modern times? or were they, as their supporters maintain, forced upon them, much against their will, by native combinations and intrigues, which constantly gave them no other alternative but conquest or ruin? It is observed by a French annalist, and quoted with approbation by the greatest of modern historians, that "in the light of precaution, all conquest must be inef-

¹ Gallard,
quoted by
Gibbon, c.
49, ix. 187.

fectual unless it could be universal ; since the increasing circle must be involved in a larger sphere of hostility." ¹ There can be no doubt that this remark is well founded, and that it sufficiently explains the experienced impossibility which the British, like all other conquering nations, have felt, of stopping short in their career when once commenced, before they had reached the limits assigned by nature to their further progress. From the time when they first became territorial sovereigns in the East, and a handful of Europeans ventured to rear the standard of independence among the sable multitudes of Asia, they had no alternative but to go on conquering, in a continually increasing circle, till they came to the snows of the Himalaya and the waves of the Indus. But while the British were, unquestionably, equally with the Romans or Napoleon, exposed to this necessity, yet there was a wide difference in their relative situations, and the consequent readiness with which they may be supposed to have embraced the career of conquest, thus in a manner forced upon them.

Rome had an inexhaustible stock of vigour and capacity in the numerous bands of experienced soldiers whom she nourished in her bosom ; and from the moment that they left the frontiers of the republic, they subsisted at the expense of the allied or conquered states. France vomited forth a host of ardent starving insolvents, to regenerate by plundering all mankind ; and, borrowing from her predecessors in ancient times the maxim that war should be made to maintain war, experienced not less relief to her finances than security to her institutions, by providing either by death or victory for such a multitude of turbulent defenders. But England had a very different task to execute when she became involved in the task of subjugating Hindostan. The centre of her strength was situated fourteen thousand miles from the banks of the Ganges ; a few thousand soldiers were all she could spare for eastern, from the pressure of European or the dangers

40.
Difference
between
Rome and
France, and
England, in
this particular.

CHAP.
XLVII.

of American warfare: the power which was involved in Indian hostilities was a mere company of merchants, who looked only to a profitable return for their capital, or a rise in the value of their stock, and dreaded nothing so much as the cost of unproductive warfare. For thirty years after they were involved in hostilities, so far from effecting any conquests, they were barely able to defend their own mercantile establishments from destruction; and every foot-soldier they transported from Europe to Hindostan cost thirty, every horseman eighty, pounds sterling. In these circumstances, it requires no argument to demonstrate that foreign aggression could not, in the first instance at least, have been voluntarily entered upon by the rulers of India. The slightest acquaintance with their annals is sufficient to show, that they stood in every instance really, if not formally, on the defensive: and that it was in the overthrow of the coalitions formed for their destruction, or the necessary defence of the allies whom previous victory had brought to their side, that the real cause of all their Indian acquisitions is to be found.

41.
Conquest
was forced
on the Bri-
tish in the
East by
necessity.

In truth, war has, in every instance for the last half century, been forced upon the East India Company, not only without their inclination, but in opposition to their most strenuous exertions. Nothing always appeared so terrible to the mercantile rulers of Leadenhall Street as the expenditure requisite either in preparing for, or conducting foreign wars in Hindostan. A good dividend upon their stock was the object they always coveted, and they anticipated nothing but ruin to that from hostilities; they were from first to last mercantile adventurers, not territorial conquerors. More than one governor-general of the highest capacity or most far-seeing penetration has been recalled for having undertaken or prepared for contests, which the event proved were essential to the salvation of our eastern empire. The bad success which in the outset of such contests has often attended our arms,

has in general arisen from the peremptory pacific orders of the East India Company, and the consequent want of any adequate preparation for wars, which those on the spot saw evidently were approaching, and to meet which the most extensive armaments were requisite. Lord Wellesley fell a sacrifice to the moral courage which led to the overthrow of the Mahratta confederacy: Lord Ellenborough to the far-seeing sagacity which was preparing against the dangers of the Sikh invasion. It is the highest proof of the energy and courage inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race, that, despite such a system of government, and the numerous disasters in the commencement of contests which it has occasioned, they have all in the end been overcome, and an empire established in the East, second now to none in the world in rulers and power, and which rivals that formed in ancient times amidst lesser difficulties by the valour and perseverance of the Roman Legions during three centuries.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

RISE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE UNDER CLIVE AND HASTINGS.

1750—1798.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1756.

1.

Sketch of
the principal
Indian
powers
when the
British empire
arose.

Atlas,
Plate 47.

WHEN the English, in the middle of the eighteenth century, quitted their commercial establishments at Calcutta and Madras to engage in a perilous contest with the native powers of India, the chief potentates with whom they were brought in contact, either as allies or as enemies, were the following:—In the northern parts of the peninsula, on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges, which is properly called Hindostan, the once-dreaded empire of Timour had sunk into the dust; and the Mogul emperors, on their throne at Delhi, could with difficulty maintain even a nominal sway over the powerful rajahs in their vast dominions. The most considerable of these was the Rajah of Bengal and Bahar, whose dominions extended over the vast and fertile plains watered by the Ganges, and who boasted of thirty millions of inhabitants acknowledging his authority. The next formidable potentate on the eastern coast, between Calcutta and Madras, was the Nizam, whose dominions embraced eleven millions of souls, and whose seat of government was Hyderabad. Dread of the Mahrattas, who lay contiguous to this state on the west, and of the Sultaun of Mysore, who adjoined it on the south, rendered the court of Hyderabad the firm and faithful ally of the East India Company. In the southern part of the peninsula, the

dominions of the Rajah of Mysore lay spread over a vast extent on the high table-land of Mysore, three or four thousand feet above the sea; and from his strong fortress of Seringapatam he gave the law to sixteen millions of brave men. This dynasty, however, was supplanted, about the same time that the British dominion was established on the banks of the Ganges, by that of Hyder Ali, a soldier of fortune, who usurped his dominions, and added to them various lesser states in their vicinity, and soon communicated to the whole the vigour of enterprise, and the thirst for foreign dominion. With this great power, serious and bloody wars were waged by the English for above thirty years.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1756.

Farther to the north, and on the western coast, the Mahratta confederacy governed a territory of vast extent and resources, though their predatory and restless habits, which engaged them in constant wars with their neighbours and each other, kept the country in great part desolate, and blighted the fairest gifts of nature. If united, the Mahratta chieftains could bring two hundred thousand horsemen, long the scourge of Northern and Central India, into the field; but their constant feuds with each other rendered it improbable that this vast force should be concentrated against any external enemy. The most renowned of these chieftains were the Rajahs of Berar, Scindiah, and Holkar; each of whom could muster sixty thousand men, almost entirely cavalry, round his standards. They acknowledged allegiance to the Peishwa, who was at the head of their confederation, and from his seat of government at Poonah, professed to execute treaties, and issue orders, binding on the whole allied states. But his authority was little more than nominal, and each of these powerful chieftains took upon himself, without scruple, to make war and conclude alliances on his own account. A vast number of lesser chiefs occupied the intervening country, from the northern frontier of the Mahratta states to the Indus, which was inhabited

2.
The Mahratta
Confederacy.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1756.

by different races, the Sikhs and Rajpoots, famed in every period of Indian history for their martial qualities, and to whom subsequent events at Bhurtpore and in the Punjaub have given still greater celebrity. In the great Alpine ridge which separates Hindostan from Tartary, the Goorkha and Nepal tribes had found shelter, and maintained, amidst forest steepes and narrow vales, the indomitable valour which, in every part of the world, seems to be the peculiar attribute of the mountain race.

3.
Origin and
early history
of the East
India Com-
pany. Cap-
ture of Cal-
cutta by
Surajee
Dowlah.

The first charter of incorporation of the East India Company was granted by Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the sixteenth century; but it was not for a hundred and fifty years afterwards that they became territorial sovereigns. During the long period that intervened from their first origin till the middle of the eighteenth century, they painfully and industriously pursued a pacific career, neither aspiring after foreign conquest, nor accumulating any force to defend even their own factories from aggression. So humble were their fortunes, even at the close of this long period, that, in 1756, when the ferocious tyrant Surajee Dowlah invested and captured Calcutta, the destined Queen of the East, and now the abode of a million of inhabitants, the whole persons made prisoners amounted only to one hundred and forty-six! They were all confined, by his orders, in a dungeon not twenty feet square, with only one window, during an intensely hot night in June. Imagination itself can scarcely figure, subsequent genius has scarcely been able to portray, the sufferings of that dreadful night. "Nothing," says Macaulay, "in history or fiction, not even the story which Ugolino told in the sea of everlasting ice, after he had wiped his bloody lips on the scalp of his murderer, approaches the horrors which were recounted by the few survivors of that night. They cried for mercy, they strove to burst the door. The governor, Mr Hollwell, who, even in that extremity, retained some presence of mind, offered large bribes to the gaolers; but it was all

in vain. Then the prisoners went mad with despair. They trampled each other down, fought for the places at the window, fought for the pittance of water with which the cruel mercy of the murderers mocked their agonies; raved, prayed, blasphemed, implored the guards to fire among them. The gaolers, in the mean time, held lights to the bars, and shouted with laughter at the frantic struggles of the victims. At length the tumult died away in low gaspings and moanings. The day broke; the nabob had left off his debauch, and permitted the doors to be opened; but it was some time before the soldiers could make a lane for the survivors, by piling up on each side the heaps of corpses on which the burning climate had already begun to do its loathsome change. When at length a passage was made, twenty-three ghastly figures, such as their own mothers would not have known, came forth alive. A pit was instantly dug; the dead bodies, one hundred and twenty-three in number, were flung into it promiscuously, and covered up." Among those saved was Mr Hollwell, the governor; but the indignation excited throughout England by that inhuman cruelty was unexampled. All classes were animated by a generous desire to avenge the sufferings of their countrymen; and from the horrors of the *Black Hole of Calcutta* the glories of our Indian empire may be said to have taken their rise.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1756.

¹ Auber's
India, i. 53,
54. Martin,
vii. 10.
Orme, ii.
71, 76. Mac-
aulay's
Essays, iii.
144, 146.

The East India Company, at that period, possessed an inconsiderable settlement at Madras, on the eastern coast of India, protected by a fort called Fort George, and to it the distressed merchants at Calcutta despatched a deputation, earnestly soliciting succour. Fortunately, at that period, the hostilities which were hourly expected with France had caused a considerable body of British troops to be assembled in that city, which, from its comparative vicinity to Pondichery, the principal seat of French power in the East, was most exposed to danger; and a detachment of nine hundred Europeans, and fifteen

4.
Calcutta
retaken.
Rise and
great ex-
ploits of
Clive.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1757.

hundred sepoys, was forthwith despatched to restore the British fortunes at the mouth of the Ganges. This considerable band seemed little qualified to combat the vast armies of the Mogul Nabob on the plains of Bengal; but it was under the direction of one of those heroes who appear at distant intervals in history, whose master-minds acquire such an ascendancy over mankind as almost to command fortune; and from whose exertions, in circumstances the most adverse, unhoped-for triumphs often proceed. In the end of December 1756, COLONEL CLIVE appeared at the mouth of the Ganges, defeated the Mogul detachment sent to oppose his landing, retook Calcutta, and, disregarding the timid expostulation of the council, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs. It soon appeared how essential the guidance of a chief of such personal and moral courage was to the salvation of our Indian possessions at that critical juncture. Surajee Dowlah in a few weeks returned with increased forces; but Clive stormed his camp, and struck such terror into his troops, that a treaty was concluded, by which Calcutta was restored to the Company, and permission granted to *fortify* it. From that hour the territorial empire of England in India may be said to have been established.¹

¹ Orme, ii.
127, 137.
Auber, i.
60, 61.

5.
Dethrone-
ment of
Surajee
Dowlah by
Clive.

Shortly after this important event, intelligence arrived in India of the commencement of hostilities between France and England, and the government at Calcutta received advices that Surajee Dowlah was preparing to join the former with all his forces. Clive instantly took his determination; he resolved to raise up Meer Jaffier, a renowned military leader in Bengal, to the viceroyship of that province, in the hope that, owing his elevation to the British, he would be less disposed to join their enemies than the Nabob, who was already their inveterate enemy. Such a treaty was immediately concluded with the Hindoo potentate, on terms highly favourable to the English; and shortly afterwards hostilities commenced, by Colonel Clive marching with two thousand men against

the French fort of Chandernagore, on the Hoogly, eighty miles above Calcutta. This fort was soon taken, and several others reduced. At length, on the 22d June, Clive, with his little army, then raised to nine hundred Europeans and two thousand sepoys, and six guns, came up with the vast array of Surajee, consisting of fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, under French officers, in a good position at PLESSY. For the first and last time in his life, Clive called a council of war: the proverb held good, and the council declined to fight;* but the English general consulted only his own heroic character, and led his troops against the enemy. The odds were fearful; but valour and decision can sometimes supply the want of numbers. The British were sheltered, in the early part of the day, by a high bank from the cannon-shot of the enemy: treachery and disaffection reigned in the Asiatic ranks; and before Clive led his troops in their turn to the attack, the victory was already gained. The Nabob fled on his swiftest elephant; Clive remained master of the Indian camp, artillery, and baggage; and the fate of a kingdom as great as France, containing thirty millions of inhabitants, was determined with the loss of seventy men.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.1757.
June 22.

¹ Orme, ii.
171, 179.
Mill, iii.
165, 169.
Martin, viii.
17.

The British ascendancy on the Ganges was now secured. Meer Jaffier, as the reward of his treachery, was saluted by the conqueror as Nabob of Bengal and Bahar. Surajee was soon made prisoner and slain; and his successor

* Clive stated in his evidence before the House of Commons—"This was the only council of war I ever called, and if I had abided by its decision, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company." The same truth may be observed in all ages, and in all transactions civil and military, where vigour and decision are requisite to success. The shelter of numbers is never sought but by those who have not the moral courage to act on their own conviction; true intrepidity of mind never seeks to divide responsibility. In the multitude of counsellors there may be safety; but it is in general safety to the counsellors, not to the counselled.—See CLIVE's *Evidence before the House of Commons*, given in MILL's *App. No. vi.*, and iii. 166.

He assigned the following reasons for his treaty with Meer Jaffier to dethrone Surajee Dowlah. "That after Chandernagore was attacked, he saw clearly that they could not stop there, *but must go on*; that having established them-

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1765.

6.

Acquisition
of territory
by the Com-
pany, and
defeat of
the Mogul
Emperor.
22d Feb.
1760.

15th June,
1761.

23d Oct.

1764.

¹ Orme, ii.

347, 865.

Auber, i.
90, 94.

7.

Cession of
all Bengal
and Bahar
to the Eng-
lish.

purchased the foreign aid which had gained him the throne by the grant of an ample territory around Calcutta, and the immediate payment of £800,000 as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Mogul Emperor, alarmed at this formidable irruption of strangers into one of the provinces of his mighty dominions, made an attempt to expel the intruders, and reinstate the former dynasty on the throne; but he was defeated by Meer Jaffier, aided by the Company's forces. Jaffier was soon after deposed in consequence of his weak and tyrannical disposition, and succeeded by his natural son, Meer Cossim: the Moguls were finally routed by Major Carnac, and the French auxiliaries made prisoners. After this, the British proceeded from one acquisition to another, till, after several intrigues and revolutions in the native governments of Bengal, sometimes effected by their influence, sometimes forced upon them by the inconstancy of the Mahomedan princes, a great battle was fought at Buxar, in which the Moguls were totally defeated, with the loss of six thousand men, and one hundred and fifty guns.¹

This important victory decided the fate of Bengal. Lord Clive, who had returned to Europe in 1760, soon after was sent out again to Hindostan; and, foreseeing the necessity of the East India Company assuming the government of the whole of that province, if they would preserve their footing on the banks of the Ganges, insisted as an indispensable preliminary that its sovereignty should be ceded to the English power. The

selves by force, and not by the consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, and some upon record; that he suggested, in consequence, the necessity of a revolution, and Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be Nabob instead of Surajee Dowlah." This is precisely the language and principles of Napoleon; this necessity of *advancing* to avoid being destroyed, is the accompaniment of power founded on force in all ages. The British power in India was driven on to greatness by the same necessity which impelled the European conqueror to Moscow and the Kremlin: it is the prodigious difference in the use the former made of their power, even when acquired by violence, which, hitherto at least, has saved them from the fate which so soon overtook him.—CLIVE'S *Evidence*, *ut supra*, and MILL, iii. 162.

court of Delhi was too much humbled to be able to resist; and after a short negotiation, the Mogul emperor signed a treaty, by which he resigned all sovereign claims over Bengal, and part of Bahar and Orissa, in consideration of an annuity of £325,000 a-year; Surajee Dowlah, son of the former tyrant of that name, the Vizier of Oude, was restored to all his dominions, on condition of being taken under British protection, and paying a tribute for the support of the subsidiary force stationed in his capital; while the claims of the family of Meer Jaffier were adjusted by the settlement of a pension of £660,000 on his natural son. Thus, in the short space of ten years, was the English power on the Ganges raised from the lowest point of depression to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory; the refugees from an insignificant mud fort at Calcutta were invested with the sovereignty over a hundred and fifty thousand square miles, and thirty millions of men; the frightful dungeon of the Black Hole was exchanged for the dominion of the richest part of India; and, in the extremity of human suffering, the foundations were laid of an empire destined in half a century to overshadow the throne of Baber and Aurengzebe.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1744-60.

24th June,
1765.

¹ Auber, i.
90, 94, 119,
149. Ormc,
ii. 347, 365.
Martin, 21,
22.

While the genius of Clive, supported by the commanding spirit of Chatham and the resolution of the local government, was thus spreading the British dominion on the banks of the Ganges, the English had to sustain a still more obstinate contest in the southern part of India. MADRAS, on the coast of Coromandel, was, so early as the year 1653, invested with the dignity of a presidency, though at that period its garrison was limited, by an express resolution of the court of directors, to *ten* men. This insignificant town was the object of fierce contests between the English and French in the middle of the eighteenth century; the war which broke out in Europe in 1744, was as warmly contested in the East as the West; and a strong French military and naval force

8.
Origin and
progress of
the Madras
Presidency.

CHAP.
XLVIII.1746.
7th Sept.

8th Nov.

besieged and took it in 1746, its weak garrison of two hundred soldiers being allowed to retire by capitulation. Clive, then a clerk in a mercantile house at Madras, first embraced the profession of arms at this siege, and, after the capture of the town, escaped in the disguise of a Moor to Fort St David, a fortress sixteen miles distant, where the remnant of the British successfully made a stand; and the talents of the young soldier materially contributed to the defeat, which followed, of the French, seven-teen hundred strong, by two hundred British soldiers. Madras continued in possession of the French till the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749, when it was restored to the English dominion. Although, however, the direct war between England and France was terminated by this treaty, yet the mutual jealousy of these powers led to the continuance of a smothered and ill-disguised hostility in the East. The rival potentates struggled for the ascendancy in the councils of the Carnatic—a vast district, five hundred miles in length and a hundred in breadth, stretching along the coast of Coromandel, comprising the dominions and dependencies of the Nabob of Arcot. For several years the skill and address of M. Dupleix, the French commander, prevailed; but at length the daring courage of Colonel Clive, and the diplomatic ability of Major Lawrence, formed a counterpoise to his influence. This, however, was more than counterbalanced in the Deccan, where M. de Bussy had gained firm possession of an extensive district, six hundred miles in length, and yielding a million sterling of revenue to the French crown.¹

¹ Martin, viii. 42, 43.
Orme, i. 360, 420,
Auber, i. 48, 53.

9.
Sieges of
Madras and
Pondichery
by the
French and
English.

No sooner had hostilities broken out a second time in Europe, between France and England, in 1756, than the cabinet of Versailles made a strenuous effort to root out the British settlements on the coast of Coromandel. The expedition fitted out for Pondichery, the chief French stronghold, for this purpose, consisted of eight thousand men, of whom more than half were Europeans, under

Lally ; and after capturing Fort St David, to which the British had retired in the former war, they besieged Madras in form. The garrison, consisting of eighteen hundred European and two thousand sepoy troops, had to sustain a variety of desperate assaults, almost without intermission, for two months. At length the siege was raised, when the brave besieged were nearly reduced to extremities, by the arrival of the English fleet with six hundred fresh troops. Lally retired precipitately, and the British immediately carried the war into the enemy's territories. Colonel, afterwards Sir Eyre Coote, invested and took the important fortress of Wandimash in the Carnatic ; and Lally having collected all his forces to regain that stronghold, was met and totally defeated by Coote, with six thousand men, who made General de Bussy and several of the ablest French officers prisoners, and took twenty pieces of cannon. This great victory proved decisive of the fate of the French power in India. Lally was soon after shut up in his capital, after losing all the detached forts which he held in the province ; he was closely blockaded by sea and land by the victorious armies and fleets of England ; and at length, after a protracted siege of eight months, in which the gallant Frenchman exerted all the expedients of courage and skill to avert his fate, his resources were exhausted, he was compelled to capitulate, and in the middle of January the British standards were hoisted on the towers of Pondichery.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.1746.
1st June.

18th Aug.

Jan. 12th.

April, 1760.

¹ Orme, ii.
480, 724.
Martin, viii.
43, 44.
Auber. i.
102, 104.

Robert Clive, afterwards Lord Clive, the founder of the British empire in India, to whom these triumphs were mainly owing, was born at the ancient seat of his ancestors, near Market-Drayton, in Shropshire, on the 29th September 1725. His family had been settled there since the twelfth century ; but, like many others of old extraction in that country, had never risen to eminence either for good or for evil. Traces of the character of the future hero are to be found even in the earliest anecdotes of the child. The letters, still existing, of his rela-

^{10.}
Early his-
tory of
Clive.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1746.

tions prove, that when yet only seven years of age, his determination of purpose, vehement passions, and unflinching intrepidity, were conspicuous. "Fighting," says one of his uncles, "to which he is beyond all measure addicted, gives his temper such a fierceness and imperiousness, that he flies out on every trifling occasion." At the age of twelve he terrified all the people of Market-Drayton by climbing to the top of the lofty steeple of the village, where he was seen for some time calmly seated on a stone spout near the summit. Soon after, he formed the boys of the place into a sort of predatory band, who levied contributions of apples and halfpence on the shopkeepers. In the vain hope of quelling his turbulent disposition, he was sent from school to school, in all of which he learned little, and gained the reputation of being exceedingly unmanageable, though one old master, more sagacious than the rest, prophesied that the wild boy would make a great man. At length his relations, anxious to get quit of him, were glad to accept the offer of a writership, or civil appointment in India; and he set sail for Madras at the age of eighteen, in the year 1743.¹

¹ Malcolm's
Life of
Clive, i. 43.

11.
His first introduction
into active
life.

Young Clive had not been long in India before his peculiar character made itself conspicuous. At first he was melancholy and reserved; he had no friends, the warm climate affected his health, solitude oppressed his spirits; and in his letters he speaks of his "dear native England, and Manchester the centre of all my wishes," with an affection which could hardly have been anticipated from his previous temper. This solitude, however, was the making of his character: he took with vehement ardour to reading, and compensated in a few years for the previous idleness of his youth. The uncontrollable fury of his passions, however, still continued: his violent temper frequently put him in danger of losing his situation; he fought a desperate duel with a noted bully who had long been the terror of Fort St David; and twice, in fits of despair, attempted to shoot himself. On both

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1749.

occasions the pistol, though well loaded and primed, missed fire; an occurrence with which Clive was so much struck, that on laying down the weapon he exclaimed, that "surely he was destined for something great!" An opportunity soon occurred for showing his real character. War having broken out in India in 1746, between the English and French, he entered the army as an ensign at the age of twenty-one, and soon distinguished himself highly in several operations against Dupleix. Peace having soon after been concluded, he again returned for a season to pacific pursuits, and was appointed commissary, with the rank of captain. But in 1749 his career of greatness began by the master-stroke which he suggested to the government, and in person delivered against Arcot, the capital of the rajah of the same name, and the heroic valour with which, at the head of a hundred and twenty English and two hundred sepoys, he successfully defended that fortress, when afterwards besieged, for two months against ten thousand of the bravest soldiers in India.¹

¹ Malcolm's Life of Clive, i. 62, 165. Macaulay in Edinburgh Review, lxx. 300, 311.

Lord Clive was one of the greatest generals and bravest men, and second in civil government to none whom England, so fertile in able statesmen, has produced. It is hard to say whether he appears with most lustre as the hero whose single exploits laid the foundation of a mighty empire, or as the governor whose resolution and integrity stamped the characters which have given stability and permanence to its power. With his defence of Arcot commenced that long series of triumphs which was destined to carry the British standards beyond the Himalaya snows and the Indian Archipelago, to Ghuznee and Nankin; with his civil administration, the power which has equalled in extent, and exceeded in duration, the empire of Aurengzebe. His genius for war was intuitive; he had little instruction, no counsellors; he was born a general. Compelled to form himself, his officers, and his army, he did the whole, amid the deepest adversity, in a few years.

^{12.} His character as a hero and a statesman.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1749.

Like all great men, he took counsel only of himself; saw by intuition the whole art of war; communicated his own ardent spirit to a noble band of followers, and awakened among his gallant sepoys a devotion rivalling even that of the tenth legion of Caesar, or the Old Guard of Napoleon. "Such an extent of cultivated territory," it has been eloquently said, "such an amount of revenue, such a multitude of subjects, was never added to the dominion of Rome by the most successful proconsul; nor were such wealthy spoils ever borne under arches of triumph along the Sacred Way to the threshold of Tarpeian Jove. The fame of those who subdued Antiochus and Tigranes grows dim, compared with the splendour of the exploits which the young Englishman achieved at the head of an army not equal in numbers to half a Roman legion. As a statesman, he first made dauntless and unsparing war on the gigantic system of oppression, extortion, and corruption, which previously existed. In that war he put to hazard his ease, his fame, his splendid fortune. If the reproach of the Company and its servants has been nobly taken away; if in India the yoke of foreign masters has been found lighter than that of any native dynasty; if a body of public servants has been reared, unequalled for their ability, integrity, and public spirit, the praise is in no small degree due to Clive. His name stands high on the roll of conquerors; but it is found in a better list—among those who have done and suffered much for the happiness of mankind."* He died by his own hand, at the age of forty-nine, in a fit of insanity, produced by the ingratitude and persecution of his country. As a warrior, history must assign him a place in the same rank with Lucullus and Trajan; as a proconsul, the veneration due to Antoninus and Turgot; as a victim of national ingra-

* See Mr Macaulay's noble biography of Clive in the *Edinburgh Review*—an author upon whom alone the mantle of Hume since his time is worthy to descend.—*Edinburgh Review*, lxx. 309-312; and *Miscellaneous Essays*, iii. 205.

tude, a place in the narrower but more glorious fane of Themistocles and Scipio.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1760.

13.
Rise and
character
of Hyder
Ali.

The downfall of the French power in India first brought the English into contact with a still more formidable enemy than the ambitious rivals who had so long disputed with them the palm of European ascendancy. On the high table-land of Mysore, elevated three thousand feet above the level of Madras, is to be found a race of men, very different from the inhabitants of the lower plains of India, breathing a purer air, hardened by a cooler temperature, inured to more manly occupations. The inhabitants of Mysore are bold, restless, and impetuous; roving in disposition, predatory in habit, warlike in character; whose fierce poverty had for ages "insulted the plenty of the vales beneath." HYDER ALI was originally a private soldier in the army of the rajah of this district, and he received the command of three hundred men, in consequence of his gallantry at the siege of one of the hill-forts of a neighbouring rajah. He was one of those domineering characters whom nature appears to have formed to command, and who, in troubled times, so often make their way, despite every obstacle, to the head of affairs. So illiterate as to be unable either to read or write, he was yet possessed of the ambition to desire, the daring to seize, and the capacity to wield supreme power; and the natural sagacity of his mind more than supplied what, in others, is the fruit of lengthened study, or the dear-bought result of experience in the world.* Active, indefatigable, and intrepid, he fearlessly incurred danger and underwent fatigue in the pursuit of ambition: liberal of money, affable in manner, discerning in character, he soon won the affections of his followers, and attracted to his standards that host of

* He was entirely ignorant of the processes of arithmetic; but such was the power he possessed of mental calculation, that he could outstrip, in arriving at a result even of complicated figures, the most skilful arithmeticians; and none of his followers could deceive him in his estimate of the amount of the plunder which should be brought into his treasury.—MILL, iii. 407.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1798.

adventurers who in the East are ever ready to swell the train of conquest. Faithless in disposition, regardless of oaths, unscrupulous in action, he was distinguished by that singular mixture of great and wicked qualities which, in every age, from the days of Caesar to those of Napoleon, has marked the character of those who raise themselves amidst blood and tumult from a private station to the command of their country. He appeared at that era, ever so favourable to usurpers, when the established government is falling to pieces from the weakness and vices of its possessors, and the experienced evils of anarchy at once prepare the throne for an audacious soldier, and induce men to range themselves in willing multitudes under his banners. His career began as a subaltern at the head of two hundred foot and fifty horse; but he was soon vested with the command of the important fortress of Dindigul, and rapidly attracted numbers to his standard by the success of his operations, and the boundless license which he permitted to his followers in plundering the adjacent territories. He experienced many reverses; but rose superior to them all, and went on from one acquisition to another, till he had entirely subverted the former government, seized the great commercial city of Bednore, with its treasures, estimated at twelve millions sterling, placed himself on the throne of Seringapatam, and established his authority over almost the whole southern parts of the Indian peninsula.¹

¹ Wilks' Historical Sketches, 240, 449, 472. Mill, iii. 404, 417. Martin, viii. 46, 47. Auber, i. 112, 115.

14.
Hostilities with Hyder are resolved on by the local authorities, but disapproved by the Company.

Hyder had established amicable relations with the French in the Carnatic, during the period of their influence in India; but the early destruction of their power after he began to rise into importance, prevented for a number of years any rupture between him and the British. At length, however, the growing consequence of the Mysore usurper on the one hand, and the rising strength of the Company on the other, necessarily brought these two great powers into collision. Hostilities with Hyder were resolved on by the local

authorities in India ; and as a precautionary measure, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded with the Nizam, a rajah whose dominions were more immediately exposed to his incursions, by which Lord Clive engaged to support him, if attacked, with a considerable body of European and sepoy troops. The Directors at home, less impressed than the authorities on the spot with the indispensable necessity of advancing in power, if they would avoid destruction, evinced the utmost repugnance at this treaty, and distinctly foretold, that if offensive wars were once engaged in, the British would be drawn on from one conquest to another, till they could find no security but in the subjection of the whole, and would be involved in destruction by the very magnitude of their acquisitions.^{1*} But ere their pacific instructions could reach their destination, the die was already cast, and the dreadful war with Hyder Ali had commenced.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1767.
12th Nov.

July, 1767.
1 Mill, iii.
414, 470.
Auber, i.
249.

Within a few weeks after its opening, the British were rewarded for their aggression by the defection of their faithless ally, the Nizam, who deserted to the Mysore chief with all his forces ; and at the same time intelligence was received that the latter had accommodated all his differences with the Mahrattas in the north, so that the confederacy which the English had projected against Hyder was now turned against themselves. The united forces of Hyder and the Nizam, forty thousand strong, approached Madras, and ravaged the country up to the very gates of the fortress ; and though Colonel Smith, with the British and sepoy troops, defeated them with

15.
First campaigns
against him,
and early
disasters.

Aug. 1767.

26th Sept.
1767.

* " If once we pass the bounds of defensive warfare, we shall be led from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose you the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan." And again, in another despatch, " We utterly disapprove and condemn offensive wars." The same principles were constantly followed by the Court of Directors, both during the administration of Warren Hastings and Marquis Wellesley ; but those great statesmen early perceived that it was impossible for a handful of foreigners to stop short in the career of conquest, and that, like Napoleon, they were constantly placed in the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin. *Directors' Despatch*, 22d April 1768 ; AUBER, i. 223-226.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1767.

1763.

the loss of sixty pieces of cannon, want of cavalry prevented him from obtaining any decisive success in the face of the numerous squadrons of the Mysore horse. The hostile incursion was repeated in the following year, when Hyder laid waste the Company's territory in so savage a manner, that like the countries desolated by Timour or Ghenghis Khan, nothing remained but bleached skeletons and smoking ruins to attest where the dwellings of man had been. In the midst of these successes, he opened a communication with the French authorities at Pondichery, to whom he announced the approaching destruction of the English power in the peninsula; while the East India Directors at home, panic-struck by the magnitude of the disasters already incurred, and the interminable prospect of wars and difficulties which opened before them, renewed in earnest terms their representations on the necessity of resuming the now almost hopeless attempt to effect an accommodation. At length Hyder struck a decisive blow. Sending all his heavy cannon and baggage home from Pondichery, which during his incursions he had twice visited to confer with the French, he put himself at the head of six thousand of his swiftest horse, drew the English army by a series of able movements to a considerable distance from Madras, and then, by a rapid march of a hundred and twenty miles in three days, interposed between them and that capital, and approached to Mount St Thomas, in its immediate vicinity. The Council were filled with consternation: although the fortress could have held out till the arrival of the English army, the open town and villas in its vicinity were exposed to immediate destruction; and they gladly embraced the overtures of accommodation which, like Napoleon, he made in the moment of his greatest success, and concluded peace on the invader's terms.¹ By this treaty it was provided that both parties should make a mutual restitution of their conquests, and that in case of attack

¹ Mill, iii.
414, 424.
Auber, i.
249, 250.

they should afford each other mutual aid and assistance.

The principal object of Hyder in concluding thus suddenly this important treaty, was to obtain for his usurped throne the countenance of the English power: the same motive which was Napoleon's inducement, immediately after obtaining the consular office, to make proposals of peace to Great Britain. He soon after, accordingly, made a requisition for the junction of a small body of English soldiers to his forces, in order to demonstrate to the native powers the reality of the alliance. The Company's affairs received so serious a shock by this inglorious treaty, that their stock fell at once sixty per cent. Hyder, some years afterwards, became involved in wars with his powerful northern neighbours, the Mahrattas, in which he was at first reduced to great straits, and he made an earnest requisition for assistance to the Company, in terms of the treaty of 1769. But the Madras council contrived, on one pretence or another, with more prudence than good faith, to elude the demand, to the inconveniences of which they were now fully awakened. These repeated refusals excited great jealousy in the breast of the Mysore chief, the more especially as he was well aware that the English had, in the interval since the cessation of hostilities, greatly augmented their army, especially in cavalry, in which it had formerly experienced so lamentable a deficiency, and that they had now thirty thousand well-disciplined men in the presidency. Accordingly, in June 1780, he descended into the Carnatic, at the head of the most powerful and best-appointed army which ever had appeared in India, consisting of twenty thousand regular infantry, and seventy thousand horse, of whom nearly a half were disciplined in the European method. So suddenly, and with such secrecy, were his measures taken, that the dreadful torrent was in motion before the English were so much as aware of

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1769.

16.

Transactions in the
Carnatic,
down to the
renewal of
the war
with Hyder
in 1780.

July 1776.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1780.

† Martin,
viii. 47, 48.
Auber. i.
540, 579.
Mill, iv.

its existence; and the government of Madras were apprised of the approach of the enemy for the first time by vast columns of smoke rising from burning villages in the Carnatic, which, converging from different directions, threatened to wrap the capital itself in conflagration.¹

17.
Mr Burke's
description
of Hyder's
irruption.

Mr Burke has described, with more than even his usual fervour of eloquence, this dreadful irruption:—"Hyder resolved, in the gloomy recesses of a mind capacious of such things, to leave the whole Carnatic an everlasting monument of vengeance, and to put perpetual desolation as a barrier between him and those against whom the faith, which holds the mortal elements of the world together, was no protection. Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and every rival, who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation of the European invader, he drew from every quarter whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the arts of destruction; and, compounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivities of the mountains. While the objects of these calamities were idly and stupidly gazing thunderstruck on this menacing meteor, which blackened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. Then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war, before known or heard of, were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants, flying from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered; others, without regard to sex, to age, to the respect of rank, or sacredness of function, fathers torn from children, husbands from wives, enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers, and the trampling of pursuing horses, were swept

into captivity in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade this tempest fled to the walled cities; but, escaping from fire, sword, and exile, they fell into the jaws of famine. For months together these creatures of suffering, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days had fallen short of the allowance of our austere fasts, silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint, perished by a hundred a-day in the streets of Madras; while every day seventy at least laid their bodies in the streets or on the glacis of Tanjore, and expired of famine in the granary of India."¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1780.

¹ Burke's speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts. Works, iv. 259, 261.

The success of Hyder in this tremendous inroad was almost equal to that of Surajee Dowlah, in the attack upon Calcutta twenty-four years before. With a degree of daring and military skill which rivalled that of Napoleon himself, he interposed with his whole forces between the two English armies, the one commanded by Colonel Baillie, the other by Sir Hector Monro, who were approaching each other, and only six miles distant; overwhelmed the former, when caught in ambuscade, by the multitude and vehement charges of his horse, literally trampling the English infantry under foot with his terrible squadrons and ponderous elephants,* and compelled the latter to retreat, and leave open the whole fortresses of the Carnatic to his attacks. The Indian chief was not slow in following up this extraordinary tide of success.² Arcot was speedily reduced; the whole open country ravaged, and siege laid to Wandimash, Vellore, Chingle-

18.
Great successes of Hyder in the Carnatic. Sept. 10.

Nov. 3.

² Mill, iv. 168, 171. Martin, viii. 48, 49. Auber, i. 580, 582.

* The valour displayed on this occasion by Colonel Baillie with his little band of followers, consisting only of four hundred Europeans and two thousand sepoy, never was exceeded even in the glorious fields of Indian warfare. Surrounded on all sides by the countless squadrons of Hyder's horse, torn in pieces by a terrible fire from sixty pieces of cannon, borne down by the weight and fury of the armed elephants, they yet long resisted with such vigour as more than once balanced the fortunes of the day, and threw Hyder into such perplexity, that but for the advice of Lally he would have drawn off in despair. The accidental explosion of two ammunition waggons early deprived them of their reserve ammunition; but, nevertheless, they continued the combat with heroic resolution to the last, forming a square which repelled thirteen different

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1780.

19.
The firm
conduct of
Warren
Hastings
and Sir
Eyre Coote
re-establishes
affairs.
Nov. 7.

put, and all the strongholds of the Carnatic. Parties of the Mysorean horse approached to the gates of Madras; the whole villas in its vicinity were deserted, and preparations were even made in the presidency for crossing the surf at the bar and abandoning the Carnatic for ever.

It is invariably in a crisis of this kind that the really great acquire an ascendancy. The timid shrink from responsibility, the multitude clamour for submission; the brave and intrepid stand forth as the deserving leaders of mankind. The council of Madras in the last extremity applied to the government of Calcutta for aid; and WARREN HASTINGS was at its head. Instantly summoning up all his resources, he rose superior to the danger; despatched Sir Eyre Coote with five hundred Europeans, and an equal number of sepoy, to the succour of Madras; and, superseding the council, whose improvidence or incapacity had brought the public fortunes to such a pass, took upon himself the supreme direction both in his own and the sister presidency. Nothing could exceed the disastrous state of affairs when Sir Eyre Coote now took the field against Hyder. His whole force did not exceed seven thousand men, of whom only one thousand seven hundred were Europeans; and he had to oppose a hundred thousand enemies, of whom eighty thousand were admirable horse, and three thousand French auxiliaries, who had recently landed from Europe in hopes, by the aid of so renowned a chieftain, of restoring their fallen fortunes in the East. By a conduct, however, at once prudent and intrepid, he succeeded in

attacks of the Mysore horse, the wounded raising themselves in many cases from the ground to resist the enemy with their bayonets, while the officers kept them at bay with their swords. Two hundred were made prisoners, for the most part desperately wounded, including the commander himself and his principal officers. They owed their lives to the humane interposition of Lally and the other French officers in the service of Hyder, who also did all in their power to mitigate the horrors of the captivity, more terrible far than death, which they afterwards underwent in the Mysorean dungeons.—See *Narrative of the Sufferings of those who fell into Hyder's hands after the battle of Conjeeveram*, Sept. 10, 1780; *Mem. of War in Asia*, ii. 102–188; MILL, iv. 165–166.

re-establishing affairs in the Carnatic. The sieges of Wandimash, Vellore, and the other beleaguered fortresses, were raised by Hyder at the approach of this new and more formidable enemy; and at length, after a variety of operations attended with various success, a decisive battle was fought between the opposing forces on the sea-coast near PORTO NOVO, whither the English had proceeded, in order to stop the incursions of the Mysoreans in the direction of Cuddalore. The contest lasted six hours, and success was, for a long period, so nearly balanced, that the whole reserves of the English were brought into action; but at length, by incredible exertions, Hyder's forces were repulsed at all points, and driven off the field in such confusion, that, if Sir Eyre Coote had possessed an adequate force of cavalry, he would have been involved in total ruin.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1781.

July 1, 1781.
¹ Mill, iv.
224, 228.
Auber, i.
624, 626.

Warren Hastings, to whose energy and determination this great success was mainly owing, was born of an ancient family, said to have been originally sprung from the Danish sea-kings, at Daylesford, in Worcestershire, on 6th December 1732. He was early distinguished by a studious turn, and inspired with a strong desire to reinstate the fortunes of his family, which once had overshadowed all the neighbouring proprietors, but had been sadly dilapidated in the lapse of centuries. At the age of seven years, as he lay on the brink of a little rivulet which flows through the old estate of his family on its way to the Isis, he first formed the resolution to regain his family possessions. This desire increased as he advanced in years: he pursued the design with that calm but indomitable spirit which distinguished him, as it does every other really great character. When, under a tropical sun, he ruled fifty millions of Asiatics, his heart was still at Daylesford; and after innumerable vicissitudes of fortune, he returned there to die, and left his bones in the churchyard, where he had played in infancy with peasant children.² "He had regained the estate," it has been

20.
Early his-
tory of
Hastings.² Gleig's
Life of
Hastings,
i. 5, 15.
Macaulay
in Edin-
Review,
lxx. 167.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1763.

21.

His progress
as a states-
man.

finely said—"he had restored his family ; he had done more : he had preserved an empire—he had restored his country."

The talents of the young Hastings, both in study and sport, soon attracted the notice alike of his companions and preceptors at school, and in 1750 he sailed with a civil appointment for India. After undergoing many vicissitudes of fortune, his talents as a diplomatic agent became so conspicuous, that after the battle of Plassey, in 1757, he was appointed resident at the court of Meer Jaffer. In 1764, he returned with a limited fortune to England ; but his ardent spirit still looked to the East as the scene of greatness, and in 1769 he re-embarked for Hindostan. Such was the reputation for capacity which he had already obtained, that, in 1772, he took his seat at the head of the Council Board of Calcutta. His vigour, audacity, and determination there, enabled him to triumph over a powerful confederacy of domestic enemies which had wellnigh proved his ruin ; and the death of his principal foe, the Maharajah Nuncomar, whom he brought to the scaffold for forgery, left him without a rival in civil administration, and struck terror into the hearts of the whole native population of India. Subsequently he engaged in many deeds which will ill bear the scrutiny of European ideas, but were strictly in unison with the daring which in every age has laid the foundation of Eastern greatness. Yet even in the most exceptionable of these, and those which were afterwards made the subject of such violent declamation in England—the Rohilla war, the revolution of Benares, and the spoliation of the Princesses of Oude—he acted under the pressure of state necessity, and agreeably to the maxims of oriental government and hostility. Every farthing he exacted was applied to the public service ; and, after having held the office of governor-general, and had all the wealth of the East at his command for thirteen years, he returned home with a fortune so moderate as to be evidently the saving only of his official income.¹

¹ Gleig, i.
156, 321.
Macaulay
in Edin.
Review,
lxx. 225,
227.

Hastings, in civil life, was the counterpart of Napoleon in war. He was an example of the class of lofty minds who, disregarding lesser objects, and often breaking subordinate rules, aim only at the attainment of great and lasting designs. With him, as with the heroes of Corneille, state necessity was the code of public morality. If he had been born in France in Napoleon's time, the Emperor would have made him his first councillor of state. Invincible resolution, moral courage, resolute determination, persevering efforts, unwearied public spirit, devoted patriotism, were his great characteristics ; and it is by such qualities that empires are won and saved. Some of his actions, viewed according to European ideas, appear harsh, a few blamable ; and certainly the great qualities of Hastings cannot abrogate the sacred rule, that the end will not justify the means. Yet must some allowance be made for the forces by which he was assailed, and the tortuous policy with which he was constrained to contend in the East. Good faith and just-dealing have ever been unknown in Hindostan ; moderation in conquest is there invariably set down to fear. Hastings combated the Asiatics, sometimes perhaps too rudely, but only when constrained by external danger or state necessity, with their own weapons. History, on this account, cannot pronounce him a faultless character ; yet must it respect the grandeur of mind which shone conspicuous even in his most questionable actions, and admire the noble spirit which disdained to bend before, and ultimately triumphed over, the most formidable combination ever arrayed in Great Britain against a single individual.

The great success won by the aid rendered by Hastings was, however, balanced by a bloody action, fought on the very ground where Baillie had so recently been defeated, in which, although neither party could boast decisive success, the English, upon the whole, were worsted ; and Hyder, as they retreated during the night, had good ground for proclaiming it to all India as a decided

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1781.

22.

His character and errors.

23.

Further disasters stemmed by the energy of Hastings. Death of Hyder.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1781.

Aug. 3.

Sept. 28.

Nov. 12.

3d Dec.

Feb. 17.

victory. The affairs of Madras were now reduced to extremities. Lord Macartney, who had just arrived there as governor, in vain made proposals of peace to the victorious chief: another murderous and indecisive action took place in the end of September. There was not a rupee in the treasury, nor the means of fitting out an additional soldier; the supreme government at Calcutta was as much straitened in finances, in consequence of a burdensome war with the Mahrattas, as the Madras presidency; and nothing but the unconquerable firmness and energy of Mr Hastings' administration preserved the affairs of the Company from total ruin. By his indefatigable efforts, and the aid of the funds which he had forced from the princesses of Oude, the resources of Lord Macartney were so much augmented, that his lordship was enabled, in November, to undertake the important enterprise of attacking Negapatam, a stronghold of Hyder's on the sea-coast, which gave him an easy entry into the Carnatic; and with such vigour were the operations conducted, that in a few weeks the place was taken, and the garrison of seven thousand men made prisoners. The British upon this regained their superiority in the field, and Sir Eyre Coote, taking advantage of it, pushed on and relieved Vellore, to the infinite joy of the garrison, who had been sixteen months closely blockaded, and were then reduced to the last extremity. Sir Eyre Coote, whose valour and conduct had done so much towards the re-establishment of affairs in the Carnatic, soon after reduced Chitore, and drove the enemy entirely out of the Tanjore. He afterwards fought, with checkered success, several other actions with his old antagonist Hyder. Colonel Braithwaite, with two thousand men, was totally defeated by TIPPOO SAIB, Hyder's son, at the head of ten thousand horse and twenty pieces of cannon, on the banks of the Cole river in the Tanjore; and the humane interposition of Lally and the French auxiliary officers alone preserved the prisoners from destruction:

while, after a bloody action, Hyder in person was repulsed by Sir Eyre Coote near Arnee, a few months after. This was the last contest between these two redoubtable antagonists: Sir Eyre was soon after obliged by bad health to return to Calcutta; and Hyder, in the midst of the most active operations in conjunction with the French fleet of twelve sail of the line, which had arrived off the coast, was summoned to another world, and died at Chitore at the advanced age of eighty-two.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1782.

Dec. 3.

¹ Auber, i.
600, 631.
Mill, iv.
210, 225.

Peace had been concluded between the Bombay government and the Mahrattas in the May preceding, which enabled the governor-general to assist the Madras presidency with large succours; and offensive operations were commenced at all points against Tippoo, who had succeeded to his father's dominions, and all his animosity against the English government. The contest, however, was still extremely equally balanced; and the government at Madras was far from exhibiting the unanimity and vigour which the importance of the occasion demanded.

24.
War with
Tippoo, and
invasion of
Mysore from
Bombay.
Its early
success.

In vain Lord Macartney, who was aware of the slender tie by which oriental armies are held together, urged General Stuart, who had succeeded Sir Eyre Coote in the command of the army, to take advantage of the consternation produced by the death of Hyder and absence of Tippoo, and instantly attack the enemy. The precious moments were lost: dissension broke out between the civil and military authorities, and Tippoo joined the army and established himself on his father's throne in the beginning of January. He was recalled, however, to the centre of his dominions, obliged to evacuate all his father's conquests in the Carnatic, and abandon and blow up Arcot, in consequence of the appearance of a formidable enemy in the heart of his power. The Bombay government, having considerable forces at their disposal in consequence of the Mahratta peace, had detached a powerful body, under Colonel Humberstone and General Mathews, into the Mysore country. These enterprising

December.

Jan. 4.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1763.

officers carried Onore by storm, on the sea-coast ; mounted the great pass called the Hussaingurry Ghaut, four thousand feet high, surmounted by a road slowly ascending through cliffs and precipices for five miles ; drove the enemy from all the batteries and forts, hitherto deemed impregnable, by which it was defended ; and rapidly advancing along the table-land of Mysore, at the summit made themselves masters of the rich city of Bednore, with a vast treasure, by capitulation ; carried Ananpore and Bangalore by assault, and spread terror throughout the whole centre of Tippoo's dominions.¹

¹ Mill, iv.
224, 231.
Auber, iv.
624, 631.

25.
Final dis-
asters of
the expe-
dition.

This formidable irruption completely relieved the Carnatic, which had hitherto been almost exclusively the seat of hostilities, from the invasion by which it had been for a series of years so cruelly ravaged, and, by depriving Tippoo of the treasure at Bednore, amounting to above a million sterling, seriously crippled his power. But it led, in the first instance, to a cruel and unexpected reverse. The magnitude of the spoil taken at Bednore threw the apple of discord among the victors. General Mathews refused to devote any portion of it to the pay of the troops, though they were above eighteen months in arrear ; Colonel Humberstone and several of the leading officers were so dissatisfied with this that they threw up their commands, and returned to lay their complaints before the government at Bombay ; the army was ruinously dispersed to occupy all the towns which had been taken ; and, in the midst of this scene of cupidity and dissension, Tippoo suddenly appeared amongst them at the head of fifty thousand men. Mathews, with two thousand infantry, was defeated before Bednore, and soon after forced to surrender in that town. The prisoners were put in irons, marched off like felons to a dreadful imprisonment in the dungeons of Mysore ; the whole towns taken by the British, in the high country, were regained ;² and the remnant of their forces, driven down the passes, threw themselves into the important fortress of Manga-

March.

April 9.

² Mill, iv.
232, 239.
Auber, i.
629, 632.

lore on the sea-coast below the Ghauts, where they were immediately invested by the victorious troops of the Sultaun.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1783.

The governments of Madras and Bombay, alive to the vital importance of withdrawing Tippoo's attention from this siege by diversions in other parts of his dominions, put in motion two different expeditions from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, into the country of Coimbatore, in the centre of his dominions, and endeavoured to stir up a civil war there by supporting the cause of the deposed rajah of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed. This project proved entirely successful. Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the southern army, acted with great vigour and intelligence, reduced Palagatchery, one of the strongest places in India, commanding an important pass on the sea-coast, made himself master of Coimbatore on the high-road to Seringapatam, the centre of the Sultaun's power, and menaced that capital itself. At the same time, the northern army made considerable progress on the other side; and both, converging towards the capital, had the conquest of Seringapatam full in view. The superiority of the British forces in the field was now apparent; the conclusion of a peace between France and England, of which intelligence had lately arrived in India, had deprived Tippoo of all hope of European aid, and the gallantry of the brave garrison of Mangalore had baffled the whole efforts of his vast army, and exposed them to dreadful losses by sickness during the rainy months. Discouraged by so many untoward circumstances, the bold spirit and inveterate hostility of the Sultaun at length yielded: after several insincere attempts at an accommodation, a real negotiation was set on foot in the close of 1783. Unhappily the pacification came too late to save Mangalore, the heroic garrison of which, after sustaining a siege of seven months against sixty thousand men, had at length been forced by famine to capitulate,¹ on the honourable terms of marching to the

26.
British in-
vasion of
Mysore,
which leads
to a peace.

Nov. 13.

Nov. 26.

¹ Mill, iv.
239, 247.
Mem. of
late War
in Asia, i.
286, 403.
Auber, i.
631, 641.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1784.

March 11.

nearest English territories with all their arms and accoutrements. But it was in the end concluded, and delivered the English from the most formidable war they had yet sustained for the empire of the East. On the 11th of March 1784, peace was concluded on the equitable terms of a mutual restitution of conquests.

27.
Change introduced by
Tippoo in
the Indian
armies.

It is seldom, says Gibbon, that the father and the son—he who has borne the weight and he who has been brought up in the lustre of the diadem—exhibit equal capacity for the administration of affairs. Tippoo inherited from his father all his activity and vigour, all his cruelty and perfidy, and, if possible, more than his inveterate hatred against the English; but he was by no means his rival either in military genius, or in the capacity for winning the affections and commanding the respect of mankind. Above all, he was not equally impressed as his great predecessor with the expedience of combating the invaders with the national arms of the East, and wearing out the disciplined and invincible battalions of Europe by those innumerable horsemen, in whom, from the earliest times, the real strength of Asia has consisted. Almost all Hyder's successes were gained by his cavalry: it was when severed from his infantry and heavy artillery, and attended only by a few flying guns, that his forces were most formidable. And it augments our admiration of the firmness and discipline with which the British and sepoy regiments under Coote withstood his assaults, when we recollect that they had to resist for days and weeks together, under the rays of a tropical sun, the incessant charges of a cavalry rivalling that of the Parthians in swiftness, equalling that of the Mamelukes in daring, approaching to that of the Tartars in numbers. But it was the very excess of the admiration which their great qualities awakened among the native powers which proved the ruin of Tippoo, and in the end gave the British the empire of the East. The officers of the Mysore court were so much struck by the extraordinary spectacle of a

few thousand disciplined men successfully resisting the thundering charges of thirty or forty thousand admirable horsemen, that they conceived that the secret lay not in their character but their tactics ; and naturally enough imagined, that if they could give to their own numbers and daring the discipline and steadiness of European troops, they would prove irresistible.

Hence the general adoption, not only in the Mysore, but the other Indian states, of the European tactics, arms, and discipline : a change of all others the most ruinous to their arms, and which, in subsequent times, has proved fatal to the independence of Turkey. Every people will find safety best in their own peculiar and national forces : the adoption of the tactics and military system of another race, will generally share the fate of the transplantation of a constitution to a different people. It was neither by imitating the Roman legions that the Parthians defeated the invasions of Crassus and Julian ; nor by rivalling the heavy-armed crusaders of Europe, that Saladin baffled the heroism of Richard ; nor by vanquishing the French infantry, that Alexander forced Napoleon into the Moscow retreat. Light horse ever have been, and ever will be, the main strength of the Asiatic monarchies ; and when they rely on such defenders, and these are conducted by competent skill, they have hitherto proved in the end invincible. It is the adoption of the system of European warfare which has uniformly proved their ruin. Hyder's horse, like the Parthian or Scythian cavalry, might be repulsed, but they could not be destroyed. The European squares toiled in vain after their fugitive squadrons, and, when worn out by incessant marching, found themselves enveloped by an indefatigable and long invisible enemy. But Tippoo's battalions could not so easily escape. Protection to their guns and ammunition waggons required that they should stand the shock of regular soldiers : Asiatic vehemence strove in vain to withstand European valour in a set field ; the strength of the East was lost

28.
Its ruinous
effects on
the inde-
pendence of
the native
powers.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1782.

29.
Mr Hastings' long-
protracted
prosecution.

without that of the West being gained; and in the attempt to substitute the one for the other, the throne of Mysore fell to the earth.*

Soon after the Indian empire of the East India Company had been engaged in these desperate contests for their very existence on the plains of the Carnatic, the statesman whose firmness and ability had brought them through the crisis, was exposed to an unparalleled persecution from the people on whom he had conferred so inestimable a benefit. In the confusion and vicissitudes of an empire thus suddenly elevated to greatness in a distant hemisphere, without any adequate restraint either on private cupidity or public ambition, many deeds of injustice had been committed, many private fortunes made by means which would not bear the light, many acts of oppression perpetrated in the name, and sometimes under the pressure, of state necessity. All these misdeeds, inseparable from an empire rising under such peculiar and unparalleled circumstances, were visited on the head of Mr Hastings. Faction fastened on the East as the chosen field of its ambitious efforts, where the lever was to be found by which the inestimable prize of Indian opulence was to be wrested from the hands of its present possessors. The sacred names of justice and equity, of religion and humanity, were prostituted as a cloak to the selfishness of private ambition; and the whole efforts of a powerful coalition of parties in the British islands, devoted for a

* In the war with Hyder in 1768, Colonel Wood, who commanded the British forces, found it impossible to bring him to a pitched battle. In vain the Madras government tried to equip him with a light train of artillery and a body of chosen men, in hopes that by the velocity of their advance they might succeed in bringing him to action; all their efforts were defeated by the rapidity and secrecy of his movements. At length, Wood, completely exhausted with the pursuit, hoping to rouse the Suldaun's pride, wrote him a letter, stating "that it was disgraceful for a great prince, at the head of a large army, to fly before a detachment of infantry and a few pieces of cannon, unsupported by cavalry." Hyder, however, returned the following characteristic answer:—"I have received your letter, in which you invite me to an action with your army. Give me the same sort of troops that you command, and your wishes shall be accomplished. You will in time come to understand my mode of warfare.

long course of years to the persecution of the statesman who had saved our empire in the East from destruction.

Early in 1782, the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr Dundas, and under the influence of the Rockingham administration, adopted a resolution condemnatory of Mr Hastings' administration, which led to a vote of recall of that governor-general by the East India Company. The latter resolution was, after the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the head of the ministry, rescinded, by a large majority of the East India proprietors; but the investigation resolved on by the Commons was prosecuted with increased vigour by the coalition ministry of Mr Fox and Lord North, by which the former cabinet was succeeded. Mr Hastings finally resigned his office, and returned to this country early in 1785; and in the following year, the prosecution commenced under the administration of Mr Pitt, who had succeeded to the helm. The impeachment was solemnly voted by a large majority of the Commons: proceedings soon after commenced with extraordinary solemnity before the House of Lords, and were protracted for many years in Westminster Hall, with a degree of zeal and talent altogether unexampled in the British senate.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

30.

Proceedings
in parliament on the
subject.
May 30.
June 14.
Oct. 31.

Feb. 1, 1785.

May 9, 1787.

Feb. 13,
1788.

¹ Auber, i.
683, 692.
Mill, v. 40,
100. Parl.
Deb. 1786.

In the earlier stages of the proceedings against Mr Hastings in the House of Commons, Mr Pitt voted with him, and, in consequence, a considerable part of the accusations were negatived by the House of Commons.

Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost a thousand rupees each horse, against your cannon-balls, which cost twopence? No! I will march your troops until their legs shall become the size of their bodies—you shall not have a blade of grass nor a drop of water. I will hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a-month. I will give your army battle; but it must be when I please, not when you please." Hyder was as good as his word. He laid waste the country, and, retiring before Colonel Wood, drew him on till his little army was exhausted with fatigue and privations, and in that weakened state attacked him, captured all his artillery, and reduced him to such straits that nothing but the opportune arrival of succours under Colonel Smith saved him from a total defeat. Had Tippoo's armies been formed on the same model, his descendants would, in all probability, have been still on the throne of Seringapatam.—See MARTIN, viii. 46, note.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

31.

Proceedings
and charges
against Mr
Hastings
before the
Commons.

His friends looked forward with reason to a total absolution. Not only on several preliminary questions, but on the great question of the Rohilla war, he had the support of government, and these charges were negatived in the House of Commons by a majority of 119 to 67. But, in regard to the charge of extortion from the Rajah of Benares, the prime minister suddenly took part with the Whig prosecutors, stigmatising the fine levied on that potentate (£500,000) as enormous and oppressive, and declaring, in regard to these transactions, "the conduct of Mr Hastings has been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible that he, as a man of honour or honesty, having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and therefore he had fully satisfied his conscience that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constitute a crime sufficient to call for an impeachment." This sudden and unexpected change of measure on the part of Mr Pitt, was decisive against Mr Hastings, as it immediately brought the majority in the Lower House against him; and it led in consequence to many vehement reflections on the conduct of the minister by the friends of the illustrious accused.* There is too much reason to

* Lord Campbell, in his valuable lives of the Chancellors, gives the following account of this unworthy transaction :—" Pitt having professed scruples when the King hinted a wish that Hastings, a few months after his return, should be called to the Upper House, Thurlow treated these scruples with contempt, and said, there was nothing to prevent the holder of the Great Seal from taking the royal pleasure about a patent of peerage !—So encouraged, Hastings actually chose his barony. Having fulfilled the resolution he had formed, when an orphan boy at a village-school, to recover the estate which had been for many centuries in his family, he now took his title from it, and declared that he would be ' Lord Daylesford of Daylesford, in the county of Worcester.' But Pitt put an end to all these speculations by voting against him, on the charge respecting the treatment of Cheyte Sing, one of the most unfounded, though he had voted with him on the charges respecting the Rohilla war, one of the best established of the grounds of complaint. A circular had been sent round by the treasury to all the ministerial members to attend and vote against : great was the astonishment of the friends of Mr Hastings and of the whole house; but it is said that, a few hours before the debate, Pitt received intelligence of the intrigue respecting the peerage, and of Thurlow's declaration that, under the King's authority, he would put the Great Seal to the patent without consulting any other minister. The turn was so sudden, that

believe that Mr Pitt's sudden change on this question, inexplicable on the face of the transaction, was really owing to a jealousy of Thurlow or Hastings, altogether unworthy of his character. And, without disputing that the fine was excessive, it must be allowed that it was imposed on a refractory delinquent, who had failed in the duty which his allegiance required; that it was determined on under the overbearing pressure of state necessity; that the exhaustion of the treasury, and the pressing dangers in the Carnatic, imperatively required an immediate supply of money, which could be obtained in no other way; that the funds thus acquired proved the salvation of India, by enabling Sir Eyre Coote to make head against Hyder, and were all applied by Mr Hastings to public purposes; and that, if justice and not persecution had been the object of the House of Commons, it would have been better obtained by a vote of restitution or reparation from the English legislature to the injured rajah, than by the adoption of vindictive proceedings against a statesman who, in this matter, did evil that good might come of it.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1785.

¹ See Parl. Hist. 1786, xxvi. 108-112; Mill, v. 55, 56; and Wraxall's Mem. ii. p. 174, 201.

Never before had such an assemblage of talent, eloquence, and influence been exerted in any judicial

even the attorney-general voted against the prime minister: but the impeachment was carried by a majority of 119 to 79."—CAMPBELL'S *Lives of the Chancellors*, v. 574. If this account is correct, and it tallies too much with the known facts of the case to leave much doubt on the subject, Hastings was sacrificed to the jealousy of Pitt and Thurlow, which had long been known to exist, and at last broke out with such violence, on occasion of the debate in the House of Lords on the sinking-fund, on May 15, 1792, that it led to Mr Pitt's insisting that Thurlow should be removed from office, which was accordingly done.—See CAMPBELL'S *Lives of the Chancellors*, v. 604. It was certainly imprudent in Thurlow to encourage the King in his design of conferring a peerage on Hastings, pending an accusation, on whatever grounds, in the House of Commons, and irregular to do so without the concurrence of the prime minister; but it was base in Pitt to avenge himself on the chancellor for this imprudence, by voting, contrary to his previous determination, the impeachment of Hastings. So true it is that the greatest men are often subject to the meanest jealousies as well as the least. In reality, the merits of Hastings' case had nothing to do with the final determination regarding it: it turned into a mere personal contest between Mr Pitt and Lord Thurlow, as to which should have the government of the cabinet.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1765.

32.

His trial
before the
House of
Lords.

proceeding as in the impeachment of this great man before the House of Lords. The powerful declamation and impassioned oratory of Mr Fox; the burning thoughts and thrilling words of Mr Burke; the playful wit and fervent declamation of Mr Sheridan, gave lustre to the progress of the prosecution. "The place was worthy of such a trial. It was the great hall of William Rufus, which had resounded with acclamations at the inauguration of thirty kings, which had witnessed the just sentence of Bacon and the unjust condemnation of Strafford, and where Charles had confronted his accusers with the calm courage which, amidst many misdeeds, has redeemed his fame. The Peers, robed in gold and ermine, were marshalled by the heralds — a hundred and seventy of them walked in solemn procession to the august tribunal. Lord Heathfield, recently ennobled for his defence of Gibraltar, led the way; the Prince of Wales, conspicuous for his fine person and noble bearing, closed the procession. The gray old walls were hung with scarlet; the galleries exhibited a matchless array of talent, grace, and beauty; the ambassadors of kings and commonwealths gazed on a spectacle which no other country could present. There Siddons, in the prime of her majestic beauty, looked with emotion on a scene surpassing all the imitations of the stage. There the historian of the Roman empire thought of the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres. There sat side by side the greatest painter and the greatest scholar of the age. The spectacle had allured Reynolds from the easel which has perpetuated so many noble foreheads; it had induced Parr to suspend his labours in that dark and profound mine from which he had extracted so vast a treasure of erudition.* Yet amidst all this stately presence was the eye riveted by the dauntless accused, who, with a figure

* The reader will recognise in this splendid passage the gifted hand of Mr Macaulay, worthy, indeed, to paint such a scene. See *Edinburgh Review*, lxx. 241, 242; and MACAULAY'S *Essays*, art. *Hastings*, iii. 446, 447.

worn with care, but a brow of intellectual dignity and a lip of inflexible decision, calmly awaited his fate from the justice or envy of his country."

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1785.

During one hundred and thirty days that the trial lasted, diffused over seven years, the public interest was unabated: Westminster Hall was thronged with all the rank, wit, and beauty of the realm; and though it terminated in the acquittal of the accused by a majority of eight to one on all the charges, yet the national mind was seriously impressed by the numerous accusations enforced with so much eloquence. His private fortune was almost ruined in the contest; and nothing but the liberality of the East India Company, who nobly supported him with unshaken firmness, against such a torrent of obloquy, preserved the otherwise unbefriended statesman from total ruin.* The Sovereign of Hindostan, the man who might have placed himself on the throne of Aurengzebe, and severed the empire of the East from the British crown during the perils of the American war, was bowed to the earth by the stroke; he remained for twenty years in retirement in the country, and sank at last unennobled into the grave.

33.
And his
acquittal.
April 23,
1795.

But truth is great, and will prevail. Time rolled on, and brought its wonted changes on its wings. The passionate declamations of Mr Burke were forgotten; the thrilling words of Mr Fox had passed away; the moral courage of Mr Pitt had become doubted in the transaction; but the great achievements, the far-seeing wisdom, the patriotic disinterestedness of Mr Hastings, had slowly regained their ascendancy over general thought. Many of the deeds proved against him, it was seen, had been imposed on him by secret instructions, others originated in overbearing necessity. The poverty of the illustrious

34.
Ultimate
change of
public
opinion on
the subject.

* The East India Company lent Mr Hastings £50,000 for eighteen years without interest, to meet the expenses of his trial, and settled on him a pension of £4000 for twenty-eight years, from June 24, 1785, being till the expiration of their charter; and it was continued on its renewal in 1813.—*Debates of Lords on Mr Hastings' Trial*, 495: MILL, v. 230.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1783.

statesman pleaded eloquently in his favour; the magnitude of his services rose in irresistible force to recollection; and a few years before his death he was made a privy councillor, from a growing sense of the injustice he had experienced. George IV., with manly generosity, soon afterwards expressed a desire to make him a peer; an intention which was only prevented from being carried into effect by the dread of appearing to slight a decision, however unjust, of the House of Commons. But even that body in the end became sensible it had been misled, and had the magnanimity to make public amends.

Aug. 4, 1813.

When Mr Hastings appeared in 1813 at the bar of the Lower House, to give evidence on the renewal of the Company's charter, the whole members spontaneously rose up in token of respect to the victim of its former persecution; and when he was called from this checkered scene, his statue was, with general consent, placed by his unshaken friends, the East India Directors, among those of the illustrious men who had founded and enlarged the empire of the East.^{1*}

¹ Auber, i.
683, 687.
Mill, iv. 40.
256. Parl.
Hist. 1788,
1795.

Bright, indeed, is the memory of a statesman who has statues erected to his memory forty years after his power has terminated, and thirty after all the vehemence of a

* A few hours before Mr Hastings' death, he wrote to the East India Directors—"I have called you by the only appellation that language can afford me, 'Var Wooffadar,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it, unprofitably I own, but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests me that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I still draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that, in the efficient body of directors, I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not express my full feelings—I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger constituent body I can only express a hope that, if there be any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interests have so long been committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment, in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to his own."

In January 1820, a proposition was submitted to the East India Directors,

powerful faction, and all the fury of popular outcry had been raised to consign him to destruction. To how many men, once the idol of the people during the plenitude of their power, will similar monuments, after the lapse of such a period, be raised? Persecution of its most illustrious citizens, of the greatest benefactors of their country, has ever been the disgrace of free states. The sacrifice of Sir Robert Calder, who saved England from Napoleon's invasion; of Lord Melville, who prepared for it the triumph of Trafalgar; of the Duke of York, who laid the foundation of Wellington's victories; the impeachment of Clive, who founded, by heroic deeds, the British empire in the East; of Warren Hastings, who preserved it by moral determination—prove that the people of this country are sometimes governed by the same principles which caused Miltiades to die in the prison of the country he had saved, consigned Themistocles to Asiatic exile, banished Aristides because it was tiresome to hear him called the Just, and doomed Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, to an unhonoured sepulchre in a foreign land. Envy is the real cause of all these hideous acts of national injustice: the people would rather persecute the innocent than bear their greatness,* or feel apprehension from their

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1785.

35.
Reflections
on the cruel
injustice of
this prosecution.

by their chairman, Campbell Marjoribank, Esq. After enumerating the great services of Mr Hastings, he asked, "How were these great services rewarded? He was not allowed even to repose in dignified retirement; he was dragged forward to contend with public accusations, and rewarded with two-and-twenty articles of impeachment. He (Mr M.) would not enter on the proceedings which distressed and harassed the feelings of that great man; they were at an end, and the feelings which excited them and that great man himself were now no more; but this he thought himself allowed to say, that those proceedings were contrary to the practice and spirit of the laws of this happy nation."

It was unanimously resolved, "That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Hon. Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India, against the combined efforts of European, Mahomedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among those of the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."—See AUBER, i. 695, 696.

* "In Miltiade erat magna auctoritas apud omnes civitates, nobile nomen, laus rei civilis maxima. Hæc populus respiciens, maluit eum innoxium plecti, quam se diutius esse in timore."—CORN. NEPOS, *Miltiades*.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1783.

ambition. But the friends of freedom may console themselves with the reflection, that, if popular institutions sometimes expose their best citizens to the effects of these occasional fits of national injustice, they furnish the only sure security for the ultimate triumph of equitable principles. If despotic power discerns more correctly the real character of its servants, it is liable to no external correction from the growing influence of honourable feelings after the wearing out of transitory passions. And if the historian of England, under other direction, would not have had to record the impeachment of the statesman who had saved its Eastern dominions from destruction, there would not have been permitted to him the grateful duty of contributing, against the united efforts of Whigs and Tories, against all the acrimony of selfish ambition, and all the fury of public passion, to rescue the memory of a great Eastern statesman from unmerited obloquy.

These frequent and interesting discussions on Indian affairs, however characteristic of the grievous injustice which the efforts of party frequently inflict on individuals in all popular communities, were, however, attended with one important and salutary consequence, that they drew the attention both of government and the nation to the administration of our Indian dominions, and the absolute necessity of assuming a more direct control than could be maintained by a mere body of directors of a trading company, over the numerous servants, civil and military, of their vast and growing possessions. This opinion, which had been strongly impressed upon the public mind by the serious and protracted disasters in the campaigns with Hyder in 1780 and 1781, was already general in the country before the fall of Lord North's ministry; and when Mr Fox succeeded to the head of affairs in 1783,* all parties were already prepared for a great and impor-

36.
Mr Fox's
India Bill.
Its premature
fate.

* Mr Pitt, in November 1783, when the coalition ministry were still in power, called on Mr Fox "to bring forward a plan, not of temporary palliation or timorous expedient, but vigorous and effectual, suited to the magnitude, the importance, and the alarming exigence of the case."—*Parl. Hist.* xxiv. 129.

tant change in the government of our Eastern empire. But the scheme of that able and ambitious statesman far outstripped either the reason or necessity of the case. He proposed,—in his famous India Bill, which convulsed the nation from end to end, and in its ultimate results occasioned the downfall of his administration,—to vest the exclusive right of governing India in seven directors, *to be named in the act*, that is, appointed by the legislature under the direction of the ministry for the time. The vacancies in these commissioners were to be filled up by the House of Commons under the same direction. The ferment raised by this prodigious proposed change in the country was unprecedented in the eighteenth century. Mr Pitt from the first denounced it as tyrannical, unconstitutional, and subversive of the public liberties: the sagacious mind of George III. at once perceived that it would render the present ministers, to whom he was secretly hostile, irremovable from their places, and put Mr Fox at the head of a powerful empire, an *imperium in imperio*, which might soon overshadow the British diadem. By the combined exertions of the crown and the Tory party, this important innovation was defeated, after it had passed the Lower House, by a small majority of nineteen in the House of Peers, and this defeat was immediately followed by the dismissal of Mr Fox and his whole administration.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1783.

Nov. 1783.

Dec. 15.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxiv. 122,
195.

The ground taken by the King and the Tory party against this celebrated bill, was its unconstitutional tendency, by vesting the patronage of so large a portion of the empire in directors appointed, not by the executive, but by the House of Commons; and it was this consideration which gave them the decisive majority which they obtained upon the dissolution of parliament in the April following. Nevertheless it is now apparent that, though at that period unperceived or unnoticed, the greatest danger of the proposed change would have arisen, not from this cause, but from the direct control over our

37.
Objections
to which the
bill was
liable.

April 1784.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1784.

Indian empire thereby conferred on the British legislature. If the vacillating and improvident policy, on many occasions forced even upon the resolute and clear-sighted mind of Mr Pitt by the unreflecting habits, and, on material questions, popular control of the House of Commons—and still more the total want of foresight in all financial measures since the peace of Paris in 1814, on the part both of government and the legislature—be compared with the steady rule, invincible firmness, and wise anticipations of our Indian government during the same period, no doubt can remain that the interests of the East would inevitably have been sacrificed by the change; that the ministerial directors, acting under the guidance of the House of Commons, could never have carried into execution those prompt and vigorous resolutions indispensable for the preservation of dominions so critically situated as those in Hindostan, and so far removed from the resources of the ruling state. In fact, no government under the direct control of a popular assembly would have been permitted to engage in those vast undertakings, or incur the expense of those gigantic establishments, which were necessary to ward off future danger, or obtain present success, over the immense extent of our Indian dominions, originally founded and necessarily supported by military power.*

Although, however, Mr Fox's India bill was rejected, yet the numerous abuses of our Indian dominions, as well as the imminent hazard which they had run during the war with Hyder Ali, from the want of a firmly constituted

* This is not the place to discuss the details of Mr Fox's bill: but it does not appear to have been calculated to afford any practical remedy for most of the evils under which the administration of Indian affairs at that period laboured; and accordingly it is observed with great candour by Mr Mill, whose leaning to the popular side is well known,—“The bills of Mr Fox, many and celebrated as were the men who united their wisdom to compose them, manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They demonstrate that the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill in speaking, were not remarkable for their powers of thought. For the right exercise of the powers of government in India, not one new security was provided, and it would not be very easy to prove that any strength was added to the old.”—MILL'S *British India*, iv. 480.

central government, were too fresh in the public recollection to permit the existing state of matters to continue. Mr Pitt, accordingly, was no sooner installed in power, than he brought forward an India bill of his own, which, it was hoped, would prove exempt from the objections to which its predecessor had been liable, and, at the same time, remedy the serious evils to which the administration of affairs in India had hitherto been exposed. This bill passed both Houses, and formed the basis of the system under which, with some subsequent but inconsiderable amendments, the affairs of the East have been administered from that period down to the present time. By it the court of directors appointed by the East India Company remained as before, and to them the general administration of Indian affairs was still intrusted. The great change introduced, was the institution of the *board of control*, a body composed of six members of the privy council, chosen by the king—the chancellor of the exchequer and one of the secretaries of state being two—in whom the power of directing and controlling the proceedings of the Indian empire was vested. The duties of this board were very loosely defined, and have all ultimately centred in the president, an officer who has become a fourth secretary of state for the Indian empire. They were described as being “from time to time to check, superintend, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in anywise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the territories and possessions of the East India Company.” These powers were ample enough; but in practice they have led to little more than a control of the Company in the more important political or military concerns of the East, leaving the directors in possession of the practical direction of affairs in ordinary cases. All vacancies in official situations, with the exception of the offices of governor-general of India, governors of Madras and Bombay, and commanders-in-chief, which were to be filled up by the British govern-

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1784.

38.
Mr Pitt's
India bill,
which be-
comes law.

Aug. 13.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1784.

124 Geo.
III. c. 24.
26. Geo.
III. c. 16.
Auber, ii.
1, 16. Parl.
Deb. xxiv.
1085, 1215.

ment, were left at the disposal of the East India directors. A most important provision was made in the institution of a secret committee, who were to send to India in duplicate such despatches as they might receive from the board of control, and in the establishment of the supreme government of Calcutta, with a controlling power over the other presidencies—a change which at once introduced unity of action into all parts of the peninsula.¹

39.

Reflections
on this con-
stitution for
India.

It cannot be affirmed that this anomalous constitution will stand the test of theoretical examination, or is confirmed by history as regards other states. Still less could it be presumed that a distribution of supreme power between a governor-general and two subordinate governors in the East, and a board of control and body of directors in the British islands, gave any fair prospect either of unity of purpose or efficiency of action. Nevertheless, if experience, the great test of truth, be consulted, and the splendid progress of the Indian empire of Great Britain since it was directed in this manner be alone considered, there is reason to hold this system of government one of the most perfect that ever was devised by human wisdom for the advancement and confirmation of political greatness. The secret of this apparent anomaly is to be found in the fact, that this division of power has existed in theory only; that from the great distance of India from the home government, and the pressing interests which so frequently called for immediate decision, the supreme direction of affairs has practically come to be vested in the governors-general; and that in them have been found a succession of great men, second to none who ever appeared in the world for vigour and capacity, and who have vindicated the truth of the saying of Salust, that it is in the strenuous virtue of a few that the real cause of national greatness is in general to be found. It is a curious speculation, the justice of which time will ere long determine, whether the direct and immediate administration of affairs in India by the board of direc-

tors and control, which has lately taken place, instead of the governor-general, will not reveal the latent weakness of the system, which has so long been concealed by the great distance of the shores of Hindostan; and whether steam navigation, and the re-opening the communication with the East by the Red Sea, has not, by bringing the intercourse with Bombay to a fourth of its former time, and thus rendering the board of directors the real rulers of Hindostan, implanted the seeds of death in the Indian empire of Great Britain.

It soon appeared how much the vigour and efficiency of the Indian administration had been increased by the important changes made in its central government. By Mr Pitt's India bill, all ideas of foreign conquest in the East had been studiously repressed—it having been declared, that “to pursue schemes of conquest or extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation.” But this declaration, in appearance so just and practicable, was widely at variance with the conduct which extraneous events shortly after forced upon the British government. In truth, an extended view of human affairs, as well as the past experience of our Indian possessions, might even then have shown the impracticability of following out such a course of policy, and convinced our rulers that a foreign people settled as aliens and conquerors on the soil of Hindostan, could maintain themselves only by the sword. In order, however, to carry into execution the pacific views of ministers at home, a nobleman of high rank and character, Lord Cornwallis, was sent out by Mr Pitt, who united in his person the two offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief, so as to give the greatest possible unity to the action of government. No sooner, however, had he arrived there, than he discovered that Tippoo was intriguing with the other native powers for the subversion of our Indian dominion; and, as a rupture with France was apprehended at that junct-

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1787.

40.
Arrangement with the British government for the increase of the British force in India.

1787.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1790.

¹ Auber, ii.
45, 65.

41.
Fresh war
with Tippoo
Saib.

Jan. 1790.

ture, four strong regiments were despatched to India. As the Company complained of the expense which this additional force entailed upon their finances, a bill was brought into parliament by Mr Pitt, which fixed the number of king's troops who might be ordered to India by the board of control, at the expense of the Company, at eight thousand, besides twelve thousand European forces in the Company's service.¹

The wisdom of this great addition to the native European force in India, as well as the increased vigour and efficiency of the supreme government, speedily appeared in the next war that broke out. Tippoo, whose hostility to the English was well known to be inveterate, and who had long been watched with jealous eyes by the Madras presidency, at length commenced an attack upon the Rajah of Travancore—a prince in alliance with the British, and actually supported by a subsidiary force of their troops. At first, from the total want of preparation which had arisen from the pacific policy so strongly inculcated upon the Indian authorities by the government at home, he obtained very great success, and totally subdued the chief against whom he had commenced hostilities. Perceiving that the British character was now at stake in the peninsula, and being well aware that a power founded on opinion must instantly sink into insignificance, if the idea gets abroad that its allies may be insulted with impunity, Lord Cornwallis immediately took the most energetic measures to reassert the honour of the British name. Fifteen thousand men were collected in the Carnatic under General Meadows, while eight thousand more were to ascend the Ghauts from the side of Bombay, under General Abercromby. So obvious was the necessity of this war, and so flagrant the aggressive acts which Tippoo had committed, that, notwithstanding their general aversion to hostile measures, from the expense with which they were attended, and their recent declaration of pacific intentions—on this

occasion, both the English parliament and the court of directors passed resolutions cordially approving of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis in the transaction.* Treaties of alliance were at the same time entered into with the Peishwa and the Nizam, native powers, whose jealousy of the Mysore chief had been of long standing; and hostilities commenced, which were at first attended with checkered success—General Meadows having taken Caroor and other towns, and Tippoo having surprised Colonel Floyd, and burst into the Carnatic, where he committed the most dreadful ravages.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1790.
April 11,
1791.

June 1.
1. Auher, ii.
103, 111.
Parl. Hist.
xxix. 119,
159. Mill,
v. 257, 314.

The energies of government, however, were now thoroughly aroused. In December 1791, Lord Cornwallis embarked in person for Madras: the Bengal sepoys were with extreme difficulty reconciled to a sea voyage; and great reinforcements, with the commander-in-chief, were safely landed in the southern presidency. It was resolved to commence operations with the siege of Bangalore, one of the strongest fortresses in Mysore, and commanding the most eligible pass from the coast to the centre of Tippoo's dominions. In the end of January the grand army moved forward; the important pass of Coorg, leading up the Ghauts, was occupied within a month after; Bangalore was invested in the beginning of March, and carried by assault on the 21st of that month. Encouraged by this great success, Lord Cornwallis pushed on direct to Seringapatam, although the advanced period of the season, and scanty supplies of the army, rendered it a service of consider-

42.
Lord Corn-
wallis' first
campaign
against
Tippoo.

Jan. 29,
1791.

Feb. 27.

* It is remarkable that the most violent declaimer against this war in the House of Peers, as uncalled-for, inexpedient, and unjust, was Lord Rawdon, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, who himself, in 1817, with much less provocation, was drawn into the great contest with the Mahrattas, which he terminated so gloriously for the British arms. So dangerous is it to judge of distant transactions from party prejudice or preconceived European ideas.—See *Parl. Hist.* 1791, xxix. 119–159. On this occasion Lord Porchester, the nobleman who opened the debate against the war, said—"I have proved that it has been the uniform policy of the directors and of the legislature, to avoid wars of conquest in India, and to confine the Company to the limits of their present

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1791.

May 15.

May 26.

¹ Mill, v.
314, 325.
Auber, ii.
118, 121.
Wilks, iii.
115, 146.

able peril, which was increased rather than diminished by the junction, shortly after, of ten thousand of the Nizam's horse, who, without rendering any service to the army, consumed every particle of grass and forage within its reach. Still the English general continued to press forward, and at length reached the fortified position of the enemy, on strong ground, about six miles in front of Seringapatam. An attack was immediately resolved on; but Tippoo, who conducted his defence with great skill, did not await the formidable onset of the assaulting columns, and after inflicting a severe loss on the assailants by the fire of his artillery, withdrew all his forces within the works of the fortress. The English were now within sight of the capital of Mysore, and decisive success seemed almost within their reach. They were in no condition, however, to undertake the siege. The supplies of the army were exhausted; the promised co-operation of the Mahrattas had failed; of General Abercromby, who was to advance from the side of Bombay, no advices had been received; and the famished state of the bullock-train precluded the possibility of getting up the heavy artillery or siege equipage. Orders were therefore given to retreat, and the army retired with heavy hearts and considerable loss of stores and men. But the opportune arrival of the advanced guard of the Mahratta contingent, on the second day of the march, which at first caused great alarm, suspended the retrograde movement, and the army encamped for the rainy season in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam.¹

territories, and the management of their commercial interests."—*Ibid.* 133. In 1815, Lord Hastings, then governor-general of India, observed, in a very valuable minute on Indian finance—"It was by preponderance of power that those mines of wealth were acquired by the Company, and by preponderance of power alone could they be retained. The supposition that the British power could discard the means of strength, and yet enjoy the fruits of it, was one that would speedily and certainly be dissipated; in the state of India, were we to be feeble, our rule would be contemptible, and a very short one."—LORD HASTINGS' *Minute on Revenue*, 15th Sept. 1815; AUBER, ii. 352.

The attack on the capital of Mysore, however, was only suspended by this untoward event. In the autumn following, Lord Cornwallis was again in motion, having in the preceding months, after the termination of the rains, made himself master of several important forts, which commanded or threatened his communications with the Carnatic. A most important blow was struck by a detachment of the British against a general of Tippoo's, who had taken post in the woods near Simoga, in order to disturb the siege of that place, which was commencing. He was defeated with the loss of ten thousand men; a disaster which led to the surrender of that fortress shortly after. Meanwhile Abercromby, with a powerful force, amply provided with all the muniments of war, broke up from Bombay, surmounted with incredible labour the ascent of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, and was in readiness to take his part in the combined enterprise. In the end of January, Lord Cornwallis's army moved forward towards Seringapatam, no longer depending on the doubtful aid of the Mahratta chiefs, but presenting a vast array of British and sepoy troops, such as had never before been exhibited on the plains of India. Eleven thousand native English, thirty thousand regular sepoys, with eighty-four pieces of cannon, exhibited an army worthy of contending for the empire of the East. Nor was this force, considerable as it was, disproportioned to the magnitude and hazard of the enterprise in which the empire was engaged; for not only were the ramparts of Seringapatam of surpassing strength, but Tippoo lay in front of them at the head of fifty thousand regular infantry and five thousand horse, in a strong position, defended by numerous fortifications, and one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery.¹

No sooner had Lord Cornwallis reconnoitred the enemy's position than he resolved to commence an attack, and the assault was fixed for that very night. The army was formed in three divisions; his lordship in

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1791.

43.

Vast preparations
for the siege
of Seringa-
patam.
Oct. 31.

Nov. 20.

Dec. 22.

Jan. 5, 1792.

Jan. 30.

¹ Mill, v.
356, 361.
Martin, 48,
49. Auber,
ii. 122, 123.
Wilks, iii.
162, 163.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1792.

44.

Prepara-
tions for a
decisive bat-
tle under
the walls of
Seringa-
patam.
Feb. 6.

person commanded the centre, General Meadows the right, Colonel Maxwell the left. Seringapatam is situated on an island, formed by two branches of the river Cavery, which enclose between them a space four miles in length and a mile and a half in breadth. On the eastern portion of the island, Tippoo had constructed without the walls, but within reach of them, in case of disaster, a strongly fortified camp, supported by numerous fieldworks and batteries, and without this stronghold beyond the river, the bulk of the Sultaun's army was encamped on elevated ground, covered on one side by a large tank, on the other by a small river which falls into the Cavery, and supported on the side next the enemy by six large redoubts. Three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the interior fortifications and the walls of the fortress, besides one hundred and fifty on the exterior line; and a thick hedge, formed of bamboos and prickly shrubs, connecting the works, formed a most serious obstacle to the attacking columns, from presenting no resistance to cannon-shot, yet being altogether impervious to foot-soldiers. To attack such a force so posted, in the dark and amid the chances and confusion of a nocturnal assault, must be considered one of the most daring deeds, even in the annals of Indian heroism.¹

¹ Mill, v.
360, 361.
Wilks, ii.
172, 180.

45.

Commence-
ment of the
action.

At eight o'clock the order was given to march. The evening was calm and serene, the moon shone bright, and the troops advanced swiftly and steadily, but in perfect silence; while the reserve, with the whole artillery and ammunition train, struck their tents, and stood to their guns in breathless anxiety. The surprise was complete: so admirably was silence preserved, that the centre came upon the enemy wholly unawares, forced their way through the stiff hedge, and carrying everything before them, pushed through the camp, passed the ford of the Cavery, crossed over to the opposite side, and, taking in the rear the batteries, which had opened their fire upon

the other division, drove the gunners from their pieces. The right wing, under General Meadows, also cut through the bound hedge about half-past eleven, while the left with ease carried the Carighaut hill: the roar of artillery was heard on all sides, while the flash of musketry now illuminated the whole extent of the horizon. Panic-struck at the celerity and vigour of the attack, which had penetrated their works in so many different quarters at once, the enemy gave way on all sides, when fortune was nearly restored by one of those accidents to which all nocturnal attacks are subject, and the centre, with its noble commander, almost cut off. The right wing, under Meadows, had been grievously impeded in its march after passing the bound hedge, by several rice enclosures and water courses, which could not be crossed without great difficulty; and, in consequence, for two hours he was unable to reach the advanced point to which Cornwallis had arrived in the island in the early part of the night. Meanwhile, Tippoo's troops began to recover from their consternation, and as day dawned, and they perceived that the body which had penetrated into the centre of their intrenchments did not exceed five thousand men, they closed in on all sides, and commenced with overwhelming numbers an attack upon this band of heroes.¹

The British troops, however, animated by the presence of their commander-in-chief, made a gallant defence. The repeated and furious onsets of the enemy were repulsed by a rolling fire, enforced when necessary by the bayonet; and at length, when daylight dawned and the guns of the fortress began to be turned upon them, they retired towards Carighaut hill in perfect order, and took post beyond their destructive range. Meanwhile, the troops of Meadows having by a mistake of their guides been brought close to the Mosque redoubt, which was meant to have been passed without molestation, transported by the ardour of the moment, commenced an assault, which at first was repulsed with heavy loss. The assailants, how-

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1792.

¹ Lord Cornwallis' Despatches, March 4, 1792. Ann. Reg. 469. Mill, v. 372.

46.
Danger of Cornwallis, and his ultimate success.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1792.

ever, returned to the charge, and that formidable work was at length carried amidst cheers which were heard over the whole camp. Animated by the joyful sound, Cornwallis's men stood their ground with invincible firmness; while Meadows was no sooner disengaged from the perilous contest into which he had been unwillingly drawn, than he pressed on with renewed alacrity to the relief of the main body, which he was well aware, from the weight of the firing in that direction, must be engaged in a very serious contest. As morning broke, the two divisions met and mutually saluted each other as victors.* The triumph was complete. Out of six of the enemy's redoubts, four were in the hands of the victors; Tippoo in an early part of the night had taken refuge in his capital; the intrenched camp, with above a hundred pieces of cannon, was abandoned; four thousand soldiers had fallen, and nearly twenty thousand more disbanded and left their colours—while the loss of the victors did not amount to six hundred men.¹

¹ Lord Cornwallis' Despatches, March 4, Ann. Reg. Mill, v. 372, 374. Anber, ii. 120, 124.

47.
Concluding operations of the war.

Feb. 16.

On the following morning Tippoo made a desperate attempt to regain the Sultaun redoubt, which was so near the capital as to be commanded in rear by its guns; and a body of two thousand chosen horse came on with appalling cries to storm the gorge, before the slender garrison, consisting only of a hundred and fifty men, could barricade it. But they were repulsed by the steady gallantry and ceaseless fire of this heroic band. Upon this the enemy retreated entirely within the town; and, soon after, the army obtained an important accession of strength by the arrival of Abercromby with two thousand Europeans and four thousand sepoy troops. Operations

* When the enemy had surrounded Lord Cornwallis, in the middle of the night, and a heavy fire had set in on all sides, he said to those around him,—“If General Meadows is above ground, this will bring him.” Nor was he mistaken. True as the magnet to the pole, his gallant lieutenant pressed to the scene of danger, and, attracted by the sound, reached in time the theatre of that desperate conflict.—The unanimity and heartfelt mutual admiration of these two great men is, as Mill has justly observed, one of the finest features of this campaign; and is particularly worthy of admiration on the part of Meadows, con-

were now commenced in form against the fortress: the first parallel was begun and completed on the night of the 18th; the splendid gardens and shady walks of the country palace, in which the Sultaun so much delighted, were, perhaps with needless violence, destroyed, and the palace itself converted into a great hospital. At length, when the breaching batteries were in readiness and armed with fifty pieces of heavy cannon, the Sultaun concluded a treaty on such terms as Lord Cornwallis chose to prescribe, and hostilities terminated. Such, however, was the ardour of the troops, especially the sepoy, who were engaged in the trenches, that it was with the greatest difficulty they could be prevailed on to cease firing, and when the European troops enforced the command, they retired sullen and dejected to their tents; while Tippoo's men by a vain bravado continued discharging cannon for some time after the British lines were silent—as if to demonstrate that they had not been the first to give up the contest.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1792.

Feb. 18.

Feb. 24.

¹ Auber, ii.
123, 124.
Mill, v. 377,
378. Wilks,
iii. 225, 235.

By the treaty of peace which followed, Tippoo was compelled to submit to the cession of half his dominions to the British, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas; to pay £3,500,000 as the expenses of the war; to deliver up all the prisoners made in Hyder's time, some of whom still lingered in a miserable captivity; and to surrender his two sons as hostages. The young princes were immediately after courteously received, and splendidly treated, by the British government. Lord Cornwallis, whose health had for some time been declining, and who had postponed his departure for England only on account of the contest in the Mysore,² soon after returned to his

48.
Treaty with
Tippoo.
March 19.

² Martin,
viii. 50.
Auber, ii.
125.

sidering that Cornwallis, by assuming the direction in person, deprived him of the honour of a separate command in so momentous a service. What a striking circumstance, that he so soon after should have the means of rescuing his noble and respected commander-in-chief from destruction! But India is the theatre of romantic adventure, as well as of heroic and disinterested exploits; and a most inadequate conception will be formed of British character or glory, till the memorable history of its empire in the East is given by a historian worthy of so magnificent a theme.—See MILL, v. 367, note.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1794.

native country, having, during his short government, added twenty-four thousand square miles to its Eastern dominions.

49.
Experi-
enced neces-
sity of fur-
ther con-
quests in
India.

Human affairs are everywhere governed at bottom by the same principles: the varieties of colour, language, and civilisation, are but the different hues which conceal the operation of passions and interests which are for ever identical among mankind. Differing widely in its origin and its effects upon social happiness, the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a very close analogy to the Roman republic in ancient times, and the contemporaneous French domination in Europe; and in none more than in the experienced necessity of advancing, in order to avoid destruction, which was felt equally strongly by the Roman consuls, the Emperor Napoleon, and the English governors-general of India. The reason in all the three cases was the same—viz. that a power had got a footing in the midst of other states, so formidable in its character, and so much at variance in its principles with the policy of the powers by which it was surrounded, that of necessity it was engaged in constant hostilities, and had no security for existence but in the continual extension of its dominions, or terrors of its name. The East India Company had fondly flattered themselves that Tippoo, being thus humbled, would lay aside his hereditary hostility to the English power—just as the Roman senate believed, after the first Punic war, that the jealousy of the Carthaginians was allayed; or as Napoleon imagined that, after the spoliation of Tilsit, he might rely upon the forced submission or cured inveteracy of Prussia;—and the result in all the instances was the same.

50.
Pacific ad-
ministration
and princi-
ples of Sir
John Shore.

Sir John Shore, a most respectable civil servant of the Company, who was appointed governor-general after the retirement of Lord Cornwallis, was strongly imbued with those maxims of the necessity of pursuing a pacific policy in India, and avoiding all causes of collision with the

native powers, which were so general both with the government, the directors, and the people at home, and which had been so strongly enforced upon the local authorities by the board of control. Ample opportunities soon occurred for putting the expedience of their apparently reasonable and just principles to the test. Shortly after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, differences broke out between the Mahrattas and the Nizam; and the English government, as the old ally of the latter prince, were strongly urged by his partisans to support him, as they had done the Rajah of Travancore, in the contest. This, however, Sir John Shore, acting on the pacific system, refused, and even declined to permit the Nizam to employ in his warfare with the Mahrattas the battalions which were placed as a protecting force in his territories.¹

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1794.

The consequences of this temporising conduct might easily have been foreseen. The Nizam, after a short contest, was overthrown by the superior force of the Mahrattas, (who could bring twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and two hundred guns, into the field,) and compelled to make peace on very disadvantageous terms. Such was the dissatisfaction produced very naturally at the court of that chieftain, by this desertion of their ally by the English government, at the most perilous crisis, that he soon after signified a wish to be relieved of the presence of the British subsidiary force, which was complied with; and the Nizam immediately threw himself without reserve into the arms of the French resident, M. Raymond. By his advice he augmented the organised force in his dominions, under the direction of European officers under his orders, to twenty-three battalions and twelve pieces of artillery. These troops carried the colours of the French republic, and the cap of liberty was engraven on their buttons. Thus, by the timid policy of the British government at that crisis, not only was the power and influence of the Mahrattas materially increased, but their old and faithful ally, the Nizam,² was converted from a

¹ Malcolm,
136, 154.
Auber, ii.
137, 142.

51.
Its disastrous effects.

March 1795.

² Malcolm's
India, 136,
177. Auber,
ii. 137, 145.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1798.

52.
Intriguing
of Tippoo to
form a con-
federacy
against the
English.

faithful friend into an embittered foe, and the moral sway resulting from the glorious termination of the war with Mysore seriously impaired.

Tippoo was not slow in using to the best advantage this unexpected turn of events in his favour. Already had exaggerated reports of the growing power and conquests of the great republic reached the courts of Hindostan; and numerous French agents had found their way to all the native powers, who represented in glowing colours the favourable opportunity which now presented itself for expelling the English from the peninsula, and re-establishing, on a durable basis, the independence of all the Indian states. The Mysorean chief, whose cunning and perfidy were equal to his ability, strove, in the first instance, by professions of eternal gratitude and attachment, to disarm the suspicions of the British government; and he succeeded so far, that, in two years after the treaty of Seringapatam, his two sons were restored to his embraces. No sooner had he got free from the restraint imposed on him by their captivity, than he sent a secret circular to the different native powers of India, proposing to them all to unite in a common league for the expulsion of the English from Hindostan; received with unbounded confidence the agents who had been despatched to the court of Seringapatam by the French Directory; and even sent emissaries to the distant court of Cabul, beyond the Himalaya snows, to confirm Zemaun Shah, the restless and ambitious chief of that formidable people, the Affghauns, in his declared design of invading the northern parts of India, and reinstating in its original splendour the throne of the Moguls. Meanwhile his own activity was indefatigable. Soon his preparations were complete; his army was on the best footing, and constantly ready to take the field; and ere long, while the Mahrattas and the Nizam had, by mutual dissensions, broken up the triple league of which he had formerly experienced the weight,¹ and the latter had fallen entirely under the guid-

¹ Wellesley's Despatches, i. 25, 82, 83. Malcolm, 185, 186.

ance of the large French force in his capital, the military strength and political consideration of Mysore were more formidable than ever.

CHAP.
XLVIII.
1798.

Matters were at length brought to a crisis, by the Sul-
taun's taking the extraordinary step, in spring 1798, of
sending ambassadors to the Isle of France to negotiate
with the French authorities for the expulsion of the
English from India, and effect the levy of a subsidiary
European force to assist him in his designs. He after-
wards publicly received the troops raised in pursuance of
this plan at Mangalore, and conducted them with great
pomp to his capital. It was impossible to doubt, after
this decisive step, that he was only awaiting the favour-
able moment for commencing his operations; the more
especially when, at the very same period, a French arma-
ment, of unprecedented magnitude, sailed from Toulon
for the Nile, and both the Directory and Napoleon pub-
licly spoke of their communications with the redoubted
Mysorean chief as their principal inducement for giving it
that direction, and "Citizen Tippoo" was openly announ-
ced as the powerful ally who was to co-operate in the
ultimate objects of the expedition.* It was evident,
therefore, that a crisis of the most dangerous kind was

53.
Tippoo's
overt acts
of hostility.

Feb. 1793.

* The following were the terms of this remarkable proclamation by General
Hypolite Malartie, governor of the Isle of France:—"Tippoo Sul-
taun has des-
patched two ambassadors to us with particular letters to the Colonial Assembly,
to all the generals employed under this government, and to the Executive Direc-
tory. 1. He desires an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, and
proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the
troops which may be sent him. 2. He declares that he has made every prepa-
ration to receive the succours which may be sent to him. 3. In a word, he only
waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, *to declare war
against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.* 4. This
power desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour; we therefore
invite all such, who are willing to serve under his flag, to enrol themselves."—
WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*. Jan. 30.

On the 20th July 1798, Tippoo transmitted to the Directory at Paris a note of
proposals for an alliance offensive and defensive, "in order to obtain such an
accession of force as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack and annihilate
for ever our common enemies in Asia; and may the heavens and the earth meet
ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest diminution." The
proposals were,—1. That the French should furnish a subsidiary force of ten
or fifteen thousand troops of every description, with an adequate naval force.

CHAP.
XLVIII.

1798.

1 Wellesley's Despatches, i. xi. Introduction. Auber, ii. 167. Gurw. i. 7.

approaching, and that, too, at the very time when the diminution in the consideration of the English in India, and the weakening of their alliances among the native powers, had rendered them least capable of bearing the shock. But the hand of fate was upon the curtain. At this perilous moment the sons of Britain were not wanting to herself. Sprung from one family, two illustrious men were now entering upon the scene, who were destined to carry its glory to the highest point of exaltation, and leave an empire, both in the East and West, unrivalled in the extent of its dominion, and unequalled in the impression it was destined to produce upon the fortunes of mankind.¹

2. That the Suldaun should furnish military stores, horses, bullocks, provisions, and all other necessities: that the expedition should be directed to Porto Novo, or some other point on the coast of Coromandel, where it will be joined by an army under the command of the king in person. 3. All conquests which shall be made from the common enemy, excepting the dominions of the Suldaun which have been wrested from him by the English, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties.—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, i. 711, 712, *Appendix*.

Napoleon's letter to Tippoo, upon landing in Egypt, already alluded to,* was in the following terms:—"Cairo, 25th Jan. 1799. You have already been made acquainted with my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England. I hasten to convey to you my desire, that you should give me, by the way of Muscat, or Mokha, intelligence of the political circumstances in which you find yourself placed. I desire even that you will send to Suez, or Grand Cairo, some able man in whom you have confidence, with whom I may confer. BUONAPARTE."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon*, vii. 192.

* Ante, Chap. xxvi. § 75.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER XLVII.

NOTE A, p. 594.

As an example of the rapid diminution of crime in British India, within the last twenty years, the convictions for serious crimes in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, at Calcutta, may be quoted.

Years.	Death.	Transportation.	Years.	Death.	Transportation.
1816,	115	282	1822,	50	165
1817,	114	268	1823,	77	119
1818,	54	261	1824,	51	145
1819,	94	345	1825,	66	128
1820,	55	324	1826,	67	171
1821,	58	278	1827,	55	153

Circuit Court of Bengal.

Years.	Burglary.	Cattle Stealing.	Embezzlement.	Larceny.
1816 to 1818,	2853	203	150	1516
1825 to 1827,	1036	31	49	223

Lower and Western provinces of Bengal.

Years.	Sentenced.	Years.	Gang Robberies.	Murders.
1826,	13,869	1807,	1481	406
1827,	8,075	1824,	234	30

—MARTIN, ix. 322, 329.

NOTE B, p. 595.

The following table exhibits the increase of committals in the British Islands since the commencement of the present century:—

Years.	England.	Ireland.	Scotland.
1805,	4,605	2,644	89
1807,	4,446	2,890	114
1820,	9,318	12,476	1486
1825,	9,964	15,515	1876
1830,	18,107	16,192	2063
1832,	20,829	16,056	2451
1834,	22,451	21,381	2711

Years.	England.	Ireland.	Scotland.
1836,	20,984	23,982	2852
1837,	23,612	24,458	2922

—See MOREAU'S *Statist. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 289, 297; *Parl. Paper, Commons*, 1812, and *Parl. Returns of Crimes in 1834-6*, PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1837, 144, 145, and vii. 122, 140.

Contrast the decrease of crime in different provinces of India during the same period, with the deplorable increase of offences of the same description in the British Islands.

Cases of Shooting, Stabbing, and Poisoning, in England and Wales.

1826,	47	1828,	72	1830,	86	1832,	132
1827,	82	1829,	81	1831,	104	1833,	138

Western Provinces of India.

Affrays with loss of Life.		Homicides.		Violent Depredations.	
1821-23,	232	1818-20,	377	1818-20,	1009
1827-28,	118	1827-28,	185	1827-28,	512
Violent Affrays in Kishennagur.		Gang Robberies in Do.		Bengal Circuit Court, Sentenced.	
1807,	452	1808,	329	1822-24,	2170
1824,	33	1824,	10	1825-27,	1524

Table of Crimes, Persons Apprehended, Convicted, Property Stolen and Recovered, in three years, ending 1832, in the Supreme Court at Calcutta.

Years.	Offences.	Persons Committed.	Convicted.	Property Stolen.	Recovered.
1830,	2330	3556	625	136,383	4,854
1831,	1304	1256	675	123,714	33,828
1832,	1329	2023	718	62,981	6,793

—ROBERTSON'S *Civil Government of India*; and MARTIN, ix. 326, 335.

State of Sentences for Crime in Lower and Western Provinces of Bengal, in two periods of two years each.

Lower Provinces.	Murder and Robbery.	Do. with torture or wounding.	With Violence.	Murder.	Homicide.	Violent Assault.
1824 and 1826,	165	283	330	358	303	86
1827 and 1828,	96	194	221	196	243	47
Western Provinces.						
1824 and 1826,	460	901	83	311	311	180
1827 and 1828,	271	512	34	252	185	118

—MARTIN'S *India*, ix. 326.

Contrast this with the increase of serious crime, tried by jury, in Glasgow, during the last fifteen years, and in Ireland in the same period.

GLASGOW, 1822-37.

IRELAND, 1822-37.

Years.	Tried by Jury.	Ratio of serious Crime to whole Population in each year in Glasgow.	Committed.
1822,	98	1 to 1540	15,251
1823,	114	... 1366	14,632
1824,	118	... 1361	15,253
1825,	160	... 1037	15,515
1826,	188	... 909	16,318
1827,	170	... 1041	18,031
1828,	212	... 873	14,683
1829,	239	... 790	15,271
1830,	271	... 719	15,794
1831,	238	... 848	16,192

Years.	Tried by Jury.	GLASGOW.		IRELAND.	
		Ratio of serious crime to population.		Committed.	
1832,	272	768		16,086	
1833,	341	633		17,819	
1834,	267	838		21,381	
1835,	348	633		22,367	
1836,	329	741		23,891	
1837,	392	645		24,458	
1838,	454	556		25,683	

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 145. *Combination Committee Evidence*, 1838, 267.

NOTE C, p. 597.

In Holkar's country alone, the number of villages rebuilt and repeopled was,—

Years.	Holkar's country.	Dhar.	Dewar.	Bohpel.
1818,	260	28	35	362
1819,	343	68	106	249
1820,	508	52	72	267

—MALCOLM'S *Central India, Appendix*.

NOTE D, p. 597.

The following is a statement of the wages of labour under the Peishwa's government in 1814, and the British in 1828 :—

	1814. PEISHWA'S.	1828. BRITISH.
Carpenter,	12—40 Rupees monthly	15—45
Sawyer,	8	15—22
Smith,	12—20	15—30
Tileman,	12	15—18
Bricklayer,	15—20	25—35
Tailor,	6	9—11
Camel-man,	5	7— 9
Palanquin-man,	10	15—16

No change in the value of money during this period.—COLONEL SYKES' *Bombay Statistics, Lords' Committee*, 1830; and MARTIN, ix. 352.

NOTE E, p. 598.

The following table shows the rapid increase in the export trade from Britain to India within the last twenty-five years, and illustrates both the advancing opulence and comfort of the inhabitants of Hindostan, and the incalculable importance of this branch of commerce, if established on principles equitable both toward the East and West, to the inhabitants of the British Islands.

Years.	Exports—Official Value.	Years.	Exports—Official Value.
1814,	£1,874,690	1826,	£3,471,552
1815,	2,565,761	1827,	4,636,190
1816,	2,589,453	1828,	4,467,673
1817,	3,388,715	1829,	4,100,002
1818,	3,572,164	1830,	4,087,311
1819,	2,347,083	1831,	4,105,444
1820,	3,037,911	1832,	4,235,483
1821,	3,544,395	1833,	4,714,619
1822,	3,444,443	1834,	4,644,318
1823,	3,416,575	1835,	5,456,116
1824,	3,476,213	1836,	6,750,842
1825,	3,173,213	1837,	5,876,241

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 193, 195; and *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 102.

NOTE F, p. 606.

The following was the revenue of India in the year 1831-2:—

Land Revenue,	£11,671,188
Professions and Ferries,	213,072
Salt and Licenses,	2,314,962
Customs,	1,380,099
Opium,	1,442,570
Post-Office,	103,501
Tobacco,	63,048
Mint Receipts,	60,518
Stamps,	328,300
Judicial Fees and Fines,	70,469
Lager and Akbaraw,	704,759
Marine and Pilotage,	45,974
Calcutta Excise,	19,106
Total,	£18,477,586

—*Parl. Papers*, May 1834; and MARTIN, ix. 113.

END OF VOL. VII.



